Case Digest: Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017
RA 7659 | Criminal Law
Facts:
(1) On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons, including Janet Lim Napoles, former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes. In its report the NBI recommended to prosecute Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and several other named individuals for the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, for essentially misappropriating former Senator Enrile’s Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) through nongovernmental - organizations (NGOs) that were selected without the required bidding procedure.
In an Information dated June 5, 2014, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder.
(2) On July 7, 2014, Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistleblowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.
(3) In view of Napoles’ application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. After the conclusion of the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested that she is not presenting any evidence for her bail application. The Sandiganbayan denied the petition to bail.
Issue:
WoN Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying Napoles bail application.
Defense:
Napoles insists that the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of proving that the
evidence of her guilt is strong.
Held:
DISMISSED.
Court finds no reason to nullify the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions. The Petition for Bail of Napoles was correctly denied.
Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong.
This was the burden that the prosecution assumed in the subsequent hearings that followed the filing of Napoles’ Petition for Bail before the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of the prosecution and the defense.
At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether there is a strong presumption of Napoles’ guilt. It is merely a preliminary determination, and the Sandiganbayan may deny admission to bail even when there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles. Thus, the prosecution can discharge its burden by proving that the evidence against Napoles shows evident proof of guilt or a great presumption of guilt.
As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan may deny the application for bail on evidence less than that required for the conviction of Napoles.
The prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and documentary evidence, endeavoring to establish evident proof of Napoles’ guilt. Napoles, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence on her behalf and relied instead on the supposed weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.
Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy among the accused, the Sandiganbayan may infer it “from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole.”
It was therefore unnecessary for the Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former Senator Enrile and Reyes. The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the transaction that furthers the common design and purpose.
As long as the prosecution was able to prove that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if no actual meeting among them was proven.
The individuals involved in this case performed different criminal acts, which contributed, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the doctrine on implied conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to prove the existence of a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless of any proof that an actual agreement took place.
Arguably, there is no documentary evidence directly linking Napoles to the NGOs used as conduits for the PDAF-funded projects of former Senator Enrile. However, her ties to the officers of the NGOs involved in this case reveal otherwise. Napoles' participation in the conspiracy was established through testimonial evidence, not only from one of her former employees, but from four (4) witnesses-all of whom corroborate each other on material points. More importantly, they testified on the minute details of the scheme that only those privy to the conspiracy would be able to provide.
The Sandiganbayan may rely on the testimonies of the whistleblowers, especially since these were corroborated by other available evidence.
Sandiganbayan did not rely solely on the testimonies of the whistleblowers. Seeing as there were other available evidence lending credence to their testimonies, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it considered the testimonies of the whistleblowers in denying Napoles' bail application, despite their participation in the conspiracy itself. The mere fact that the whistleblowers were conspirators themselves does not automatically render their testimonies incredible and unreliable.
The core issue, therefore, of whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of Napoles, was resolved by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with the relevant laws, rules, and jurisprudence.
Notes:
In Cortes v. Catral, this Court laid down the following duties of the trial court in cases of an application for bail:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
Evident proof in People v. Cabral:
“By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. “Proof evident” or “Evident proof’ in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. “Presumption great” exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.”
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