Case Digest: Sanchez vs. Far East Bank and Trust Co, G.R. No. 155309 November 15, 2005

                                  Rule 120: Judgment, Civil Liability | Criminal Procedure

Facts:

Josephine Sanchez was assigned as the secretary of Kai J. Chin, the director and representative of Chemical Bank.

Sanchez allegedly made unauthorized withdrawals from the account of Chemical International Finance Limited (CIFL) in Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) using forged applications for cashier's checks. She deposited the checks into her personal accounts and withdrew the amounts for her personal benefit, causing damage to FEBTC.

FEBTC had to reimburse the CIFL account for a total amount of ₱3,787,530.86.

RTC:

Acquitted Josephine Sanchez of all charges as it found Kai Chin, the key witness, not credible and doubted the integrity of the handwriting expert's findings. The court highlighted that the alleged fraudulent transactions involved the participation of other bank officials, leading to procedural irregularities, and concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the petitioner's culpability.

CA:

The CA explained that a single act or omission may produce two forms of civil liability: one is for ex delicto or that which arises from a crime under our penal statutes; and the other is for a quasi delict or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, civil liability ex delicto was foreclosed by the acquittal. Nonetheless, "Athough the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist due to [petitioner’s] acquittal, [respondent’s] cause of action makes out a case of quasi delict."

Contrary to the trial court, the CA disbelieved petitioner’s assertions that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks to Kai Chin. Granting that she was authorized to encash the checks, she supposedly had no like authority to deposit the proceeds to her personal bank account. The appellate court concluded that, in breach of Article 3351 of the Civil Code, "she abused the confidence reposed in her by [respondent] in the performance of her duty."

Issues:

I. WoN the judgment of conviction had already become final at the time the motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect was filed by the complainant-appellant? NO.

II. Whether an appeal on the civil aspect may be made from a decision in a criminal case acquitting the accused for being not the author of the crime? NO.

III. Whether a separate civil action is necessary to be instituted after the accused is acquitted in a criminal case based on reasonable doubt? YES.

"(4) Whether the civil aspect of the criminal offenses where the accused was acquitted may be pursued by a party other than the offended parties? Otherwise stated, whether the civil liability may be pursued by a party which is not a real party in interest after the acquittal of the accused of the offenses charged?

Held:

I. One who desires a review of a criminal case must appeal within fifteen days from the date the decision or judgment was announced in open court in the presence of the accused, or was promulgated in the manner set forth in Section 6 of Rule 116 (now Section 6 of Rule 120) of the Rules of Court. 

The above ruling, however, is relevant and applicable to the accused who appeals. In the present case, we are confronted with the Motion filed by the private offended party for reconsideration of the civil aspect of the RTC judgment. It should also be noted that she was not required to be present during the promulgation of the judgment.

In the case before us, respondent undisputedly claims that petitioner received notice of the RTC Decision only on February 1, 1996. Records show that FEBTC filed its Motion for Reconsideration on February 14, 1996. The Motion was thus filed within the reglementary period.

III. An action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.

In the present case, the original action involved a prosecution for estafa or swindling through falsification of commercial documents, an offense defined under the RPC. Records do not show -- and respondent does not claim -- the presence of any of the three instances precluding the automatic institution of the civil action together with the criminal complaint. Ineluctably, respondent’s right to damages, if any, was deemed prosecuted in the criminal proceeding. Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be instituted.

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where 

(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; 

(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; 

(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. 

Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is settled that the private offended party may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. But this recourse may prosper only if the nature of the trial court’s judgment falls under any of the three categories stated.

III. A close scrutiny of the RTC Decision and Order leads us to the conclusion that petitioner did not commit the crime imputed to her. Hence, her acquittal likewise extinguished the action for her civil liability. 

Kai Chin did not even bother to rebut the statement of petitioner that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks to him. All he asserted was that he had neither signed the applications for the purchase of the checks nor endorsed those checks.

The CA based its imposition of civil liability upon petitioner on her supposed abuse of her employer’s confidence. Granting for the sake of argument that she indeed forged the checks and misappropriated the proceeds to her personal benefit, it must be recalled that it was Kai Chin’s signatures that she purportedly forged; and CIFL’s account that she, in effect, misappropriated. Be it remembered that respondent’s own documentary evidence unequivocally concurred in the assertion of petitioner that Kai Chin had given her express authority to transact CIFL’s account on his behalf. Consequently, it was his, not respondent’s, confidence that she had exploited. In other words, the factual premises of the CA did not support its conclusion.

In sum, we hold that petitioner’s acquittal was based on the fact that she had not committed the offense imputed to her. Consequently, she cannot be held civilly liable. In concluding that she, as well as her testimony, was credible, the trial court cannot be faulted with arbitrariness or negligence. Tellingly, her testimony that she turned over the proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chin stands unrebutted.

CA Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. RTC Decision REINSTATED.