Succession: Substitution of Heirs Summary Cases

 SUCCESSION

SECTION 3

Substitution of Heirs

Article 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.

Article 858. Substitution of heirs may be:
(1) Simple or common;
(2) Brief or compendious;
(3) Reciprocal; or
(4) Fideicommissary.

 

Vda de Mapa vs. CA, G.R. No. L-38972, September 28, 1987, Trust

• Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo instituted Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal heir to the residue of her estate, with the obligation as trustee for the petitioners and the respondents. Ludovico, however, died without fulfilling the obligation so that the estate of Concepcion formed part his estate.
• Petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Concepcion, instituted a civil case to recover from the estate of Ludovico, the properties left by Concepcion.
• Respondents, who are nephews and nieces of Hidrosollo, denied the existence of trust and claimed that as Concepcion's surviving spouse, Hidrosollo became her universal heir when she died without descendants or ascendants.

WoN the will of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo created a trust in their favor, not a fideicommissary substitution. YES

• In the Will, Ludovico Hidrosollo was instituted as sole and universal heir to the rest of the properties not covered by the legacies in the preceding paragraphs. However, said Ludovico Hidrosollo was charged (encargo) with the obligation to deliver the rest of the estate in equal parts to the Mapa, Salazar and Hidrosollo nephews and nieces, who, as beneficiaries, were directed to deliver annually to one Salvador Genova, during his lifetime, 12 cavans of palay on the condition that the latter assist Luis Hidrosollo in each harvest.
• Although the word "trust" itself does not appear in the Will, the testatrix's intent to create one is nonetheless clearly demonstrated by the stipulations in her Will. In designating her husband Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver the properties to petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title should vest in him, and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as "beneficiarios," she intended that the beneficial or equitable interest to these properties should repose in them. To our mind, these designations, coupled with the other provisions for co-ownership and joint administration of the properties, as well as the other conditions imposed by the testatrix effectively created a trust in favor of the parties over the properties adverted to in the Will. "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." 
• However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the surviving spouse of the testatrix, Ludovico Hidrosollo was entitled to a legitime of one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate. As that portion is reserved by law for the compulsory heirs, no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever may be imposed upon the legitime by the testator. The trust created by Concepcion Mapa should therefore be, as it is hereby declared to be effective only on the free portion of her estate, i.e., that portion not covered by Ludovico Hidrosollo's legitime.

Article 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.

Causes of simple (vulgar) substitution:

1. predecease of the first heir
2. renunciation of the first heir 
3. incapacity of the first heir

Article 860. Two or more persons may be substituted for one; and one person for two or more heirs. 

Article 861. If heirs instituted in unequal shares should be reciprocally substituted, the substitute shall acquire the share of the heir who dies, renounces, or is incapacitated, unless it clearly appears that the intention of the testator was otherwise. If there are more than one substitute, they shall have the same share in the substitution as in the institution.

 
Article 862. The substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon the instituted heir, unless and testator has expressly provided the contrary, or the charges or conditions are personally applicable only to the heir instituted.

 
Article 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.

Elements of the fideicommissary. 

1. a first heir (fiduciary/fiduciario) who takes the property upon the testator’s death; 
2. a second heir (fideicommissary heir/fideicomisario) who takes the property subsequently from the fiduciary; 
3. the second heir must be one degree from the first heir;
4. the dual obligation imposed upon the fiduciary to preserve the property and to transmit it after the lapse of the period to the fideicommissaiy heir; 
5. both heirs must be living and qualified to succeed at the time of the testator’s death.

Ramirez vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982, One Degree Requirement

• Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only his widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez, as compulsory heir. 
• The beneficiaries of his will include his widow Marcelle, a French who lives in Paris; his companion Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian who lives in Spain; and his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez. The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
• Bare Ownership
• Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
• Substitution clause: In favor of their respective descendants and, if absent, reciprocal substitution between Roberto and Jorge
• Usufruct
• One-third to testator's wife, Marcelle Ramirez
• Substitution clause: In favor of Wanda de Wrobleski
• Two-thirds to Wanda de Nrobleski
• Substitution clause: Half in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and remaining half to the testator's nephew, Horace V. Ramirez
• CFI-Manila: Admitted his will to probate and appointed Maria Luisa Palacios as administratrix of the estate. Maria Luisa Palacios submitted an inventory of the estate and a project of partition dividing the property of the deceased into two parts:
• One part shall go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; 
• The other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez.
• One third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

1. WoN the one-third usufruct over the free portion in favor of the widow is justifiable. NO

• Since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. However, it appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate.
• The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "in full ownership" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

2. WoN the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda survived the testator. YES

• Substitution is the appoint-judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. There are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary. Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two. The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 and fideicommissary substitution is described in Art. 863. 
• The appellants allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.

3. WoN the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.  YES

• The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary. 
• There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners."

4. WoN the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution. NO

• The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
• This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

The estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:

• One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
• One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

Crisologo vs. Singson, G.R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962, Dual Obligation

• In 1948, Dña. Leona Singson passed away single, survived by brothers, nieces, and a grandniece. 
• Clause IX of her will stipulated granting half of her house in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, to her grandniece Consolacion Florentino. But if Consolacion pass away before or after Leona, the property would be equally divided among Leona's three brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio or their heirs if any of them died earlier.
• Spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo filed an action for partition against Manuel Singson. They allege that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion owned the other half by virtue of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson. The defendant claims that Consolacion was a mere usufructuary of, and not owner of the property, thus, she was not entitled to demand partition.

WoN the testamentary disposition provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar and not for a sustitucion fideicomisaria. YES

• It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino — whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix — the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. 
• If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. 

• Fiduciary substitution requires three requirements:    

1. A first heir called to enjoy the assets preferably.
2. Clearly imposed obligation on the same to preserve and transmit the whole or part of the estate to a third party.
3. A second heir.

• A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix — her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
• In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

 
Article 864. A fideicommissary substitution can never burden the legitime.

 
Article 865. Every fideicommissary substitution must be expressly made in order that it may be valid.

The fiduciary shall be obliged to deliver the inheritance to the second heir, without other deductions than those which arise from legitimate expenses, credits and improvements, save in the case where the testator has provided otherwise.

Two ways of making an express imposition: 

1. by the use of the term fideicommissary, or
2. by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation to preserve and to transmit to the second heir.

Article 866. The second heir shall acquire a right to the succession from the time of the testator's death, even though he should die before the fiduciary. The right of the second heir shall pass to his heirs.

 
Article 867. The following shall not take effect:
(1) Fideicommissary substitutions which are not made in an express manner, either by giving them this name, or imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation to deliver the property to a second heir;
(2) Provisions which contain a perpetual prohibition to alienate, and even a temporary one, beyond the limit fixed in article 863;
(3) Those which impose upon the heir the charge of paying to various persons successively, beyond the limit prescribed in article 863, a certain income or pension;
(4) Those which leave to a person the whole or part of the hereditary property in order that he may apply or invest the same according to secret instructions communicated to him by the testator.

 
Article 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary substitution does not prejudice the validity of the institution of the heirs first designated; the fideicommissary clause shall simply be considered as not written.

 
Article 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves to a person the whole or part of the inheritance, and to another the usufruct, shall be valid. If he gives the usufruct to various persons, not simultaneously, but successively, the provisions of article 863 shall apply. 

Article 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void. 

 

Rodriguez vs. CA, G.R. No. L-29264, August 29, 1969, 

• In 1958, Nieves Cruz authorized a land sale to Valenzuela, Victorio, and Santos with specific payment conditions. Cruz collected payments beyond the agreement, totaling P47,198.60. 
• In 1960, the land was registered under the Torrens system, recognizing partial payments by Valenzuela, Victorio, and Santos, entitling them to a share.
• Cruz subsequently sold the land to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez and tried to rescind the original deal, but her attempt was rejected. After Cruz's death, her heirs sued to cancel the agreement and the annotation on the title.
• Trial Court: Ruled in favor of Cruz and Rodriguez
• CA: Reversed the decision, annulling Rodriguez's purchase, granting title to Valenzuela, Victorio, and Santos, and ordering Rodriguez to pay damages.

WoN the petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in the matter of the value of the land in controversy. YES

• Granting arguendo, however, that the value of the land in controversy is in excess of P200,000, the petitioner had allowed an unreasonable period of time to lapse before she raised the question of value and jurisdiction, and only after and because the respondent Court had decided the case against her. The doctrine of estoppel by laches bars her from now questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
• A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
• The estate of Nieves Cruz is liable to Barbara Lombos Rodriguez for the return to the latter of the sum of P77,216, less the amount which Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. had deposited with the trial court in accordance with the decision of respondent Court. We cannot order the heirs of Nieves Cruz to make the refund. As we observed above, these heirs are liable for restitution only to the extent of their individual inheritance from Nieves Cruz. Other actions or proceedings have to be commenced to determine the liability accruing to each of the heirs of Nieves Cruz.

Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, G.R. No. 138774, March 8, 2001

• Gregorio Francisco owned two residential parcels in Bocaue, Bulacan. 
• In 1990, Gregorio was hospitalized. He informed Aida Francisco-Alfonso that the titles to his properties were in possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Aida is the sole legitimate daughter of Gregorio while Regina and Zenaida are his illegitimate children.
• After Gregorio's death, Aida discovered a deed of absolute sale dated August 15, 1983, where Gregorio sold the land to Regina and Zenaida for P25,000, resulting in title certificates issued to them. Aida filed a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages, alleging forgery.
• RTC-Bulacan: Dismissed the complaint, upholding the validity of the sale and the titles, but the CA reversed the decision and declared the deed null and void.

WoN legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children. NO

1. The kasulatan was simulated. 

• There was no consideration for the contract of sale. 
• Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend, testified that Zenaida and Francisco had no apparent income 
• source from 1983 until 1991. Zenaida claimed multiple sources of income—operating a canteen, working as a cashier at a nightclub, and trading RTW items. Regina Francisco claimed she is a market vendor selling nilugaw. We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
• The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void.

2. Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.

• Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
• Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

Baritua vs. CA, G.R. No. 82233, March 22, 1990

• A tricycle driven by Bienvenido Nacario collided with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned by petitioner Jose Baritua. Bienvenido and his passenger died, and the tricycle was damaged, but no criminal case was filed.
• Through an extra-judicial settlement negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer, Bienvenido's widow Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00 after signing a "Release of Claim," and an affidavit of desistance. However, Bienvenido's parents, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners.
• CFI-Camarines Sur: Dismissed the complaint, but the CA ruled in favor of the parents, ordering the petitioners to pay damages. The court ruled that the case was instituted by the parents of the deceased in their own capacity, not as heirs, and that Alicia could not waive the damages she did not suffer.

WoN the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs. YES

• Obligations are extinguished by payment or performance. There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the accident. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment.
• The parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
• While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.