Case Digest: People vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 139179, April 3, 2002

                          Rule 115: Rights of the Accused  | Criminal Procedure

                        Presumption of Innocence 

Facts:

Jonathan Fabros appealed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, which found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

The case involves the killing of Hernan Sagario on February 28, 1996, in Zamboanga City.

The prosecution's version of the events states that Fabros, along with his cousins Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. Tolentino revealed his plan to kill Sagario and instructed Merwin to get a bolo. They were told to go home and wait for Sagario.

When Sagario arrived at the house, Tolentino struck him on the neck with a piece of wood, rendering him unconscious. Fabros and Merwin helped Tolentino carry Sagario to a nearby creek where Tolentino stabbed him multiple times, causing his death. They then left the scene.

The defense's version, as presented by Fabros, denies his involvement in the killing and instead points to Tolentino as the assailant. Fabros claimed that Tolentino had planned to kill Sagario and forced Fabros to assist him. He stated that he saw Tolentino hit Sagario with a piece of wood, and when Sagario regained consciousness, Fabros ran away and witnessed Tolentino stabbing Sagario.

Tolentino later executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the killing and exonerating Fabros.

(Summary: Jonathan Fabros appealed his conviction for murder in the killing of Hernan Sagario. 

The prosecution presented evidence that Fabros, along with Tolentino and other accomplices, conspired to kill Sagario.

They struck him with a piece of wood, carried him to a creek, and Tolentino stabbed him to death. Fabros denied his involvement and claimed that Tolentino forced him to assist.

 However, Tolentino later confessed to being the sole perpetrator of the crime and exonerated Fabros.)

Issue:

WON the prosecution evidence is sufficient.

Held:  NO. Jonathan Fabros is ACQUITTED.

No Conspiracy

The assault was carried out without the participation of appellant, who did not personally hit or stab the victim, but only subsequently helped carry the latter from the house to the nearby creek. Nothing in the testimony conveyed a coordinated action, concerted purpose or community of design to commit the criminal act. It must be emphasized that Tolentino's plan to kill the victim was concocted in the absence of appellant.

In fact, appellant, showing clearly his lack of support for the criminal intent of Tolentino, even tried to prevent the latter from hacking the victim, according to the eyewitness. Because of the lack of a united purpose, appellant cannot be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation. Absent a conspiracy, his responsibility, as well as that of his co-accused, is individual -- not collective -- and each is to be punished only for his own separate acts.

Not an Accomplice

In the case before us, appellant did not concur in or lend support to the nefarious intent of Tolentino. The mere fact that the former had prior knowledge of the latter's criminal design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principal's criminal intent.

That appellant helped Tolentino carry the victim from the house to the creek did not necessarily demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose or action. Quite the contrary, the former's attempt to dissuade the latter from killing Sagario was attested to by the prosecution witness. With the nominal role appellant played in the drama that had been thrust upon him, we cannot declare that he was an accomplice in the crime charged.

Not an Accessory Either

In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril.

The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.