Case Digest: Padura v. Baldovino, G.R. No. L-11960. Dec. 27, 1958

Succession | Art. 891, Preference among the reservatarios

Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

Ponente:

Reyes, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:

Agustin Padua contracted two marriages during his lifetime.

With his first wife Gervacia Landig, he had one child: Manuel Padura.

With his second, Benita Garing, he had two children: Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.

In 1908, Agustin Padura died. He left a will distributing his properties to his three children and to his surviving spouse Benita Garing. Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land.

In the same year, Fortunato died unmarried and intestate. The parcels of land were inherited by his mother. Benita Garing was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title for the properties, subject to the condition that these were reservable.

In 1934, Candelaria Padura died. She left four legitimate children: Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino.

In 1940, Manuel Padura died. He left seven children: Dionesia, Elisa, Flora, Comelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all sumamed Padura.

In 1952, Benita Garing died.

A court resolution declared the legitimate children of Manuel Padura and Candelaria Padura as the rightful reservees entitled to the reservable properties.

The heirs of Candelaria filed a petition for partition, requesting one-half for themselves and the other half for the appellees. 

The heirs of Manuel opposed the petition, asserting that all eleven reservees should inherit in an equal share.

CFI-Laguna: Declared all reservees as co-owners of equal shares in the parcels of land without any distinction.

Issue:

In reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendants (prepositus) but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood? 

Held:

The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of 1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentine vs. Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra). 

"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such. 

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x.” (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.

There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. 

Had the nephews of whole and half-blood succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent (causante) the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Román and Mucius Scaevola. The reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to take the reservable property because they belong to the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But the argument, if logically pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all the reservatarios, as a class, and in equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of Scaevola, that later became known as the theory of reserva integral. But, as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that the reservable property should be succeeded by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of intestacy.

All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a minimum the alterations introduced by the reserva in the basic rules of succession mortis causa.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside, and the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood. 

Note:

• Conformably to the Padura ruling, which subjects the choice of reservatarios to the rules of intestate succession, those reservatarios nearer in degree of relationship to the Prepositus will exclude those more remotely related.