Case Digest: Lorenzana vs Austria, Am No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014

                        New Code of Judicial Conduct, Propriety |     Legal Ethics

Facts:

Antonio M. Lorenzana filed administrative complaints against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria.

Complaints arose from a case regarding the rehabilitation of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) Complainant alleged gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority, misconduct, incompetence, bias, and partiality by the respondent.

Allegations included appointment of a conflicted rehabilitation receiver, conducting informal meetings outside official jurisdiction, dictating the terms of the rehabilitation plan, secret meetings with a creditor, and personal involvement in the case.

Supplemental complaint raised concerns about the respondent's photos and personal details on a social networking website called "Friendster".  She posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The respondent denied the allegations and argued that her actions were within the scope of her duties.

The complaints were referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation and recommendation. The CA found the complaints partly meritorious, ruling on issues of judicial nature and disciplinary conduct. The CA recommended a fine for professional incompetence and admonishment for impropriety. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended a fine and admonition for conduct unbecoming of a judge and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA found no gross ignorance of the law or bias and partiality but upheld the charges of impropriety.

Issue:

WoN the respondent judge is administratively liable. 

Held:

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;Irregularity in the Performance of Duty;  Grave Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant.

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

Aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence and Gross Ignorance of the Law

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of his/her official functions. When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period

 Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. As a judge, she should ensure that her conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. She must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety.

On the Ground of Impropriety

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.