Case Digest: Bank of the Philippine Islands Employees Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-69746-47 [and two companion cases] March 31, 1989
- Three cases involving Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and its employees are consolidated:
- G.R. Nos. 69746-47:
- Dispute between BPI Employees Union-Metro Manila and the Associated Labor Unions (ALU) regarding a collective bargaining agreement led to negotiations breaking down.
- NLRC: Resolved the wage increase deadlock but did not settle the intra-union dispute, which led to petitions and conflicting decisions.
- The issue became moot after a new collective bargaining agreement was concluded with BPI after the disaffiliation period.
- G.R. Nos. 76842-44:
- Dispute over union dues between Reyes and Valdez groups within BPIEU-Metro Manila.
- NLRC: Declared BPIEU-ALU (Valdez) as the lawful head entitled to the union dues.
- Eventually became moot as the Reyes group disaffiliated and became a separate union.
- G.R. Nos. 76916-17:
- Ignacio Lacsina filed a motion for an attorney's lien based on a resolution from the Bank of P.I. Employees Union (BPIEU) authorizing payment of attorney's fees (5% of economic benefits) for negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement.
- BPI deducted P 200.00 from each employee who signed the authorization. Petitioners objected that it was not authorized under Labor Code.
- NLRC: Initially set aside the order, stating the rights needed determination; later, an en banc resolution ordered release amounts to Lacsina except for cases without signed authorization or withdrawn authorization.
- Petitioners argued that the deductions contravened Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, preventing fees imposed on individual union members.
Art. 222. Appearances and Fees.- . . .
(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.
They also cite the case of Pacific Banking Corporation v. Clave where the lawyer's fee was taken not from the total economic benefits received by the workers but from the funds of their labor union.
The Court reads the afore-cited provision as prohibiting the payment of attorney's fees only when it is effected through forced contributions from the workers from their own funds as distinguished from the union funds. The purpose of the provision is to prevent imposition on the workers of the duty to individually contribute their respective shares in the fee to be paid the attorney for his services on behalf of the union in its negotiations with the management. The obligation to pay the attorney's fees belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to the workers as their direct responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may require the individual workers to assume the obligation to pay the attorney's fees from their own pockets. So categorical is this intent that the law also makes it clear that any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void ab initio.
We see no such imposition in the case at bar. A reading of the above-cited resolution will clearly show that the signatories thereof have not been in any manner compelled to undertake the obligation they have there assumed. On the contrary it is plain that they were voluntarily authorizing the check-off of the attorney's fees from their payment of benefits and the turnover to Lacsina of the amounts deducted, conformably to their agreement with him. There is no compulsion here. And significantly, the authorized deductions affected only the workers who adopted and signed the resolution and who were the only ones from whose benefits the deductions were made by BPI. No similar deductions were taken from the other workers who did not sign the resolution and so were not bound by it.
That only those who signed the resolution could be subjected to the authorized deductions was recognized and made clear by the order itself of the NLRC. It was there categorically declared that the check-off could not be made where "no individual signed authorization has been given by the members concerned or where such authorization has been withdrawn."
The Pacific Banking Corporation case is not applicable to the present case because there was there no similar agreement as that entered into between Lacsina and the signatories of the resolution in question. Absent such an agreement, there was no question that the basic proscription in Article 222 would have to operate. It is noteworthy, though, that the Court there impliedly recognized arrangements such as the one at bar with the following significant observation:
Moreover, the case is covered squarely by the mandatory and explicit prescription of Art. 222 which is another guarantee intended to protect the employee against unwarranted practices that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and consent. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar recognition was made in Galvadores v. Trajano, where the payment of the attorney's fees from the wages of the employees was not allowed because: "No check-offs from any amount due to employees may be effected without individual written authorities duly signed by the employees specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting."
Finally, we hold that the agreement in question is in every respect a valid contract as it satisfies all the elements thereof and does not contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. On the contrary, it enables the workers to avail themselves of the services of the lawyer of their choice and confidence under terms mutually acceptable to the parties and, hopefully, also for their mutual benefit.
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