Succession: Case Digests on Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions

Succession | Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions


Art. 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper.
  • In 1935, Father Pascual Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died.
  • In his will, he named as devisees his nearest relatives.
  • He also specified in his will a devise of 44 hectares of ricelands in Nueva Ecija in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
  • The devise included specific conditions:
    1. He has no right to sell the land.
    2. He has the right to begin enjoying and administering the lands upon starting to study Sacred Theology, and when ordained as a Priest, until his death.
    3. He loses this right to administer if he ceases to continue his studies for ordination.
    4. Once a priest, he must celebrate 20 annual masses for the testator and his parents.
    5. If excommunicated, the land goes to the parish priest and his successors of the Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac.
    6. If there is no qualified, the administration will pass to the current Catholic Parish Priest and his successors, of Victoria, Tarlac.
  • In 1940, the project of partition was approved.
  • No nephew claimed the devise.
  • In 1954, the Parish Priest of Victoria, Tarlac filed a petition in the pending testate proceeding requesting the appointment of a new administrator. He also filed a petition to deliver the rice lands to the church as trustee.
WoN Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy. NO.

We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.


 Intestate Succession

Art. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. 

  • In 1992, Sima Wei died intestate leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00.
  • His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy.
  • In 1997, Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed for letters of administration for the estate of Sima Wei.
  • They alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei.
  • Michael Guy opposed the petition, arguing that his father's estate could be settled without letters of administration and that the status of the minors as illegitimate children should have been established during Sima Wei's lifetime.
  • Other heirs joined the opposition, citing the Waiver of Claim by the mother of the minors.

WoN the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights. NO

As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence.


Intestate Succession

Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
  • In 1963, Benedicto Leviste agreed to represent Rosa del Rosario in a probate case for a property bequeathed to her by Maxima C. Reselva's holographic will, with a contingent fee of 35% of the property.
  • The attorney conducted legal research, interviewed witnesses, filed the probate petition, made publications, and presented witnesses during the trial.
  • In 1965, Del Rosario terminated the attorney's services due to perceived conflicting interests as the attorney was morally obliged to protect his brother-in-law, whom other parties intended to eject from the bequeathed property.
  • The attorney filed a motion to intervene to protect his right to fees, but it was denied by the trial court for failure to file a claim for fees or record an attorney's lien.
  • Despite the denial, the attorney continued to receive court orders and filed pleadings. The case proceeded without the respondents' evidence.
  • Del Rosario and another party filed a motion to withdraw the probate petition, which the court initially denied as it went against public policy.
  • In 1967, the court disallowed the will due to insufficient witness testimony.
  • The attorney attempted to appeal but faced opposition on the grounds of not being a party in interest. 
WoN an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court. NO

Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that  he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent attorney's fees.

The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.

Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name. Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will.


Intestate Succession

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. 
  • In 1999, Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate, leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: 
    1. Petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, 
    2. Respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
  • Respondents filed a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration" alleging to include the donation of a property in Teresa Village, Makati, by the deceased to the petitioner.
  • The respondents assails the validity of the donation and may be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner.
WoN the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation. NO
The term collation has two distinct concepts: 
  1. It is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and 
  2. It is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

The compulsory heirs may be classified into: 
  1. primary
  2. secondary and 
  3. concurring. 
The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs.

The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs.

The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

WoN the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties. YES
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. 


Intestate Succession
Art.1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious. 

  • Candelaria de Roma legally adopted Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma.
  • In 1971, Candelaria died intestate.
  • Administration proceedings were initiated in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent Felicidad Caringal, as the guardian of Rosalinda.
  • Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an inventory of the estate.
  • Rosalinda opposed the action because certain properties donated by Candelaria to Buhay and the fruits thereof were not included and should be subject to collation, as per Article 1061 of the Civil Code.
  • Buhay argued that there was no obligation to collate because the donation expressly prohibited collation and was not officious, citing Article 1062.
WoN the subject properties should be collated. YES

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.


Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

  • In 1979, Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde bought a land from her father Rafael Nicolas in Valenzuela, Bulacan.
  • In 1990, Estrellita sold the property and using a portion of the proceeds of sale, she then bought a car and a property in Parañaque.
  • In 1991, Estrellita and her daughters were tragically killed in the incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre", leaving Lauro as the sole heir after their succession.
  • Her widower, Lauro G. Vizconde, entered into an extra-judicial settlement of Estrellita's estate with Rafael and Salud. He received the Parañaque property and the car with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims in the said properties.
  • In 1992, Rafael died.
WoN the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita is void and declaring the Parañaque property as subject to collation. NO

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.

The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
  1. The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.
  2. With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. 
  3. The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. 
  4. The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.
  5. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque property.
  6. It was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
Notes: 
  • Value to be computed—Only the value of the property donated at the time the donation was made is to be computed, since in donations ownership transfers at the time the donation is perfected. Thus, any subsequent increase in value is for the donee’s benefit, and any decrease is for his account.
  • Purpose of article—To determine the amount of the net estate so as to ensure that the legitimes are not impaired.

Attorney's Fees, Distribution of Estate

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
  • In 1987, Raymond Triviere died.
  • Attorneys Enrique P. Syquia and William H. Quasha were appointed administrators of the estate.
  • In 1995, the RTC denied the Motion for Payment of litigation expenses by Attys. Syquia and Quasha, citing failure to submit an accounting of estate assets and liabilities.
  • In 1996, Atty. Quasha died; Atty. Redentor Zapata took over as counsel for Triviere children.
  • In 2002, Attys. Syquia and Zapata filed another Motion for Payment.
  • LCN Construction Corp., the only remaining claimant against the intestate estate, opposed the Motion for Payment, citing the RTC's denial of the first motion due to failure to submit an accounting. 
  • RTC-Makati (2003): Granted the Motion for Payment, stating administrators and counsel are entitled to fees and declaring that there was no need for accounting as estate has minimal assets.
    • The court also awarded:
      • ₱450,000 as share of the children of the deceased 
      • ₱150,000 as share for the widow of the deceased
  • CA: Held that Attys. Syquia and Quasha, were entitled to administrator's fees and litigation expenses. However, they could not claim the same from the funds of the estate but should be borne by their clients, the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere.
    • Deleted the shares awarded to the heirs of the deceased as it violated Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, since there still exists its LCN's unpaid claim in the sum of ₱6,016,570.65.
WoN the CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of the heirs of the late Raymond Triviere is already a distribution of the residue of the estate. NO

A perusal of the 12 June 2003 RTC Order would immediately reveal that it was not yet distributing the residue of the estate. The said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received their respective shares therefrom for more than a decade. The intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still had to hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.

While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for.

Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance distribution of the estate. The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of the estate prior to the payment of the obligations.

In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following:
  1. only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and 
  2. the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). 
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.

WoN the CA erred in nullifying the award of Attorney's Fees in favor of the co-administrators.  NO

The person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate did not extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death for the same would be in violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office merely helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the petitioner children of the late Raymond Triviere.


Prescription
  • In 1915, Genaro Dimayuga and Segunda Gayapanao were married. They had a son, Manuel Dimayuga.
  • In 1928, the spouses acquired a Torrens title for a thirteen-hectare homestead located at Pola, Oriental Mindoro.
  • In 1940, Segunda died intestate, survived by her husband and son.
  • During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named Emerenciana Panganiban
  • They had five children: Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaide, Remedios and Socorro. 
  • In 1944, a sixth child, Nelia Dimayuga, was born.
    • Emerenciana cultivated a homestead adjoining the thirteen-hectare homestead. It was not surprising that she became the paramour of Genaro.
  • In 1947, Genaro who was already 56 years old, married Emerenciana who was 37.
    • That marriage legitimated Nelia, who had been a duly acknowledged natural child, but not the other five who were adulterous or spurious children.
  • In 1948, about a month before Genaro's death, a "partition of real property" was executed in English. It was signed and duly notarized. 
    • It was signed by Genaro, Manuel Filomeno and Pacita and thumbmarked by Emerenciana, in representation of her minor children Adelaide, Remedios, Socorro and Nelia. Emerenciana had not been appointed judicial guardian of their property.
    • The document states the ages of the children as:
      • Pacita, 22, 
      • Filomeno, 19, 
      • Adelaide, 17, 
      • Remedios, 15,
      • Socorro, 13, 
      • Nelia, 4. 
    • However, their birth certificates show that they were all minors. 
      • Filomeno and Pacita were twins born on December 25, 1929; 
      • Remedios and Adelaida were also twins born on January 2, 1932; 
      • Socorro was born in 1938;
      • Nelia was bond in 1944;
  • In that partition, which the petitioners also regard as a donation, Genaro treated the homestead as his sole property and not conjugal which it actually was.
    • Manuel was given as share 5 1/2 hectares of the homestead
      • southern portion adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead
    • The six illegitimate children were given 7 7/10 hectares
      • northern portion adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead
  • The partition was not registered.
  • In 1948, Genaro died intestate.
  • In 1951, The partition was amended by means of an affidavit in Tagalog signed by the same parties except Genaro.  An additional one hectare was given to Manuel, since "ang ginawang paghahati ni Genaro Dimayuga ay hindi tumpak sapagkat naapi si Manuel Dimayuga."
  • In 1970, Manuel was advised that the entire homestead was inherited by him from his parents and freed from his father's moral ascendancy.
  • He executed an affidavit of adjudication which he registered and obtained a Torrens title for the thirteen-hectare homestead.
  • The six illegitimate children filed a complaint for the annulment of the title and for the equal division of the homestead.
WoN the possession the illegitimate children of about one-half of the homestead since the 1948 partition made them owners by prescription and that Manuel is estopped to deny that fact because he adjudicated the homestead to himself only twenty-two years later.  NO

That contention is devoid of merit. It may be morally plausible but it is legally indefensible. No portion of the homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by prescription. "No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand insofar, as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean that a person who makes an inter vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is void, the partition is void. With more reason would the partition be void if there was no will.

The 1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the owner of the entire homestead. That is wrong. One-half of the homestead, subject to the husband's usufructuary legitime, was inherited in 1940 by Manuel upon the death of his mother who was married to Genaro for twenty-five years. Genaro could dispose by an act inter vivos only one-half of the homestead in that one-half portion, Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, had a two-third legitime.

In "donating" the said one-half portion to his six illegitimate children, Genaro deprived Manuel of his legitime in his estate or, in effect, made him renounce his future inheritance.  The 1951 affidavit cannot be construed as a repudiation of his inheritance in his father's estate because the document does not have that tenor. 

The five illegitimate children (the sixth child Nelia was legitimated) have no rights whatsoever to the said homestead. As already said, they were adulterous or spurious children.

As such, they are not entitled to successional rights but only to support.
 
Three-fourth of the said homestead is hereby adjudicated to Manuel Dimayuga and one-fourth to Nelia Dimayuga. 


 Act Inter Vivos

Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

  • Old Man Tumpao had a first wife by whom he begot three children:
    1. Bando Tumpao
    2. Lambia Tumpao
    3. Abito Tumpao
  • Upon the death of his first wife, he married his second wife who had  two children she had "adopted" according to the practice of the Igorots then.
  • In 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and testament" appointing his son Bando Tumpao as the executor of his will.
  • The beneficiaries named in the document are:
    1. Bando Tumpao
    2. Lambia Tumpao
    3. Abito Tumpao
    4. Jose Tumpao
    5. Labet Tumpao
    6. Sucdad Butiog
    7. Tulingan Pul-ot
    8. Anthony Menecio
  • Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died.
  • The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them.
  • However, in 1960, the respondents Bando, Lambia and Abito executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the document.
  • Old Man Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents.
  • The petitioners sued for reconveyance.
WoN the document executed by Old Man Tumpao may be sustained. YES

After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling-made both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals-that the will, not having been probated as required by law, was inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court. 

We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:

Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and testament." When the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate. and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between them.

Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed.

The agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a conveyance of properties or property right.

It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.


Act Inter Vivos

Art. 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned, be paid in cash.

  • Manuela Buenavista vda. de Chavez owned a land in Camarines Norte as a paraphernal property.
  • She had six (6) children:
    1. Antonio
    2. Rosario
    3. Concepcion
    4. Raquel
    5. Presentacion
    6. Floserpina 
  • In 1958, Presentacion, with the conformity of her mother, executed a deed of sale of her 1/6 undivided share of the land to her sister, Concepcion for P 450.
  • In 1960, Floserpina, with the conformity of her mother, also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same price of P450. 
  • In the same year, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the same property to Concepcion for P600. 
  • Having acquired the shares of Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.
  • In all the documents, Manuela had distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property while reserving for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime.
  • In 1968, Manuela signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez.
  • Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed a civil case against their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. 
  • In 1969, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an additional defendant.
WoN the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale as a partition by an act inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista. NO

Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.

In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez in favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid..... As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of their own voluntary acts.

As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine that "no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."


Act Inter Vivos

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
  • Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents.
  • In 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the land to spouses Carlos and Casimira Alonzo for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 
  • In 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00.
  • By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. 
  • In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
  • In 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen.
  • In 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 
WoN the notice required was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. NO

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners. "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

| Act Inter Vivos

Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

  • Don Julian L. Teves contracted two marriages.
  • The first with Antonia Baena, where he had two children:
    • Josefa Teves Escaño
    • Emilio Teves
  • After the death of Antonia, Don Julian married Milagros Donio Teves and had four children:
    • Maria Evelyn Donio Teves
    • Jose Catalino Donio Teves
    • Milagros Reyes Teves
    • Pedro Reyes Teves
  • Don Julian and Antonia originally registered a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 in the name of the conjugal partnership.
  • When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition in a civil case where Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. 
  • The parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
  • In 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. 
  • In 1973, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities, transferring the ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner.
  • In 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
  • On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. 
  • In 1979, a court, so it appeared, issued an order cancelling the title in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia and issued in the name of petitioner. Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.
  • Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. 
  • In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with respondent spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. They temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber yard. 
  • In 1980, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate allotting Lot No. 63 to her and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. 
  • In 1983, unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate.
  • While trying to register the deed of absolute sale at the Register of Deeds, respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. 
  • Respondents filed a complaint seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of title in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title in their names.
WoN future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. YES

Our declaration in Blas v. Santos is relevant, where we defined future inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.

A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
  1. That the succession has not yet been opened;
  2. That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
  3. That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

WoN the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage. NO

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.

In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.

Constructive Partition

Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

  • In 1941, the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion. 
  • Nieves offered her 1/3 portion for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. She also made an offer to their mother who also declined to buy.
  • The share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new certificate of title was issued.
  • In 1941, three co-owners entered into a "Memorandum of Agreement" to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. 
  • Atty. J. Antonio Araneta acted as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
  • In 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. 
  • In 1946, Angela decided to rescind said contract because of alleged breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and abuse of powers.
  • Angela filed a complaint in the CFI-Manila asking the court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents collected during the time that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said property.
  • Antonio Tuason Jr. evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose and joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-defendant.
WoN CFI-Manila erred in dismissing the complaint. NO

We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we agree with the trial court that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of both contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and both had every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage in entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member of the Board of Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party with which Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the evidence Araneta, the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent about P117,000 in improvement and had received as proceeds on the sale of the lots the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. 

As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation from 1942 and up to 1946, the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable to obtain the equipment and gasoline necessary for filling the low places within the parcel. As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling the lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be paid in Japanese military notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be thankful because otherwise she would have received these notes as her share of the receipts, which currency later became valueless.

We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.

Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.

Prescription
  • Teodora Rosario owned a 211.80-square meter parcel of land in Pangasinan.
  • In 1970, Teodora Rosario died intestate, leaving behind her spouse Isidro Bautista and five children, namely: 
    1. Teofilo Bautista 
    2. Alegria Bautista
    3. Angelica Bautista
    4. Pacita Bautista
    5. Gil Bautista
  • In 1981, Isidro and four of his five children – Pacita, Gil, Alegria, and Angelica – executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the property in which Isidro waived his share in favor of his said four children. 
  • Teofilo was excluded from the partition.
  • Alegria and Angelica acquired ½ of the property and sold the same to their sibling Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro Tandoc.
  • Pacita and Pedro soon obtained tax declarations in their names over 209.85 square meters of the property including the shares they purchased from Angelica and Alegria.
  • In 1993, Pacita, with Pedro’s conformity, later conveyed via Deed of Absolute Sale, ½ of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong, Pedro’s nephew.
  • In 1994, Teofilo, represented by his attorney-in-fact Francisco Muñoz, filed a Complaint for annulment of documents, partition, recovery of ownership, possession and damages against:
    1. his siblings Alegria and Angelica, along with Pedro (the common-law husband of his already deceased sister Pacita)
    2. Priscilla Bautista (wife of his already deceased brother Gil)
    3. Pricilla’s children Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, and Gelacio 
    4. Cesar Tamondong
  • Petitioner claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the property and that the deed of sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar Tamondong was fictitious as it was impossible for her to have executed the same in Manila, she being already seriously ill at the time.
WoN erred in dismissing the complaint. YES

The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo’s co-heirs was invalid, however. So Segura v. Segura instructs:
x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years x x x

The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not prescribe.

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo’s co-heirs. Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.

  • Spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot in Isarog St., Quezon City.
  • In 1982, Virginia P. Viado died.
  • In 1985, Julian C. Viado died.
  • They were survived by their children:
  1. Nilo Viado
  2. Leah Viado Jacobs
  3. Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non
  4. Delia Viado
  • In 1987, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died. 
  • Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
  • Since 1977, petitioners and respondents share a common residence at the property. 
  • Rebecca Viado asked Alicia Viado that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children.
  • Respondents claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter
  • In 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition.
  • Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents:
  1. a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the property in favor of Nilo Viado, and 
  2. a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. 
  • A new title was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
  • Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments.
WoN appellate court erred in affirming the decision. NO

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. 

The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.

In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed.

Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

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