Case Digest: Olego vs. Rebueno, No. L-39350. October 29, 1975

CASE TITLE:  Olego vs. Rebueno
GR No/ Date: No. L-39350. October 29, 1975.
PONENTE: Aquino, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Appeal
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: CFI - Declaration of legality of title, Contempt
FACTS: In 1962, Pedro D. Servano filed a complaint against Cenona Olego, claiming ownership of a residential lot. The case was set for multiple hearings but eventually settled through a compromise. The compromise agreement declared Servano as the owner of the disputed land, and he waived his claim for damages. The lower court approved the compromise. In 1974, Servano filed a petition for contempt against Olego and her children for allegedly preventing him from enjoying the land. Olego and her children were given three months to vacate the premises by the court. Servano later filed an ex parte motion to expedite the removal of Olego's huts from the land. Olego filed a motion to dismiss the contempt charge, alleging fraud in obtaining the compromise. CFI: Denied the motion, stating that Olego's right to challenge the compromise had prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether Cenona Olego could be held in contempt of court for not vacating the land involved in the compromise. NO
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Servano alleged that he acquired the lot by purchase in 1960 and possessed it since time immemorial.	Olego denied Servano's ownership, claiming she inherited the land from her father and possessed it en concepto de dueño. Olego claimed to be a sickly widow without means of support and was allowed to litigate in forma pauperis.
PREVAILING PARTY: Olego
DECISION/DOCTRINE: We hold that Cenona Olego's failure to vacate the lot could not be the basis of a contempt proceeding against her. The orders citing her for contempt are oppressive, unjust and unwarranted. In the compromise agreement and in the decision approving it, she was not ordered to vacate the lot. It was stipulated in the compromise that she admitted Atty. Servano's ownership of the lot and "that judgment be rendered declaring" him to be the owner thereof. The decision approving the compromise followed the usual pattern of judgments in such cases: ordering the parties to comply with the terms and stipulations of the compromise. The rule is that an order or judgment which declares the rights of the parties without any express command or prohibition is not one which may be the basis of a contempt proceeding  A violation of the rights of ownership does not constitute contempt of court, even though they have been ascertained and declared by judgment, unless it consists in doing something that was prohibited, or in failing to do something that was required, by the terms of the judgment. Where there is no decree or order commanding accused or anyone else to do or refrain from doing or anything, disobedience of it is impossible. Hence, Cenona Olego could not be held guilty of contempt of court. With respect to the validity or enforceability of the lower court's judgment approving the compromise, Cenona Olego raised the issue of fraud. A compromise may be annulled on the ground of fraud and mistake. A judicial compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a party thereof. The extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the decision approving it.  As to the enforceability of the lower court's decision, it should be noted that assuming arguendo that decision is valid, it becomes necessary to find out whether the decision includes the delivery of the possession of the land to Atty. Servano. The decision was based on Cenona Olego's supposed admission that Atty. Servano is the owner of the land in question. Does Cenona Olego's acknowledgment of Servano's ownership include the obligation to deliver the possession of the land to him? The general rule is that the adjudication of ownership does not include the possession of the property. The exception is that the adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. But then in such a case a writ of execution would be required if the defeated party does not surrender the possession of the property. The owner should enforce his right to possess the land (as an incident of his ownership) by asking for a writ of execution within five years from the finality of the decision. Thereafter, he could enforce his right by action within the next five years. Atty. Servano did not enforce his right to possess the land within the ten-year period. To enforce the judgment in his favor by means of a contempt proceeding after the expiration of the ten-year period would be a circumvention of the statute of limitations. What the law prohibits directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly. Mr. Justice Antonio believes that the judgment against Cenona Olego, which had become unenforceable by reason of prescription, is a dormant judgment. The dormancy of a judgment destroys its legal force and effect. It is inert and incapable of any effective manifestations of legal life. Indeed, proceedings for the enforcement of a dormant judgment have been declared a nullity. Mr. Justice Barredo concurs in that view. Considering that the judgment against Cenona Olego is no longer enforceable and talking into account her imputation that the compromise, on which the said judgment was based, was vitiated by fraud and mistake, the said judgment cannot possibly affect her possession of the disputed land. Nor can it destroy the legal presumption in her favor that as possessor of the land in the concept of owner she has a just title thereto . WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of February 21 and June 3, 1974, citing Cenona Olego for contempt of court, are set aside. The lower court's judgment of January 8, 1964 can no longer be enforced against Cenona Olego because it had already prescribed. Costs against respondent Servano. SO ORDERED.