Succession: Case Digest (Recit Ver) October 27, 2023
Art. 815.
Heirs of Rosendo Lasam vs. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006
When a Filipino is in a foreign country,
he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms
established by the law of the country in which he may be.
Such will may be probated in the Philippines.
Art. 816.
The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country,
or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Art. 817.
A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject,
and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same
effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.
Art. 818.
Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly,
or in the same instrument,
either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
Art. 819.
Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country
shall not be valid in the Philippines,
even though authorized by the laws of the country
where they may have been executed.
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, established a medical practice in New York, U.S.A., and executed separate wills in 1979 leaving their property to each other and, in case of their survival, to their children and grandchildren, with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor. In 1982, the entire Cunanan family tragically died in a fire in the U.S.
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., trustee, probated the wills in New York in 1983. Salud Teodoro Perez, Dr. Evelyn's mother, filed a petition in the Philippines to reprobate the wills and be appointed as special administratrix of the estates.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws;
(2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
(5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills .
Petitioner submitted all required evidence except for the presentation of the relevant New York laws on procedure and allowance of wills, which is necessary because Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The probate of a will is a special proceeding, and while courts should be flexible regarding evidence, they must aim to receive the best evidence possible before granting or denying probate.
Article 818 expressly prohibits making joint wills for reciprocal or third-party benefits.
The Cunanan spouses executed separate wills, but since these wills have similar provisions and likely concern conjugal property, practical considerations favor joint probate. Courts aim to settle entire controversies in a single proceeding to prevent future litigation.
Ruperta C. Palaganas, a naturalized U.S. citizen, died in 2001, leaving properties in the Philippines and the U.S. She executed a will in California designating her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor. Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother, filed a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will in the Philippines. Nephews Manuel and Benjamin opposed, arguing the will should be probated in the U.S. first and alleged duress in its execution.
Philippine laws do not prohibit probating foreign wills not yet probated in their country of execution. Article 816 of the Civil Code allows foreign wills to have legal effect in the Philippines if executed in compliance with the place of residence or country's laws.
Luz Gaspe Lipson, is a U.S. citizen who executed her will in the Philippines. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Iriga City initially dismissed the probate petition, arguing that her will should be probated in the United States, her home country.
However, the Supreme Court clarified that the probate process involves assessing the extrinsic validity of a will, including formalities, the testator's mental capacity, and due execution. In this context, the court emphasized that Philippine law applies to the extrinsic validity of an alien's will executed within the country. Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code allow for the probate of an alien's will either according to the laws of their country of residence or Philippine law.
As Lipson had real property in the Philippines, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case. The court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to determine Lipson's testamentary capacity, compliance with formalities, and the authenticity of her will as her true last testament.
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca executed a joint last will and testament, leaving their properties to their niece, Manuela Rebaca. Despite the joint will being contrary to the law, it was admitted to probate by the CFI-Cebu when Bernabe de la Serna passed away in August 1939. In 1952, Gervasia Rebaca died, and a petition for probate of the same joint will was filed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, stating that the 1939 probate decree was conclusive, even though the joint will was technically void due to legal prohibitions. However, the probate decree only affected Bernabe de la Serna's share, not Gervasia Rebaca's.
The Court of Appeals correctly reversed the lower court's decision, confirming the conclusive effect of the 1939 probate decree regarding Bernabe de la Serna's share. However, it should have recognized that the joint will's validity for Gervasia Rebaca's share needed reevaluation after her death. As joint wills are considered separate for each testator, the joint will was properly deemed invalid for Gervasia Rebaca's portion. Consequently, her undivided interest would pass to her heirs intestate unless a valid will in her favor was presented or if she was the sole intestate heir.
SUBSECTION 4. - Witnesses to Wills
Article 820.
Any person of sound mind
and of the age of eighteen years or more,
and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write,
may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code.
Article 821.
The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
Article 822.
If the witnesses attesting the execution of a will
are competent at the time of attesting,
their becoming subsequently incompetent shall not prevent the allowance of the will.
Article 823.
If a person attests the execution of a will,
to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child,
a devise or legacy is given by such will,
such devise or legacy shall,
so far only as concerns such person, or spouse, or parent, or child of such person,
or any one claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or child, be void,
unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will.
However, such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise or legacy had not been made or given.
Article 824.
A mere charge on the estate of the testator
for the payment of debts due at the time of the testator's death
does not prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will.
In 1961, Isabel Andres Gabriel, a widow and former Governor of Rizal Province, executed a typewritten will in Tagalog. She was accompanied by three witnesses and a photographer to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office. Atty. Paraiso advised her to bring local officials as witnesses since he didn't know the identities of the attesting witnesses in advance.
Isabel Gabriel passed away, just two months after executing the will, due to terminal cancer at the age of 85. Lutgarda Santiago, who lived with Isabel Gabriel, filed a probate petition, claiming to be the principal beneficiary and executrix of the will. Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, another niece of the deceased, opposed the will. Rizalina claims that Article 806 of the Civil Code requires witnesses to be credible, implying that they must have a good standing in the community.
The court ruled that competency and credibility are distinct concepts. Competency is determined by Articles 820 and 821 of the Civil Code, ensuring that the witness meets the necessary qualifications and lacks disqualifications. Credibility, on the other hand, pertains to the court's assessment of the witness's truthfulness, which arises from the court's belief in the witness's testimony. The court emphasized that witnesses do not need to prove their good standing in the community or trustworthiness independently. Also, the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness.
Simeona F. Naval made a will on February 13, 1915, naming Atty. Perfecto Gabriel as executor. After her death, Atty. Gabriel tried to probate the will, but it was denied by CFI-Manila due to improper execution. Simeona's nieces presented another will, dated October 31, 1914, which was contested, claiming the 1915 will revoked the earlier one.
According to Article 739 of the Civil Code, a former will is revoked by another valid subsequent will, provided the testator does not state in the later will a desire for the former will to subsist wholly or partly. Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that no will shall be revoked except by another will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided for wills. For the first will to revoke the subsequent will, the latter must be perfect and valid, executed as required by law. The court held that the revocatory clause in the disallowed will was annulled because the will was not executed in accordance with the law.
SUBSECTION 5. Codicils and Incorporation by Reference
Article 825.
A codicil is supplement or addition to a will, made after the execution of a will and annexed to be taken as a part thereof, by which disposition made in the original will is explained, added to, or altered.
Article 826.
In order that a codicil may be effective, it shall be executed as in the case of a will.
Article 827.
If a will, executed as required by this Code, incorporates into itself by reference any document or paper, such document or paper shall not be considered a part of the will unless the following requisites are present:
(1) The document or paper referred to in the will must be in existence at the time of the execution of the will;
(2) The will must clearly describe and identify the same, stating among other things the number of pages thereof;
(3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the document or paper referred to therein; and
(4) It must be signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every page, except in case of voluminous books of account or inventories.
SUBSECTION 6. Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions
Article 828.
A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.
Article 829.
A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Article 830.
No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
Article 831.
Subsequent wills which do not revoke the previous ones in an express manner, annul only such dispositions in the prior wills as are inconsistent with or contrary to those contained in the later wills.
Article 832.
A revocation made in a subsequent will shall take effect, even if the new will should become inoperative by reason of the incapacity of the heirs, devisees or legatees designated therein, or by their renunciation.
Article 833.
A revocation of a will based on a false cause or an illegal cause is null and void.
Article 834.
The recognition of an illegitimate child does not lose its legal effect, even though the will wherein it was made should be revoked.
SUBSECTION 7. Republication and Revival of Wills
Article 835.
The testator cannot republish, without reproducing in a subsequent will, the dispositions contained in a previous one which is void as to its form.
Article 836.
The execution of a codicil referring to a previous will has the effect of republishing the will as modified by the codicil.
Article 837.
If after making a will, the testator makes a second will expressly revoking the first, the revocation of the second will does not revive the first will, which can be revived only by another will or codicil.
SUBSECTION 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
Article 838.
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's a death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
In 1963, Adriana Maloto died, leaving her niece and nephews as heirs. The heirs initiated an intestate proceeding for Adriana's estate, and a court-approved extrajudicial settlement divided the estate equally among them. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a document dated January 3, 1940, claiming to be Adriana's last will and testament. The discovered will granted larger shares to Aldina and Constancio than their previous agreement and benefited other parties.
However, the will was allegedly burned by Adriana's househelp, following Adriana's instructions. The CFI-Iloilo dismissed the petition as it found the will revoked, but the Court of Appeals deemed the evidence inconclusive.
The mere physical destruction of a will, like burning, is not enough for revocation; it must be accompanied by animus revocandi, the intention to revoke. The evidence provided does not conclusively establish that the document burned was Adriana's will, nor does it prove that the burning was done under her express direction or in her presence. The concept of res adjudicata does not apply here because the previous judgment only dealt with the intestate settlement of the estate and was not a final judgment on the merits of the action for probate.
In 1918, Miguel Mamuyac executed a will (Exhibit A). He passed away in 1922. Francisco Gago sought to probate Exhibit but the court denied probate, citing a newer will executed on April 16, 1919. A subsequent attempt to probate the 1919 will (Exhibit 1) but the court determined that Exhibit A was a duplicate of the original will and that the original will was cancelled by Miguel Mamuyac before his death.
The law doesn't require specific evidence of revocation; if a will cannot be found and was last seen in the testator's possession, it's presumed to be cancelled or destroyed. In this case, the original 1919 will couldn't be found after Miguel Mamuyac's death, and there was positive proof of its cancellation in 1920. The court found that the cancellation was established, and therefore, the lower court's decision to deny probate was upheld.
The Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, died in the City of Manila. Two proceedings were filed before different courts on the same day. A petition for intestate proceeding was filed before CFI-Rizal at 8:00 am while a petition for the probate was filed before CFI-Bulacan at 11:00 am.
The jurisdiction of the CFI-Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will.
Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
The subject lot was inherited by the heirs from Isabel Cuntapay. The heirs of Rosendo Lasam claimed ownership based on a last will and testament allegedly bequeathing the property to Rosendo Lasam. However, the CA found that the will had not been probated and, therefore, could not be a basis for their claim. In contrast, Vicenta Umengan provided deeds of conveyance showing her legal possession of portions of the lot. The CA ruled in her favor, emphasizing that its decision pertained only to physical possession, not ownership, and did not preclude the parties from filing appropriate actions to contest ownership.
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, stating that the last will and testament had no legal effect without being probated. As a result, the CA's provisional ruling on possession was justified, and Vicenta Umengan's deeds of conveyance substantiated her right to physical possession. The Court emphasized that the decision did not settle the issue of ownership conclusively, allowing the parties to pursue appropriate legal actions to contest ownership.
In 1938, childless widower Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect. When he died in 1939, a probate petition was filed in CFI-Sorsogon, where the will was admitted, appointing Pedro Gallanosa as executor. Despite legal heirs' opposition, the will was validated.The legal heirs failed to contest the probate and the distribution. In 1952, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of the parcels of lands which was dismissed. In 1967, the same heirs attempted another legal action against Gallanosa, alleging fraud, bin the execution of the will.
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory. After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes were married. Aniceta passed away in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro also passed away later. In 1977, Lourdes Legaspi Dorotheo filed for the probate of Alejandro's will, claiming to have cared for him before his death. The trial court initially admitted Alejandro's will to probate. In 1983, the legitimate children of Alejandro filed a motion to declare the will intrinsically void. In 1986, the trial court declared Lourdes not the wife of Alejandro and recognized the private respondents as the only heirs, holding the will intrinsically void. In 1990, the trial court issued an order setting aside the final and executory 1986 order, stating that it was "interlocutory" and not final. The Court of Appeals nullified the 1990 order.
The Court held that a final and executory decision or order cannot be disturbed or reopened, no matter how erroneous it may be. Setting aside the 1986 order nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals, which is against the principles of the hierarchy of courts and the essence of review. In probate proceedings, the focus is on the extrinsic validity of the will concerning formalities, testamentary capacity, and due execution. The intrinsic validity, dealing with the disposition of properties and compliance with laws of succession, can be raised even after the will's authentication. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but intrinsically void. Consequently, the rules of intestacy applied, and matters regarding the disposition of properties in the void will would be resolved in the intestate proceedings for Alejandro's and his late spouse's estates. Since Lourdes was not married to Alejandro and not an heir, her motion for appointment as administratrix was moot.
After the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., his illegitimate son, Lewellyn Barlito Quemada, sought to probate Pastor Sr.'s alleged holographic will, claiming a 30% legacy from mining claims. The legitimate children of Pastor, Sr., Pastor, Jr. and Sofia, filed an opposition. In 1972, the probate court allowed the holographic, affirmed by CA, and remanded to probate court by the Supreme Court . In 1980, the probate court granted Quemada 42% royalties from Pastor, Sr.'s estate. Quemada retained 75%, and 25% was deposited for estate obligations. Pastor, Jr.'s 33% share was garnished for Quemada's legacy.
The petitioners raised whether before the provisions of the holographic win can be implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with finality. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners that the probate court's order did not conclusively resolve ownership, only the extrinsic validity of the will. The order only allowed the holographic will "with respect to its extrinsic validity," implying ownership was not resolved. The order did not determine legitimes, debts, estate tax, or liquidate assets, making it premature to distribute the legacy.
Leonardo Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had four children. Lino Jimenez acquired five parcels of land during their marriage. After Consolacion's death, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy and had seven more children. When Lino and Genoveva passed away, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition to administer their properties.
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. sought to exclude his father and siblings from the petition, claiming they were not Lino and Genoveva's children and had received their inheritance. The Probate Court excluded the disputed land based on Leonardo's evidence. In 1984, the heirs filed a complaint to recover the land, arguing that the probate court's decision was not conclusive and their claim was not barred by prescription or laches.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions
Martin Jugo passed away, leaving a will that appointed Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his executor. In the will, he acknowledged his legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and their children, but also stated that he had been living with Sofia as husband and wife since 1952. Sofia filed for the probate of the will, but Rufina Gomez and her children opposed, claiming that the will was executed under undue influence and that Sofia's status as the testator's concubine rendered her unfit for inheritance.
The Court of Appeals declared null and void the provision in the will favoring Sofia.
The Supreme Court noted that while probate proceedings typically focus on the extrinsic validity of the will, there are exceptional circumstances where the court can pass judgment on the intrinsic validity, especially if the will appears to be intrinsically void. In this case, both parties agreed on the formal validity of the will, so the only issue was the court's jurisdiction to declare the provision in Sofia's favor null and void.
The court cited Article 739 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between persons living in adultery or concubinage. Since Martin Jugo admitted in the will that he was disposing of properties to someone with whom he had been living in concubinage, the donation in Sofia's favor was invalidated, rendering it void.
In 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap passed away. A petition for the probate of her alleged holographic will was filed by her nephew. The will purportedly listed beneficiaries of her estate. Felicidad's husband, Ildefonso Yap, contested the will's existence. Witnesses testified that Felicidad had confided in her cousin Vicente Esguerra about making a secret will. Allegedly, she wrote the will in the presence of relatives but the original holographic will was never presented in court. The trial court refused to probate the will.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court. The courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature. The loss of the holographic is fatal. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
Ricardo B. Bonilla allegedly executed a holographic will on January 25, 1962. After Ricardo's death on May 13, 1976, Marcela Rodelas filed a petition in the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holographic will. However, the opposition argued that the holographic will could not be proven since the original copy was lost. The trial court dismissed the petition, citing the absence of the original holographic will and the considerable time lapse between its execution and Ricardo's death, suggests that the will had been discarded.
The court held that according to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills requires the court to allow the will after its due execution has been proved. In cases where the original holographic will is lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated based on mere testimony. However, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the lost will may be admitted as evidence, allowing the authenticity of the deceased's handwriting to be determined by the probate court. The court's decision set aside the lower court's order and affirmed the admissibility of the photostatic copy of the holographic will in the probate proceedings.
Article 839.
The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
Paciencia Regala made a will bequeathing her properties to her nephew, Lorenzo Laxa, and his family. Paciencia left for the USA, where she lived with Lorenzo until her death. Lorenzo filed for probate, which was opposed due to alleged mental incapacity.
The Supreme Court held that the will was validly executed. The burden to prove Paciencia's unsound mind rested with the petitioners, who failed to provide substantial evidence. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will. The special bond between Paciencia and Lorenzo's family further validated the will.
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