Case Digest: J.L.T. Agro vs. Balansag, G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005

Succession | Act Inter Vivos

Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

Ponente:

Tinga, J.:

Digest:

• Don Julian L. Teves had two marriages. 
• A parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and his first wife Antonia.
• When Antonia died, Lot No. 63 became part of a civil case for partition.
• A Compromise Agreement was reached, dividing the properties among the parties, Lot No. 63 remained with Don Julian.
• In the Agreement, the properties adjudicated to Don Julian was exclusively adjudicated to his second wife and their four minor children after his death. 
• In 1972, Don Julian, and his two children from the first marriage Emilio, and Josefa executed a Supplemental Deed and assigned assets, including Lot No. 63, to petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc. 
• In 1974, Don Julian died intestate. 
• J.L.T. Agro, Inc. sought registration of Lot No. 63 based on a Supplemental Deed. 
• Meanwhile, the second wife Milagros and her children had taken possession of the lot after the Compromise Agreement.
• In 1983, unaware of the registration change, respondents spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday bought from Milagros.
• Upon discovering the title was in the petitioner's name, respondents filed a complaint seeking cancellation of the title.

Court of Appeals: Declared the registration null and void. 

• The Compromise Agreement, specifically paragraph 13, preserved the heirs' legitimes, and Don Julian could not dispose of properties adjudicated to his heirs. 

Supreme Court: Upheld the CA.

• The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.
• Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
• In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
• Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.
• Irregularities in the replacement of the title are noted, with the court order allowing the issuance of a new title despite the original not being lost.
  The absence of acceptance by the donee further contributes to the nullity of the Supplemental Deed. The Supplemental Deed lacked consideration and did not follow legal requirements for a valid contract or donation.

Facts:

Don Julian L. Teves contracted two marriages.

The first with Antonia Baena, where he had two children:

1. Josefa Teves Escaño
2. Emilio Teves

After the death of Antonia, Don Julian married Milagros Donio Teves and had four children:

1. Maria Evelyn Donio Teves
2. Jose Catalino Donio Teves
3. Milagros Reyes Teves
4. Pedro Reyes Teves

Don Julian and Antonia originally registered a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 in the name of the conjugal partnership.

When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition in a civil case where Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. 

The parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.

CFI-Negros Oriental: On the basis of the compromise agreement, declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.

• Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties.
• The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.

The Compromise Agreement, lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:

13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaňo and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.

In 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. 

In 1973, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities, transferring the ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner.

In 1974, Don Julian died intestate.

On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. 

In 1979, a court, so it appeared, issued an order cancelling the title in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia and issued in the name of petitioner. Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. 

In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with respondent spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. They temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber yard. 

In 1980, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate allotting Lot No. 63 to her and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. 

In 1983, unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate.

While trying to register the deed of absolute sale at the Register of Deeds, respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. 

Respondents filed a complaint seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of title in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title in their names.

RTC-Bais City: Dismissed the complaint filed by respondents, ordering them to vacate the subject land.

Court of Appeals: Reversed the trial court’s decision, declaring the registration in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void.

• The Compromise Agreement, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his (Don Julian’s) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.
• The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them.
• Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. 
• Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.
• Nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from the second marriage. 

Issues:

1. WoN future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. YES
2. WoN the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage. NO

Held:

While most of petitioner’s legal arguments have merit, the application of the appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.

Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement has to be quoted again:

13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves."

With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos is relevant, where we defined future inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. 

Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:

ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.

Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.

For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract.

A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

1. That the succession has not yet been opened;
2. That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
3. That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

. . . .

In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.

The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.

Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.

Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. 

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.

In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.

Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.

To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title. Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of petitioner’s title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature.

The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The sections read, thus:

SEC. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate upon entry of new certificate. – No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. 

. . . .

SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. – An owner desiring to convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner’s duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The original and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s certificate shall be stamped "cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with the number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.

As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there is absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains significant relevance. Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid transaction.

What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:

Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.

CONDITIONS: Lost owner’s duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and void and a new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.

Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979

Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.

(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA

Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II

(Emphasis supplied)

What the entry indicates is that the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a petition for the reconstitution of the said owner’s duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate and its replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds had not been lost.

Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order the reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since what was lost is the owner’s copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owner’s copy could be ordered replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owner’s copy of the original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title—even designating the very number of the new transfer certificate of title itself—the order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation and replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost, as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the owner’s duplicate of the OCT

Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so constrained to do because the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of conveyance of the "registered land in fee simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.

A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that the assignment is not supported by any consideration. The provision reads:

. . . .

WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño at Dumaguete City on 16th day of November 1972 and ratified in the City of Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latter’s notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 17; Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño, transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as of December 31, 1971.

WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision made in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the following properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L. Teves. We quote.

From the properties at Bais

Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves

. . . .

Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with all improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00

. . . .

WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in order to effect the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall become absolute upon signing.

The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument does not represent the consideration for the assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value of all the nineteen (19) properties enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of petitioner. Consequently, the testimony of petitioner’s accountant that the assignment is supported by consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental Deed.

The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948 mortgage which is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the consideration for the assignment. However, the said annotation57 shows that the mortgage was actually executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner.58 Clearly, said mortgage, executed as it was in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not have been the consideration for the assignment to petitioner.

Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract, namely: 

1. consent of the contracting parties; 
2. object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
3. Cause of the obligation which is established.

Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2).

The absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which normally should be supported by a consideration such as the assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the President and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of existence of consideration established by law.

Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of the New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al., this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document, the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.

One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal objectives to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all times. Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts have ample authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues. Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case, or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.65

In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which is at the core of the controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the appellate court.66 Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

SO ORDERED.