Case Digest: Rivera-Calingasan vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 171555. April 17, 2013.*

Usufruct

CASE TITLE: Rivera-Calingasan vs. Rivera
GR No/ Date:  G.R. No. 171555. April 17, 2013.*
PONENTE: Brion, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: MCTC -  Forcible entry RTC - Appeal CA - Petition for Review
FACTS: Respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas.  Two parcels were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-22290 and T-30557. In 1982, Loreto died, leaving Wilfredo and their two daughters, Evangeline and Brigida Liza, as her heirs. In 1993, Loreto’s heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating all properties to Evangeline and Brigida Liza.  Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties but reserved his usufructuary rights during his lifetime. TCT Nos. T-22290 and T-30557 were canceled and replaced with TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495 in the names of Evangeline and Brigida Liza, with Wilfredo’s usufructuary rights annotated. In 2003, Wilfredo filed a forcible entry complaint against petitioners Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan, E. Rical Enterprises and Star Honda, Inc., alleging unlawful possession of properties covered by TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495. Wilfredo claimed he was barred from entering the property by armed men employed by the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. Petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. claimed Wilfredo had renounced his usufructuary rights in 1996. MTCC: Dismissed the complaint, finding no evidence of Wilfredo's prior possession. Acknowledged the lease contracts of the property to E. Rical Enterprises and Star Honda, Inc. by Evangeline and her husband. RTC: Initially affirmed the MTCC’s findings, ruling Wilfredo lacked a cause of action. Upon reconsideration, the RTC reversed its decision, ordering the eviction of the petitioners and awarding compensation to Wilfredo. RTC absolved Star Honda, Inc. from liability, finding no evidence of its participation in the dispossession. CA: Affirmed the RTC’s findings, noting Evangeline's judicial admission of residence in a different place, and the stealthy nature of her entry to the property.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner had been in prior physical possession of the property.
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioners argued the CA erred in equating possession with residence and pointed to RTC statements and Wilfredo’s actions contradicting his claim of prior possession.	Respondents countered that the petitioners misinterpreted RTC statements from an interlocutory order and emphasized Evangeline’s own admissions about her residence.
PREVAILING PARTY: Acanay
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The petition lacks merit. Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto.  “Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.  It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.” Thus, “an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property.” Indeed, possession in ejectment cases “means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.” In a forcible entry case, “prior physical possession is the primary consideration.” “A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.” “The party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.” The respondents have proven prior physical possession of the property.     In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and that the petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth. The CA did not err in equating residence with physical possession since residence is a manifestation of possession and occupation. Wilfredo had consistently alleged that he resided on “C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas,” the location of the property, whereas Evangeline has always admitted that she has been a resident of “J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas.” The petitioners failed to prove that they have occupied the property through some other person, even if they have declared their residence in another area. We note that in another proceeding, a criminal complaint for qualified trespass to dwelling, the Lipa City Prosecutor also observed that the petitioners did not reside on or occupy the property on December 16, 2002, about three (3) months before Wilfredo filed the complaint for forcible entry on March 13, 2003. The petitioners also alleged therein that they are residents of “J. Belen St., Rosario, Batangas” and not “No. 30 C.M. Recto Ave., Lipa City.” Furthermore, the petitioners failed to rebut the affidavit of Barangay Captain Briones attesting to Wilfredo’s prior possession and the petitioners’ unlawful entry to the property during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement. The petitioners’ claim of physical possession cannot find support in the March 11, 2003 order of the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 stating that the petitioners “have been occupying the premises since 1997.” We note that the order was a mere interlocutory order on Wilfredo’s motion for the issuance of a cease and desist order. An interlocutory order does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities against each other.  “It is basically provisional in its application.” It is the nature of an interlocutory order that it is subject to modification or reversal that the result of further proceedings may warrant. Thus, the RTC’s pronouncement on the petitioners’ occupation “since 1997” is not res judicata on the issue of actual physical possession. In sum, we find no reversible error in the decision appealed from and, therefore, affirm it. Wilfredo’s death did not render moot the forcible entry case. The death of Wilfredo introduces a seeming complication into the case and on the disposition we shall make.  To go back to basics, the petition before us involves the recovery of possession of real property and is a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party.  The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased.  This judgment entitles the winning party to:  the restitution of the premises,  the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and  attorney’s fees and costs. The complicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredo’s possession; he was holding the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputed before his death, hand in hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case. Without need, however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution. Thus, what actually survives under the circumstances is the award of damages, by way of compensation, that the RTC originally awarded and which the CA and this Court affirmed. This award was computed as of the time of the RTC decision (or roughly about a year before Wilfredo’s death) but will now have to take into account the compensation due for the period between the RTC decision and Wilfredo’s death. The computation is a matter of execution that is for the RTC, as court of origin, to undertake. The heirs of Wilfredo shall succeed to the computed total award under the rules of succession, a matter that is not within the authority of this Court to determine at this point. WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal and accordingly AFFIRM the February 10, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90717 with the MODIFICATION that, with the termination, upon his death, of respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s usufructuary over the disputed property, the issue of restitution of possession has been rendered moot and academic; on the other hand, the monetary award of P620,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property up to the time of the Regional Trial Court decision on April 6, 2005, survives and accrues to the estate of the deceased respondent Wilfredo Rivera, to be distributed to his heirs pursuant to the applicable law on succession.  Additional compensation accrues and shall be added to the compensation from the time of the Regional Trial Court decision up to respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s death.  For purposes of the computation of this additional amount and for the execution of the total amount due under this Decision, we hereby remand the case to the Regional Trial Court, as court of origin, for appropriate action.  Costs against petitioners Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises. SO ORDERED.