Case Digest: Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc, G.R. No. 213207 February 15, 2022

Property | Property in Relation to Whom it Belongs (Arts. 420-426)

Facts:  

• In 1958, Manuel Dee Ham caused the survey of a 944-square meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City.
• The Decree of Registration was subsequently approved by the Director of Lands.
• The property was declared in Manuel's name for tax purposes.
• In 1961, Manuel died.
• The property was inherited by his surviving wife Esperanza Gerona, and their children who collectively transferred ownership to the Dee Ham family corporation, Pasig Rizal Co., Inc. (PRCI).
• In 2009, Esperanza formalized the transfer through an Affidavit.
• In 2010, Esperanza filed an application for original registration of title over the property on behalf of PRCI.
• PRCI asserted ownership since 1956.
• RTC-Pasig:  Confirmed PRCI's title over the property.
• CA: Affirmed the RTC Decision.
• SC (2014): Identified two key points needing resolution: 
1. the requirements for original registration of land acquired through prescription; and
2. evidence to prove the alienable and disposable status of land for PD 1529 registration.
• SC (2021): Issued a Resolution, mandating the submission of memoranda within 30 days and designated the LRA as amicus curiae.
• PRCI argued that the alienable and disposable status of the property meets the requirements for registration, citing Malabanan.
• The Republic argued that lands become patrimonial only with an express declaration from the State.
• The LRA failed to submit its brief within the specified period.
• In consideration of the recent enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 11573 which took effect on September 1, 2021, the Petition is now deemed submitted for resolution.

Issue: 

• Whether  PRCI sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a decree of registration over the Subject Property. NOT YET

Held:

The Court resolves to remand the Petition to the CA for the reasons set forth below.

As a starting point, it bears recalling that the RTC held that PRCI was able to establish that it had been in open, actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the Subject Property in the concept of an owner for the period then required by law for the acquisition of title. While the Republic filed an appeal to assail the Subject Property's land classification status, it did not impugn the evidence presented by PRCI to prove the nature and period of its possession. Consequently, the fact that PRCI has been in possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner since 1956 is not disputed.

Thus, the crux of the present controversy hinges on a single question ­whether PRCI has established that the Subject Property forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain in accordance with the requirements set by prevailing law.

To resolve this question, a preliminary discussion on the relevant concepts relating to property, ownership, and land classification is in order.

Land classification under the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Code

The Regalian doctrine has long been recognized as the foundation of the State's property regime and has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. In essence, the Regalian doctrine espouses that lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are generally presumed to form part of the public domain belonging to the State.

As explained in the recent case of Federation of Coron, Busuanga, Palawan Farmer's Association, Inc. v. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and as cogently pointed out by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, this general rule admits of a single exception: native title to land. Claims of private ownership pursuant to native title are presumed to have been held even before the Spanish conquest. Thus, lands subject of native titles are deemed excluded from the mass of lands forming part of the public domain.

The Court's ruling in Federation elucidates:

Pursuant to the Regalian doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

To further understand the Regalian doctrine, a review of the previous Constitutions and laws is warranted. The Regalian doctrine was embodied as early as in the Philippine Bill of 1902. Under Section 12 thereof, it was stated that all properties of the Philippine Islands that were acquired by the United States through the treaty with Spain shall be under the control of the Government of the Philippine Islands, to wit:

SECTION 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this Act.

The only exception in the Regalian doctrine is native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown. 

In Cariño v. Insular Government, the United States Supreme Court at that time held that:

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

As pointed out in the case of Republic v. Cosalan:

Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that "refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." 

To reiterate, they are considered to have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way.

The CA has correctly relied on the case of Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, which institutionalized the concept of native title. Thus:

Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

From the foregoing, it appears that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to the Regalian doctrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.

At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into five (5) categories — 

1. agricultural lands
2. forest lands
3. timber lands
4. mineral lands
5. national parks

The provision states:

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. x x x 

In turn, Section 3 mandates that only lands classified as agricultural may be declared alienable and susceptible of private ownership. It bears noting, however, that private ownership contemplates not only ownership by private persons, but also ownership by the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities in their private capacity:

On the other hand, the Civil Code classifies the property of the State into two (2) categories, thus:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

ART. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

In the 2013 Resolution in the case of Malabanan, the Court attempted to harmonize the classification of land under the 1987 Constitution and the classification of property under the Civil Code, thus:

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either: 

1. is intended for public use; or
2. belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

x x x x

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: 

1. patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and
2. lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. x x x

During the deliberations, Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan astutely raised that this classification of "alienable and disposable lands of the State" into patrimonial lands and lands of the public domain appears to be inconsistent with the intent of the framers. Indeed, the record of the Constitutional Commission deliberations on what was then Section 6, Article XII is illuminating:

MR. SUAREZ. If it is reflective of the thinking of the Committee insofar as Section 4 is concerned, we propose that the words "lands of the public domain" appearing on line 26 of Section 6 be changed to "PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS"; but basically, it is "agricultural land."

MR. MONSOD. Maybe to be consistent and to harmonize, we just use the same phrase as we used in Section 4: "AGRICULTURAL LANDS of the public domain."

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I call attention to the fact that the words "public domain" are the words used in the 1935 as well as in the 1973 Constitutions.

MR. VILLEGAS. We retained it that way.

MR. RODRIGO. So, they have already adopted a meaning and I suppose there is even a jurisprudence on this matter. Unless it is absolutely necessary, I do not think we should change that.

MR. SUAREZ. What we are suggesting, Madam President, is to retain the words "public domain" but qualify the word "lands" with "AGRICULTURAL lands of the public domain."

MR. VILLEGAS. We are retaining "public domain."

MR. CONCEPCION. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.

MR. CONCEPCION. If the Committee does not intend to change the original implication of this provision — and by original I mean the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 — may I suggest the advisability of retaining the former phraseology. Otherwise, there might be a question as to whether the same meaning attached thereto by jurisprudence will apply or another meaning is sought to be imparted to this provision.

MR. VILLEGAS. As long as it is clear in our record that we really mean agricultural lands, can we ask Commissioner Suarez to just retain the existing phraseology?

MR. SUAREZ. I would have no objection to that. I just want to make it very clear, whether in the record or in the constitutional provisions, when we speak of "lands of the public domain" under Section 6 we are thinking in terms of agricultural lands.

THE PRESIDENT. So, there will be no need anymore to insert the word "AGRICULTURAL"?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. We will not press on our amendment, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. We already have that interpretation.

x x x x

MR. TINGSON. There are no more registered speakers for Section 6; so we may now vote on Section 6, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Will the honorable Chairman please read Section 6?

MR. VILLEGAS. Section 6 will read: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."

As the quoted exchange shows, it was initially suggested that the term "lands of the public domain" under then Section 6, Article XII be qualified with the term "agricultural" in order to clarify that only private agricultural lands of the public domain may be acquired and/or held by individuals, corporations, or associations.

This initial suggestion, albeit not pursued, clearly shows that the concept of public domain under the Constitution is indeed broader than the concept of public dominion under the Civil Code.

Hence, while lands of the public domain under the Constitution pertain to all lands owned or held by the State both in its public and private capacity, lands forming part of the public dominion under the Civil Code pertain only to those which are intended for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth, and excludes patrimonial property. Therefore, property of public dominion and patrimonial property, as defined by the Civil Code, both fall within the scope of public domain contemplated under the 1987 Constitution. Excepted from the scope of public domain are lands subject of a claim of ownership based on native title as explicitly recognized in Cariño v. Insular Government.

Patrimonial property

As stated, the Civil Code classifies property into two (2) categories:

1. property of public dominion
• that held by the State in its public capacity for:
• public use
• public service 
• development of national wealth for the common and public welfare
2. patrimonial property
• that held by the State in its private capacity to attain economic ends.

Being private in nature, patrimonial property is subject to alienation and disposition in the same way as properties owned by private individuals, and may thus be subject to prescription and be the object of ordinary contracts or agreements. 

Examples of patrimonial property of the State include:

1. those acquired by the government in execution sales and tax sales
2. friar lands
3. mangrove lands and mangrove swamps.

Article 420 suggests that at any given point in time, all property of the State may either be classified as property of public dominion or patrimonial property. The Republic recognizes this dichotomy inasmuch as it asserts that "the classifications of land pertaining to the State under the Civil Code are mutually exclusive."

In turn, patrimonial property of the State may be further classified into two sub-categories: 

1. those which are not property of public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State's current or intended use, and may thus be classified as patrimonial property "by nature" pursuant to Article 421; and 
2. those which previously assumed the nature of property of public dominion by virtue of the State's use, but which are no longer being used or intended for said purpose, and may thus be classified as "converted" patrimonial property pursuant to Article 422.

Thus, the proper interpretation of Article 422 in relation to Articles 420 and 421 is that "converted" patrimonial property can only come from property of public dominion under Article 420. Hence, "converted" patrimonial property should not be understood as a subset of patrimonial property "by nature" under Article 421.

There is no doubt that forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks which are lands of the public domain under the Constitution fall under property of public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, as do agricultural lands. It is also clear that land classified as agricultural and subject to the State's current or intended use remains property of public dominion. However, these agricultural lands, once declared as alienable and disposable, become "converted" patrimonial property of the State.

In effect, the classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable serves as unequivocal proof of the withdrawal by the State of the said land from the public dominion, and its "conversion" to patrimonial property. The clear intention of such conversion is to open the land to private acquisition or ownership. Again, as keenly observed by Justice Gaerlan, such converted patrimonial property remains within the broader constitutional concept of public domain precisely as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

To recall, property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it can neither be appropriated nor be the subject of contracts; hence, they cannot be alienated or encumbered. Property falling under Article 420 is outside the commerce of man precisely because it is property of public dominion. Conversely, those falling under Articles 421 and 422 are necessarily within the commerce of man, as they are not property of public dominion.

Clearly, any specific property of the State may either be outside or within the commerce of man; it cannot be both. Prior to the classification of such property to alienable and disposable, agricultural lands (being property of public dominion) are beyond the commerce of man. It is the classification of agricultural lands as alienable and disposable which places them within the commerce of man, and renders them capable of being the subject matter of contracts (such as a patent, the latter being a contract between the State and the grantee). In turn, the power to classify (and re-classify) land is vested solely in the Executive Department. Once a parcel of land forming part of public dominion is classified as alienable and disposable, they become subject to private acquisition but only through the prescribed modes of acquisition of ownership.

Prescription as a mode of acquisition of real property

PD 1529 governs the registration of land under the Torrens System. Since PD 1529 merely prescribes the manner through which existing title (ownership) may be confirmed, registration thereunder presupposes that the ownership of the land subject of the application for registration had already been acquired through any one of the modes prescribed by law.

At the time when PRCI filed its application for registration, ordinary registration proceedings were governed by Section 14 of PD 1529, thus:

Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
2. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
3. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
4. Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

Notably, PRCI did not specify the statutory provision invoked as basis for its application for registration. Nevertheless, PRCI hinged its application on the allegation that it and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the Subject Property for more than fifty (50) years, particularly since the year 1956, and not 1945 as prescribed by what was then Section 14(1). Thus, the inevitable conclusion which may be drawn from this is that PRCI's application for registration could only fall within the rubric of what was then Section 14(2) of PD 1529 which covered the registration of land acquired through prescription under existing laws.

The reference made by then Section 14(2) to "existing laws" necessarily includes the Civil Code — the statute which governs the acquisition of lands through prescription. By prescription, ownership over real property may be acquired through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law, that is:

1. through uninterrupted possession in good faith and with just title for a period of ten (10) years for ordinary acquisitive prescription;
2. through uninterrupted possession for thirty (30) years without need of just title or good faith for extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

As to the requirements of possession, just title, and good faith, the Civil Code further provides:

ART. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.

x x x x

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.

x x x x

ART. 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

The provisions governing prescription only permit the acquisition of private unregistered lands. As previously noted, lands of private ownership may either be lands owned by private persons, or, pursuant to Article 425 of the Civil Code, patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, or municipalities, owned by them in their private capacity.85

Thus, excepted from acquisitive prescription are real properties belonging to the State which are not patrimonial in character (that is, property of public dominion under Article 420 of the Civil Code), as they fall outside the commerce of man.

In Malabanan, the Court laid down the requirements for original registration under what was then Section 14(2). Reconciling Section 14(2) with the Civil Code provisions governing prescription, the Court held:

x x x Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2) x x x

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification [of] what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion x x x cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

x x x x

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion x x x when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. 

Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government

Based on the foregoing discussion in Malabanan, the requirements for original registration under then Section 14(2) were:

1. a declaration that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable;
2. an express government manifestation that said land constitutes patrimonial property, or is "no longer retained" by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth; and
3. proof of possession for the period and in the manner prescribed by the Civil Code for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from the moment the property subject of the application becomes patrimonial property of the State.

The second Malabanan requirement, that is, the express government manifestation that the land constitutes patrimonial property, was anchored on the premise that "all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as [property of public dominion] and ought to be used only by the Government." However, this premise was not meant to be adopted in absolute terms.

Once property of public dominion is classified by the State as alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it immediately becomes open to private acquisition, since "alienable lands of the public domain x x x [form] part of the patrimonial property of the State." The operative act which converts property of public dominion to patrimonial property is its classification as alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as this classification precisely serves as the manifestation of the State's lack of intent to retain the same for some public use or purpose.

To emphasize, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are generally presumed to be part of the public domain pursuant to the Regalian doctrine.

Consequently, those who seek registration on the basis of title over land forming part of the public domain must overcome the presumption of State ownership. To do so, the applicant must establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable and thus susceptible of acquisition and subsequent registration.

However, once the presumption of State ownership is discharged by the applicant, the burden to refute the applicant's claim that the land in question is patrimonial in nature necessarily falls on the State. For while the burden to prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable is placed on the applicant, the burden to prove that such land is retained for public service or for the development of the national wealth, notwithstanding its previous classification as alienable and disposable, rests, as it should, with the State.

Where the property subject of the application had not been utilized by the State, and the latter had not manifested any intention to utilize the same, proof of conversion into patrimonial property requires the establishment of a negative fact — the lack of intent on the part of the State to retain the property and utilize the same for some public purpose. In such situations, what precludes the conversion of property of public dominion to patrimonial property is an existing intention to use the same for public purpose, and not one that is merely forthcoming. This is clear from the language of Article 420 of the Civil Code:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

x x x x

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. 

In other words, placing on the applicant the burden to prove the State's lack of intent to retain the property would be unreasonable, and totally beyond the text and purpose of PD 1529. Further, this renders illusory the legal provisions in the Civil Code for the acquisition of property. After all, it is the State which has the capacity to prove its own intent to use such property for some public purpose in the absence of any overt manifestation thereof through prior use, occupation, or express declaration.

Jurisprudence instructs that when the plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is placed upon the party averring the negative fact. Conversely, if the means to prove the negative fact rests easily, if not only, upon the defendant, the plaintiff should not be made to bear the burden of proving it.

In cases where land held by the State has not been previously utilized for some public purpose, the State has no prior use to abandon or withdraw the land from. It would therefore be unreasonable to require the applicant to present a law or executive proclamation expressing such abandonment for there never will be one. The imposition of this additional requirement in cases where the land so possessed had never been utilized by the State has dire consequences for those who have occupied and cultivated the land in the concept of owners for periods beyond what is required by law.

However, and to be clear, where the property subject of the application had been previously utilized by the State for some public purpose, proof of conversion requires the establishment of a positive fact — the abandonment by the State of its use and the consequent withdrawal of the property from the public dominion. To establish this positive fact, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to present an express government manifestation that the land subject of his application already constitutes patrimonial property, or is no longer retained for some public purpose. It is within this context that the second requirement espoused in Malabanan was crafted. This second requirement covered "converted" patrimonial property of the State, or those falling within the scope of Article 422 of the Civil Code.

The early case of Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles (Cebu Oxygen) already established this interpretation of Article 422 of the Civil Code. In Cebu Oxygen, the applicant therein sought the registration of a parcel of land previously used by the local government as a public road. The Court held that the registration of the property should be permitted since the petitioner therein had been able to prove that the parcel of land had been explicitly withdrawn from public use by virtue of a city resolution authorizing its sale in a public bidding.

The fact that explicit withdrawal from public use finds relevance only with respect to "converted" patrimonial property under Article 422 (i.e., property subject to prior state-use) was further emphasized in Laurel v. Garcia (Laurel), which involved consolidated petitions for prohibition to enjoin government officials from selling a 3,179-square meter property in Roponggi, Tokyo which had been acquired by the State through the Reparations Agreement executed between the Philippines and Japan in 1956. The Roponggi property initially served as the site of the Philippine embassy before it was relocated to Nampeidai, Tokyo when the embassy building had to undergo major repairs.

In Laurel, the Court held that the Roponggi property assumes the nature of property of public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code (i.e., intended for some public service or the development of national wealth). Noting that the Roponggi property had been subject of prior state-use, the Court held that its conversion from property of public dominion under Article 420(2) to patrimonial property under Article 422 must be explicit. The Court ruled:

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public [dominion], not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such["] x x x.

The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property x x x.

Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.

From these referenced cases, it becomes clear that the need for an express government manifestation confirming that the property in question is "no longer retained" by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth, stems from the principle that abandonment of property of public dominion under Article 420 cannot be inferred solely from non-use. In turn, the determination of whether property has in fact been abandoned by the State is necessary only in cases where there has been prior state-use. To repeat, there is no abandonment to speak of in the absence of prior state-use.

The application of the second Malabanan requirement in cases where there has been no prior state-use, in addition to the requirement of proof that the property in question had been declared alienable and disposable, is thus improper.

Amendments introduced by RA 11573

In a serendipitous turn of events, RA 11573 took effect on September 1, 2021, days after the Court directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. RA 11573 was passed with the intention of improving the confirmation process for imperfect land titles.

Among the changes introduced by RA 11573 is the amendment of Section 14 of PD 1529, thus:

SEC. 6. Section 14 of PD 1529 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file at any time, in the proper Regional Trial Court in the province where the land is located, an application for registration of title to land, not exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

1. (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section.
2. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or accretion under the provisions of existing laws.
3. Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co­-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land: Provided, however, That should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of the principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by the trustee, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust."

Notably, Section 6 of RA 11573 shortens the period of possession required under the old Section 14(1). Instead of requiring applicants to establish their possession from "June 12, 1945, or earlier", the new Section 14(1) only requires proof of possession "at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure."

Equally notable is the final proviso of the new Section 14(1) which expressly states that upon proof of possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for the period and in the manner required under said provision, the applicant/s "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section." This final proviso unequivocally confirms that the classification of land as alienable and disposable immediately places it within the commerce of man, and renders it susceptible to private acquisition through adverse possession.

The final proviso thus clarifies that for purposes of confirmation of title under PD 1529, no further "express government manifestation that said land constitutes patrimonial property, or is 'no longer retained' by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth" shall henceforth be required. This harmonizes the language of PD 1529 with the body of principles governing property of public dominion and patrimonial property in the Civil Code. Through the final proviso, any confusion which may have resulted from the wholesale adoption of the second Malabanan requirement has been addressed.

In line with the shortened period of possession under the new Section 14(1), the old Section 14(2) referring to confirmation of title of land acquired through prescription has been deleted. The rationale behind this deletion is not difficult to discern. The shortened twenty (20)-year period under the new Section 14(1) grants possessors the right to seek registration without having to comply with the longer period of thirty (30) years possession required for acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code. It is but logical for those who have been in adverse possession of alienable and disposable land for at least twenty (20) years to resort to the immediate filing of an application for registration on the basis of the new Section 14(1) without waiting for prescription to set in years later.

In addition to the amendments discussed, RA 11573 also prescribes the nature of proof sufficient to establish the status of land as alienable and disposable, hence:

SEC. 7. Proof that the Land is Alienable and Disposable. — For purposes of judicial confirmation of imperfect titles filed under [PD 1529, a duly signed certification by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is alienable. Said certification shall be imprinted in the approved survey plan submitted by the applicant in the land registration court. The imprinted certification in the plan shall contain a sworn statement by the geodetic engineer that the land is within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classification Project Map Number covering the subject land.

Should there be no available copy of the Forestry Administrative Order, Executive Order or Proclamation, it is sufficient that the Land Classification (LC) Map Number, Project Number, and date of release indicated in the land classification map be stated in the sworn statement declaring that said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the DENR as land classification map.

In effect, Section 7 supersedes the requirements in T.A.N. Properties and Hanover.

Hence, at present, the presentation of the approved survey plan bearing a certification signed by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer stating that the land subject of the application for registration forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain shall be sufficient proof of its classification as such, provided that the certification bears references to: 

1. the relevant issuance (e.g., Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, or Proclamation); and
2. the LC Map number covering the subject land.

In the absence of a copy of the relevant issuance classifying the subject land as alienable and disposable, the certification of the DENR geodetic engineer must state:

1. the LC Map number;
2. the Project Number; and 
3. the date of release indicated in the LC Map; and
4. the fact that the LC Map forms part of the records of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is therefore being used by DENR as such.

In addition, the DENR geodetic engineer must be presented as witness for proper authentication of the certification so presented. The Court's ruling in Republic v. Galeno lends guidance:

In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows

1. The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
2. Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
3. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.—Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x

As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Like certifications issued by the CENROs, Regional Technical Directors, and other authorized officials of the DENR with respect to land classification status, certifications of similar import issued by DENR geodetic engineers do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, their authentication in accordance with said rule is necessary.

Retroactive application of RA 11573

As stated, RA 11573 took effect on September 1, 2021, or fifteen (15) days after its publication on August 16, 2021.

Notably, RA 11573 does not expressly provide for its retroactive application.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.103 However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions, as when the statute in question is curative in nature, or creates new rights, thus:

As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:

"It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 'laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.' But there are settled exceptions to this general rule; such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS."

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court shed light on the nature of statutes that may be deemed curative and may therefore be applied retroactively notwithstanding the absence of an express provision to this effect:

According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive x x x (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

In Nunga, Jr. v. Nunga III, the Court further clarified that while a law creating new rights may be given retroactive effect, this can only be done if the new right does not prejudice or impair any vested rights.

On this basis, the Court finds that RA 11573, particularly Section 6 (amending Section 14 of PD 1529) and Section 7 (prescribing the required proof of land classification status), may operate retroactively to cover applications for land registration pending as of September 1, 2021, or the date when RA 11573 took effect.

To be sure, the curative nature of RA 11573 can easily be discerned from its declared purpose, that is, "to simplify, update and harmonize similar and related provisions of land laws in order to simplify and remove ambiguity in its interpretation and implementation."

Moreover, by shortening the period of adverse possession required for confirmation of title to twenty (20) years prior to filing (as opposed to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier), the amendment implemented through Section 6 of RA 11573 effectively created a new right in favor of those who have been in possession of alienable and disposable land for the shortened period provided. The retroactive application of this shortened period does not impair vested rights, as RA 11573 simply operates to confirm the title of applicants whose ownership already existed prior to its enactment.

Here, PRCI presented the following evidence to prove the fact of possession:

1. the testimony of Esperanza detailing the manner through which the Subject Property had been transferred from Manuel to PRCI;
2. the testimony of Bernarda Lu, a neighbor of the Dee Ham family, confirming that Manuel, and, thereafter, PRCI, had openly and exclusively occupied the Subject Property, and had built significant improvements thereon including a warehouse presently used by PRCI in the conduct of its business;
3. the original land survey plan in Manuel's name, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 22, 1958; and
4. tax receipts and declarations in the name of PRCI's predecessors in interest, which date back to 1956.109

PRCI's application stood unopposed before the RTC. As explained, the Republic did not present any controverting evidence to impugn the veracity of PRCI's claims as to the nature and period of its possession over the Subject Property. Instead, the Republic's subsequent appeal primarily raised PRCI's alleged failure to establish the Subject Property's classification as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.

In effect, PRCI's assertions anent possession stand uncontroverted, and thus establish that PRCI, through its predecessors in interest, had been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner since 1956, or for a period of over fifty-four (54) years prior to the filing of its application for registration. This period amounts to more than three (3) decades beyond the twenty (20)-year period required under the new Section 14(1).

On the other hand, PRCI presented the following evidence to prove that the Subject Property forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain:

1. the 2011 Certification issued by the Regional Technical Director of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR attesting to such fact; and 
2. the 2013 Certification subsequently issued by the DENR RED-NCR affirming and validating the statements in the 2011 Certification.

Evidently, these certifications are not acceptable proof of the required land classification status under the new parameters set by RA 11573.

Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, bearing in mind the curative nature of RA 11573, and recognizing the long period of possession by PRCI, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to the CA for reception of evidence on the Subject Property's land classification status in accordance with Section 7 of RA 11573. Thereafter, the CA is directed to resolve PRCI's application for land registration with utmost dispatch following the guidelines set forth in this Decision.

Thus, to aid the bench and the bar, the Court lays down the following guidelines on the application of RA 11573:

1. RA 11573 shall apply retroactively to all applications for judicial confirmation of title which remain pending as of September 1, 2021, or the date when RA 11573 took effect. These include all applications pending resolution at the first instance before all Regional Trial Courts, and applications pending appeal before the Court of Appeals.

2. Applications for judicial confirmation of title filed on the basis of the old Section 14(1) and 14(2) of PD 1529 and which remain pending before the Regional Trial Court or Court of Appeals as of September 1, 2021 shall be resolved following the period and manner of possession required under the new Section 14(1). Thus, beginning September 1, 2021, proof of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation" shall be sufficient for purposes of judicial confirmation of title, and shall entitle the applicant to a decree of registration.

3. In the interest of substantial justice, the Regional Trial Courts and Court of Appeals are hereby directed, upon proper motion or motu proprio, to permit the presentation of additional evidence on land classification status based on the parameters set forth in Section 7 of RA 11573.

a. Such additional evidence shall consist of a certification issued by the DENR geodetic engineer which

1. states that the land subject of the application for registration has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
2. bears reference to the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, or proclamation classifying the land as such; and 
3. indicates the number of the LC Map covering the land.

b. In the absence of a copy of the relevant issuance classifying the land as alienable and disposable, the certification must additionally state

1. the release date of the LC Map; and
2. the Project Number. 
3. Further, the certification must confirm that the LC Map forms part of the records of NAMRIA and is precisely being used by the DENR as a land classification map.

c. The DENR geodetic engineer must be presented as witness for proper authentication of the certification in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Final Note

The underlying philosophy of making public land available to Filipino citizens is sewn into the foundations of the Constitution; it is reflected in the exclusive reservation of land ownership to Filipinos, and is echoed in the State's mandate to promote agrarian and urban land reform through the just distribution of all agricultural lands, and the establishment of urban centers and resettlement areas for the homeless. Through the imposition of retention limits, the provision of incentives for voluntary land-sharing, and the directive to respect the rights of small land and property owners, the Constitution further institutionalizes the policy of making land ownership accessible to each individual Filipino.

In line with this, PD 1529 provides for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title to land so as to bring the latter within the coverage of the Torrens system. The protection afforded by the Torrens system provides the necessary security to encourage land owners to make the investments needed to make productive use of their landholdings. Through this process, the law functions to aid land owners in becoming productive members of society in a manner that is consistent with the principles enshrined in the Constitution.

With the passage of RA 11573, any doubt which may have plagued the requirements for confirmation of title under Section 14 of PD 1529 have been clarified, with the expressed view of removing any ambiguity in its interpretation, and further streamlining the registration process.

To this end, the Court stresses that the issues involved in a land registration proceeding rest heavily on factual considerations, as they require the determination of land classification status and the nature of actual physical possession over the property subject of the action. These factual considerations are, in turn, established not only through written documentation, but also through proof of prior acts which serve as assertions of ownership, not only of the applicant but also, of the State. Accordingly, the State's participation in land registration proceedings is imperative, not only at the appeal level, but more so, at the first instance before the trial courts. Since trial courts are "in a more advantageous position to examine x x x evidence, [and] observe the demeanor of the witnesses x x x testifying in the case," they play a unique and essential role in the fact-finding process. The State's participation in the trial court proceedings enables the parties to thresh out evidentiary issues which would not otherwise be addressed at the appeal level. Consequently, the State's belated participation at the appeal level hampers prompt and equitable resolution, and leads to protracted litigation, as in this case.

For this reason, the immediate participation and heightened vigilance of the OSG at the trial court level is strongly enjoined, the latter having been vested with the sole authority to represent the State in all land registration and related proceedings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines is DENIED in part.

The February 25, 2014 Decision and June 27, 2014 Resolution respectively rendered by the Court of Appeals First Division and Special First Division in CA-G.R. CV. No. 98531 are AFFIRMED insofar as it holds that Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., by itself and through its predecessors in interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 1956.

The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on the Subject Property's land classification status based on the parameters set forth in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 11573. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals is directed to resolve the present case in accordance with this Decision with due and deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.