Administrative Law: Chapter IV — Separation of Administrative and Other Powers
Separation of Administrative and Other Powers
Doctrine of separation of powers.
- The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.
- It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
- Allocation of governmental powers.
- The doctrine declares that governmental powers are divided among the three departments of government, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and broadly operates to confine legislative powers to the legislature, executive powers to the executive department, and judicial powers to the judiciary, precluding one branch of the government from exercising or invading the powers of another.
- Stated otherwise, it is:
- the duty of the Legislature to make the law;
- of the Executive to execute the law; and
- of the Judiciary to construe the law;
- The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law
- Blending of allocated powers.
- An exact delimitation of governmental powers, however, is not possible.
- Separation of powers does not mean an entire and complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable if not impossible.
- That there may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the three powers of government, particularly in administrative agencies, is well recognized.
- Exclusive exercise of assigned powers.
- The true meaning of the theory of separation of powers is that the powers assigned to one department should not be exercised by either of the other departments, and that no department ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence or control over the others.
Doctrine of non-delegation of powers.
- This rule which follows as a necessary corollary of the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits:
- the delegation of legislative power
- the vesting of judicial officers with non-judicial functions, as well as
- the investing of non-judicial officers with judicial powers.
- Any attempt at such delegation is unconstitutional and void.
- The doctrine of non-delegation of powers is based on the maxim of potestas delegata non potest delegari.
- What has been delegated cannot in turn be delegated.
- The doctrine rests on the ethical principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter and not through the intervening mind of another.
- A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.
- As has been said:
- One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
- Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by that constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen to fit confide this sovereign trust.
Non-delegation of legislative power.
- While the rule of non-delegation is applicable to all the three branches of the government, the application usually arises to the grant of powers pertaining to lawmaking because of many instances when their delegation is made.
- The general rule against delegation of legislative power is that Congress may not delegate to administrative agencies the legislative powers vested in it except when authorized by the Constitution.
- The rule is fixed and unalterable, not depending upon the existence of an emergency.
- An unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is not brought within the limits of permissible delegation by the establishment of procedural safeguards, the right to judicial review, or by the assumption that the officer acts and will act for the public good.
- Such delegation will violate not only the doctrine of separation of powers but also the due process guarantee.
Doctrine of non-delegation not absolute.
- Delegation to administrative agencies.
- It is recognized that the doctrine of separation of power does not preclude a certain degree of admixture of the three powers of government in administrative agencies.
- Many cases recognize that a particular administrative agency has legislative and judicial, or legislative, executive, and judicial powers or functions, sometimes softened by a "quasi" or stated to be in nature legislative and judicial, and sometimes stated to be in addition to administrative powers.
- It is this combination in fact, which principally gives rise to the need for "Administrative Law" as a separate category of law.
- Need for the delegation.
- The Constitution does not demand the impossible or the impracticable and has never been regarded as denying to the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality to perform its function.
- Details and questions beyond capacity of legislature to determine.
- The delegation to administrative agencies or bodies of some legislative power is necessary particularly in modern regulatory enactments in which the legislature is incapable of defining the multitudinous details.
- While the legislature may not divest itself of its proper functions or delegate its general legislative authority, there are questions which are beyond determination by the legislature and which must necessarily be left to the determination of executive or administrative agencies, and the legislature may authorize others to do those things which it might properly, yet cannot understandingly or advantageously, do itself.
- The rule is one of necessity.
- When the legislature is not in session, the government must be carried on, and the legislature must delegate certain powers and discretion to others in carrying on essential functions of government.
- Matters requiring more specialized knowledge and expertise possessed by administrative agencies.
- Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, administrative bodies can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
- In the case of the first, it would have neither the time nor the knowledge to create detailed rules to suit changing business needs that are becoming more intricate, especially with the globalization of trade and new discoveries in technology and electronics, and in the case of the second, already obliged to handle a great diversity of cases, it would have been hard pressed to acquire the knowledge they needed to deal intelligently with all the new types of controversy.
- Thus, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in such bodies, now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government, is held not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive.
- Requisites for delegation.
- The requisites for such delegation are:
- the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
- the presence of a sufficient standard.
Shipowner questions validity of circular prescribing a standard contract to be adopted in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
POEA, 166 SCRA 533 [1988]:
- KS was awarded the sum of P192,000 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband VS pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 2 which prescribes a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
- Petitioner, owner of the vessel where KS's husband was a chief officer, claims that it had never entered into such a contract. It questions the validity of the Circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation.
- Under Executive Order No. 797 (promulgated May 1, 1982) which created the POEA, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights, to "fair and equitable employment practices," it is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen" and given the authority to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of [its] adjudicatory functions." (Sec. 4[a], thereof.)
- Is the circular valid? Yes.
- Principle of non-delegation of legislative power not violated.
- Its provisions are deemed written into every overseas employment contract as a postulate of the police power of the State.
- The authority to issue said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. There is no violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
- Delegation permitted in many instances.
- The principle of non delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted.
- The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain.
- In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary.
- This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
- Reasons for delegation.
- The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
- The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
- Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
- These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular field assigned to them.
- Reasons particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
- The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
- With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation.
- Broad legislative policies implemented by supplementing regulations.
- With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
- Sufficient standard prescribed in Executive Order No. 797.
- Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
- The power of the POEA (and before it, the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.
- That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment practices.
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to declare R.A. No. 935 (An Act to Improve the Revenue Collection Performance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR] and the Bureau of Customs [BOC] through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund of a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board and for Other Purposes) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) unconstitutional, and the implementation thereof be enjoined permanently.
Bureau of Customs Employees Association [BOCEA] vs. Teves, 661 SCRA 589 [2011].
- Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance Contracts (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank- and-file employees to sign.
- The Performance Contract pertinently provided:
- "xxx WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act of 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.
- xxx
- NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties unto this Agreement hereby agree and so agreed to perform the following: xxx
- 2. The 'Section 2, PA/PE' hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target and further accepts/commits to meet the said target under the following conditions:
- That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby undertakes and binds himself/herself that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the target with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act and its IRR, he/she will voluntarily submit to the provisions of Sec. 25(b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and
- That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct them to accept their individual target. The Performance Contract executed by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall be submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before March 31, 2008. x x x"
- BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Government's own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract.
- The majority of them, however, did not sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the Performance Contracts but they also refused.
- To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters, and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them.
- Among the issues is whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and the IRR are unconstitutional as they constitute undue delegation of legislative powers to the revenue performance evaluation board in violation of the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the constitution.
- Delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies.
- The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, x x x
- However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
- R.A. No. 9335 states policy and standards in fixing revenue targets.
- R.A. No. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law: x x x
- Section 4 'canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing' the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets: x x x
- On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board's authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
- 'SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:
- xx
- (b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply: x x x'
- At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: 'public interest,' 'justice and equity,' public convenience and welfare' and 'simplicity, economy and welfare.' In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest."
- Completeness test and sufficient standard test fully satisfied.
- We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof.
- Moreover, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the incentives due to District Collection Offices.
- While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides that '[t]he allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board, Section 7(a) of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335.'
- In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA's supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board."
Delegation to administrative agencies.
- In view of the doctrine of separation of powers, administrative agencies do not possess legislative (or judicial) power in the strict sense, and such power may not be delegated to them, except where otherwise provided by the Constitution.
- However, limited power may be conferred to carry out the legislative purpose.
- There is no absolute and universal formula for determining in all cases the powers which must be exercised by the legislative body itself and those which may be delegated to some administrative agency.
- But the rules which follow can serve as clear guide on the question of whether there has been an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power or proper grant of administrative power.
- It is power which is essentially or purely legislative in nature which must be exercised by the legislature and cannot be delegated, and not one merely incidental to some of the administrative powers for the exercise of which a board of commission was created.
- The distinction is between a delegation of power to make the law, which involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, which delegation is void; and the delegation of authority or discretion as to the execution of a law to be exercised under, and in pursuance of the law, to which delegation no objection can be made.
- The legislature may not delegate the determination of what the law shall be, to whom it may be applied, or what acts are necessary to effectuate the law.
- In short, what can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
- The legislature may delegate its authority to make findings of fact, and the fact-finding power may be conferred for putting into effect, suspending, or applying the law.
- But where delegation to a fact-finding body empowers it to create the conditions which constitute the fact, the delegation is invalid.
- The legislature must declare a policy and fix a standard in enacting a statute conferring discretionary power upon an administrative agency, but the agency may be authorized to "fill up the details" in promoting the purposes of the legislation and carrying it into effect.
- When the legislature laid down the fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose.
- The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode of proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
- The possibility that administrative officers might exercise delegated powers in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner in defiance of the policy and standards stated in the delegation of authority is not a ground for objection to the delegation.
- Accordingly, in delegating powers to administrative bodies, the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule for their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion with regard thereto, and a statute which is deficient in this respect is invalid.
- Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
- The presumption that an officer will not act arbitrarily but will exercise sound judgment and good faith cannot sustain a delegation of unregulated discretion.
- Neither can the difficulty be overcome by saying that any act the delegate may perform can be tested after he has performed it and held valid if the legislature could have authorized that particular act, and invalid if it could not.
- It is not necessary that the legislature supply administrative officials with a specific formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program.
- The modern tendency is to be more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to administrative agencies in order to facilitate the administration of laws as the complexity of economic and governmental conditions increases.
- The standard to guide an administrative agency in the exercise of its rule-making power may be either express or implied.
- In the former, the non delegation objection is easily met.
- The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
- It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the statute considered as a whole.
- In case of a delegation of a rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
- However, even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
- It has been held that the authority given by the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), the regulatory body with delegated power to fix rates of public utilities, to provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid, as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority — Potestas delegata non potest delegari.
- Another accepted test to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power is the completeness test.
- Under this test, a statute must be complete in itself so that by appropriate judicial review and control, any action taken pursuant to delegated authority may be kept within the defined limits of the authority conferred.
- A statute may be complete when the subject, and the manner and the extent of its operation are stated in it such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
- The test of completeness has been said to be whether the provision is sufficiently definite and certain to enable one to know his rights and obligations thereunder.
- The general rule which requires an express standard to guide the exercise of discretion of administrative agencies is subject to exceptions.
- The rule of non-delegation of legislative power does not apply when permitted by the Constitution and in case of delegation to local.
Statute left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say
what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing it.
U.S. v. Ang Tang, 43 Phil. [1923].
- In 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice and corn, and under extraordinary circumstances regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose."
- Under the Act, the Governor-General was authorized "whenever for any cause, conditions arise resulting in extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice, or corn, to issue and promulgate with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act." The violation of any provisions of the Act or of its regulations promulgated in accordance therewith is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both in the discretion of the court. Pursuant thereto, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price of rice and penalizing violation thereof.
- The defendant Ang was prosecuted for the violation of the law for selling rice at a price higher than that fixed in the proclamation and convicted by the trial court. He appealed to the Supreme Court.
- Ang assailed the validity of the proclamation as having issued pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation of powers.
- Law is incomplete as a legislation.
- By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
- The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for cause and leaves the question of what is any cause to the discretion of the Governor- General.
- The Legislature does not specify or define what is an extraordinary increase in the price of palay, rice, or other cereal. That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
- The law does not specify or define what such temporary rules or emergency measures are, or how long such temporary rules and emergency measures shall remain in force and effect or when they shall take effect.
- All of these are left to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General. The law is thus incomplete as a legislation."
- Determination of what acts constitute a criminal offense essentially a legislative task.
- It is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor General which constitutes the crime. Before the promulgation of the rules and regulations, a dealer could sell rice at any price and he would not commit any crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and a sale of it at any price would not be a crime.
- In other words, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor- General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Philippine Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not a crime.
- The Governor-General cannot, by proclamation, determine what act shall constitute a crime or not. That is essentially a legislative task.
Statute requires every public utility "to furnish annually a detailed
report of finances and operations in such form and containing such matters
as the Board may, from time to time, by order, prescribe
Compana General De Tabacos de Filipinas v. The Board
of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil. 136 119161
- Petitioner appealed from an order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, requiring it to file a detailed report of its finances and operations in the form set forth in the petition.
- The Board relies upon its authority under Section 16 of Act No. 2307 empowering it, "after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility detailed reports as quoted above."
- Does the provision in question constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power? Yes.
- Authority given very general
- The provision is very general. It is also very comprehensive. It is clear that a statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the Board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
- Such a provision does not declare or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State.
- No sufficient standard prescribed by the Act.
- The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board to require what information the Board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board all of its powers over a given subject matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied.
The Probation Act shall apply in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have probation officers.
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]
- C applied for probation under the provisions of Act No. 5521, otherwise known as The Probation Act. Original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed to prohibit the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking any further action in entertaining the said application for probation on the ground that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
- The challenged provision of the said Act was Section 11 thereof which reads: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at the rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officers shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
- Does the provision in question constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power? Yes.
- Absence of definite standard renders legislative act void.
- For the purpose of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces.
- An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence, invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it...
- No standard or guide fixed by Probation Act.
- The Probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. By Section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
- In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards.
- If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
- Distinction between discretion as to what the law shall be and discretion as to its execution.
- The true distinction, says Judge Ranney, 'is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made.'
- To the same effect are decisions of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan (36 Phil. 547 11917]); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660 [1919]); and Cruz vs. Youngberg (56 Phil. 234 [1931]).
- In the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of a law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised if the conditions of the country make this advisable, or if disease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands.
- Power to ascertain existence of acts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law may be delegated.
- It should be observed that the case at bar is not concerned with simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation or the adoption by the people of a particular community. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise... The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of acts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. The legislature then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingency has arisen.
- Discretion vested in provincial boards absolute and unlimited.
- But in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expediency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure.
- Taking effect of Act based solely upon provincial boards.
- The fact that at some future time, the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus, put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking effect, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or a body other than the legislature itself. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities."
Statute confers on the President authority to create municipal
corporations.
- The President of the Philippines, acting under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code created, by Executive Orders, 33 municipalities. The petitioner, as Vice-President of the Philippines and as a taxpayer, instituted a civil action for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor-General to restrain him and his representatives from passing in audit any expenditures of public funds in implementation of the executive orders or any disbursements by the newly created municipalities.
- He alleges that the executive orders are null and void upon the ground, among others, that Section 68 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers. Said Section 68 empowers the President by executive order to "define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require."
- Does the provision in question constitute an undue delegation of legislative power? Yes.
- Authority to create municipal corporations essentially legislative in nature.
- The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it, municipal corporations are purely the creatures of the statute. The Cardona vs. Binangonan case (36 Phil. 507.) cannot be relied upon to support the contrary view for what was involved in the same was not the creation of a new municipality but a mere transfer of territory from a municipality to another. Whereas, the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
- Completeness and sufficient standard requirements for valid delegation.
- Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself, must set forth therein the policy to be executed, be carried out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard the limits of which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby delegate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
- Requirements not satisfied by the statute.
- Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the powers to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. It is true that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President 'xxx may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such therein as the public welfare may require.' It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase 'as the public welfare may require' qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred."
- Power granted essentially legislative in character.
- At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase 'as the public welfare may require/ in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof.
- It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), the court had upheld 'public welfare' and 'public interest,' respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issue, involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and having no binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets.
- Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in Section 68.
- The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not 'public interest' demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is purely a legislative question.
- Similar cases.
- For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting, undue delegation of legislative powers, state laws:
- granting the judicial department the power to determine whether certain territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-259.); or
- vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308.); or
- conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409.); or
- authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition 'ought justly' to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village 'as justice may require' (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037.); or
- creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is 'in the public interest' and whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same. (Caroline-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310.)
- Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L.Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar.
- The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve 'codes of fair competition' submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative, provided that such codes are 'not designated to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy' of said Act.
- The Federal Supreme Court held:
- To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1.
- In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
- Discretion vested in President virtually unfettered.
- If the term 'unfair competition' is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is 'virtually unfettered,' and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that 'public welfare,' which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of power made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion may be required by public welfare or public interest.
- Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which is the special duty and privilege of the Court to uphold.
Statute provides for the inspection, grading and baling of fibers and the creation of a board to carry the law into effect.
Alegre v. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil. 394 [1929]
- Section 1772 of the Administrative Code provides: "The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that may hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor, x x x" Section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without, being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided.
- Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of legislative power?
- No delegation of legislative power involved.
- The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp and by whom and how it should be done, and creates the Fiber Board with power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution.
- In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands, it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board for that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation of legislative power.
- Delegation of the power involved necessary.
- It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission.
Administrative order implements Reflector Law.
Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 [1970]
- Respondent CFI Judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner Land Transportation Commissioner for the enforcement of R.A. No. 5715, otherwise known as the Reflector Law, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and probation filed by the Government, the other respondent, assailing the validity of said enactment as well as such Administrative Order No. 2.
- This Order has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in reflectors, commercial glass reflectors, reflectionalized tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night."
- Then came a section of dimensions, placement and color.
- As to dimensions, the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then made as to how reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted."
- There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted. There is the further requirement... The color required of each reflector, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall be all red. Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non compliance with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration may be suspended. It is an express provision of the statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, a fine of not less than P10 or more than P50 could be imposed."
- Is the Order contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power? No.
- Guide to determine whether or not there is undue delegation.
- It is obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted.
- The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward."
- Function of standard fixed in the law.
- To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel.
- A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies that public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may, in pursuance of the above guidelines, promulgate supplemental rules and regulations."
- Standard may be implied.
- The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
- In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams (70 Phil. 726.) is 'safe transit upon the roads.'"
- Growing tendency toward judicial approval of principle of subordinate legislation.
- This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not-too-long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non delegation 'has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the approval of the practice by the courts.
- For the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes x x x."
Petitioner, a death convict, assails the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8177, the Lethal Injection Law, on the ground, among others, that it unduly
delegates legislative power to respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of
the Bureau of Corrections.
Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 297 SCRA 754 [1998]
- The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the crime of rape and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
- Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Corrections from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177, and its implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for, among others, unduly delegating legislative power to the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.
- Is there an undue delegation of legislative powers in R.A. No. 8177 to the two (2) officials mentioned.
- There is no undue delegation of legislative powers.
- Principle of non-delegation of powers.
- The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers.
- 'The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
- Exceptions to the rule.
- The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
- Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
- Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
- Delegation to the people at large;
- Delegation to local governments; and
- Delegation to administrative bodies.
- Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
- Reasons for delegation of authority to administrative agencies
- The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself.
- Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
- Two tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation.
- Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
- be complete in itself— it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and
- fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions."
- R.A. No. 8177 passes both tests.
- Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. xxx
- Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable of reasonable application.
- R.A. No. 8177 does not unduly delegate legislative power.
- A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the 'administration of the correctional system.
- Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health."
- Implementing Rules and Regulations suffer serious flaws.
- However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides:
- SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. — Details of the procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events before and after execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
- Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized prison personnel.
- Thus, the Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
- As to the second paragraph of Section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern 'which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.' Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
- SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen; subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
- Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section 17 of the implementing rules which provides:
- SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. —Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In the latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.' Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary.
- Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659. Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 now reads as follows:
- ART. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided in Article 40 x x x.
- On this point, the Court finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
- Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.' An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
- In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no support in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid."
- Dissenting Opinion:
- R.A. No. 8177 is void.
- R.A. No. 8177 is unprecedented in our annals of lawmaking. A careful reading will show that it actually authorizes two persons to promulgate rules and regulations to implement its provisions — one, the Secretary of Justice and the other, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections. The delegated power of the Secretary of Justice is given in Section 3 which provides:
- The Secretary of Justice in coordination with the Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections shall xxx promulgate the rules to implement its provisions.
- The delegated power of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections can be gleaned from Section 1 of the law which provides,
- ' xxx The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection, as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict.' Under said Section 1, the power of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to promulgate rules cannot be denied. The Director cannot carry out his duty to execute the death sentence 'xxx endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection, as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution' as well as his duty to 'x x x take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict,' without the power to promulgate the necessary rules.
- Indeed, it was pursuant to this power to make rules that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections prepared a Manual governing the 'details of the procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal injection x x x.' The Manual which is a compendium of the rules of execution is recognized by no less than the respondent Secretary of Justice.
- It is my humble submission that this unprecedented act of delegating the power to make rules to two persons over the same subject matter does not have any constitutional warrant. It can easily spawn legal absurdities and incongruities. The two authorities exercising the same power over the same subject matter may promulgate contrasting if not contradictory rules to the prejudice of the remaining rights of a death convict.
- In the case at bar, the anomalous situation is exacerbated by the possibility that the rules promulgated by the Director of Corrections, a lower ranked official, may contradict the rules of the Secretary of Justice, the top-ranked official in the Department of Justice. We should lay down the case law that the legislative choice of who shall be the delegate to make the rules and regulations to implement a law must be clear and unequivocal. Unless the choice of delegate is clear, the promulgation of the appropriate rules and regulations cannot be done. It is self-evident that the legislative choice of who shall promulgate the rules to implement the law is as important as the standard which should guide the delegate in making the rules. Both must be beyond doubt.
- Implementing Rules and Regulations are void.
- We may assume arguendo that R.A. No. 8177 exclusively delegates to the respondent Secretary of Justice the power to promulgate its implementing rules and regulations. Nevertheless, I agree with the petitioner that the implementing rules and regulations are void.
- FIRST. It is elementary that the respondent Secretary of Justice cannot further delegate the power to make rules and regulations to another person. Delegata potestas non potest delegari, delegated power cannot further be delegated is a time honored legal principle. Under Section 19 of the Rules and in blatant breach of this principle, the respondent Secretary of Justice delegated to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections the power to determine the 'details of the procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal injection.
- In addition, he abdicated to the said Director the power to determine 'the sequence of events before and after the execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous lines; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the intravenous system.' The matters sub-delegated by the respondent Secretary of Justice to the Director of Bureau of Corrections involve the most significant aspects of the execution process. A wrong rule in any of these aspects of the execution process will deny a death convict the right to die with dignity. Citing Death Row Confidential by Weinstein and Bessent, petitioner relates some bizzare experience that have resulted from the inept executions of some death convicts by lethal injection, viz.: xxx
- The choice of the delegate who shall cobble the rules and regulations that will implement a law is part of lawmaking and hence, this power to choose is the sole prerogative of Congress. It follows that the delegate so designated by Congress has no authority to choose another who shall discharge the power given to him by Congress. It is a duty that the delegate cannot abdicate.
- SECOND. It is bad enough that the respondent Secretary of Justice surrendered to the Director of Corrections the power to promulgate the rules on 'x x x the sequence of events before and after the execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the intravenous system
- Worse still, under Section 19 of the Rules, the respondent Secretary of Justice ordered that the rules governing these details should be contained in a Manual that 'shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized prison personnel.
- In other words, the operating Manual is a secret Manual whose content is unknown to the person to be executed and be unknown to the public as well. The secret Manual can well contain arbitrary, capricious and whimsical rules and yet the rules cannot be challenged as they are known only to the Director and authorized prison personnel but not to the person most affected — the death convict.
- If basic due process demands that no person can be denied his lesser property rights thru unpublished laws, there is more reason to hold that one cannot be denied his greater right to life thru unpublished rules. The Secret Manual denies a death convict the right to know how he will die.
- While the respondent Secretary of Justice was unenthusiastic in crafting the rules on the critical aspects of the execution process, he was overly enthusiastic in enacting rules on matters unrelated to the subject matter of R.A. No. 8177. R.A. No. 8177 is stark clear on its subject matter. As its title indicates, it is merely 'An Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection as the Method of Carrying Out Capital Punishment x x x.' Yet, the Rules promulgated by the respondent Secretary overly arched on matters too remotely connected with the subject matter of R.A. No. 8177 such as prison services, manner of confinement, religious services, exercise, meal services, visitation and interviews, private correspondence and communication, court appearance, etc.
- These elaborate rules are not germane to the purpose of R.A. No. 8177. A re-reading of Section 3 of R.A. No. 8177 will reveal that the authority of the respondent Secretary of Justice is limited to promulgating rules on how lethal injection should be administered to the death convict. Nothing less and nothing more. But this is not all. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the respondent Secretary of Justice ordained that 'execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age.' The rule suspending the execution of a pregnant woman and the commutation of the death sentence of a convict over seventy (70) years of age is in harmony with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code. There is, however, no law that provides that 'execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence x x x.
- In ordaining this rule, the respondent Secretary engaged in out and-out legislation which is taboo for an executive official. Our long undisturbed jurisprudence is that, the 'xxx rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. A public administrative body may make only such rules and regulations as are within the limits of the powers granted to it.
Sufficiency of standards.
- Dependent upon certain considerations.
- The sufficiency of a particular standard or limit governing the authority and discretion of the administrative agency in effecting the policy of the legislature greatly depends upon the nature of the power exercised and the nature of the right restricted by such power; it also depends upon whether or not proper regulation or control requires the vesting of such discretion.
- Detailed standard not required.
- The necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems have led to judicial approval of broad standards for administrative action.
- Detailed standards are not required, especially in regulatory enactments under the police power.
- The legislature is not required to provide such a standard as confers the least amount of discretion, and in many situations, detailed standards in precise and unvarying forms would be wholly unrealistic and more arbitrary than a general indefinite one.
- Examples of standards held sufficient.
- The following legislative specifications are among those which have been held to state a sufficiently definite standard for administrative action in specific fields:
- "necessity,"
- "necessary or expedient,"
- "appropriate,"
- "reasonable,"
- "just and reasonable,"
- "fair and equitable,"
- "sufficient,"
- "excessive profits,"
- "unduly complicated corporate structures and inequitable distributions of voting power,"
- "fit," or "unfit,"
- "suitable,"
- "unsuitable,"
- "competency, ability and integrity,"
- illuminating oil which is "safe, pure, and affords a satisfactory light,"
- "worthy cause,"
- "decency and good order,"
- "substantial,"
- "undesirable residents,"
- "undesirable business practices,"
- "unprofessional conduct,"
- "misconduct,"
- "offensive because of injurious and obnoxious noise, vibrations smoke, gas, and other factors,"
- "injurious substances,"
- "danger to peace or safety,"
- "public interest,"
- "public convenience or necessity,"
- "a clear and present danger,"
- "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil."
- Personal judgment of the agency as standard.
- The personal judgment of the agency, where unrestrained, is not a standard or a sufficient standard.
- Even where broad standards are laid down, such standards are not sufficient if the statute expressly adds "in the opinion" of the agency, or expressly confers policy-making power upon the agency.
"Necessary in the interest of law and order" as a standard.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 [1929]
- This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dagobo is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. The Philippine Legislature has, by the enactment of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro to be exercised by the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board.
- Is the provision in question an unlawful delegation of legislative power? No.
- Discretion on matters involving questions of fact.
- Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact
- The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the 'necessity' of the case."
- Discretionary authority as to the execution of the law.
- An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
- In the case at bar, the Legislature merely conferred upon the Provincial Governor, with the approval of the Provincial Board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. Who, but the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board, as the official representatives of the Province, are better qualified to judge 'when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order.'As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state."
"Necessary or advisable in the public interest" as a standard.
People v. Rosenthal and Osmena, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]
- Act No. 2581, otherwise known as the Blue Sky Law, requires every person, partnership or corporation to obtain a certificate or permit from the Insular Treasurer before offering for sale to the public speculative securities. The Insular Treasurer, under the law, is empowered to cancel or revoke a certificate or permit previously issued by him.
- Appellants R and O were charged with having violated the Blue Sky Law. Convicted under the penal provisions of the said law, R appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the Act fixes no standard or rule which can guide the Insular Treasurer in determining the cases on which a certificate or permit ought to issue, thereby making his opinion, the sole criterion on the matter of its issuance, with the result that legislative power is being unduly delegated to him.
- Does Act No. 2581 furnish a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision to follow regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit? Yes.
- Sufficient standard provided.
- The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provision of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with.
- Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation 'is in the public interest.' In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against schemes which have, no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the 'sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines and other like fraudulent exploitations' — 'public interest' in this case is sufficient standard pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term 'public interest' is not without a settled meaning."
"To promote simplicity, economy and efficiency" as a standard.
Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359 [1952].
- This is a petition by C to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as NAFCO. It appears that the petitioner was, in 1949, the manager of the NAFCO with salary of P15,000 a year.
- By a resolution of the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective on the first day of that month. Submitted to the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was disapproved on August 4, 1949. The Government Enterprises Council was created by the President under Executive Order No. 93 pursuant to R.A. No. 51, which authorizes the President to effect reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in their operation.
- C challenged the action of the Government Enterprises Council, contending that Executive Order No. 93 was an undue delegation of power.
- Is Executive Order No. 93 null and void because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislative power to the President? No.
- A policy and a standard laid down.
- So long as the legislature lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute, there is no undue delegation of power. R.A. No. 51, in authorizing the President, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-owned and controlled corporations lays down a standard policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating Executive Order No. 93 which, tested by the rule above-cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
"Of a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character" as a
standard.
Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 [1914].
- MFC appealed from an order denying an injunction to restrain the enforcement of an Ohio law creating a Board of Censors of motion picture films. Section 3 makes it the duty of the Board to examine and censor motion picture films to be publicly exhibited and displayed in the State of Ohio.
- The films are required to be exhibited to the Board before they are delivered to the exhibitor for exhibition, for which a fee is charged. Under Section 4, "Only such films as are, in the judgment and discretion of the Board of Censors, of a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and approved by such Board." The films are required to be stamped or designated in a proper manner. A penalty is provided for exhibition without such approval.
- The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is educational, moral, or amusing or harmless, and the law places upon the members of the Board unlimited and absolute discretion.
- Does the law in question embody an improper delegation of legislative power to the censors? No.
- Power to ascertain facts and conditions may be delegated.
- While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply.
- If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and not particularize, they would miss sufficiently both in provision and execution.
- Statute guards against arbitrary judgments.
- The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is educational, moral, or amusing or harmless, and hence, leaves decision to arbitrary judgment, whim, and caprice, or aside from those extremes, leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of the pictures, permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting 'in unjust discrimination against some propagandist film/ while others might be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other terms, get precision from the sense and experience of men, and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct.
- The exact specification of the instance to their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law properly relies.
"To maintain monetary stability, promote a rising level of
production, employment and real income" as a standard.
People v. Jollife, 105 Phil. 677 [1959].
- This is an appeal by defendant-appellant J from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, convicting him of violation of R.A. No. 265, and sentencing him to imprisonment for one (1) year, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs, as well as decreeing the forfeiture, in favor of the government, of four (4) pieces of gold bullion valued at P35,305.46, and a traveller's check in the sum of $100,000.
- It appears that on December 7, 1958, when J was about to board a plane, four pieces of gold bullion were found in his body. There was also found $100,000 traveller's check in his possession.
- Section 74 of R.A. No. 265 conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis."
- The Board is, likewise, authorized to take such remedial measures as are appropriate to protect the international stability of the peso, "whether the international reserve is falling, as a result of payments or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the national welfare." (Sec. 70, R.A. No. 265.) It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are among, others, "to maintain monetary stability and income in the Philippines." (Sec. 2, R.A. No. 265.)
- J challenged, among others, Circular No. 21 on the ground that it is an undue delegation of legislative power.
- Does the grant of authority to issue the circular in question constitute an undue delegation of legislative power? No.
- Distinction between power to make law and authority as to its execution. —
- It is true that, under our system of government, [legislative] power may not be delegated to any political body except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
- Standards provided sufficiently concrete and definite.
- Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which 'sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.'
- The standards provided by R.A. No. 265 are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant to said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers..."
"Adequate and efficient instruction " as a standard.
Phil. Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 [1955]
- The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional. Their attack is specifically aimed at Section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:
- "It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same.
- "Nowhere in this Act," petitioners argue, "can one find any description, either general or specific, of what constitutes a general standard of efficiency. Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of any basis or condition to ascertain what is adequate education to the public. Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the efficiency of instruction."
- The attack on this score is also extended to Section 6 which, provides:
- "The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academic degrees. It shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and other medical or vocational, or professional character."
- Petitioners reason out that, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standards."
- Does Act No. 2706 confer on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards thereby constituting an invalid delegation of legislative power? No.
- Power to fix minimum standards for adequate and efficient instruction may be delegated.
- It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as the legislature has not fixed the standards, 'the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain' — and for that reason constitutionally objectionable.
- The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness, the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students, etc., and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did, and could validly rely upon the education, experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements for adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school.
- Adequate and efficient instruction should be considered sufficient, in the same way as 'public welfare,' 'necessary in the interest of law and order/ 'public interest' and 'justice and equity and substantial merits of the case' have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate."
"Simplicity and dignity" as a standard.
Balbuena v. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 [1960].
- Section 1 of R.A. No. 1265 requires all educational institutions to observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes the Secretary of Education to issue rules and regulations on the proper conduct of flag ceremony. Petitioners, members of the religious sect "Jehovah's Witnesses," challenged the constitutionality of the Act by virtue of which the Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8 (prescribing compulsory flag ceremony in all schools), as an undue delegation of legislative power.
- Do the requirements of simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the national anthem constitute an adequate standard? Yes.
- Statute need not specify in detail, manner of exercise of delegated power. —
- The requirements constitute an adequate standard especially when contrasted with other standards hereto for, upheld by the courts as 'public interest/ 'public welfare,' 'interest of law and order/ 'justice and equity' and the 'substantial merits of the case/ or 'adequate and efficient instruction/ That the legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute for all that is required of it is the laying down of standard and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency.
- To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve."
"Justice and equity and substantial merits of the case" as a standard.
International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1946)
- This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the resolution dated December 23, 1939, of the Court of Industrial Relations. The petitioner IHVC claims that if Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is held to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to determine minimum wages in connection with an industrial dispute, the section is unconstitutional as constituting an undue delegation of legislative power to the court, depriving the petitioner of the equal protection of the laws. In support of this claim, petitioner argues that the determination of minimum wages is a legislative function, and that Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 "does not indicate in what manner, by what standards, or in accordance with what rules, the Court of Industrial Relations shall determine minimum wages under said section." Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that "in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and powers under the Act, the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits to the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms."
- Has the National Assembly, by this Section 20, furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it? Yes.
- Discretionary power conferred judicial in character.
- "The discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of separation of powers the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the equal protection clause of the Constitution."
"Fair and equitable employment practices " as a standard.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 [1988]:
- KS was awarded the sum of P192,000 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband VS pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 2 which prescribes a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Petitioner, owner of the vessel where KS's husband was a Chief Officer, claims that it had never entered into such a contract. It questions the validity of the circular as violative of the principle of non delegation. Under Executive Order No. 797 (promulgated May 1, 1982) which created the POEA, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights to "fair and equitable employment practices," it is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship causing out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers including seamen," and given the authority to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of [its] adjudicatory functions." (Sec. 4[a], thereof.)
- Does the grant of authority to issue the circular in question constitute an undue delegation of legislative power? No.
- Circular issued in exercise of police power of the State.
- The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco [VS] but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the Circular, which specifically declared that all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date. In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State.
- Distinction between discretion to determine how the law may be enforced and discretion to determine what the law shall be.
- But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
- 'xxx The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)
- The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held: '
- We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
- The phrase 'may see fit' is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall thebe chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
- Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission,' a wide and sweeping authority that is not 'canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and, therefore, invalid delegation of legislative powers.
- Two accepted tests for determining validity of delegation.
- There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz., the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative."
- Broad legislative policies implemented by supplementary regulations. —
- With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
- Sufficient standard provided in Executive Order No. 797.
- Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it, the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive orders itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment practices. Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards:
- 'public interest' in People v. Rosenthal
- 'justice and equity' in Antamok Cold Fields v. CIR,
- 'public convenience and welfare' in Calalang v. Williams, and
- 'simplicity, economy and efficiency' in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few cases.
- In the United States, the 'sense and experience of men' was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and 'national security' in Flirabayashi v. United States."
"As far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world
market," and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar," as a
standard.
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 [1997].
- The petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled, "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes."
- R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty-six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.
- On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 392. The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 provides:
- Sec. 15. Implementation of full deregulation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed: x x x"
- In assailing Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:
- First, Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the president may consider it practicable to declare the full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
- Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund — a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180. Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and in concrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor.
- Are Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 unconstitutional on the ground that they constitute an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy?
- Distinction between discretion as to what the law shall be and discretion as to its execution.
- The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early as 1916, in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipina vs. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners, this Court thru Mr. Justice Moreland, held that the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
- Two accepted tests for determining validity of delegation.
- Over the years, as the legal engineering of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
- Standard need not be express.
- The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in the light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States, supra, as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity.
- Law hurdles both tests.
- Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down Section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
- Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President — he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Petitioners contend that the words 'as far as practicable,' 'declining' 'and stable' should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration.
- The dictionary meanings of these words are well-settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines 'practicable' as meaning possible to practice or perform; 'decline' as meaning to take a downward direction; and 'stable' as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases."
- Executive Department failed to follow standards.
- It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate standards set by R.A. No. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse. But petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive Department misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997.
- A perusal of Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.:
- the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and
- the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
- Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit.
- We therefore hold that the Executive Department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misapplication of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive Department considered anyway the stability of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive Department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. No. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers
- Executive Department infringed terms of the delegation.
- The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive commingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive Department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil.
- In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
Restriction on grant of judicial power.
- The doctrine of separation of powers of government also operates to restrict the exercise of judicial functions to administrative agencies.
- Since the legislature cannot exercise judicial functions, it certainly is precluded from delegating the exercise of judicial functions to administrative agencies or officers.
- While the legislature is powerless to confer purely or strictly judicial powers, functions, and duties to an administrative agency, it, by no means, follows that it may not perform functions which are in their nature, judicial, and possess and exercise quasi-judicial powers.
- It is recognized that some judicial powers may be conferred upon and exercised by administrative agencies without violating constitutional provisions inhibiting the "delegation" of judicial power.
- However, the judicial power which may be exercised by administrative agencies is a restricted one, limited to what is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration of the statutes that are committed to them for administration.
- Of course, arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred upon administrative agencies either in the exercise of rule making or adjudicatory functions.
Statute empowers Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
after notice and hearing, to remove unauthorized constructions on public
navigable streams.
Lovina v.
Moreno, 9 SCRA 557 [1965].
- This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and dikes in a fishpond owned by L in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Rampanga. The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati," a navigable river in Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed under the provisions of R.A. No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and ordered the spouses L, to remove five (5) closures of "Sapang Bulati."
- L filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The position of L in the court below was that, Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests upon the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is publicly navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
- Is the objection to the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 2056 not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications but also unreasonable and arbitrary, tenable? No.
- Power delegated merely incidental to administrative power possessed.
- R.A. No. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway, entitled to make because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession. (Palanca v. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449.)
- It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, Section 2.
- Notice and hearing required for exercise of power delegated.
- Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value cannot be done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and the appellees who appeared therein. It is noteworthy, that Republic Act 2056 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as 'public nuisances or as prohibited constructions' on public navigable streams, and those to appellees clearly are in the latter class.
- Findings of fact generally binding on courts.
- Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions, in matters within their jurisdiction, are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in this case, the lower court erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Reorganization Plan confers jurisdiction on Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime,
separation pay, etc.
Miller v. Mardo, 2 SCRA 898 [1961].
- G filed with the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint against M alleging he was arbitrarily dismissed as driver without being paid separation pay. M filed with the CFI of Baguio, a petition praying for judgment prohibiting AM, its Chief Hearing Officer, from proceeding with the case for the reason that AM had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. M questions the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.
- Under Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation Law; (b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and (c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay, and payment for medical services of domestic help.
- Before the effectivity of the Plan, the Department of Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above. R.A. No. 1241, which amended Section 4 of R.A. No. 997 which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, empowered the latter to abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions.
- Is Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it confers judicial power on the Regional Offices over cases other than those falling under the Workmen's Compensation Law, invalid and of no effect? Yes.
- "Functions" contemplated in law refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions.
- The 'functions' referred to in R.A. No. 1241 which could thus be created, obviously, refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government which plainly did not include the creation of courts.
- Quasi-judicial powers delegated incidental to administrative functions.
- It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislative must leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over the matter exclusively vested in the courts."
- Delegation if not, express, must be clearly implied.
- If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create 'functions' in connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of Government.
Law where standard may be expressed or
contained.
- Standard may be prescribed in the law itself.
- The standard or limit governing the authority and discretion of the agency in effecting the policy of the legislature must be found in the law itself, since only the legislature can create such standards and limits.
- However, it need not, in all instances, be expressly stated in the statute particularly where a standard is implied in the statute conferring the power.
- The standard to guide a particular act which in terms is not limited by any specific standard may be found within the framework of the statute under which the act is to be performed, or may inhere in its subject matter or purpose.
- Standard may be found in other sources.
- Also, a standard may be found in other pertinent legislation, or an executive order, or in the field of law governing the operation of the agency. Thus:
- Although a Board is declared to "have full and complete authority to use its discretion," a standard to guide such discretion may be deemed to be stated in a provision that "in order to..." the Board "is hereby authorized to" perform certain acts.
- The standards to guide the price administrator in fixing maximum prices of commodities and rents were held to be prescribed by the statute and an executive order promulgated under it.
- A standard set in one section of a statute may be held to provide the guide for exercise of power under another section.
- Where a Board is created by a local governing body pursuant to a statute providing for such creation and setting forth the powers of the Board and the guiding standard which governs the exercise of such powers, the ordinance itself need not set forth the standards and powers of the Board.
- The standard of "common sense and experience" of the members of a film censor board was used by the U.S. Supreme Court in the determination of when a film is of "moral, educational or amusing and harmless character."
Exceptions to rule requiring standards or
guides.
- There are situations in which the courts may relax the strict requirements of the rule, or recognize that it is not always necessary to prescribe a specific rule of action to guide the exercise of administrative discretion.
- The following are instances in which uncontrolled discretion may be vested on administrative agencies:
- In the handling of state property or funds;
- A power which is not directly or exclusively a legislative one in the exercise of which the State is supreme and may act at its pleasure, and which has no relation whatsoever to personal or property rights, may be delegated without any standard to guide its exercise.
- This has been held with regard to the power to form and consolidate school districts, and substantially the same principle has been stated in regard to exclusion of aliens;
- In a field which is purely administrative, that is, in regard to a matter of internal administration, standards may be deemed unnecessary;
- The power of a Board to make recommendations which bind no one has been held administrative and not legislative, so that the absence of standards was immaterial;
- In matters which are in the nature of privileges as to the using of property, the engaging in occupations, or the committing of acts which might well be forbidden altogether, but which under certain conditions may be harmless or well-managed;
- Where it is impracticable to lay down a definite comprehensive rule, such as where regulation turns upon the question of personal fitness; and
- Where the act relates to the administration of a police regulation and is necessary to protect the general welfare, morals, and safety of the public.
- In such situations, the courts will infer that the standard of reasonableness is to be applied.
- Although other cases in such situations recognize the existence of the necessity of a prescribed standard, they also recognize that in such cases, a more general or less definite grant of authority is necessary.
Permissible delegation of legislative power
under the Constitution.
- Delegation of strictly legislative power is expressly authorized in the following provisions of the Constitution:
- Art. VI, Sec. 23.
- x x x
- (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
- Art. VI, Sec. 28.
- x x x
- (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government x x x.
- Art. VI, Sec. 32.
- The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor, signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
- Art. X, Sec. 3.
- The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, x x x
- Art. X, Sec. 5.
- Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges, subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
- Art. X, Sec. 10.
- No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
- Art. X, Sec. 18.
- x x x. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."
- Art. X, Sec. 20.
- Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
- Administrative organization;
- Creation of sources of revenues;
- Ancestral domain and natural resources;
- Personal, family, and property relations;
- Regional urban and rural planning development;
- Economic, social, and tourism development;
- Educational policies;
- Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
- Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region."
Delegation of legislative powers to
local governments.
- An exception to the general rule against the delegation of legislative power sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to make such delegation to local authorities.
- This exception is universally recognized for so long a time that its existence has not been disputed even under constitutions that do not expressly permit the delegation.
- As has been said;
- "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authority; and hence, while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local self-government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded, as a transfer of general legislative power but rather as the grant of authority to prescribe local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity."
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