Succession: Case Digests on Intestate Succession

Succession | Intestate Succession

Provisions

Jurisdiction

  • The Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, died in the City of Manila. Two proceedings were filed before different courts on the same day.
  • A petition for intestate proceeding was filed before CFI-Rizal at 8:00 am while a petition for the probate was filed  before CFI-Bulacan at 11:00 am.
  • The jurisdiction of the CFI-Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will.
  • Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. 
  • Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

  • In 1962, Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate.
  • In 1963, Gertrudes de los Santos and several co-heirs, including Maximo de la Cruz executed an extrajudicial partition agreement on the estate of Pelagia.
  • In 1965, Gertrudes filed a complaint against Maximo for specific performance regarding the agreement. She claimed that Maximo agreed to develop the estate in exchange for three lots, but he sold these without performing the development.
  • Maximo admitted the agreement's execution but argued that Gertrudes was not an heir of  Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, as she was included in the agreement by mistake.
  • Maximo counterclaimed for a share of the proceeds from Gertrudes's sale of her share in the estate. The court declared Gertrudes in default for not answering the counterclaim.
  • In 1966, the case was submitted to decision.
  • CFI-Rizal: Ruled that Maximo, being part of the agreement, was estopped from challenging the right of Gertrudes to inherit.
WoN Gertrudes, being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation. NO

Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.

ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.

Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.

Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly received and took possession of the property of a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance. 


Rule on Proximity

  • In 1995, Ofelia Hernando Bagunu intervened in the a special proceeding, asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad.
  • Ofelia is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto, being the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto.
  • Ofelia assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to Pastora Piedad, the maternal aunt of Augusto.
WoN Ofelia, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree. NO

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply.  

The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following:
  1. firstly, the legitimate children and descendants
  2. secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants
  3. thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants
  4. fourthly, the surviving spouse, and 
  5. fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. 
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.


Rule on Proximity

  • Benedicto Estrada filed a case for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land had been acquired by Justa as follows: 

    1. 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 
    2. 2.2 hectares by purchase.

  • Benedicto is the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. He claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa.
  • Benedicto complained that Pascasio Uriarte who worked the land as Justa’s tenant, refused to give him his share of the harvest. 
  • Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. 
WoN Benedicto is entitled to share in the estate of Justa. YES

Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justa’s parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her father’s (Juan Arnaldo’s) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition, Justa inherited her mother’s (Ursula Tubil’s) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justa’s nearest surviving relative. 

In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa’s cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. 

As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa’s half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. 


Iron Curtain Rule, Representation

  • In 1966, Dominga Revuelta died at the age of 92.
  • She left a will leaving her properties to her three children: Alfredo, Vicente, and Isabel de la Puerta.
  • Isabel filed a petition for the probate of the will, where she was given the free portion in addition to her legitime.
  • Alfredo and Vicente opposed the petition.
  • When Alfredo died, Vicente was left as the lone oppositor.
  • Vicente was married to Genoveva de la Puerta but was separated two years after their marriage in 1938. They never reconciled. 
  • In 1974, Vicente filed a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta, which Isabel appealed.
  • Carmelita was born on December 18, 1962 from Vicente and Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife.
  • In 1978, during the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died. The appeal was dismissed.
  • In 1981, Carmelita intervened in the probate proceedings, requesting a monthly allowance as Vicente's acknowledged natural child.
WoN Carmelita may claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. NO

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.

It is settled that —

In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases:
  1. first, when the person represented dies before the testator; 
  2. second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and 
  3. third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father’s death, which came after his own mother’s death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.

But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.

Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either.

The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father’s estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta’s will.


Iron Curtain Rule, Representation
  • Eleno and Rafaela Sayson have five children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. 
    • In 1952, Eleno died.
    • In 1976, Rafaela died. 
  • Teodoro married Isabel Bautista. 
  • They have three children: Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel.
  • Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted while Doribel was their legitimate daughter.
    • In 1972, Teodoro died.
    • In 1981, Isabel died.
  • In 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. 
  • Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson opposed the action alleging successional rights.
  • They filed their own complaint for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, claiming Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation. 
WoN Doribel is qualified from inheriting from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. YES

WoN Delia and Edmundo Sayson are qualified from inheriting from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. NO

Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. 

Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

Representation, Aunt-Nieces/Nephews

  • Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
  • She was a resident of Cebu City before transferring to Intramuros, Manila and known to have continuously lived until 1944. Since then, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown.
  • She left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives:
    • Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and
    • Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). 
  • Trial Court: Ruled that the children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt of the same decedent.
WoN the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance. NO

We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975: When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows: Under Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. 

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.

Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly states:

Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.

Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship. 

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.


Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Iron Curtain Rule
  • A Chinese named Juan Clavecilla had three daughters' with different women. His daughters are:
  1. Patricia Clavecilla
    • Patricia's mother is Susana Germodo.
    • Upon Patricia's birth, Susana married Eleno Cuartico and had children: Feliciana, Gregorio, Paula, and Macario; 
  2. Ramona Clavecilla 
    • Ramona's mother is a woman named Bonifacia with an unknown surname. 
    • Ramona died at an early age, single and without issue. 
  3. Maria Clavecilla
    • Maria's mother is Sinforosa Romano who, after Maria's birth, married Benigno Martinez;
  • Maria Clavecilla married Macario Cuartico (son of Eleno and Susana) and had five children: Tranquilino, Cipriano, Luis, Demetrio, and Pancrasio Cuartico.
  • In 1940, Patricia Clavecilla died single and intestate, leaving six parcels of land and houses.
  • Macario and Maria are both deceased and their children are the petitioners-appellants claiming to be natural nephews of Patricia, based on a 1896 private instrument executed by Juan Clavecilla.
  • The oppositors-appellees are children of Eleno and Susano, both deceased. They argued Juan Clavecilla was legally married to Bonifacia Cardente, and Romana was their legitimate child. They claim Patricia and Maria, if children of Juan, were adulterous and not validly recognized due to Juan's legal marriage to Bonifacia.
  • Trial Court: Declared the petitioners and oppositors legal heirs of Patricia Clavecilla.
WoN the petitioners are the exclusive heirs of Patricia. NO

No dispute exists that the appellees are the children of Eleno Cuartico and Susana Germodo. Susana Germodo being the natural mother of Patricia Clavecilla, it results therefore, that the appellees are natural half-brothers, half-sisters and half-niece respectively of Patricia Clavecilla.

We begin with an inquiry into the alleged rights of the appellees to be declared heirs of and to succeed Patricia Clavecilla. During the trial, petitioners adduced in evidence a certificate issued by the parish of Alegria, Cebu attesting to the marriage between Eleno or Lino Cuartico and Susana Germodo, parents of the herein oppositors. Said marriage purportedly took place in Alegria, Cebu on June 1, 1880. 

It is plainly evident, therefore, that the oppositors who are illegitimate children of Susana Germodo and Lino Cuartico are seeking to inherit ab intestato from their half-sister, Patricia Clavecilla. This pretension is certainly not countenanced under Article 943 of the Old Civil Code which provision is substantially reproduced as Article 992 in the New Civil Code. The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate succession is obviously the intervening antagonism and incompatibility between members of the natural family and those of the legitimate family. 

The appellants, on the other hand, pretend to succeed Patricia Clavecilla by reason of their alleged status of natural nephews of the latter. The appellees attempt to refute appellants' claims by alleging that Maria Clavecilla was merely a maid and not a child of Juan Clavecilla and could not have been, therefore, a relative of Patricia Clavecilla who was admittedly a daughter of Juan Clavecilla. Moreover, appellees claim, that assuming that Maria was a child of Juan Clavecilla along with Patricia Clavecilla, neither Maria nor Patricia could have been recognized as natural daughters by Juan Clavecilla who was, at the time of their (Maria's and Patricia's) birth legally and validly married with Bonifacia Cardente. 

In view of all the foregoing, and finding that neither the appellants nor the appellees are entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance left by Patricia Clavecilla, it behooves us to call upon the State to succeed.


Iron Curtain Rule
  • Eufrancia Vda. de Crisologo filed an action against Bernardo Mallillin for ownership, annulment of sale, and possession of properties, claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, Lutgarda Capiao. 
  • They seek to annul deeds of sale covering 17 parcels of land and a house sold to the respondent.
  • Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing petitioners were strangers to Lutgarda Capiao and had no cause of action as they were not real parties in interest.
  • Trial Court: Rendered a summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint based on findings that, according to Article 992 of the Civil Code, legitimate relatives cannot inherit from an illegitimate child and vice versa based on the following:
  1. That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao;
  2. That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao was married to Raymundo Zipagan, both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' 
  3. That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any will intestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs;
  4. That Lutgarda Leogarda is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao.
  • CA: Denied the petition.
WoN the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the appeal of petitioners on the ground that the record on appeal was filed out of time. NO

With regard to the first issue, we hold that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the record on appeal was filed out of time. The records bear out the fact that the petitioners filed their record on appeal nineteen days after the last day to perfect the appeal. Moreover, it did not incorporate the Motion for Summary Judgment with its Annexes and Exhibits nor was it accompanied by any motion for an extension of time to file a record on appeal which, if approved, could have justified its having been filed late. Furthermore, the appeal bond was filed fifteen (15) days late. We, therefore, rule that no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the respondent judge.

The present case does not warrant such liberality because the decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the records. It is clear from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the legitimate line of Julia Capiao they cannot inherit from tier illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda Capiao. 

Iron Curtain Rule
  • In 1959, Silvina G. Udan died.
  • She left a purported will naming Francisco G. Udan and Wencesla Cacho as sole heirs.
  • Wencesla Cacho filed a petition to probate the will.
  • Rustico G. Udan, Silvina's legitimate brother, opposed the probate. 
  • Francisco G. Udan also filed an opposition to the will's probate. Later, Rustico G. Udan verbally moved to withdraw his opposition due to the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, and the opposition was withdrawn.
  • In 1961, Francisco G. Udan died.
  • John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, Silvina's legitimate brothers, filed oppositions to the will of Silvina.
  • CFI-Zambales: Disallowed the oppositions for lack of interest in the estate, ordering the Fiscal to study the possibility of filing escheat proceedings.
WoN the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. NO

We find that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).

That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the oppositor; and he is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single, the son must be necessarily illegitimate.

The trial court, therefore, committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms from participation in the estate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.

The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.

There is no document or pleading in the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco Udan.

Iron Curtain Rule
  • In 1939, Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila at age 77.
  • His will was probated in and affirmed in the court's 1941 decision (Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527).
  • Yangco had no forced heirs. His nearest relatives at death included:
    • Luis R. Yangco (half brother)
    • Paz Yangco (half sister, married to Miguel Ossorio), 
    • Amalia, Jose A. V., and Ramon Corpus (children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus), and 
    • Juanita Corpus (daughter of his half brother Jose)
  • In 1944, Juanita died.
  • In 1945, the probate court received a project of partition in the will of Teodoro R. Yangco.
    • The estate of Luis R. Yangco opposed the petition.
    • Atty. Roman A. Cruz, representing Juanita Corpus among others, alleged the will intended estate conservation, not physical partition.
  • Probate Court: Approved the partition, rejecting the need for intestacy declaration.
    • Appeals were dismissed after compromises were reached.
    • Tomas Corpus signed the compromise settlement as Juanita Corpus's sole heir. 
    • Luis R. Yangco's estate entered into a similar compromise.
  • In 1951, Tomas Corpus, as Juanita Corpus's sole heir, filed an action to recover her supposed share, alleging that the perpetual prohibitions in the will invalidated it, demanding intestate distribution.
  • Trial Court: Dismissed the action due to res judicata and laches, stating the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was already determined.
WoN Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate. NO

The trial court found that Yangco "At his death, Luis and Paz, surnamed Yangco, also survived him, acknowledged natural siblings by their natural father, Luis R. Yangco." The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child in the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. 

Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.

These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.

On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. 

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.

Iron Curtain Rule
  • Antonio Manuel was married to Beatriz Guiling.
  • Antonio had an extramarital relationship with Ursula Bautista, resulting in the birth of Juan Manuel.
  • Juan Manuel married Esperanza Gamba. 
    • A donation propter nuptias was given to Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel.
    • Juan later acquired two other parcels of land, which were registered in his name.
  • Juan and Esperanza, unable to have children, raised Modesta Manuel-Baltazar as their own "daughter" out of their desire to have a child.
  • In 1980, Juan Manuel executed a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro to Estanislaoa Manuel over a half portion of his land.
  • In 1990, Juan Manuel died intestate.
  • In 1992, Esperanza Gamba died.
  • Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, claiming three parcels of land owned by Juan Manuel. She also executed a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel over a portion of the land.
  • The legitimate children of Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
  • Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint, stating that they are not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit since they are not the heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel.
WoN the petitioners are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code. NO

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

Iron Curtain Rule

  • In 1942, Francisca Reyes died intestate, leaving behind daughters Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo (son of deceased daughter Pascuala Cailles).
  • In 1944, Sotero Leonardo died.
  • In 1949, Silvestra Cailles died without children.
  • In 1964, Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be Sotero Leonardo's son, filed a complaint for ownership of properties and accounting, seeking a declaration as one of Francisca Reyes's lawful heirs entitled to a half share in her estate.
  • Maria Cailles claimed exclusive ownership of the properties and argued that Cresenciano, as an illegitimate child, couldn't inherit through representation. 
  • James Bracewell also claimed ownership through a deed of sale from Maria Cailles, and the properties were mortgaged to Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc.
  • CFI-Rizal: Ruled in favor of Cresenciano.
  • CA: Reversed the trial court's decision.
WoN Cresenciano Leonardo has the right be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes. NO

Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation. In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother. 

However, the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. 

Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. 

  • Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion had two legitimate children: Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and Juliana Pamuti.
    • Juliana married Simon Jardin and had Felisa Pamuti Jardin. 
    • Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero, their only legitimate son.
  • In 1970, Pascual Santero died. 
  • In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
  • Pablo Santero was survived by his mother Simona and his four minor natural children with Anselma Diaz and two minor natural children with Felixberta Pacursa.
  • In 1976, Simona Santero died.
    • Felisa Pamuti Jardin, the niece of Simona, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero.
    • Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children with Pablo, opposed Felisa's intervention in Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero's estate, as well as in the estates of Pascual and Pablo Santero. 
    • Felixberta Pacursa, guardian of her minor children with Pablo, supported Anselma's opposition.
  • CFI-Cavite: Excluded Felisa Jardin from further participation in the settlement of the estates of Simona, Pascual, and Pablo Santero, declaring her not an heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
  • IAC: Reversed the trial court's decision, affirming Felisa's status as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and barring Anselma Diaz and Felixberta Pacursa from interfering in the declaration of heirship in Simona's estate.
WoN her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin is the sole legal heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. YES

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. 

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Iron Curtain Rule

as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

WoN her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin is the sole legal heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. YES

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. 

Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction of Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. 

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. 

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. 

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this: The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.

Iron Curtain Rule
  • Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay is married to Dr. Federico Suntay. 
  • They had a son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay I.
  • Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco.
    • They had three children:
      1. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
      2. Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay
      3. Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay II
    • Their marriage was subsequently annulled.
    • The siblings lived with their mother separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
  • Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock:
    1. Emilio A. M. Suntay III
      • with Concepcion Mendoza
    2. Nenita Suntay TaΓ±edo
      • with Isabel Santos
    • Emilio III and Nenita are both acknowledged natural child of Emilio I.
    • They were reared by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
  • In 1979, Emilio I died, predeceasing both his parents.
  • After Emilio's death, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. However, it was stopped due to a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel for the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
  • In 1990, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate.
  • In 1993, Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
  • In 1995, Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for Cristina's estate.
  • Federico opposed alleging that he should be the one appointed as a part owner of the mass conjugal properties left by Cristina, and that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years.
  • In 1999, Federico nominated his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf.
  • In 2000, Federico died.
  • RTC-Bulacan: Appointed Emilio A.M. Suntay as administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
  • CA: Reversed the decision and appointed Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay as administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
WoN Emilio A.M. Suntay III, an illegitimate grandchild, is qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. YES

We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts and circumstances:
  1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
  2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
  3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
  4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
  5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
  6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning – Emilio III’s nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federico’s death – wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, we upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate. In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian that:

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita TaΓ±edo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.


Iron Curtain Rule
  • Amadea Angela K. Aquino claims to be a nonmarital child of Arturo Aquino, who was a marital child of Miguel Aquino, Angela’s grandparent. 
  • Arturo died on January 10, 1978 before Angela was born on October 9, 1978. While her parents were not married, they did not suffer from any impediment to marry.
  • Angela seeks to inherit from the estate of Miguel through her right of representation.
WoN Amadea Angela K. Aquino, the alleged nonmarital child of Arturo C. Aquino, who was a marital child of Miguel T. Aquino, can inherit from her grandfather's estate. YES
  • Intestate succession presumes the decedent's will. Article 992 assumes decedent's property disposition excludes nonmarital children due to perceived hostility.
  • However, nonmarital children are those born outside a valid marriage and it does not solely mean extramarital affairs; it includes unmarried parents by choice, sexual assault victims, or birth to adolescent parents.
  • Children, regardless of birth circumstances, should inherit from direct ascendants. The Family Code supports reciprocal support regardless of legitimacy.
  • Nonmarital children can inherit through representation in their grandparent's estate. Article 982 of the Civil Code—which does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status of the “grandchildren and other  descendants”—shall apply.
  • The ruling applies only when the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent's share in their grandparent's estate. It does not cover cases where the nonmarital child inherits solely by themselves.
  • However, the application of Article 982 here does not automatically give Angela the right to inherit from Miguel's estate. Angela must still prove her filiation.
  • The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of origin for resolution, within 90 days of receipt of this Decision, of the issues of Amadea Angela K. Aquino's filiation—including the reception of DNA evidence upon consultation and coordination with experts in the field of DNA analysis
WoN Angela was barred from claiming her filiation. NO.
  • Jurisprudence dictates illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition under Article 285 of the Civil Code for a period of up to four (4) years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired by the passage of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
  • Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives the right to file petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take the right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
  • Angela was born on October 9, 1978, before the Family Code was created and when the Civil Code provisions on proving filiation applies. 
  • Hence, Angela, has the right to prove that she was her father’s daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within four years from attaining the age of majority. 
  • Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of majority is 21 years old. 
  • Angela attained majority on October 9, 1999. 
  • She had until October 9, 2003 to assert her right to prove her filiation with Arturo. 
  • Thus, when she moved to be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel’s estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet barred from claiming her filiation.
  • However, there is no provision in the Civil Code that guides a child, who was born after their father's death, in proving filiation with him. Documents may need to be presented and authenticated; witnesses’ testimonies received and examined; and DNA testing ordered and conducted, to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations raised by the parties before the Court. 

Intestate Succession
  • In 1953, Pedro Santillon died intestate.
  • He was survived by his wife, Perfecta Miranda, and one son, Claro Santillon. 
  • In 1957, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. 
  • Perfecta Miranda and Spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales filed an opposition.
  • In 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate.
  • After deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, Claro claims 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
  • CFI-Pangasinan: Ruled and ordered that after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties, Perfecta Miranda shall inherit 1/2 share and the remaining 1/2 share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. 
WoN Atty. Claro Santillon is entitled to 3/4 of his father estate. NO

Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; 
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession.

Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.

This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:

One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions:
  1. Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; 
  2. Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.

A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 
So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following articles:

ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and descendants ... .

ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate ... .

ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).

In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.

B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies:
  1. where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and 
  2. where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception)
Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not called upon to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.

Intestate Succession
  • In 1956, Macaria Atega died intestate.
  • She owned a 248-square meter residential lot in Butuan City.
  • During her lifetime, Macaria had two marriages, first with Angel Burdeos and later with Canuto Rosales.
  • At her death, Macaria was survived by:
    • from her first marriage:
      1. her son Ramon A. Burdeos
      2. her grandchild Estela Lozada (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) 
    • from her second marriage:
      1. her child David Rosales
      2. her child Justo Rosales
      3. her child Romulo Rosales
      4. her child Aurora Rosales
  • Some time after Macaria's death, David Rosales died intestate without an issue.
  • In 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad their interest on the disputed lot for the price of P55,460.00.
  • However, in a duly notarized deed of sale the lot was sold for only P23,000.00.
  • In 1987, Socorro Rosales, widow of David Rosales, discovered the sale.\She attempted to redeem the property by tendering P23,000, but Zosima refused, citing the lot's current value of P80,000.
  • Socorro initiated an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction."
  • RTC-Butuan: Held that Socorro's right to redeem the property had  already lapsed.
  • CA: Reversed the decision, declaring Socorro entitled to redeem the inheritance rights of the Heirs of Ramon Burdeos.
WoN Socorro C. Rosales is entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Article 1088, NCC) or pro-indiviso share (Article 1620, NCC) of the heirs of Ramon Burdeos. YES

Still, the thrust of the petition before us is the alleged incapacity of private respondent Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she being merely the spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir herself in the intestate estate of Macaria.

We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.

David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.

We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court.


Intestate Succession

  • Dr. Nixon L. Treyes and Rosie Larlar Treyes are married.
  • In 2008, Rosie died without children and left no will. She had seven siblings.
  • Rosie and Treyes jointly owned 14 real estate properties as conjugal properties.
  • Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, transferring Rosie's estate to himself, claiming to be her sole heir.
  • In 2012, Rosie's siblings requested settlement of Rosie's estate, but Treyes did not respond. They discovered that titles to most properties were transferred to Treyes.
  • In 2013, the Larlar siblings filed a complaint for annulment of the affidavits, cancellation of titles, reconveyance, partition, and damages against Treyes.
  • Treyes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground on the following grounds: (1) improper venue; (2) prescription; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
  • RTC: Denied the Omnibus Motion.
  • CA: Affirmed the RTC ruling.
WoN a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection and enforcement of ownership rights given by the law of succession. NO

Petition denied.

In the instant case, it is readily apparent from the allegations in the Complaint filed by the private respondents that the action was not instituted for the determination of their status as heirs, as it was their position that their status as heirs was already established ipso jure without the need of any judicial confirmation. Instead, what the Complaint alleges is that the private respondents' rights over the subject properties, by virtue of their being siblings of the deceased, must be enforced by annulling the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication and ordering the reconveyance of the subject properties.

That the private respondents do not really seek in their Complaint the establishment of their rights as intestate heirs but, rather, the enforcement of their rights already granted by law as intestate heirs finds basis in Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's death – the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution."

Hence, the Court has held that the "title or rights to a deceased person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be declared 'heirs.'"

In Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., the Court held that:

"From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, x x x the right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings."

In fact, in partition cases, even before the property is judicially partitioned, the heirs are already deemed co-owners of the property. Thus, in partition cases, the heirs are deemed real parties in interest without a prior separate judicial determination of their heirship.

Similarly, in the summary settlement of estates, the heirs may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the decedent amongst themselves through the execution of a public instrument even without a prior declaration in a separate judicial proceeding that they are the heirs of the decedent. If there is only one legal heir, the document usually executed is an affidavit of self-adjudication even without a prior judicial declaration of heirship.

The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs and intestate heirs. They refer to relatives that become heirs by virtue of compulsory succession or intestate succession, as the case may be, by operation of law.

In the instant case, Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their children, who survive with the widow or widower, shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, while the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the other half:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Hence, subject to the required proof without any need of prior judicial determination, the private respondents siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the decedent. Thus, in filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as intestate heirs established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes that right. What they seek is the enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Article 1001 in relation to Article 777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication that disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.

As correctly explained by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Bernabe) in her Separate Opinion, "a prior declaration of heirship in a special proceeding should not be required before an heir may assert successional rights in an ordinary civil action aimed only to protect his or her interests in the estate. Indeed, the legal heirs of a decedent should not be rendered helpless to rightfully protect their interests in the estate while there is yet no special proceeding."

To stress once more, the successional rights of the legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent or expectant — they vest upon the death of the decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute an action to protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are thus real parties in interest in the instant case. To delay the enforcement of such rights until heirship is determined with finality in a separate special proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the Civil Code which recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a moment's interruption — upon the death of the decedent.

Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance vest immediately at the precise moment of the decedent's death even without judicial declaration of heirship, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no prior judicial declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification of deeds divesting property or properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the estate or for the common benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing doctrine.

Accordingly, the rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.

Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding only between and among the parties.


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