Case Digest: Manuel vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. 117246, August 22, 1995

Succession | Iron Curtain Rule

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Ponente:

Aquino, J.:

Facts:

Antonio Manuel was married to Beatriz Guiling.

Antonio had an extramarital relationship with Ursula Bautista, resulting in the birth of Juan Manuel.

Juan Manuel married Esperanza Gamba. 

A donation propter nuptias was given to Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel.

Juan later acquired two other parcels of land, which were registered in his name.

Juan and Esperanza, unable to have children, raised Modesta Manuel-Baltazar as their own "daughter" out of their desire to have a child.

In 1980, Juan Manuel executed a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro to Estanislaoa Manuel over a half portion of his land.

In 1990, Juan Manuel died intestate.

In 1992, Esperanza Gamba died.

Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, claiming three parcels of land owned by Juan Manuel. She also executed a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel over a portion of the land.

The legitimate children of Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.

Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint, stating that they are not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit since they are not the heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel.

Issue:

WoN the petitioners are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code. NO

Held:

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. 

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. 

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. His thesis:

What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. 

The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. In Diaz, we have said:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled:

1. that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance;
2. that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child;
3. that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent;
4. that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father;
5. and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.

Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.

In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through

Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:

Order of Preference

1. Legitimate Children and Descendants
2. Legitimate Parents and Ascendants
3. Illegitimate Children and Descendants (in the absence of ICDs and LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents)
4. Surviving Spouse'
5. Brothers and Sisters/Nephews and Nieces
6. Other Collateral Relatives (within the fifth civil degree)
7. State
   

Order of Concurrence

1. Legitimate Children and Descendants, Illegitimate Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse
2. Legitimate Parents and Ascendants Illegitimate Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse
3. Illegitimate Children and Descendants and Surviving Spouse
4. Surviving Spouse and Illegitimate Parents
5. Brothers and Sisters/ Nephews and Nieces and Surviving Spouse
6. Alone
7. Alone

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.