Case Digest: De la Cerna vs. Rebaca-Potot, G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

  Art. 818 | Succession, Alien

Provision:

Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.

Ponente:
Reyes, J.B.L., J.,

Recit Version:

-

Facts:

On May 9, 1939, Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca executed a joint last will and testament, leaving their properties to their niece, Manuela Rebaca, specifying that they would continue to enjoy the property's fruits while alive.

On August 30, 1939, Bernabe de la Serna passed away.

On October 31, 1939, the will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Cebu, despite the joint will being contrary to the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code).

On October 14, 1952, Gervasia Rebaca died.

A petition for probate of the same joint will concerning Gervasia was filed.

CFI-Cebu: Dismissed due to non-appearance of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot, and her attorney, Manuel Potot.

CA: Reversed the lower court's decision, stating that the 1939 probate decree was conclusive, despite the joint will's invalidity under the law. The joint will's probate in 1939 was binding, and the heirs were concluded by this decision, even though the will was technically void due to legal prohibitions.

However, the Court of Appeals noted that the probate decree only affected Bernabe de la Serna's share. Gervasia Rebaca's share needed reexamination after her death since the joint will was considered separate for each testator. Gervasia's share would pass to her heirs intestate unless a valid will in her favor existed.

Issue:

WoN the CA is correct in reversing the CFI decision. YES

Held:

The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).

Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).