Legal Ethics

C. ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER JUDGES AND JUSTICES

Supreme Court

Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust (Sec 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

The SC has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel (Art. VIII, Sec. 6.) and exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts (Art. VIII, Sec. 11).

The Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the SC all cases against judges and court personnel.

Rule:

The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon (Section 11, Article VIII, Constitution).

Qualification:

(1) In principle, the Supreme Court would not assign complaints filed with it against justices and judges of the lower courts to the IBP for investigation after the Supreme Court shall have found a probable cause in such charges. As a matter of long standing practice, the Court has assigned complaints against Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Judges to an Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court, and complaints against judges of the Regional Trial Courts to a justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation, while a complaint against a member of the Court of Appeals would probably be assigned to a member of the Supreme Court for investigation, report and recommendation.

(2) The IBP shall refer to the Supreme Court all cases filed against judges, including complaints charging judges jointly with practicing lawyers, whether filed directly with the IBP or transmitted to the IBP by the Office of the Solicitor General. The Supreme Court will examine these complaints individually and on a case by case basis. The Court may refer such a case for joint investigation to an Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court or to a justice of the Court of Appeals. There may, however, be instances when the case against the practicing lawyer may be separable and conveniently referred to the IBP for investigation (SC Circular No. 3-89, Series of 1989)

Q: Who are Judges and Justices covered by this rule?

1. Judges of Regular and Special Courts

2. Justices of Court of Appeals

3. Sandiganbayan 

Three (3) Ways of Instituting Administrative Charges against Justices and Judges

a. Motu proprio by the Supreme Court;

b. Verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged or substantiating documents; or

c. Anonymous complaint with public record of indubitable integrity.

Notes: All other justices and judges from the Court of Appeals to the lowest level may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)

How to file a complaint? The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.

D. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

1. Compulsory (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) PRRER

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which:

1. He, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise;

2. In which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity;

3. He is to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law;

4. In which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel;

5. In which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record (Sec. 1, Rule 137, ROC).

As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The only exception is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties (Rule 5.06, Canon 5, New Code of Judicial Conduct).

The Code has defined who may be considered as members of his immediate family and they are the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity (Carual vs. Brusola, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999).

The disqualification is mandatory and gives the judicial officer concerned no discretion but to inhibit himself from trying or sitting in a case. The rationale, therefore, is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary's fairness and objectivity (Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. vs. United Church of Christ in the Philippines, G.R. No. 171765, [March 21, 2012], 685 PHIL 21-36).

2. Voluntary

May be acted upon exercise of the judge’s sound discretion, disqualifying himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above (Ibid).

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a case, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt as to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that people’s faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself.

Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. That one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification of the said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. But if the relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is such that there would be a natural inclination to prejudice the case, the judge should be disqualified in order to guaranty a fair trial.

Objection that a judge is disqualified

The party objecting the official’s competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case (Sec. 2, Rule 137, ROC).

Dipatuan vs Judge Mangotara, AM no. 87-9-02190, April 23, 2010

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.

The murder case involving Ishak M. Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan was transferred to different judges, including Judge Mangotara. When Mangotara suffered a mild stroke, the Supreme Court, revoked the earlier designation of Judge Mangotara and designated Judge Lacsaman M. Busran.

Two days later, Judge Mangotara issued a decision finding the accused guilty of murder. 

In February, Judge Mangotara denied their motion for reconsideration and increased their bail bond. On the same date, Mangotara issued another Order recalling the two Orders.

Complainant alleges that Judge Mangotara displayed bias and prejudice by not inhibiting himself from the case because Judge Mangotara is a relative by affinity and consanguinity of the victim Elias Ali Taher and hails from the same place as Taher.

Complainant also argues that Judge Mangotara, despite the designation of Judge Busran as Acting Presiding Judge, unlawfully and maliciously issued the decision and two orders.

Whether Judge Mangotara is guilty of bias, partiality, gross ignorance of the law, and abuse of authority.

On the charge of bias and partiality resulting to grave abuse of authority

We rule in the negative. As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, complainant indeed failed to specify the degree of relationship of respondent Judge to a party in the subject case. She failed to present any clear and convincing proof that respondent Judge was related within the prohibited degree with the victim. 

This being the case, the inhibition was indeed discretionary or voluntary as the same was primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the respondent Judge. When Mangotara chose not to inhibit and proceed with the promulgation of the disputed decision, he cannot be faulted by doing so. Significantly, complainant while asserting that Mangotara should have inhibited in the said case, she nonetheless failed to institute any motion for inhibition.

As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law

In the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.

Penalty.

In this case, a fine of ₱20,000.00, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, would thus appear to be an appropriate sanction to impose on respondent Judge, considering that this is his first infraction in his 13 years of service; his admission of his mistake; and his prompt correction of such mistake.

Kilosbayan Foundation vs Janolo Jr , GR No. 180543, July 27, 2010

Facts:

Private respondent Gregory Ong filed a petition to amend his Certificate of Birth regarding his citizenship. Petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation challenge four Orders and the Decision issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the case presided by public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr.

Petitioners filed a motion for voluntary inhibition, which the RTC denied, and the RTC proceeded with the hearings on Ong's petition.

The RTC granted Ong's petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Petitioners assert that public respondent erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) in not voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding over the case.

In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and public respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which, along with the school's Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported Ong's petition through newspaper advertisements.

On Voluntary Inhibition  

The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality.  

Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public respondent, Ong and his counsel, they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, albeit years apart, spell partiality.

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties, however, in one case, the Court ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.

Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity.  A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is or was a member of a college fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religion-oriented organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist Men, and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically inhibit himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her group happens to come before him or her for action.

The added fact that the law school's alumni association published statements in support of Ong's application cannot lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of pubic respondent.  No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni association's stand.  It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni association's statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed.

In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot just be overturned. In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate such acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the attributes of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.  Unjustified assumptions  and mere misgivings that the hand of prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness moves the judge in the performance of his functions are patently weak to parry the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.

In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did not inhibit himself from hearing the case.

E. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

1. Members of the Supreme Court

Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust (Sec 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

Notes: Justice Brion state in his separate concurring opinion In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011) that what the impeachment provisions of the Constitution guarantee is simply the right to be removed from office only through the impeachment process and not by any other means; it does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions short of removal on the impeachable official. Impeachment is the sole means of removal, but it is certainly not the sole means of disciplining, Members of the Supreme Court or, for that matter, public officials removable by impeachment.

2. Lower court judges and justices

The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during a good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon (Sec. 11, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

General Rule: A judge is not liable administratively, civilly, or criminally when he acts within his power and jurisdiction.

This frees the judge from apprehension of personal consequences to himself and to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary.

Exception: The judge will be held liable upon showing of serious misconduct, inefficiency, gross and patent, or deliberate and malicious error, or bad faith.

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc.

Misconduct. A wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.

Serious Misconduct. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence 

Ignorance of Law. Attaches when the respondent judge is found to have issued her assailed erroneous order, decision or actuation in the performance of official duties moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive

Effect of withdrawal or desistance

It should be remembered that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot simply be withdrawn anytime; such withdrawal would not result in the automatic dismissal of the case. The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real senses only witnesses therein.

3. Grounds

I. Administrative Liabilities

A. Serious misconduct – Implies malice or wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. For serious misconduct to exist there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules 

a. Failure to deposit funds with the municipal treasurer or to produce them despite his promise to do so.
b. Misappropriation of fiduciary funds (proceeds of cash bail bond) by depositing the check in his personal account, thus converting the trust fund into his own use.
c. Extorting money from a part litigant who has a case before his court.
d. Solicitation of donation for office equipment.
e. Unlawful solicitation in violation of RA 6713.
f. Frequent unauthorized absences in office.
g. Falsification of Certificate of Service to collect salary

h. Dictating Wednesdays as non-session days, which the judge declared as his “mid-week pause”.

i. Indefinite postponement for several years of a criminal case pending in his sala.

j. Judge poking his gun at another in a restaurant while in a state of intoxication.

k. Pistol-whipping the complainant on the latter’s left face without any justification.

l. Using intemperate language unbecoming of a judge.

m. A judge who accepts the free use of a car for a year or utilizes free battery charging services from the shop of a litigant 

n. A judge who allows litigant to pay for the freight of his personal acquisitions 

o. Allowing his bailiff’s son to store attached property at his house (Ibid).

p. Allowing relatives to accept a business partnership offered by persons with

pending cases before his court 

q. Use of surrendered evidence, such as guns and ammunition for own protection.

r. Borrowing of court funds to pay for personal expenses.

B. Misconduct – Intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or a standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be established.

C. Inefficiency – Implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence, and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.

a. Unduly granting repeated motions for postponement of a case;
b. Unawareness of or unfamiliarity with the application of Indeterminate Sentence Law and the
duration and graduation of penalties;
c. Gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law;
d. Reducing to a ridiculous amount the bail bond of the accused in a murder case thus enabling him to escape the toils of the law;
e. Imposing a penalty of subsidiary imprisonment on a party for failure to pay civil indemnity in
violation of RA 5465;
f. Issuing a warrant of arrest in a case which is clearly civil in nature;
g. Failure to dismiss a complaint which has prescribed;
h. Oppression or unwarranted display of authority;
i. Imposing the wrong penalty to the crime charged and proven;
j. Failure to comply with the basic prerequisites for the issuance of a search warrant;
k. Dismissing a criminal case based on the principle of “in pari delicto” – a civil law principle;
l. Including execution in the judgment itself;
m. Granting an Ex-Parte Motion For Execution in ejectment case without notice to adverse party; and
n. Nonfeasance of Judges – No judge or court, shall decline to render judgment by reason, of the silence, obscurity or inefficiency of the law.

ii. Administrative Charges

a) Serious charges;

i. Bribery, direct or indirect;
ii. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
iii. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
iv. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding;
v. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
vi. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
vii. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
viii. Immorality;
ix. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
x. The error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision. The error must be so grave and so fundamental to a point as to warrant a condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or negligent. When the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conservance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Dipatuan vs. Judge Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010)

xi. Partisan political activities; and
xii. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits

b) Less serious charges; and

i. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
ii. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
iii. Unauthorized practice of law;
iv. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars
v. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
vi. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
vii. Simple misconduct (Sec. 9, Rule 140, ROC).

c) Light charges, (Sec. 7, Rule 140, ROC)

i. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
ii. Gambling in public;
iii. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
iv. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports (Sec. 10, Rule 140, ROC).

Administrative case cannot be immediately filed in every offense committed by a judge. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry taking of other measures against the judge concerned, whether civil, administrative, or criminal in nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies against the rulings or acts performed in the exercise of their judicial power have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into their criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened or closed.

To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice.

Absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have acted in good faith in exercising his judicial functions.

Notes:

The nature of adjudication by a judicial magistrate as a function of sovereignty invests the magistrate with a great degree of immunity from administrative and other liabilities.

It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction. 

From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others. 

A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of this rule. Thus, it is said of the judge: “His doing justice as between particular individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the end and object which were in view when his court is created, and he was selected to preside over or sit in it.

Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society, and that rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy is only the occasion.

The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or if he fails to do justice as between individual, he may be called to account by the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have provided.

But as duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible.

The filings of administrative complaints do subvert and undermine the independence of the Judiciary and its judges. Thus, the Court does not tolerate unwarranted administrative charges brought against sitting magistrates in respect to their judicial actions.

Automatic Conversion of Administrative Cases against CA and Sandiganbayan Justices and Lower Courts Judges. Administrative cases against CA and Sandiganbayan justices and lower courts judges where the charges constitute misconduct for members of the Bar, shall also considered as disciplinary action against the justice or judge. The respondent shall be required to comment or show cause why he should not be suspended, disbarred, or sanctioned as a member of the Bar.

Civil Liabilities

A judge who willfully or negligently renders a decision causing damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same (Art. 20, Civil Code). Also, a judge is civilly liable for damages if, in refusing or neglecting to decide a case without just cause, a person suffered material or moral loss without prejudice to any administrative action that may be taken against him (Art. 27, Civil Code).

III. Criminal Liabilities

i. Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment (Art. 204, RPC);
ii. Judgment Rendered Through Negligence (Art. 205, RPC);
iii. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order (Art. 206, RPC); and
iv. Maliciously delaying the administration of justice (Art. 207, RPC).

Notes: During the pendency of disbarment proceedings against a judge, the latter may not retire service. The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he should still be answerable.

4. Impeachment

Articles of Impeachment against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (December 12, 2011): 

The House of Representatives voted to impeach Chief Justice Corona. They charged him with eight (8) articles of impeachment alleging:

1. Betrayal of public trust
2. Graft and corruption
3. Culpable violation of the Constitution

Articles of Impeachment Filed by the House of Representatives:

ARTICLE I

Betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court justice and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present.

ARTICLE II

Committed culpable violation of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust when he failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required under SEC. 17, ART. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

ARTICLE III

Committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under ART. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the Constitution that provides that “[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence” in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.

ARTICLE IV

Betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution when he blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo ante” order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.

ARTICLE V

Betrayed the public trust through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province.

ARTICLE VI

Betrayed the public trust by arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the constitution in the House of Representatives via impeachment.

ARTICLE VII

Betrayed the public trust through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions of the Supreme Court’s own TRO.

ARTICLE VIII

Betrayed the public trust and/or committed graft and corruption when he failed and refused to account for the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) collections.

5. Sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court on erring members of the Judiciary

If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

a. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may be determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

b. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

c. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but exceeding P40, 000.00.

If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

a. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

b. A fine of more than P10, 000.00 but not exceeding P20, 000.00.

If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

a. A fine of not less than P1, 000.00 but not exceeding P10, 000.00 and/or

b. Censure;

c. Reprimand; and

d. Admonition with warning (Sec. 11, Rule 140, ROC)

•    Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals…, AM No. 02-9-02-SC, September 7, 2002

•    Sison- Barias vs Rubia, Am No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014

•    In Re: First Endorsement from Honorable Raul Gonzales dated March 16 1988, Am No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988

•    Republic vs Sereno, GR No. 237428, May 11, 2018

•    Re: Diaz AM No. 07-7-17-SC, September 19, 2007

Petition for judicial clemency. — The verified petition for judicial clemency shall allege the following:

(a) that the verified petition was filed after five years from the receipt of the order, decision, or resolution of disbarment;

(b) that the disbarred lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders, including orders for restitution;

(c) that he or she recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which he or she was disbarred by showing positive acts evidencing reformation;

(d) that he or she has reconciled, or attempted in good faith to reconcile, with the wronged private offended party in the disbarment case, or if the same is not possible, an explanation as to why such attempt at reconciliation could not be made.

Where there is no private offended party, the plea for clemency must contain a public apology; and

(e) notwithstanding the conduct for which the disbarred lawyer was disciplined, he or she has the requisite good moral character and competence.

Any of the following allegations may also be made in support of the petition:

(a) that he or she still has productive years that can be put to good use if given a chance; or

(b) there is a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

Sworn statement after service of suspension. — Upon the expiration of the period of suspension from the practice of law, the lawyer shall file a Sworn Statement with the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, to show that the petitioner, during the period of suspension:

(a) has not appeared before any court, tribunal or other government agency, whether in respect of current, former or prospective clients;

(b) has not signed or filed any pleading or other court submission;

(c) has duly informed his or her clients, law firm, law school where the lawyer is teaching, legal clinic, or other legal service organization of which he or she is a member, regarding the suspension; and

(d) has not otherwise performed any act, directly or indirectly, that amounts to the practice of law.

The Sworn Statement shall state the date of the lawyer’s receipt of the order, decision or resolution imposing the penalty of suspension, as well as a list of the lawyer’s engagements affected by the suspension, indicating the relevant court, tribunal or other government agency, if any.

Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP, to the Executive Judge of the courts where the suspended lawyer has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel.