Case Digest: Periquet vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 91298, June 22, 1990

   Labor Law | Bureau of Labor Relations

• Corazon Periquet was dismissed by Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) for alleged breach of trust.
• Labor Arbiter: Ordered her reinstatement with full back wages.
• NLRC: Affirmed the order.
• Nine years later, petitioner filed a motion for the execution of the decision.
• Labor Arbiter: Granted the motion.
• NLRC: Reversed the order.
• NLRC ruled the motion for execution was time-barred, having been filed beyond the five-year period.
• NLRC also ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signed waiving her right to reinstatement.

WoN the NLRC erred in setting aside the order of the Labor Arbiter. NO

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into signing the second quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.

The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash settlement she received? It must be remembered that on that date the decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight years.

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases that this should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof. Hence, the petitioner's contention that she should be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been counted against her) that she was actually employed during most of that period.

Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure of the private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, the bond is required only when there is an appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.