Succession: Case Digests on Legitimes, Disinheritance, and Legacies and Devises (Arts. 886-959)

Succession | Legitimes, Disinheritance,  and Legacies and Devises (Arts. 886-959)

Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1988
Donation Inter Vivos

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

• In 1979, Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde bought a land from her father Rafael Nicolas in Valenzuela, Bulacan.
• In 1990, Estrellita sold the property and using a portion of the proceeds of sale, she then bought a car and a property in Parañaque.
• In 1991, Estrellita and her daughters were tragically killed in the incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre", leaving Lauro as the sole heir after their succession.
• Her widower, Lauro G. Vizconde, entered into an extra-judicial settlement of Estrellita's estate with Rafael and Salud. He received the Parañaque property and the car with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims in the said properties.
• In 1992, Rafael died.

WoN the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita is void and declaring the Parañaque property as subject to collation. NO

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.

The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

1. The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.
2. With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. 
3. The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. 
4. The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.
5. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque property.
6. It was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Notes: 

On Art. 902: Manner of Computing the Hereditary Estate

The process has three steps: 

1. Inventory of all the existing assets—
• This will involve an appraisal/valuation of these existing assets at the time of the decedent’s death.
• These assets include only those properties that survive the decedent; le., those which are not extinguished by his death. 
• The value determined by this inventory will constitute the gross assets. 
2. Deducting unpaid debts and charges— 
• All unpaid obligations of the decedent should be deducted from the gross assets. 
• Only those obligations with monetary value which are not extinguished by death are considered here. Thus, those obligations which are purely personal are not taken into account. 
• The difference between the gross assets and the unpaid obligations will be the available assets. 
3. Adding the value of donations inter vivos— 
• To the available assets should be added all the inter vivos donations made by the decedent.
• The donations inter vivos shall be valued as of the time they were respectively made. Any increase or decrease in value from the time they were made to the time of the decedent’s death shall be for the donee’s account, since donation transfers ownership to the donee. 
• The sum of the available assets and all the donations inter vivos is the net hereditary estate.

Net Hereditary Estate = (Gross Assets - Unpaid Obligations) + Inter Vivos Donations

On Collation, Art. 1061:

• Value to be computed—Only the value of the property donated at the time the donation was made is to be computed, since in donations ownership transfers at the time the donation is perfected. Thus, any subsequent increase in value is for the donee’s benefit, and any decrease is for his account.
• Purpose of article—To determine the amount of the net estate so as to ensure that the legitimes are not impaired.

Seangio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 140371 and 72, November 27, 2006

Disinheritance

• Segundo Seangio left a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo Seangio:
• Ako si Segundo Seangio... ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
• Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
• At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
• Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

WoN the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. YES

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

xxx

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;

xxx

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Van dorn vs. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985

Foreign Divorce

• Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines.
• Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States.
• In 1972, they were married in Hongkong.
• After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born in 1973 and in 1975, respectively
• In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States.
• Alice has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
• Richard filed suit against Alice stating that Alice's business in Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop), is a conjugal property. He asked petitioner to account for the business and wanted declaration of the right to manage conjugal property.

WoN respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court. YES

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Republic vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, August 24, 2018

Foreign Divorce

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

• Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married to Yoshino Minoro, a Japanese national. 
• Their marriage was registered in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
• Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court in December 6, 2011.
• Manalo and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and she and her daughter are living separately from said former husband.
• In 2012, Manalo filed for cancellation of her marriage entry in the Civil Registry based on the Japanese divorce decree.

WoN a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. YES

The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. 

We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse.

We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact of divorce must still first be proven. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

Bugayong vs. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956

Legal Separation

• In 1949, Benjamin Bugayong married Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan while on leave from the US Navy. They initially lived with Benjamin's sisters in Pangasinan. When Benjamin report back to duty, Leonila moved to her mother's place and later to studied in Dagupan City.
• Since July 1951, Benjamin received letters from family members and anonymous writers alleging Leonila's infidelity. He also admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, which he claims to have destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her.
• In 1952, Benjamin visited Leonila in Pangasinan. 
• They met in the house of Mrs. Malalang, defendant’s godmother, and proceeded to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong, where they stayed and lived for several days as husband and wife. When Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify truth on the alleged adultery, Leonila, instead of answering him, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. 
• In November 1952, Benjamin filed for legal separation against Leonila in the CFI-Pangasinan.

WoN the husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for two nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts. YES

The conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.

Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence. Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

Santos vs. Blas de Buenaventura, G.R. No. L-22797, September 22, 1966 and Resolution dated November 29, 1966

No Contest and Forfeiture Clause, Fruits and Interest

• In 1956, Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas died.
• Rosalina Santos filed a petition for the probate of Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas's will made in 1965.
• Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia opposed the will, citing various grounds. Flora Blas later withdrew her opposition to protect her rights and interests as a legatee in the will.
• Notably, Flora had to sell her house for P5,000 to pay for stenographic notes of the case and Rosalina thereafter gave a party at the Manila Hotel to settle the case.
• When CFI-Rizal allowed the probate of the will, Flora later filed a petition for the delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific devise in her favor under the will.
• Rosalina filed an opposition, citing a "no contest and forfeiture" clause in the will, which states that any opposition to its probate would result in forfeiture of inheritance or benefits under the will.

WoN Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. NO

Contrary to the translation accorded to Paragraph Fourteen of the will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its probate, but a contest or opposition to the probate of the will and the carrying out of its provisions. This is so because the questioned clause speaks of "pagpapatibay at pag-bibigay-bisa" instead of "pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa." This furnishes a significant index into the intention of the testatrix, namely, that she was more concerned in insuring the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding any contest or opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest which appellant brought in good faith, no prejudice has been done into the intention of the testatrix. The dispositions of her will can now be safely carried out.

Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will. Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention.

WoN Flora is entitled to, not only the devised fishpond, but all the fruits or rents of said property from the death of the testatrix up to the time said property will be delivered to her. YES

We believe that appellant should receive the fruits of the property given to her in devise. The provisions of law regarding devised proper are emphatic in stating that a devise of a specific things includes its fruits and income accruing after the testator's death. Furthermore, since fruits or rents are accessions (Arts. 441, 442, Civil Code), strictly speaking, there was really no need to mention them in the petition or the decision. 

The next argument is on appellant's claim to interest upon the fruits or rents. The rule is that interest does not run, unless stipulated, where there is yet no delay (Arts. 1169, 2209, Civil Code). And in settlement proceedings, there is no delay on the part of the administratrix until after the court orders her to make delivery of the legacy or devise (Ongpin v. Rivera, 44 Phil. 808). In this case, the court a quo not having issued such an order, appellee has not incurred in delay and is thus not liable for interest.

WoN Flora is entitled to moral damage. NO

Flora claims upon fraud allegedly committed on two different occasions: First, in the preparation of the will; and, second, during the supposed negotiation for the withdrawal of her opposition preparatory to the delivery of her devise.

As to the first, appellant would hereby be assailing the very basis of the right she is asserting as devisee, for if the will was not a voluntary act of the testatrix as she would contend, the devise in question would suffer the same defect. It should be remembered also that the will has already been admitted to probate, so that its due execution and authenticity, are already deemed established for purposes of this proceeding.

As to the second alleged occasion of fraud, We have on record only the parties' allegations and denials, and the affidavit of the devisee-claimant. Fraud being a serious charge, it is difficult to see how the same can be sustained on so insufficient an evidence. And moreover, this being a factual issue, We cannot consider the same, for this appeal is confined to questions purely of law. Appellant-movant's prayer for moral and exemplary damages, therefore, is hereby denied.

Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662, October 12, 1967

Revocation, Devisee

• In 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition to probate the alleged will of Benedicta de los Reyes executed in 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.
• Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate due to  revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944
• CFI-Bulacan: Found the will was genuine but deferred resolution on estoppel and revocation.

WoN there was revocation in the will. NO

The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:

Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:

(1) . . . .

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;

xxx           xxx           xxx

It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the quoted provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the testator.

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances).

If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy.

Notes:

Art. 957 enumerates the instances when the legacy/ devise is revoked by operation of law: 

1. transformation
• e.g., the testator converts a plantation into a fishpond.
2. alienation
• the alienation by the testator may be onerous or gratuitous. a. The alienation revokes the legacy/devise even if for any reason the thing reverts to the testator. 
• Exceptions
1. If the reversion is caused by the annulment of the alienation and the cause for annulment was vitiation of consent on the grantor’s part, either by reason of incapacity or of duress. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428 [1967]) 
2. If the reversion is by virtue of redemption in a sale with pacto de retro. 
3. total loss
• this will be a cause for revocation only if it takes place before the testator’s death. 
• Fortuitous loss after the testator’s death will not constitute revocation (despite the wording of par. 3 of this article, because legally the disposition takes effect upon death [Article 777, supra]. 
• Therefore, fortuitous loss after the testator’s death will simply be an instance of “res perit domino'' and will be borne by the legatee/devisee.

Belen vs. BPI, G.R. No. L-14474, October 31, 1960

Representation, Legacy

• On September 29, 1944, Benigno Diaz executed a codicil, detailing provisions for the distribution of his estate among heirs and descendants, including Filomena Diaz.
• In case of the death of any or all the legatees named by me, the benefits or, in other words, the legacies in favor shall be for the legitimate descendants and ascendants only, but not for the surviving spouses.
• On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died.
• His codicil and will were admitted to probate in CFI-Manila.
• In 1950, the proceedings for the administration of Benigno Diaz's estate were closed. Bank of the Philippine Islands became trustee for legatees.
• In 1954, Filomena Diaz died, leaving behind two legitimate children: Milagros Belen de Olaguera (married with seven children) and Onesima D. Belen (single).
• Onesima D. Belen filed a petition to split Filomena Diaz's share under the codicil between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, excluding Milagros's seven legitimate children.

WoN the term "sus descendeintes legitimos (her legitimate descendants)," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz (her two daughters) thereby excluding the seven grandchildren of said legatee. YES

A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. The reason and logic strongly suggest that, in seeking to favor these relatives, he would have to adhere more closely to those linked to him by blood and family ties.  But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator. There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.

The meaning of the word "descendants", when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed, has been frequently considered and decided by the Court of England and the United States. They established rule in England from an early date was that the word "descendants" or the word "issued" unexplained by anything in the context of the instrument, means all persons descending lineally from another, to the remotest degree, and includes persons descended, even though their parents are living, and that such descendants take per capita stripes.

We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846. So that the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.

Notes:

• Apparently, the term “relatives” extends only up to the fifth degree (the limit in intestacy). 
• Belen v. BPI (109 Phil. 1008 [I960]) states in an obiter that “...the law [Art. 959] assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy ...”. 
• Intestacy in Philippine law stops with the fifth degree of consanguinity. Beyond that degree, blood kinship is not recognized.
• However, representation (a feature of intestate succession) does not operate in the application of this article (Belen v. BPI, supra 1, citing Castan). 
• The reason is that Article 751 of the Spanish Code (from which this article is derived) deliberately suppressed the provision in the Proyecto of 1851 (Art. 562) allowing representation. 
• In fact, commentators opine that the other rules of intestacy, such as preference of line, the distinction between full- and half-blood fraternity, are not applicable either, and that only the principle of proximity applies
• Institution of relatives of another person
• The institution of relatives of another person, not of the testator, does not fall within the ambit of this article. 
• There is opinion to the effect that such an institution is void for vagueness.
• But it was held in Belen v. BPI, that an institution (by way of simple substitution, of the legatee’s “descendientes legitimos” was valid and covered all legitimate descendants, i.e. children, grandchildren, etc. per capita, in accord with Art. 846.

Racca vs. Echague, G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021

Twin Notice

• Maria Lolita A. Echague filed a petition for the allowance of the will of the late Amparo Ferido Racca and issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. 
• Echague averred that Amparo executed a notarial will before her death and bequeathed an undivided portion of a parcel of land in favor of her grandnephew Migdon Chris Laurence Ferido. 
• She also named Migdonio Racca and Miam Grace Dianne Ferido Racca, Amparo's husband and daughter, respectively, as Amparo's known heirs. 
• Migdonio and Miam failed to appear during the hearing.
• RTC-Palawan: Declared Migdonio and Miam in default. 

WoN the known heirs of the testator are still entitled to personal notice despite the publication and posting of the notice of the hearing. YES

An Order of General Default does not apply in probate proceedings

It should be emphasized that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. By extrinsic validity, the testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. These matters do not necessitate the issuance of an order of default against parties who failed to appear in the proceedings despite the publication of the notice of hearing. After all, the probate of a will is mandatory and cannot be left to the discretion of the persons interested in the estate of the deceased.

Without legal support, the RTC cannot validly issue an order of default in probate proceedings. Hence, the RTC palpably erred in issuing the order of general default due to the non-appearance of petitioners in the June 21, 2017 hearing.

Notice to the designated and known heirs, devisees and legatees under Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court is mandatory; Publication of notice of hearing is not sufficient when the places of residence of the heirs, legatees and devisees are known

In here, Miam was indicated as a known heir of Amparo in the petition filed by respondent. While her status as a compulsory heir may still be subject to confirmation, the petition, on its face, had already informed the probate court of the existence of Miam as one of Amparo's heirs. The petition also provided Miam's residence. By respondent's own averments, Miam is entitled to the notice of hearing under Sec. 4.

Respondent's contention that notice to Migdonio redounded to Miam since they live in the same residence does not avail. Sec. 4 requires that each known heir whose residence is known be individually served a copy of the notice of hearing. Although petitioners live in the same residence, it should not deprive Miam of her right to receive her own copy of the notice. Sec. 4 does not distinguish between heirs with the same address and those who reside in different locations. 

Based on records, Migdonio received a copy of the notice on June 19, 2017 or two (2) clays prior to the hearing on June 21, 2017. This is short of the 10-day period fixed by Sec. 4. Hence, the notice served to Migdonio did not satisfy the requirement provided by Sec. 4.