Succession: Institution of Heirs Summary Cases
SECTION 2
Institution of Heir
Article 840. Institution of heir is an act by virtue of which a testator designates in his will the person or persons who are to succeed him in his property and transmissible rights and obligations.
Article 841. A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
Article 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. (763a)
Article 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and surname, and when there are two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the instituted heir may be known.
Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he designate him in such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the institution shall be valid.
Article 844. An error in the name, surname, or circumstances of the heir shall not vitiate the institution when it is possible, in any other manner, to know with certainty the person instituted.
If among persons having the same names and surnames, there is a similarity of circumstances in such a way that, even with the use of other proof, the person instituted cannot be identified, none of them shall be an heir.
Article 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void, unless by some event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a disposition in favor of a definite class or group of persons shall be valid.
Article 846. Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts.
Article 847. When the testator institutes some heirs individually and others collectively as when he says, "I designate as my heirs A and B, and the children of C," those collectively designated shall be considered as individually instituted, unless it clearly appears that the intention of the testator was otherwise.
Article 848. If the testator should institute his brothers and sisters, and he has some of full blood and others of half blood, the inheritance shall be distributed equally unless a different intention appears.
Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, G.R. No. L-24561, June 30, 1970
Agripina Valdez made a will dividing her estate among her heirs and seven grandchildren. When she dies, she left seven compulsory heirs. The estate was appraised at P1,811,695.60, with each heir entitled to P129,362.11 as their legitime
The will allocated specific properties to heirs, but five heirs felt they received less than their legitime, while two received more. Marina Dizon-Rivera, the executrix, proposed a partition to ensure legitimes were fulfilled, adjusting shares with cash or properties.
Oppositors countered, suggesting half the estate be treated as the legitime, reducing testamentary dispositions to P905,534.78, while the other half would remain unchanged.
WoN the lower court erred in approving the executrix’ project of partition. NO
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition.Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate.
The dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, and upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs. Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition.
Article 849. When the testator calls to the succession a person and his children they are all deemed to have been instituted simultaneously and not successively.
Article 850. The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed a probate petition for her last will and testament before she died. The estate of Basilia was designated to her legally adopted children. Despite the opposition of the nephews and nieces of Basilia, the court allowed the probate of the will.
After Basilia died, her nephews and nieces filed a petition in intervention for partition, alleging that they are the nearest kin of Basilia and the respondents were not adopted in accordance with law, rendering them as strangers with no right to succeed.
They allege that the decedent instituted the respondents because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that the adoption was valid.
WoN the lower court erred in restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions. NO
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur:
First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false; and
third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
If the decedent was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. The decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes.
Were we to exclude the respondents from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case.
Article 851. If the testator has instituted only one heir, and the institution is limited to an aliquot part of the inheritance, legal succession takes place with respect to the remainder of the estate.
The same rule applies if the testator has instituted several heirs, each being limited to an aliquot part, and all the parts do not cover the whole inheritance.
Article 852. If it was the intention of the testator that the instituted heirs should become sole heirs to the whole estate, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, and each of them has been instituted to an aliquot part of the inheritance and their aliquot parts together do not cover the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, each part shall be increased proportionally.
Article 853. If each of the instituted heirs has been given an aliquot part of the inheritance, and the parts together exceed the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, each part shall be reduced proportionally. (n)
Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, left a will.
The trial court admitted the will to probate and declared Maria Helen Christensen Garcia as natural child of the deceased. The executor Adolfo Aznar submitted a project of partition, where the properties of the estate were divided equally between: Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
Since Helen Garcia is preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled. The properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, except for the legacies which have been duly approved.
WoN the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to Lucy Duncan and to Helen Garcia in equal shares. NO
WoN the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate. YES
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.
It is therefore is necessary:
(a) That the omission refers to a forced heir;
(b) That the omission be complete; that the forced heir receives nothing in the will.
In the will of the deceased Edward E. Christensen, Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir — indeed her status as such is denied — but is given a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.
In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.
One-fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent, she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. The contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.
Leodegaria Julian created a notarial will desiring her properties not to be divided among her heirs during her husband Felix Balanay, Sr.'s lifetime. After her death, her son Felix Balanay, Jr. petitioned for probate.
Felix Balanay, Sr., and Avelina B. Antonio opposed on the ground of preterition, among others, but the former withdrew his opposition and signed a document renouncing his hereditary rights in favor of their six children.
The lower court declared the will void and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
WoN there is preterition of the husband which would void the will. NO
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership. It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. It is true that the testatrix could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, where a will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
Nemesio Acain executed a will containing a disposition of all his joint properties with his wife in favor to his brother Segundo Acain or Segundo Acain's children if Segundo predeceased Nemesio.
Segundo predeceased Nemesio, and his children, led by Constantino Acain, filed a petition for the probate of the will.
Virginia A. Fernandez, the legally adopted daughter of the testator and Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain, the widow of the testator opposed the petition based on preterition.
WoN the private respondents have been pretirited. YES
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. The adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including the free portion of the estate. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. Intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and the special proceeding must be dismissed.
Rosario Nuguid was survived by her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters.
Remedios Nuguid, her sister, filed a petition for probate of the Rosario's alleged holographic will designating her as sole heir. Felix and Paz filed an opposition claiming that as compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line, they were preterited.
WoN the private respondents have been pretirited. YES
The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. The consequence of the annulment or nullity of the institution of the heir due to the preterition of one, several, or all of the compulsory heirs in direct line, is the opening of total or partial intestate succession. It will be total when the testator who commits the preterition had disposed of all the assets by universal title of inheritance in favor of the instituted heirs. Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father Hermogenes Campos and her three sisters, including Nenita C. Paguia. Hermogenes, being the only compulsory heir, claimed the ownership of the estate through Extrajudicial Settlement. Nenita filed to reprobate Adoracion's will allegedly executed in the United States, asserting Adoracion was an American citizen with a will probated in Pennsylvania, appointing Clement J. McLaughlin as administrator.
Hermogenes initially opposed the will alleging forgery, but later withdrew his opposition and waived his rights after verifying the veracity of the will. After the court allowed the reprobation of the will, Hermogenes later filed a petition for relief, alleging fraud in withdrawing his opposition. When Hermogenes died, his appointed executrix, Polly Cayetano, sought substitution in the ongoing case.
WoN the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will divesting Hermogenes C. Campos of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him. NO
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2). However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Article 851. If the testator has instituted only one heir, and the institution is limited to an aliquot part of the inheritance, legal succession takes place with respect to the remainder of the estate.
The same rule applies if the testator has instituted several heirs, each being limited to an aliquot part, and all the parts do not cover the whole inheritance.
Article 852. If it was the intention of the testator that the instituted heirs should become sole heirs to the whole estate, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, and each of them has been instituted to an aliquot part of the inheritance and their aliquot parts together do not cover the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, each part shall be increased proportionally.
Article 853. If each of the instituted heirs has been given an aliquot part of the inheritance, and the parts together exceed the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, each part shall be reduced proportionally.
Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Article 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not disposed of by the will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be taken proportionally from the shares of the other compulsory heirs. (1080a)
Article 856. A voluntary heir who dies before the testator transmits nothing to his heirs.
A compulsory heir who dies before the testator, a person incapacitated to succeed, and one who renounces the inheritance, shall transmit no right to his own heirs except in cases expressly provided for in this Code.
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