Property: Title I, Chapter 3 — Property in Relation to the Person to Whom It Belongs

Property

Chapter 3

Property in Relation to the Person to Whom It Belongs

Article 419.
Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

Property Classified According to Ownership 

• This article expressly provides that properties are owned either: 
1. in a public capacity (dominio publico) 
• Heirs of Proceso Bautista v. Sps. Barza GR 79167, May 7, 1992 
• The function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed by law is not entrusted to the courts but to executive officials. 
2. in a private capacity (propiedad privado) 
•  Regarding the state, it may own properties both 
• in its public capacity (properties of public dominion) and 
• in its private capacity (patrimonial property).
• May agricultural lands of the public domain be alienated?
•  Yes, only agricultural lands may be alienated all the national resources may not be. (See Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 704 SCRA 561) 
• The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into:
• agricultural
• forest
• timber or 
• national parks.
• Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine [Jura Regalia], a legal concept first introduced into the Philippines from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indices and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic) 
• Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.

Article 420. 

The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, 

such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges 

constructed by the State, 

banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State,

without being for public use, 

and are intended for some public service 

or for the development of the national wealth.

(1) ‘Public Dominion’ Defined 

• Public dominion means:
• ownership by the State in that the State has control and administration; 
• ownership by the public in general, in that not even the State or subdivisions thereof may make them the object of commerce as long as they remain properties for public use. 
• Such is the case, for example, of a river or a town plaza. 

• Republic of the Phils. v. Lat Vda. De Castillo, et al. GR 69002, June 30, 1988 
• Mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character. 

• Mendoza v. Navarette 214 SCRA 337 (1992) 
• A homestead patent, once registered under the Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title, is only true and correct if the parcel of agricultural land patented or granted by homestead by the Government, after the requirements of the law had been complied with, was a part of public domain. 

(2) Three Kinds of Property of Public Dominion 

1. For public use
• like roads, canals (may be used by any body).
2. For public service 
• like national government buildings, army rifles, army vessels (may be used only by duly authorized persons). 
3. For the development of national wealth
• like our natural resources. 

(3) Paragraph 1 states “and others of similar character.” 

• Examples are the following: 
• public streams
• natural beds of rivers
• river channels
• waters of rivers
• creeks — because “a creek is no other than an arm extending from a river.”
• Maneclang, et al. v. IAC GR 66575, Sep. 30, 1986
• A creek is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. 
• It is a property belonging to the public domain. 
• It is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. As a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. 
• Neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevents the water from flowing in and out of a fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. 
• Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null and void. It has no legal effect. It is contrary to law and public policy. 
• all lands thrown up by the sea and formed by accretion upon the shore by the action of the water, together with the adjacent shore. 
• lands reclaimed from the sea by the Government.
• Monteverde, et al. v. Director of Lands, L-4628, May 25, 1953
• “Only the executive and possibly the legislative department have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is not necessary for purposes of public utility or for the establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.’’ (interpreting Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866). 
• the Manila Bay area or coastal area inasmuch as it be longs to the state, and is used as a waterway.
• private lands which have been invaded by the waters or waves of the sea and converted into portions of the shore or beach.
• Since the private owner here loses his property in favor of the state without any compensation, the occurrence has been referred to as a case of “natural expropriation” or a de facto case of eminent domain. 
• streets, even when planted by persons with coconut trees

• Note: Some definitions:
1. Shore 
• that space alternately covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. (Art. 1, Sec. 3, The Law of Waters).
• Republic of the Phils. v. Lat Vda. De Castillo, et al. GR 69002, June 30, 1988 
• Does a decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore land constitute res judicata in an action instituted by the Republic for the annulment of title? 
•  No. Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use  (Art. 420, Civil Code), and therefore not registerable. 
• Thus, it has long been settled that portion of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. 
• Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant. 
• A lot which always formed part of a lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof are not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men. If the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art. 502, par. 4, Civil Code), the registration court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the lands as private property. Hence, res judicata does not apply. 
• RA 1899 applies only to foreshore lands, not to submerged lands.
2. Foreshore Lands
• The riparian or littoral owner has preferential right to lease the foreshore area. 
• The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters.
• So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.
• Almagro v. Kwan 634 SCRA250 (2010)
• Does a land's proximity to the waters alone automatically make it a foreshore land?
• No. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 
3. Torrent
• that amount of water which in case of heavy rains gathers in deep places or canals where it is supposed to flow afterwards. 

• Note: The amounts given by students to a government school, to answer in the future for the value of materials and equipment destroyed by them, are public funds. 
• The relationship between the students and the college is not one of depositors and depository but one of creditors and debtors. 
• This is so because the identical bills given are not necessarily the same ones to be returned.

• Santos v. Moreno L-15829, Dec. 4, 1967
• Ayala y Cia owned a big tract of land in Macabebe, Pampanga, the Hacienda San Esteban. To provide access to different parts of the property, the Company dug interlinking canals, which through erosion, gradually acquired the characteristics of rivers. The company sold part of the Hacienda to Santos, who closed some of the canals and converted them into fishponds. The residents Art. 420 of the surrounding barrios (now barangays) complained that the closure deprived them of their means of transportation, as well as of their fi shing grounds.
• May the canals be ordered open?
• No, because said canals are of private ownership. 
• Reason: “The said streams, considered as canals of which they originally were are of private ownership. Under Art. 420, canals constructed by the State and devoted to use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership.’’ 

(4) Are rivers whether navigable or not, properties of public dominion? 

• It would seem that Art. 420 makes no distinction. 
• However:
• Commonwealth v. Meneses, 38 O.G. No. 123, p. 2389
• the Court mentioned only “navigable river” instead of “river” merely. 
• Commonwealth v. Palanca, 39 O.G. No. 8, p. 161
• the court seemed to imply that had the rivers been “non-navigable” they would not have been properties of public dominion. 
• Palanca v. Commonwealth, 40 O.G. (6th S) No. 10, p. 148
• the Supreme Court said: “The river Viray and the estero Sapang Sedoria, being navigable, useful for commerce, for navigation, and fi shing, have the character of public domain (or ownership).’’ 
• Besides, in that case, the government lawyers proved that the rivers were navigable. 
• (All this would seem to imply that non navigable rivers are not of public dominion, otherwise, why did the government have to prove that the rivers were navigable, and why did the Supreme Court use the participial phrase “being navigable’’?) 
• In a decision, the Supreme Court has held that if a river is navigable, it is of public dominion.
• People v. Jacobo, L-14151, Apr. 28, 1960
• the Supreme Court distinguished between public and private streams; and held that a stream, generally, is only a creek, and not a river as contemplated under Art. 420 of the Civil Code. 
• It concluded that it is only after the stream has been declared a public stream by the courts, that a private person, claiming ownership thereof, may be held liable for maintaining an obstruction thereon. 
• Lovina v. Moreno, L-17821, Nov. 29, 1963
• the Court ruled that the ownership of a navigable stream or of its bed is not acquired by prescription. 
• Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works, L-24281, May 16, 1967
• it was held that if a river is capable in its natural state of being used for commerce, it is navigable in fact, and therefore becomes a public river. 

• Cases:
• Hilario v. City of Manila L-19570, Apr. 27, 1967
• Sand and gravel were extracted by agencies of the City of Manila from the San Mateo River banks of the Hilario Estate in the province of Rizal. When Hilario sued for indemnity, it was alleged that river banks are of public ownership.
• Are they really of public ownership? 
• River banks are of public ownership, hence no indemnity need be given. 
• Reason: The bed of a river is of public dominion, hence also the banks since they are part of the bed. 
• While it is true that in Art. 638 on ease ments on river banks, the law speaks of both public and private river banks, still these private river banks refer to those already existing prior to the Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866. 
• Martinez v. Court of Appeals L-31271, Apr. 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 647
1. Navigable rivers are outside the commerce of man and therefore cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law. If converted into fi shponds, the latter can be demolished notwithstanding the Title, for said Title cannot convert the streams into private ones. 
2. Void land decisions like the present one can be at tacked collaterally. 
3. The action of the State for reversion (of the rivers) does not prescribe.

(5) Characteristics of Properties of Public Dominion OPR-EUP

1. They are outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of any contract, except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or improvements and other incidental things of similar character. 
2.  They cannot be acquired by prescription; 
• No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, “there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of the public domain.”
• “Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.” (Art. 1113). 
• Even a city or a municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. 
3. They cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title.
• If erroneously included in a Torrens Title, the land involved remains property of public dominion. 
4. They, as well as their usufruct, cannot be levied upon by execution, nor can they be attached. 
5. In general, they can be used by everybody. 
6. They may be either real or personal property, for it will be noted that the law here makes no distinction. 

(6) Cases 

• Mun. of Cavite v. Rojas 30 Phil. 602
• The Municipal Council of Cavite in 1907 with drew and excluded from public use a part of its plaza in order to lease same for the benefit of defendant Rojas. Issue was the validity of the lease.
• The lease is null and void, because streets and plazas are outside the commerce of man, since they are properties for public use. 
• In creating the lease, the municipality exceeded its authority because it did something it was not empowered to do. 
• The lessee must therefore vacate the premises. 
• In turn, the municipality must reimburse the rentals which had already been paid to it. (In this case, the lessee had not received any benefit, from the lease. If there had been such benefit there might have been no reimbursement of rent)

• Note: While in case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be temporarily occupied by private individuals, still, when the emergency ceases, the temporary occupation or use must also cease. 
• Indeed, a town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls or of residences. Such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. 
• Neither may a town plaza be donated to the Roman Catholic Church. 

• Commonwealth v. Meneses 38 O.G. 123, p. 2389 
• A fishery was constructed on a river. For many years, the constructor of the fishery remained in its possession. 
• Whether or not the constructor has acquired ownership over said river.
• Rivers are not subject to private appropriation. The law of prescription does not apply to them. 

• Gobierno Insular v. Naval (CA) 40 O.G. (11th S) 15, p. 59 
• A registered some esteros in his name under the Torrens system. Now, under that system, registration is effective against everybody. When the government sought to get the properties, A pleaded in defense the fact of its registration; and that although certain properties of public dominion could not really be registered under that system, still there was no prohibition in the Land Registration Law regarding rivers and esteros. 
• Issue: Validity of A’s defense. 
•  A’s defense will not prosper. Although it is true that rivers and esteros are not specifically included in the list of those that could not be registered; still the intention of the law is plainly to prevent a usurpation of any part of public domin ion, rivers and esteros included. 
• It is evident therefore that the registry obtained by A does not confer any right of ownership over the portions of the properties of public dominion usurped, since said usurpation cannot be done under the law. 

• Note: Portions of the territorial waters of the public domain not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant. 

• Republic v. Reyes L-36610, June 18, 1976 
• An applicant for registration of some 23,000 square meters of land won in the CFI (now RTC) in a default judgment. Later, the government presented a motion for re consideration, asking for a chance to prove that the land was public land. When the motion was denied, appeal was made, but since this was done beyond the reglementary period, the appeal was considered not perfected. 
• Is there any remedy left for the Government?
• The remedy is to ask for the reversion of inalienable public lands which are erroneously registered in the name of private individuals. 
• The action is, of course, subject to defenses that may properly be set up. The Torrens system of registration is not a means of acquiring ownership over private or public land; it merely confi rms and registers whatever right or title may already be possessed or had by the applicant.

• Republic v. Animas L-37682, Mar. 29, 1974
• Forest lands as such cannot be registered. 
• The mere fact that a person has a certificate of title over them is unavailing. 
• Indeed, the doctrine of indefeasibility does not apply here. 

• Tufexis v. Olaguera 32 Phil. 654 
• During the Spanish regime, A was allowed by the Spanish government to have the usufruct of a public market for 40 years. A died, and the usufruct was inherited by B, his son. When B became indebted, his properties were sold at an auction sale, and the usufruct was bought by C.  Then a fire destroyed the market. The Council granted B the right to reconstruct the building and continue the usufruct. C complained on the ground that he had bought at the auction sale B’s usufruct. 
• Whether or not C can be given the usufruct and administration of the market. 
• C cannot be given the right because the right is of public character and could not be bought at an auction sale. 
•  What he should have done before the building was burned was to attach the income already received by B, but C did not do this. For C now to take B’s place would be contrary to law, for this would be allowing a stranger who had not been selected by the government, to take over a public function. 
• On the other hand, the terms of the concession given to A (B’s father) were personal and transferable only (by its terms) by inheritance. C, not being an heir of A, cannot therefore exercise the right. 

• Insular Government v. Aldecoa 19 Phil. 505 
• In 1907, the government demanded from Alde coa and Co., the possession of a piece of land which had been formed by the action of the sea. Aldecoa and company claimed ownership on the ground that the adjacent land was theirs, and that their erection of a wall was responsible for the forming of the new parcel of land.
• The land produced by the action of the sea is of public ownership and cannot therefore be acquired by any private person or entity inasmuch as same belongs to the state. Furthermore, the company did not ask government permission to set up the wall.  

• Government v. Cabangis 53 Phil. 112 
• In 1896, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of Manila Bay, part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained submerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been recovered A took possession of it. Issue: the ownership of the reclaimed land. 
• The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion, because in letting it remain submerged, A may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or the seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again, its status as public dominion re mained unchanged; therefore, A is not entitled to the land. 

• Mercado v. Mun. Pres. of Macabebe 59 Phil. 592 
• A owned a hacienda in which a river and a creek f l owed. (Both the river and the creek are of course of public dominion.) A constructed a canal connecting the two bodies of water, and many people used the canal. One day, 22 years later, A closed the two openings of the canals, converted same into a fish pond, and prevented the people from using the erstwhile (former) canal. The government now wants the canal opened so that same may be used by the general public. A objects. 
• The canal should be opened. While the use and enjoyment of the waters could have been acquired by prescrip tion, still when he allowed others to use the canal, he lost the exclusive right to use the same. Moreover, although the hacienda is registered under his name under the Torrens System, this does not confer upon him any right to the river or creek since these are properties of public dominion, and cannot be registered. 

• Clemencia B. Vda. de Villongco, et al. v. Florencio Moreno, et al. L-17240, Jan. 31, 1962 
• Mrs. Villongco of Pampanga was accused by Senator Rogelio de la Rosa of having included as part of her fishpond in Macabebe, Pampanga, a portion of the coastal waters of Pampanga and of Manila Bay; and so the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Mr. Florencio Moreno, ordered her to remove said intruding fi shpond works and other constructions. Mrs. Villongco, instead of appealing to the President, directly brought the case before the courts. She alleged among other things that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 2056, constructions made in good faith on navigable rivers could not be ordered removed.
• Firstly, what Mrs. Villongco should have done was to appeal the administrative decision to the President of the Philippines, in view of the doctrine of “exhaustion of adminis trative remedies” before recourse to the courts. (However, to promptly dispose of the case, the Court decided to dispose of it on the merits). Secondly, while it is true that under Republic Act 2056, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications can order the removal of constructions on navigable rivers or streams EXCEPT those which had been constructed in GOOD FAITH and would not impede free passage on the river or cause the inundation of agricultural areas, still the constructions in this case although made in GOOD FAITH cannot be considered as falling under the exception because said constructions were made on COASTAL WATERS. There is no navigable river or stream in coastal waters, neither may there be inundations therein. Hence, the constructions may be properly removed or demolished. 

• City of Manila v. Garcia L-26053, Feb. 21, 1967 
• Squatters entered land belonging to the City of Manila, and constructed dwellings thereon. The lot was a public lot intended for school purposes. When their occupancy was offi cially brought to the attention of the city authorities, some of the squatters were given “lease contracts’’ by then Mayor Fugoso. Others received “permits’’ from Mayor de la Fuente. The squatters were then charged nominal rentals. When the city decided to use the lot for the expansion of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, it asked the squatters to vacate the premises and to remove the improvements. The squatters refused. The City then sued to recover possession of the lot.
• May the squatters be ejected?
• Yes, for they never really became tenants. The property being a public one, the Manila mayors did not have the authority to give permits, written or oral, to the squatters. The permits granted are, therefore, considered null and void. 

• C & M Timber Corp. (CMTC) v. Alcala 83 SCAD 346 (1997) 
• Executive evaluation of timber licenses and their conse quent cancellation in the process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is a prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of evidence showing grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. 

• Villarico v. CA 309 SCRA 193 (1999) 
•  and within which the unclassifi ed forest zone is incapa ble of private appropriation, a forest land cannot be owned by private persons, and possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a registrable title. 

• Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. CA 495 SCRA 591 (2006) 
• The term “ports” under Art. 420(1) of the Civil Code includes seaports and airports. 
• The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port,” constructed by the State.

(7) Public Lands

• Definition
• “In acts of Congress of the U.S., the term ‘public lands’ is uniformly used to describe so much of the national domain under the Legislative Power of Congress as has not been subjected to private right or devoted to public use … They are that part of government lands which are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by homestead and other like general laws.’’ (Montano v. Insular Gov’t., 12 Phil. 570).
• Among the public lands are mining, forest, and agricultural lands. 
• Note: While agricultural lands may be sold to or acquired by private individuals or entities, ownership over mining and forest lands cannot be transferred, but leases for them may be had.
• Classification of Public Lands 
• It is believed that forest and mining lands are proper ties of public dominion of the third class, i.e., properties for the development of the national wealth. 
• Upon the other hand, the public agricultural lands before being made available to the general public should also be properties of public dominion for the development of the national wealth (and as such may not be acquired by prescription); but after being made so available, they become patrimonial property of the State, and therefore subject to prescription. 
• Moreover, once already acquired by private individuals, they become private property. 
• Nota Bene: “Public agricultural lands’’ may be defined as those alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
• Note: When a homestead entry has been permitted by the Director of Lands:
• the homestead is segregated from the “public domain” and 
• the Director is divested of the control and possession thereof except if the application is finally disapproved and the entry is annulled or revoked. 
• Note: Where a license is issued for the taking of forest products, and a person other than the licensee unlawfully operates without license and cuts or removes any forest products, the same may be seized and delivered to the proper licensee, upon the payment of the regular charges thereon. 

• Bureau of Forestry, et al. v. CA GR 37995, Aug. 31, 1987 
• Can the classification of lands of the public domain by the executive branch of the government into agricultural, forest, or mineral be changed or varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced before it? 
• Whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial of a cause. 
• Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside said land for forestry or mineral resources. 
• It is the Bureau of Forestry that has the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth.
• As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of the courts. 
• There should be no room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the executive branch of the government, thru the Office of the President.
• It is grave error and/or abuse of discretion for a trial court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that 
1. the disputed area is within the timberland block, and
2. as certified to by the Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. 
• One cannot claim to have obtained his title by prescription if the application filed by him necessarily implied an admission that the portion applied for is part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. Possession of forest land, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

• Republic v. CA GR 40402, Mar. 16, 1987 
• Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural lands. 
• Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. 
• They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens System of registration, nullifies the title. 
• Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 
• A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. 

• Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc. 508 SCRA 498 (2006) 
• Licenses concerning the harvesting of timber, in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policies and the demands of public interest and welfare.
• When the licenses, concessions, and the like entail government infrastructure projects, should the provisions of RA 8975 be deemed to apply? 
• Yes. RA 8975 prohibits lower courts from is suing temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions in connection with the implementation of government infrastructure projects. 
• While PD 605 prohibits the issuance of the sum in any case involving licenses, concessions, and the like in connection with the natural resources of the Philippines. 

• QUERY:
• Are “public forests” inalienable public lands? 
• Yes. (Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, 500 SCRA 209 [2006]). 

(8) Exploration Permits are Strictly Granted to Entities or Individuals Possessing the Resources and Capability to Undertake Mining Operations 

• Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. 492 SCRA 355 (2006) 
• Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are within the full control of the State thru the Executive Branch –– pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7942. 
• Here, the State can either directly undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into agreements with qualified entities. 
• What is the extent or scope of power of administration, over mineral lands and minerals vested on the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences? 
• This includes the power to prescribe terms and conditions in granting exploration permits to qualified entities. 
• Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining operations. 
• Nonetheless, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the so called “gold rush.” 
• Note: By providing a 5-day period within which to file an appeal on the decision of the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, PD 463 unquestionably repealed Sec. 61 of Commonwealth Act 137. 
• Note: Sec. 18 of RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestry subject to existing rights and reservations. 

• Governing Law 
• Public lands may be disposed of in accordance with Commonwealth Act 141. 
• The disposition of public lands is lodged exclusively in the Director of Lands, subject only to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture.
• Preference of tenants in their acquisition is in accord with the policy of the government of permitting tenants of public agricultural lands to acquire by purchase or by homestead their respective landholdings.
•  Sec. 64(e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the President to reserve alienable public lands for a specific public purpose or service, and under the Public Land Act, to release those reserved. 
• Note: The word “Government lands’’ is not synonymous with “Public lands.’’ 
• “Government lands’’ 
• The first is broader in scope, and may be said to include also those lands devoted to public use or public service, as well as public lands “before and after they are made available for private appropriation,’’ and also patrimonial lands. 
• Upon the other hand, as has already been seen “public lands’’ are merely a part of “government lands.’’ 

• Non-Conversion Into Private Property
• If a portion of the public land either is needed for river bank protection or forms part of a permanent timberland, possession thereof, however long cannot convert it into private property. 
• Such portion falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, and beyond the jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens system. 

• Disposition by Public Bidding 
• When the Public Land Law decreed that public lands shall be sold to the highest bidder, it does not necessarily follow that the Government is thereby engaged in profit-making; it is getting money in exchange for its property. 
• Upon the other hand, knowingly to sell public property at 1/20 of its price is not selling; it is donating. 
• Such sale is invalid because the land officer, in donating, has exceeded his power to sell.
• In every public bidding the winner prejudices the loser; yet this is no reason to disqualify him; that in itself is not bad faith, for he is merely exercising the right to buy. 

(9) Ownership of Roman Catholic Churches 

• There is no question that Roman Catholic churches constructed after the Spanish occupation are owned by the Catholic Church itself, which incidentally is a juridical person. 
• But the churches constructed during the Spanish regime, and built with “forced labor” were considered outside the commerce of man because they were sacred, devoted as they were to the worship of God (there was then a union of Church and State). 
• Said churches therefore did:
• ❌ not belong to the public in general, 
• ❌ nor to the State
• ❌ nor to any private individual
• ❌ nor to the priests
• ❌ nor to the Church itself. 
• But certainly, the Church had the possession and control of the churches. 
• And it is not necessary or important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. 

(10) The Ecclesiastical Provinces

• The naked ownership of the ecclesiastical provinces donated to the Church belongs to the Roman Catholic Church; the use is for the worshippers.

(11) Effect of the Separation of Church and State in the Philippines 

• One important effect of the separation of Church and State in the Philippines, insofar as ownership of things is concerned, is that now, there is nothing that will prohibit the churches from alienating any of the properties denominated in canon law as holy or sacred. 

(12) Public Land Act 

• Bracewell v. CA GR 107427, Jan. 25, 2000 119 SCAD 47 
• The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove: 
• (a) that the land is alienable public land; and 
• (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. 
• When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the lands, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. 
• The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. 

(13) Parity Rights Amendment of 1946 

• Ancheta v. Guersey–Dalayyon 490 SCRA 140 (2006) 
• As it now stands, Art. XII, Secs. 7 and 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain.

Article 421. All other property of the State, 

which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,

is patrimonial property.

(1) ‘Patrimonial Property’ Defined 

• Patrimonial property of the State is the property it owns but which is not devoted to public use, public service, or the development of the national wealth. 
• It is wealth owned by the State in its private, as distinguished from its public, capacity. 
• Sanchez v. Mun. of Asingan L-17635, Mar. 30, 1963:
• On a municipal patrimonial lot, plaintiff constructed in 1952 temporary stores and buildings, with the knowledge and implied consent of the municipality. 
• In 1959, however, the municipal council passed a resolution calling for the ejectment of the plaintiff. 
• The plaintiff refused to be ejected and in the alternative, asked the court that in case he is ejected, he must be reimbursed for the rents already paid. 
• Plaintiff relied on the case of Mun. of Cavite v. Rojas (30 Phil. 602), where the court had declared the lease of the public plaza void, and ordered the reimbursement of the rentals.  
• Should the rents be reimbursed?
• There should be no reimbursement. 
• Firstly, the case of Rojas cannot apply for there, the lot was public, here, it is patrimonial. 
• Secondly, assuming that the lot is public, and that therefore the lease is void, still there will be no reimbursement because the plaintiff had received some benefit from the land.

(2) Other Examples of Patrimonial Property FSER

1. Friar lands. (Jacinto v. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853). 
• They may be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Act 1120. 
• Pugeda v. Trias, L-16925, July 24, 1962:
• Under the Friar Lands Act (Act 1120), conveyance executed in favor of a purchaser, or the so-called certificate of title is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid in full.
• Thus, if a husband has purchased said land, on his death, the certificate may be issued in favor of his widow. 
• In default of the widow, the assignment must be made in favor of the successional heirs. 
• It should be noted, however, that the issuance of the title to the wife does not make the friar lands purchased by the deceased husband the paraphernal property of the wife. The lands continue to be the conjugal property of her deceased husband and herself. 
• In the case, however, of a sale of public lands under the Public Land Act, there would seem to be no vested right on the property purchased by the mere fact of application therefor. 
• This is because aside from the purchase, there are requirements for cultivation and improvement. 
• Hence, if the applicant dies before fulfillment of said requisites, and the widow and her second husband should comply with the requirements, the certificate is issued to said wife and her second husband, each of them having equal rights on the land.
• Dela Torre v. CA GR 113095, Feb. 8, 2000:
• Jurisprudence has consistently held that under Act 1120, the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes  to the purchaser the moment the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. 
• In order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration
• The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands.
2. The San Lazaro Estate. (Tipton v. Andueza, 5 Phil. 477). 
• This may be disposed of, and is governed by Act 2360 as amended by Act 2478. 
3. Properties obtained by the Government in escheat proceedings (as when there is no other legal heir of a decedent), or those inherited by or donated to the Government. 
4. Rents of buildings owned by the State would also come under this classification.
• City of Cebu v. NAWASA, L-12892, Apr. 30, 1960:
• A municipal-owned waterworks system is patrimonial in character, for while such a system is open to the public (in this sense, it is public service), still the system serves only those who pay the charges or rentals (thus, the system is propreitary). 
• Therefore, Republic Act 1383 which vests on the NAWASA, ownership of municipal water system without compensation (to the municipality) cannot be sustained as valid. 
• See also: 
• Municipality of Lucban v. National Water works and Sewerage Authority, L-15525, Oct. 11, 1960; 
• Board of Assessment Appeals, Prov. of Laguna v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-18125, May 31, 1963.

(3) Acquisition of Patrimonial Properties thru Prescription 

• Patrimonial properties may be acquired by private individuals or corporations thru prescription. (Art. 1113). 
• However, if a municipality has been taking the products of a certain parcel of land, and planting thereon certain other crops, this is not proof of ownership, but only of the usufruct thereof.
• Mun. of Tigbawan v. Dir. of Lands, 35 Phil. 798:

Art. 422. 

Property of public dominion, 

when no longer intended for public use or for public service, 

shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. 

(1) Conversion of Property of Public Dominion to Patrimonial Property: Entities that may Effect the Change 

• Faustino Ignacio v. Dir. of Lands, L-12958, May 30, 1960:
• Citing Natividad v. Dir. of Lands (CA) (37 O.G., p. 2905), only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries or for Coast Guard Service.
• If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. 
• Consequently, until there is made a formal declaration on the part of the Government thru the executive department or the legislature, the parcel in question continues to be part of the public domain, and cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription. 
• Note: This case involved lands gained by the sea which thus are considered properties of the public dominion under Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866.

• Municipality of Oas v. Roa 7 Phil. 20:
• When a municipality no longer uses a public plaza as such, and instead constructs buildings thereon for storage of government property, or for housing purposes, it is clear that the property has become patrimonial. 
• Being patrimonial, same may, from that moment on, be sold to a private individual. 

• Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles L-40474, Aug. 29, 1975:
• The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an abandoned road, the terminal portion of one of its streets.  Later it authorized the sale thru public bidding of the property. 
• The Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. 
• It then petitioned the RTC of Cebu for the registration of the land. 
• The petition was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still part of the public domain, and cannot therefore be registered. 
• May the lot be registered in the name of the buyer?
• Yes, the land can be registered in the name of the buyer, because the street has already been withdrawn from public use, and accordingly has become patrimonial property. The lot’s sale was therefore valid.
• Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) 702 SCRA 222 (2013) 
• Does Fort Bonifacio remain property of the public domain of the state of although declared alienable and disposable? 
•  Yes, at least declared alienable and disposable, it is resource for some public service or for the development of the national wealth in this case, for the conversion of military renovations in the country to productive civilian users.
• Mun. of Hinunang v. Director of Lands 24 Phil. 125
• Although a fortress as such is property of public dominion because it is for public service, still when it is no longer used as such, it does not necessarily follow that the State has lost ownership over the same inasmuch as the property is now considered patrimonial, and therefore still belongs to the state. 
• What is true of the fortress is also true of the land on which it has been built. 
• Francisco Chavez v. NHA, et al. GR 164527, Aug. 15, 2007 
• Presidential Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 jointly with the special patents have classified the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable and open to disposition or concession as they would be devoted to units for Smokey Mountain beneficiaries. 
• Because said lands are no longer intended for public use or service, shall those lands form part of the patrimonial properties of the State? 
• Yes, under Art. 422 of the new Civil Code. The lands are classified as patrimonial parties of the NHA in the case at bar, and ready for disposition when the titles are registered in its name by the Register of Deeds.

(4) Different Rule for Abandoned River Beds

• Although, as a rule, property of public dominion when no longer used for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State (Art. 422), it should be remembered that under Art. 461, an abandoned river bed belongs not to the State, but to the private land owner whose land is now occupied by the changed course, in proportion to the area lost.

 Art. 423. 

The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities 

is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. 

(1) ‘Reclaimed Lands’

• These are not plain and simple patches of the earth as agricultural, timber, or mineral lands are, in the full sense of being products of nature, but are the result of the intervention of man just like in the extraction of mineral resources, i.e., gold, oil, petroleum, etc.
• In terms of the long-range development of the country, its fundamental law vests the State with the concomitant authority to draw on the resources of the private sector, to aid it in such an awesome endeavor as land reclamation. 
• For “reclaimed land’’ does not fall under the category of natural resources which under the Constitution are inalienable; it is statutory law which determines the status of reclaimed land. 
• Note:
• “Submerged lands’’ are owned by the State and are inalienable; submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. 
• Case Chavez v. Public Lands Authority 415 SCRA 403 (2003):
• Contracts of individuals who, not being personally disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public domain,  have been able to acquire in good faith, reclaimed portions of the subject property from AMARI Coastal Bay Development Corporation. 
• Should said contracts be duly-respected and upheld? 
• Yes. In instances where the successor-in-interest is itself a corporate entity, the constitutional proscription would stand, but if the corporation has introduced structures or permanent improvements thereon, such structures or improvements, when so viewed, as having been made in good faith, could very well be governed by the new Civil Code. 
• The approval of the contracts, in the case at bar, clearly and unambigously attested to the fact that the lands in question were no longer intended for “public use’’ or “public service.’’ 
• When the conversion activity such as co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements is authorized by the Government thru a law, the qualified party to the agreement may own the converted product or part of it, when so provided in the agreement. 
• If there is any doubt as “to the object of the prestation in this case, the Supreme Court opined that the ‘interpretation which would render the contract valid is to be favored.’’’

(2) Properties of Political Subdivisions

1. property for public use
2. patrimonial property

(3) Alienation of the Properties 

• Properties of a political subdivision for public use cannot be alienated as such, and may not be acquired by prescription. 
• Properties of a political subdivision which are patrimonial in character may be alienated, and may be acquired by others thru prescription.

(4) Donation by the National Government to a Political Subdivision 

• The National Government may donate its patrimonial property to a municipality, and the latter may own the same. 
• This is because a municipality is a juridical person capable of acquiring properties. 
• When thus donated, the property becomes either property for public use or patrimonial property, depending on the use given to the property. 
• When for example, the municipality devotes donated land to the erection thereon of the municipal building, courthouse, public school, or public market, the property is for public use. 
• When, however, it allows private persons to build on it, and merely collects for example, the rent als on the land, the property is patrimonial in character.
• The acquisition by a city of portions of public lands is subject to the rules and regulations issued by the proper governmental authorities, as well as the subsequent approval of such acquisition by the Director of Lands.

Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation L-33022, Apr. 22, 1975

• Are the terms “National Government of the Philippines” and “Government of the Philippines” synonymous? 
• No, because the first term “National Government of the Philippines” is more restrictive and does not include local governments or other governmental entities. 
• Under the Administrative Code itself, the term “National Government” refers only to the Central Government (consisting of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the government), as distinguished from local governments and other governmental entities. 
• The Central Bank (Bangko Sentral) is, therefore, not included in the term “National Government,” but is included in the term “Government of the Philippines.”

(5) Conversion to Patrimonial

• Of course, by analogy, and applying Art. 422, when a municipality’s properties for public use are no longer intended for such use, the properties become patrimonial, and may now be the subject of a common contract.

Article 424. 

Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, 

consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets,

the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works

 for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial 

and shall be governed by this Code, 

without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

(1) Properties in Political Subdivisions

• Art. 424 enumerates the various kinds of properties of political subdivisions, and classifies them into:

1. property for public use 
• Dacanay v. Asistio, Jr. 208 SCRA 404 (1992)  
• A public street is property for public use, hence, out side the commerce of man and may not be the subject of lease or of any other contract. 
• The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away thru a contract. 
• Thus, Mayor Robles’ Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve, i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.
2. patrimonial property 
• Prov. of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., L-24440, Mar. 28, 1968:
• In the case of state properties, properties for public service are of public dominion; this is not so in  the case of provinces, cities, etc., said properties for public service are patrimonial (since they are not for public use).

• Prov. of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., L-24440, Mar. 28, 1968:
• After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that — “All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga.’’ 
• Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.
• Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial? 
• If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use (in the sense that generally, they are available to the general public), and all the rest are patrimonial, since they are not devoted to public use but to public service; since they are not for public use, under Art. 424 of the Civil Code, they are patrimonial. 
• For public use if anybody can use; for public service if only authorize persons can use.
• Had they been owned by the state, they would not have been patrimonial but would have been properties of public dominion — for this would include public service, conformably with Art. 420, par. 2.
• But if we follow the law of Municipal Corporations (and not the Civil Code), as long as the purpose is for a public service (governmental service like public education, public health, local administration), the property should be considered for public use.
• Should the city pay for said properties? 
• If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation. 
• If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore no compensation would be required. It is this law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. 
• Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State, otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. 
• Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says “without prejudice to the provisions (or principles) of special laws.”

(2) Basis of the Classification

• Apparently under Art. 424, the basis of the classification would be the use, however:
• Salas v. Jarencio, L-29788, Aug. 30, 1972
• The National Government still controls the disposition of properties of political subdivisions (regardless of the use to which they are devoted) provided that the properties came from the state.
• In the absence of proof that the province, city, or municipality acquired the properties with their own funds, we should presume that they really had come from the State. 
• Thus, it can be said that properties of provinces, cities, and municipalities may also be classified into the following:
1. those acquired with their own funds (in their private or corporate capacity) — 
• here the political subdivision has ownership and control.
2. those which do not fall under (a) —
•  these are subject to the control and supervision of the state. 
• In fact, they are held by the political subdivision in trust for the state for the benefit of the inhabitants (whether the purpose of the property is governmental or proprietary). 
• Reason the political subdivision owes its creation to the State. 
• It is the State’s agents, or subdivision, or instrumentality for the purposes of local administration.

• Salas v. Jarencio L-29788, Aug. 30, 1972
• The City of Manila had a Torrens Title over a 7,490-square-meter lot. The municipal board of Manila re quested the President of the Philippines to have the lot declared as patrimonial property of the City so that it could be sold by the City to the actual occupants of the lot. 
• In 1964, Congress enacted Republic Act 4118 whereby the lot was made disposable or alienable land of the State (not of the City), and its disposal was given to a national governmental entity, the Land Tenure Administration. 
• Can this be lawfully done by the National Government? 
• Yes. There being no proof that the lot had been acquired by the City with its own funds, the presumption is that it was given to it by the State in trust for the benefit of the inhabitants. Residual control remained in the State, and therefore the State can lawfully dispose of the lot. 
• Thus, Republic Act 4118 is valid and constitutional and this is so even if the City of Manila will receive no compensation from the State.

(3) Rules With Respect to Properties for Public Use

1. Properties for public use may not be leased to private individuals. 
• If possession has already been given, the lessee must return the possession to the municipality, which in turn must reimburse him for whatever advanced rentals had been given. 
2. If a plaza is illegally leased to private individuals, the lease is void, and any building on said plaza built by the “lessee” such as a restau rant, may be demolished. 
3. Properties used by a municipal corporation in the exercise of its governmental powers cannot be attached or levied upon. 
4. The right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities is vested by law on the provincial board of the province concerned, from the decision of which board, appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Executive Secretary, now Office of the President, whose decision shall be final. 
5. Until the matter is resolved by such official (now office), judicial recourse would be premature. 
• If the provincial board fails to settle the boundary dispute, the action if at all, would be one against said board, not an action for declaratory relief.

• Viuda de Tan Toco v. Mun. Council of Iloilo 49 Phil. 52:
• The municipality of Iloilo bought from the widow of Tan Toco a parcel of land for P42,966.40 which was used for street purposes. 
• For failure of the municipality to pay the debt, the widow obtained a writ of execution against the municipal properties, and by virtue of such writ was able to obtain the attachment of two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, two police stations, and two markets, including the lots on which they had been constructed. 
• The issue is the validity of the attachment.
• The attachment is not proper because municipal-owned real and personal properties devoted to public or governmental purposes may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against a municipality. 
• Just as it is essential to exempt certain properties of individuals (like the bare essentials) from execution, so it is also essential and justifi able to exempt property for public use from execution, otherwise governmental service would be jeopardized.
• Note: Had the properties been patrimonial, they could have been levied upon or attached. (See Mun. of Pasay v. Manaois, et al., L-3485, June 30, 1950)

(4) Effect if Private Land is Donated to a Town and Made into a Plaza 

• Private land donated to a town for use as a plaza becomes property for public use, and may not in turn be donated by the town to the church, nor can the church acquire ownership over it by prescription, for a town plaza is outside the commerce of man. 
• Such a plaza cannot be deemed patrimonial property of a municipal government.

• Harty v. Municipality of Victoria 13 Phil. 152 
• A parcel of land alleged to originally belong to a person named Tanedo was in part donated by him to the church. The remaining part was kept open as a plaza. For many years, the people of the town were allowed by Tanedo to use the said remainder as a “public plaza.” Later, the church claimed ownership over said “plaza” on the ground that the same had been donated to it by the municipality. It was proved that the curates and the town heads (the gobernadorcillos) used to plant fruit trees on the plaza. 
• May the church now be considered as the owner of the plaza?
• No, the Church cannot be regarded as the owner of the plaza. Assuming that Tanedo was its original owner, still when he allowed the people of the town to use same as a public plaza, he was in effect waiving his right thereto for the benefit of the town folks. 
• Being property for public use, the municipality cannot be said to have validly donated it in favor of the Church. Then again, because of its being for “public use,’’ the plaza could not have been acquired by the Church thru prescription. 
• Incidentally, the act of planting fruit trees on the plaza cannot be regarded as an act of private ownership. It was simply an act intended to enhance the beauty of the plaza for the benefit of the people in the community. 

(5) National Properties May Not Be Registered by a Municipality Under its Own Name 

• Properties of public dominion, owned by the national government, even if planted upon with trees by a municipality for a number of years, do not become municipal properties, and may not therefore be registered by a municipality under its name.

(6) Patrimonial Property of a Municipal Corporation

• The town’s patrimonial property is administered, at least insofar as liability to third persons is concerned, in the same way as property of a private corporation. 
• Hence, the town is not immune to suits involving this kind of property.
• The municipal council serves as a sort of Board of Directors, with the municipal mayor or provincial governor as general manager.

Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. 417 SCRA 115 (2003):

• Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades, or centuries, cannot ipso facto ripen into ownership. 
• In the instant controversy, however, the majority decision actually awarded to the Government ownership of the disputed property, without notice to both parties and without giving them an opportunity to be heard and submit their opposition.

Article 425. 

Property of private ownership, 

besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, 

consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.

(1) Private Properties Other than Patrimonial 

• Other private properties are those that belong to private persons: individually or collectively. 
• Incidentally, by virtue of Art. 425, the Code recognizes the rights to private property.

(2) Collective Ownership 

•  “Collectively’’ refers to ownership by private individuals as co-owners; or by corporations, partnerships, or other juridical persons (such as foundations) who are allowed by the Civil Code to possess and acquire properties. (Arts. 44-47)

(3) Effect of Possession by Private Persons 

• Possession by private persons since time immemorial carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
• An allegation to this effect is a sufficient averment of private ownership.

(4) Ownership of Roads

• Roads may be either public or private property; 
• hence, if a person constructs on his own land a road, it is a private one. 
•  This is particularly true when the government spent nothing for the construction of the road. 

(5) Private Lands Within a Military Zone

• If private lands of a person should lie within a military zone, said lands do not necessarily become property of public dominion (public service).
• Note: If there be fortified places in said zone, Art. 667 applies. “No construction can be built or plantings made near fortified places or fortresses without compliance with the conditions required in special laws, ordinances, and regulations relating thereto.”
• This restriction does not mean that the private person is deprived of the ownership of said private land.

(6) Improvements Introduced by the Japanese Occupation Forces on Private Lands 

• Improvements constructed during the Japanese occupation by the Japanese army on private lands do not belong to the private owner but to the Philippine government which emerged as victor in the last world war. 
• Such improvements may refer to railroad tracks or to passageways for airplanes. 
• On the other hand, an automobile seized by the Japanese army from a Filipino during the war, and later turned over to the Philippine government, does not become government property, and when sold by the Philippine government to another private person, the true owner of the car may recover same from the buyer. 

(7) Ownership Evidenced by a Torrens Title 

• If there is any error in the Torrens title of a person in the sense that it includes lands belonging to the government, it is only the government which can properly question that fact, and a judicial pronouncement is necessary in order to have the portion excluded from the Torrens title. 

• Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz GR 39272, May 4, 1988:
• A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. (Sec. 49, Act 496).
• A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly is sued and that they are valid. 
• A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title. 
• All persons dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. 
• Payment of land tax is not an evidence of ownership of a parcel of land for which payment is made, especially when the parcel of land is covered by a Torrens title in the name of another.

• Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v. CA 215 SCRA 783 (1992):
• A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence.

(8) Acquisition by Aliens 

• An alien has had no right to acquire since the date of effectivity of the Philippine Constitution, any public or private agricultural, commercial, or residential lands (except by hereditary succession). 
• The same rule applies to a foreign corporation, even if it be a religious and non-stock foreign corporation. (See Art. XII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Phil. Constitution). 
• This is not contrary to religious freedom because the ownership of real estate is not essential for the exercise of religious worship.
• The constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of land by aliens (save Americans by virtue of the Parity Amendment) is absolute. 
• Thus, the transfer of ownership over land in favor of aliens is not permissible in view of the constitutional prohibition. 
• Paragraph (c), Sec. 25 of Republic Act 337 allows a commercial bank to purchase and hold such real estate as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of its dealings. 
• The debts referred to are only those resulting from previous loans and other similar transactions, not those conveyed to it by reason of “civil liability” arising from a criminal offense against it, even if the acquisition of ownership by the bank is merely temporary.

(9) Query 

• What should an applicant establish to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable?
• An applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. 
• The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. 
• Republic v. Tri-Plus Corp., 505 SCRA 41 (2006):
• Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: 
1. that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain; and 
2. that they have been in open, continuous exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fi de claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
• Republic v. Southside Homeowners Assn., Inc. (502 SCRA 587 [2006]):
• The Supreme Court informed: the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract/s of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. 
• In the same decision, the Court posited that –– lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such classification, and declared open to disposition. 
• Art. XII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except thru lease for a limited period.

Provisions Common to the Three Preceding Chapters

Article 426. 

Whenever by provision of the law, 

or an individual declaration, 

the expression "immovable things or property," or "movable things or property," is used, it shall be deemed to include, respectively,

 the things enumerated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

Whenever the word "muebles," or "furniture," is used alone, 

it shall not be deemed to include money, credits, commercial securities, stocks and bonds, jewelry, scientific or artistic collections, books, medals, arms, clothing, horses or carriages and their accessories, grains, liquids and merchandise, or other things which do not have as their principal object the furnishing or ornamenting of a building, except where from the context of the law, or the individual declaration, the contrary clearly appears.

(1) What the Expression ‘Immovable Things’ and ‘Movable Things’ Include   

• The first paragraph of the Article explains itself. 

(2) Use of the Word ‘Muebles’

• This word is used synonymously with “furniture.” 
• Note that furniture has generally for its principal object the furnishing or ornamenting of a building. Found in the old Code, the use of “muebles” was retained by the Code Commission, evidently because many people are acquainted with its meaning. 
• Note the enumerations of things which are not included in the term “furniture.” 

(3) Some Questions 

• A told B, “I’ll give you my furniture.’’ Does this include books and bookcases?
• The books, no; the bookcases, yes. (Art. 426, 2nd par.). 
•  A told B, “I’ll give you my furniture, including my stocks and horses.” Are the stocks and horses included? 
•  Yes, in view of the express declaration to that effect. (Art. 426)