Case Digest: Balanay Jr. vs. Martinez, G. R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975

Art. 792 | Succession, Validity

Provisions:

Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.

Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention.

Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. 

Ponente:
-

Petitioner: Felix Balanay, Jr

Respondent: Hon. Antonio M. Martinez,

                Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban

Recit Version:

Leodegaria Julian created a notarial will desiring her properties not to be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime. After her death, her son Felix Balanay, Jr. petitioned for probate. Felix Balanay, Sr., and Avelina B. Antonio opposed, but the former withdrew his opposition.

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity but erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. By the surviving husband's conformity to the will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate.

Facts:

In 1970, Leodegaria Julian created a notarial will containing provisions regarding her desire for her properties not to be divided among her heirs during her husband Felix Balanay, Sr.'s lifetime.

In 1973, she passed away leaving behind her husband and six legitimate children.

Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial will.

Felix Balanay, Sr., and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the will's probate, citing lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband, and an improper partition of the conjugal estate. 

Felix Balanay, Sr. later withdrew his opposition, affirmed his interest in the probate, and signed a document renouncing his hereditary rights in favor of their six children.

The lower court initially denied the opposition and scheduled the probate hearing.

Later, another lawyer, filed a motion to withdraw the probate of the will and convert the proceeding into an intestate estate proceeding.

Lower Court: Declared the will void, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.

Issue: WoN the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void. NO

WoN there is preterition of the husband which would void the will. NO

Held:

In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. 

But the probate court erred in declaring, that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to Article 1080 of the Civil Code.The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in Article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership.

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership  but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate. it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected. It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).

In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will.

To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will.

It also erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed.