Case Digest: Belen vs. BPI, G.R. No. L-14474, October 31, 1960

Succession | Revocation

Art. 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator’s relatives shall be understood to be in favor of those nearest in degree.

Ponente:

Reyes, J.B.L., J.:

Facts: 

On September 29, 1944, Benigno Diaz executed a codicil, detailing provisions for the distribution of his estate among heirs and descendants, including Filomena Diaz.

On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died.

His codicil and will were admitted to probate in CFI-Manila.

In 1950, the proceedings for the administration of Benigno Diaz's estate were closed. Bank of the Philippine Islands became trustee for legatees.

In 1954, Filomena Diaz died, leaving behind two legitimate children: Milagros Belen de Olaguera (married with seven children) and Onesima D. Belen (single).

Onesima D. Belen filed a petition to split Filomena Diaz's share under the codicil between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, excluding Milagros's seven legitimate children.

CFI-Manila: Denied the petition. The court clarified the nature of Filomena Diaz's share in the estate, does not constitute her estate but belongs to her legitimate descendants. Distribution should involve not only Milagros and Onesima but also other legitimate descendants of Filomena, extending to grandchildren and beyond

Issue: WoN the term "sus descendeintes legitimos (her legitimate descendants)," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz (her two daughters) thereby excluding the seven grandchildren of said legatee. YES

Held: 

Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided equally between her and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters, grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889):

A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.

The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him, because, as Manresa observes, — The reason and logic strongly suggest that, in seeking to favor these relatives, he would have to adhere more closely to those linked to him by blood and family ties. 

But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator. There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.

Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by anology? There are various reasons against this. The most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does not operate. 

In the second place, the history of Article 751 (of the 1889 Code) shown that the right of representation was deliberately suppressed. 

The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the other legates, to us indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms. Observe that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz, Nestor Santiago and Isabel M. de Santiago, the testator, does not even use the description "sus hijos o descendientes," but only "descendientes".

It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could mean the nearest descendant but with the right of representation in favor of the more distant relatives. Unquestionably, the testator was at liberty to provide a series of successive substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship to the original legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the more distant descendants should enjoy the right of representation as in intestate succession. But to arrive at such conclusion, we must declare that the testator had:.

(a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs and co-legatees, as established for testamentary successions by Articles 10016 (old Art. 982) and 1019, and intended to replace such accretion with representation;

ART. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:

(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or to the same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and

(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.

xxx           xxx           xxx

ART. 1019. The heirs to whom the petition goes by the right of accretion take it in the same proportion that they inherit.

(b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced from Article 765 of the Code of 1889) providing that:

Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts,

which would not obtain if the right of representation were to apply;

(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies in the free part should be filed according to the rules of accretion or substitution (not representation); and in default of these two, ultimately inherited by the testator's own heirs intestate:

ART. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not take place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the same charges and obligations.

There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being the cardinal rule of succession in the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But without any other supporting circumstances, we deem expression "o a sus desecendientes legitimos," the testator Benigno Diaz did intend to circumvent all the legal provisions heretofore quoted. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove such intention on the part of the testator; yet she has not done so.

It is interesting to note that even under the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, the courts are divided on the question whether a bequest to "relatives" or "issue," made in general terms, gives rise to succession per capita or per stripes. In Wyeth, et al., vs. Crane, 174 N.E. 871, the Supreme Court of Illinois said;

The meaning of the word "descendants", when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed, has been frequently considered and decided by the Court of England and the United States. They established rule in England from an early date was that the word "descendants" or the word "issued" unexplained by anything in the context of the instrument, means all persons descending lineally from another, to the remotest degree, and includes persons descended, even though their parents are living, and that such descendants take per capita stripes.

The courts of this country are divided on the question of whether in case of a gift or conveyance to "descendants" or "issue", children take concurrently with their parents. The so- called English rule has been adhered to in New York, New Jersey, and Tenessee. . . . On the other hand, the courts of Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island and South Carolina have held that, in case of a gift or conveyance to descendants or issue, unexplained by anything in the context of instrument, children do not take currently with their parents.

We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846. So that the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant.

Notes:

• Apparently, the term “relatives” extends only up to the fifth degree (the limit in intestacy). 
• Belen v. BPI (109 Phil. 1008 [I960]) states in an obiter that “...the law [Art. 959] assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy ...”. 
• Intestacy in Philippine law stops with the fifth degree of consanguinity. Beyond that degree, blood kinship is not recognized.
• However, representation (a feature of intestate succession) does not operate in the application of this article (Belen v. BPI, supra 1, citing Castan). 
• The reason is that Article 751 of the Spanish Code (from which this article is derived) deliberately suppressed the provision in the Proyecto of 1851 (Art. 562) allowing representation. 
• In fact, commentators opine that the other rules of intestacy, such as preference of line, the distinction between full- and half-blood fraternity, are not applicable either, and that only the principle of proximity applies
• Institution of relatives of another person
• The institution of relatives of another person, not of the testator, does not fall within the ambit of this article. 
• There is opinion to the effect that such an institution is void for vagueness.
• But it was held in Belen v. BPI, that an institution (by way of simple substitution, of the legatee’s “descendientes legitimos” was valid and covered all legitimate descendants, i.e. children, grandchildren, etc. per capita, in accord with Art. 846.