People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 158157 September 30, 2005

                               Rule 119: Trial, Demurrer to Evidence | Criminal Procedure

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental granted the separate demurrer to evidence of accused Louel Uy and Teofilo Panangin, resulting in their "acquittal" for murder due to insufficient evidence.

The victim, Rabel Campos, was found dead with multiple stab wounds on March 23, 2001, along the National Highway of Maputi, Naawan, Misamis Oriental.

Teofilo Panangin, a suspect in the crime, was arrested on January 22, 2002.

Panangin executed a Sworn Statement on January 23, 2002, implicating Louel Uy in the crime and providing details of the incident.

The investigating judge issued a warrant of arrest against Panangin and recommended the indictment of Uy and Panangin for murder.

An Information charging Uy and Panangin with murder was filed on April 5, 2002.

Both accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned.

The prosecution presented evidence, including Panangin's sworn statement and testimonies of witnesses.

The defense filed separate demurrers to evidence, asserting insufficiency of evidence and procedural irregularities.

The trial court granted the demurrers, acquitting Uy and Panangin due to insufficient evidence.

The court held that the testimonial evidence was hearsay and speculative, and Panangin's sworn statement was deemed inadmissible due to its alleged illegality.

The court ordered Uy and Panangin to jointly and severally pay ₱35,000 to the heirs of the victim for vigil and burial expenses.

The People and the victim's mother filed a petition for certiorari challenging the trial court's decision.

Issue:

WoN there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it granted the demurrer to evidence.  (YES)

Held:

The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:

In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.

The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.

As succinctly observed in Green v. United States “(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.”

The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. 

As held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is filed after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

In People v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to elucidate on the special civil action of certiorari, the remedy availed of by petitioners:

To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

This Court finds that the trial court committed not only gross reversible error of judgment but also was actuated with grave abuse of discretion, exceeding the parameters of its jurisdiction, in holding that Panangin’s retracting of his confession shows that the execution thereof was involuntary and that in any event it was inadmissible as it was "a fruit of [a] poisonous tree."

The trial court blindly accepted the claim of the defense that the confession was not made voluntarily on the basis of an affidavit executed by Panangin on July 1, 2002 or more than 5 months after his sworn statement-confession was given and after the prosecution rested its case, which affidavit Panangin was not even called to identify and affirm at the witness stand, hence, hearsay.

The decision of the trial court undoubtedly deprived the prosecution of due process as it was not given the opportunity to check the veracity of Panangin’s alleged retraction.

It bears emphasis that the State, just like the accused, is entitled to due process. People v. Bocar so teaches:

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, the exclusion of the extra-judicial confession on the basis of Panangin’s unsubstantiated claim that it was not voluntarily made is contrary to what People v. Porio instructs:

A confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. Appellant was unable to discharge this burden. He failed to present evidence that he was "intimidated or practically forced to execute or sign his Sinumpaang Salaysay.

The affidavit of retraction, attached to the defense’s demurrer to evidence - basis of its thesis that Panangin’s sworn statement of January 23, 20002 was flawed due to its involuntariness, being hearsay, the above-quoted categorical statements of Atty. Sarsaba claiming otherwise stands unrefuted. The burden of the evidence thus passed to the defense.

The trial court’s ruling that even if Panangin’s confession were not retracted, it is still inadmissible, being the "fruit of [a] poisonous tree" or illegal arrest, Sections 2 and 3 of Art. III of the Constitution.

The inadmissible evidence termed as "fruit of a poisonous tree" in jurisprudence is that contemplated in above-quoted constitutional provisions. It refers to object, not testimonial, evidence. And it refers to an object seized in the course of an illegal search and seizure.

In fine, since as reflected above, the trial court committed not only gross errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion in the grant of the defense’s demurrer to evidence, no valid judgment was rendered, preventing jeopardy to attach.

A remand of the case for further appropriate proceedings is thus warranted and it does not violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy.

This Court will not close its eyes to miscarriages of justice brought about by precipitate actions taken by trial courts in criminal cases resulting to the acquittal of the accused. As the court of last resort, it is its sacred duty to maintain its vigilance against the haphazard application of the finality of acquittal rule on the ground of double jeopardy, to insure that lawbreakers do not seek refuge thereunder to the prejudice of public justice.

A final note. Also en passant, in holding that the extra-judicial confession of Panangin is inadmissible and that the testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution amounts to mere suspicions and speculations, the trial court in effect held that no evidence imputing authorship of the crime to the accused was presented. But an acquittal based on that ground closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found not to be the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot be held liable for such act or omission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The April 7, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 44 in Criminal Case No. 2002-349 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to said court for further proceedings in line with the foregoing disquisitions.