Case Digest: Dream Village v. BCDA, 702 SCRA 222, G.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013

Property | Property in Relation to Whom it Belongs (Arts. 420-426)

Facts:  

• Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. represents over 2,000 families occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985.
• The lot was previously part of Hacienda de Maricaban, owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa, covered by Torrens title Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291 issued in 1906.
• The US government purchased Maricaban and converted it into Fort William McKinley during the American colonial period, subsequent title was issued in the name of the USA.
• The US government transferred 30 hectares of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad Company.
• In 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William McKinley to the Republic of the Philippines and title was issued the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
• In 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, reserving the land within Fort William McKinley (now Fort Bonifacio) for military purposes.
• In 1986, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 allowing the sale of certain portions of Fort Bonifacio, including the area occupied by Dream Village, for residential use.
• President Corazon Aquino later amended Proclamation No. 2476 with Proclamation No. 172, limiting the areas open for disposition.
• In 1992, RA No. 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee the conversion of military reservations to civilian use, including Fort Bonifacio. 
• BCDA acquired titles to the land for this purpose.
• Dream Village filed a complaint with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)against BCDA, alleging unlawful summary demolition and asserting their right to the land.
• COSLAP: Conducted a verification survey, and concluded that Dream Village lies outside BCDA's jurisdiction.
• Directed LMB to process their applications for sales patent.
• BCDA argued that the land has been under private title since 1906 and is currently held by the government.
• CA: Ruled that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the land’s history of private ownership.

Issue: 

• Whether the Honorable Court of Appeal erred in ruling that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the land’s history of private ownership. NO

Held:

We find no merit in the petition.

The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.

That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. In Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA, it was categorically ruled as follows:

First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of the then Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than their view that the USA is still the owner of the subject lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim of ownership or interest in them.

The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not much different from the controversy below. There, 20,000 families were long-time residents occupying 98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought to avert their eviction and the demolition of their houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the name of the Republic, which title was in turn cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name of the BCDA. The Court ruled that the BCDA’s aforesaid titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question, since TCT No. 61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for BCDA’s takeover and management of the subject lots.52

Dream Village sits on the

abandoned C-5 Road, which lies

outside the area declared in

Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as

alienable and disposable.

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were conducted by the Bureau of Lands to delimit the boundaries of the areas excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423:

Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved

1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986

2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 1987

However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 thereof are inside the area segregated for the Libingan ng mga Bayani under Proclamation No. 208, which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 as available for disposition. For this reason, it was necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476. Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 are declared alienable and disposable.

The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 but actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: "x x x Dream Village is outside Lot1, SWO-13-000298 and inside Lot 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13, SWO-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78466 square meters. The area is actually is [sic] outside SWO-00-0001302 of BCDA."55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is outside of BCDA, completely oblivious that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio, even as the BCDA asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road. This area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really the proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which was abandoned when, as constructed, it was made to traverse northward into the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has not disputed this assertion.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.

While property of the State or any

of its subdivisions patrimonial in

character may be the object of

prescription, those "intended for

some public service or for the

development of the national

wealth" are considered property of

public dominion and therefore not

susceptible to acquisition by

prescription.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of public dominion and what is patrimonial property:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and disposable. 

However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion:

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.

Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former Maricaban have been legally disposed to settlers, besides those segregated for public or government use. 

• Proclamation No. 1217 (1973) established the Maharlika Village in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs of resident Muslims of Metro Manila; 
• Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended by Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared more than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable; 
• Proclamation No. 518 (1990) formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared them open for disposition.

The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military reservations in the country to productive civilian uses.61 Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run.

Ownership of a land registered

under a Torrens title cannot be lost

by prescription or adverse

possession.

Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDA’s claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We have already established that these lots have not been declared alienable and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.

Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. And, although the registered landowner may still lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches, nowhere has Dream Village alleged or proved laches, which has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.

The subject property having been

expressly reserved for a specific

public purpose, the COSLAP

cannot exercise jurisdiction over the

complaint of the Dream Village

settlers.

BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream Village’s complaint. Concurring, the CA has ruled that questions as to the physical identity of Dream Village and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302, or whether Proclamation No. 172 has released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are "manifestly beyond the scope of the COSLAP’s jurisdiction vis-á-vis Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561," rendering its Resolution a patent nullity and its pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP’s duty would have been to refer the conflict to another tribunal or agency of government in view of the serious ramifications of the disputed claims:

In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. It would have been more prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred the controversy to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements contained therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect."

We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public purpose under R.A. No. 7227, which unfortunately for Dream Village does not encompass the present demands of its members. Indeed, this purpose was the very reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has been transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes the dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the COSLAP. A review of the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes over public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or purpose.

On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of all kinds of land disputes between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or recommend other solutions E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other lands of the public domain, as well as adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain."69

On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged its functions and duties. Section 2 thereof even granted it quasi judicial functions, to wit:

Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. – The PACLAP shall have the following functions and duties:

1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government agencies and agencies involved in land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction thereof;

x x x x

4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible. 

On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and created the COSLAP to be a more effective administrative body to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest. Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No. 561 now specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

x x x x

Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the seriousness and urgency of the reliefs sought in its Amended Petition, Dream Village insists that the COSLAP was justified in assuming jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But in Longino v. Atty. General, it was held that as an administrative agency, COSLAP’s jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically mentioned in its enabling statute, E.O. No. 561. The Supreme Court said:

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. x x x.

x x x x

Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.

The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among them Davao New Town Development Corp. v. COSLAP, Barranco v. COSLAP, NHA v. COSLAP, Cayabyab v. de Aquino, Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan, Machado v. Gatdula, and Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo.

Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 to assume jurisdiction over "other similar land problems of grave urgency," since the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.  Following this rule, COSLAP’s jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory interest, or public lands covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreements, a timber concessions, or a reservation grants, and where moreover, the dispute is between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; and between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants.

In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine National Railways. The high court rejected COSLAP’s jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot is not public land, and neither party was a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority, nor was the dispute critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action. 

In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP has no concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws, since "the grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable by the DAR." Thus, instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred private respondents’ complaint to the DAR or DARAB. According to the Court:

The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the power to resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in Bañaga involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the DAR.85

In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching into private property. The Supreme court ruled that COSLAP may resolve only land disputes "involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant."86

In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between two local government units, that its decision is an utter nullity correctible by certiorari, that it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void, and all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.87

In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend to disputes involving the ownership of private lands, or those already covered by a certificate of title, as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction of the courts and other administrative agencies."

In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over controversies relating to ownership and possession of private lands, and thus, the failure of respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was held not fatal to the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy remained available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.89

In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in disputes over private lands between private parties, reiterating the essential rules contained in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 governing the exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit:

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. 

In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers:

1. the nature or classification of the land involved;
2. the parties to the case;
3. the nature of the questions raised; and
4. the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. 

The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants.

In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint for "interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing" over a private parcel of land. The CA ruled that the parties were estopped to question COSLAP’s jurisdiction since they participated actively in the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting from the complaint that the case actually involved a claim of title and possession of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not critical and explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties, nor was there social tension or unrest present or emergent.

In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Bañaga to assert its jurisdiction. There, Guillermo Bañaga had filed a free patent application with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with an area of 30 has. Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent application for the same property. The opposing claims and protests of the claimants remained unresolved by the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it conduct an investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then opted to exercise jurisdiction over the controversy. The high court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction is not confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, but includes land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.

But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases aforecited, the land dispute in Bañaga was between private individuals who were free patent applicants over unregistered public lands. In contrast, the present petition involves land titled to and managed by a government agency which has been expressly reserved by law for a specific public purpose other than for settlement. Thus, as we have advised in Longino, the law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem, but it has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.