Law of Public Officers: Chapter IV — Commencement of Official Relations
Commencement of Official Relations
Official relations are commenced:
By appointment; or
By election.
Appointment.
Definition of terms:
Appointment
the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to perform the functions of a given office.
Commission
the written evidence of the appointment.
Designation
the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in public service.
Classification:
Permanent and Temporary.
Regular and Ad-interim.
Permanent and Temporary.
A permanent appointment is
extended to a person possessing the requisite qualifications, including the eligibility required, for the position, and thus protected by the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure.
A temporary appointment is
an acting appointment;
it is extended to one who may not possess the requisite qualifications or eligibility required by law for the position, and is revocable at will, without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation.
Marohombsar v. Alonto, 194 SCRA 391:
An “acting” appointment is a temporary appointment and revocable in character.
Maturan v. Maglana, 113 SCRA 268:
Acquisition of the appropriate civil service eligibility by a temporary appointee will not ipso facto convert the temporary appointment into a permanent one; a new appointment is necessary.
Achacoso v. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235:
It was held that an appointment to a position in the Career Service of the Civil Service does not necessarily mean that the appointment is a permanent one and the appointee entitled to security of tenure.
Where the appointee does not possess the qualifications for the position, the appointment is temporary and may be terminated at will.
De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, January 22, 2001:
The Supreme Court said that the mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure. Such right will have to depend on the nature of the appointment which, in turn, depends on the appointee’s eligibility or lack of it.
A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it only in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
Such being the case he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Romualdez III v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168:
The acceptance by the petitioner of a temporary appointment resulted in the termination of official relationship with his former permanent position.
When the temporary appointment was not renewed, the petitioner had no cause to demand reinstatement thereto.
Felix v. Buenaseda, G.R. No. 109704, July 17, 1995:
The Supreme Court said that whatever objections the petitioner had against the earlier change from his status as permanent Senior Resident Physician to temporary Senior Resident Physician were never pursued nor mentioned at, or after his designation as temporary Medical Specialist I.
He is therefore :estopped from insisting upon a right or claim which he had plainly abandoned when, from all indications, he enthusiastically accepted the promotion.
Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128082, April 18, 2001:
Petitioner, holding a permanent appointment as Utility Worker, accepted a temporary appointment as Bookbinder II, in the Office of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental.
Since a temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, pursuant to Sec. 13(b), Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, petitioner could not claim security of tenure upon the expiration of the one-year period and demand reappointment or reinstatement.
Padilla v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 149451, May 8, 2003:
Petitioner resigned from her permanent position and accepted casual or temporary appointments.
A mere designation does not confer security of tenure, as the person designated occupies the position only in an acting capacity.
Gloria v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, October 6, 1995:
It was held that private respondent’s assignment as Coordinator of Extension Services (CES) at PSCA was a mere designation; thus, not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.
Sinon v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410:
Where the appointment is subject to conditions, e.g., that there is no pending protest against the appointment or any decision by competent authority which will adversely affect the approval of the appointment, the appointment is not permanent.
In any event, the appointee cannot claim a “complete appointment” as long as the re-evaluation incidental to the re organization is still pending.
Orcullo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 138780, May 22, 2001:
Where the employment is qualified by the phrase “unless terminated sooner”, it is clear that even if the employment is co-terminous with the project, the employee nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Ambas v. Buenaseda, 201 SCRA 308:
It was held that where the temporary appointment is for a fixed period, the appointment:
may be revoked only at the expiration of the period, or,
if revocation is made before such expiration, the same has to be for a valid and just cause.
Osea v. Malaya, G.R. No. 139821, January 30, 2002:
In connection with Sec. 99 of the Local Government Code which requires consultation with the local school board in the appointment of a schools division superintendent, the Supreme Court said that the requirement obviously applied to appointments extended by the DECS.
In 1994, when the position of schools division superintendent was placed within the career executive service, the power to appoint was vested in the President. Thus, the President issued the appointment which was not specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their respective stations was vested in the DECS, pursuant to the exigencies of the service.
The petitioner could not demand that she be designated to the Camarines Sur division because she lacked one essential ingredient, her appointment to the position. Her earlier designation as OIC, Asst. Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, was temporary, giving her no vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent.
Sta. Maria v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-30773, February 18, 1970:
An appointment for a fixed term of five years “unless sooner terminated” is not terminable at will. It is not an appointment in an acting capacity, and the appointee cannot be terminated without just cause.
Having an appointment with a fixed term, he cannot, without his consent, be transferred before the end of his term.
Thus, in this case, the appointee’s transfer to the position of Special Assistant with the rank of Dean was a demotion, because deanship in the university is more exalted than that of a Special Assistant.
Regular and Ad-Interim.
A regular appointment is
one made by the President while Congress is in session after the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and continues until the end of the term.
An ad interim appointment is
one made while Congress is not in session, before confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, is immediately effective, and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by the Commission on Appointments upon the next adjournment of Congress.
An ad-interim appointment is a permanent appointment, and its being subject to confirmation does not alter its permanent character.
Classification of appointments into regular and ad interim can be used only when referring to the four (4) categories of appointments made by the President of the Philippines in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VIII of the Constitution, which require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, viz: EAAC
Heads of executive departments;
Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
Officers of the armed forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
Officers whose appointments are vested in the President under the Constitution.
Steps in the Appointing Process
For regular appointments: NCIA
Nomination by the President;
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
Issuance of the commission; and
Acceptance by the appointee.
In the case of ad interim appointments, the nomination:
Nomination by the President;
Issuance of the commission;
Acceptance by the appointee; and
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
For appointments which do not require confirmation: AIA
Appointment by appointing authority;
Issuance of the commission; and
Acceptance by the appointee.
Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740:
The Supreme Court held that acceptance of the appointment by the appointee is the last act that completes the appointing process.
General Rule: A person cannot be compelled to accept an appointment to public office, as the same will constitute a violation of the constitutional right against involuntary servitude.
Exception: When the appointment is made to an office required in defense of the State, as contemplated in Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution.
Where the appointment is to the career service of the Civil Service.
Attestation by the Civil Service Commission is required.
An appointment to the career service of the Civil Service is not deemed complete until attestation/ approval by the Civil Service Commission.
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O. 292:
An appointment not submitted to the Civil Service Commission within 30 days from issuance (which shall be the date appearing on the face of the appointment) shall be ineffective.
Without the favorable certification or approval of the Civil Service Commission, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be revoked or withdrawn by the appointing authority.
Until the appointment shall have been a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke security of tenure.
Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 269:
However, all that the Civil Service Commission is authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility; “if he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved”
Completion of Appointment.
An appointment becomes complete only when the last act required of the appointing power is performed; until the process is completed the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor claim security of tenure.
Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123989, January 26, 1998:
The years of service of the employee involved cannot substitute for the want of consent of another body required by law to complete the appointment
For the duration of his occupancy of the office, he is merely a de facto officer, because he assumed office under color of title of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect.
Position Must Be Vacant.
For the appointment to be valid, the position must be vacant
Gayatao v. Civil Service Commission, 210 SCRA 183:
The reassignment by Customs Commissioner Mison of incumbent Customs Operations Chief Fernandez as Acting Chief of the Export Division of the NAIA Customs House was illegal, the subsequent appointment of Gayatao as Customs Operations Chief was null and void, because the position to which Gayatao was appointed was not vacant.
Garces v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99:
Where a private respondent refused to vacate his office because he was being transferred without consent, the Supreme Court said that the appointment of the petitioner was invalid because the position to which he was appointed was not vacant.
Discretion of Appointing Authority.
Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in whom it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the minimum qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position
The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
Not only is the appointing authority primarily responsible for the administration of his office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can effectively discharge the functions of the position.
Thus, the final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed.
Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240:
It was held that when the appointing authority has already exercised his power of appointment, the Commission cannot revoke the same on the ground that another employee is better qualified, for that will constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.
The Commission may not and should not substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority.
“Next-in Rank” Rule:
While the Civil Service Law grants career service officers preference in promotion under the “next-in-rank” rule, it is not mandatory that the appointing authority fill a vacancy by promotion, as the appointing authority should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible.
For disregarding this doctrine, the CSC drew a stern rebuke from the Court in Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission; warned in Guieb v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 93935, February 9, 1994; and again “duly warned; henceforth, it disobeys at its peril”, in Mauna v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 97794, May 13, 1994.
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999:
Sec. 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) provides that all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice” should be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation and indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character but is not binding or obligatory upon the person to whom it is made. Accordingly, the discretion of the appointing authority still prevails.
The discretion of the appointing authority is not only in the choice of the person who is to be appointed, but also in the nature and character of the appointment extended, i.e., whether the appointment is permanent or temporary.
Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 281:
The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the Civil Service Commission cannot convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one, as it would constitute an arrogation of a power properly belonging to the appointing authority.
The Civil Service Commission may, however, approve as temporary an appointment intended to be permanent where the appointee does not possess the requisite eligibility, and the exigency of the service demands that the position be filled up, even in a temporary capacity.
Judicial Review of Appointments.
Given the discretion vested in the appointing authority, an appointment is generally a political question so long as the appointee fulfills the minimum qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position.
Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission:
The Court held that where the validity of the appointment is not challenged in appropriate proceedings, the question of the competence of the public officer is beyond the pale of judicial inquiry.
Bongbong v. Parazo, 57 SCRA 623:
An action for usurpation of office may be brought only by one who claims valid title to the office.
Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission:
Disciplinary cases, and
cases involving “personnel action” affecting employees in the Civil Service, including:
appointment through certification, promotion,
transfer,
reinstatement,
reemployment,
detail,
reassignment,
demotion and
separation
employment status and
qualification standards.
Mantala v. Salvador:
The Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for quo warranto and mandamus filed by one who, claiming she is next-in-rank and better qualified, should have been extended the promotional appointment.
Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184:
The power of the Civil Service Commission includes the authority to recall an appointment which has been initially approved when it is shown that the same was issued in disregard of pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001:
But the Civil Service Commission is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies.
Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their compliance with the Civil Service Law.
On its own, the Commission does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop members from the rolls.
Appointments to the Civil Service.
Scope of the Civil Service
Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-B
Embraces all:
branches,
subdivisions,
instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government,
including government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters.
University of the Philippines v. Regino, 221 SCRA 598:
It was held that the University of the Philippines, having been created by a special law and having an original charter, is clearly part of the Civil Service.
Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284:
It was held that the Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198, is a government-owned corporation with an original charter.
Accordingly, its employees fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees in the said water district.
EIIB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129133, November 25, 1998:
It was held that the Economic Intelligence and Information Bureau is a government agency within the coverage of the Civil Service.
Department of Health v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 700:
The Jose M. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital is a government hospital exercising governmental functions, and is within the coverage of the Civil Service.
Camporedondo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999:
The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter under RA 95, as amended.
Paid staff of the PNRC are government employees who are members of the GSIS and covered by the Civil Service Law .
Juco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98107, August 18, 1997:
It was held that the employment relations in the National Housing Corporation (NHC) are within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, not the Civil Service Commission, even as the controversy arose prior to 1987, because, as held in National Service Corporation v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122, it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision which governs.
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the phrase “with original charter” refers to corporations chartered by special law, as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code.
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) v. Venus, G.R. No. 163782, March 24, 2006:
The Supreme Court said that LRTA being a government-owned corporation with an original charter, employment therein is governed by civil service rules, not by the Labor Code, and is beyond the reach of the DOLE.
However, METRO was originally organized under the Corporation Code and became a government-owned and controlled corporation only when it was acquired by LRTA. Thus, it is the DOLE, not the Civil Service Commission,
Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007:
It was held that the person occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative Service or Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by the President.
As such, he is neither embraced in the Career Executive Service (CES) nor does he need to possess Career Executive Service eligibility.
To classify the positions as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences, as it will result either in:
vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution, or
including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.
Classes of Service.
Career Service.
Non-career service.
Career Service.
Characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, and security of tenure.
The positions included are: OCCC-AGL
Open career positions
prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
Closed career positions
e.g., scientific or highly technical in nature;
Career Executive Service
e.g., undersecretaries, bureau directors, etc., where the appointee is required to possess the appropriate Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) eligibility;
Career officers (other than those belong to the Career Executive Service)
who are appointed by the President;
Positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
although governed by a separate merit system;
Personnel of government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charter; and
Permanent laborers,
whether:
skilled,
semi-skilled or
unskilled.
Career executive service.
The two requisites that must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure are:
career executive service eligibility; and
appointment to the appropriate career executive service rank.
It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second level employees in the civil service) pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed.
Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned.
In fact, a career executive service officer suffers no diminution in salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office which he occupies.
Dimayuga v. Benedicto, G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002:
Accordingly, where the appointee does not possess the required career executive service eligibility, his appointment will not attain permanency.
On this basis, the appointment of the respondent as Ministry Legal Counsel, CESO IV, Department Legal Counsel or Director III — inasmuch as he did not possess the appropriate CESO eligibility — was merely temporary. Thus, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating security of tenure.
Non-career service.
Characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized for the career service.
Tenure:
limited to a period specified by law, or
which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made.
The officers and employees embraced in the non-career service are: EDCCE
Elective officials, and their personal and confidential staff;
Department Heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President, and their personal and confidential staff;
Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal and confidential staff;
Contractual personnel or those whose employment in government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period not exceeding one year, under their own responsibility, with the minimum direction and supervision; and
Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 131954, June 28, 2001:
The Supreme Court said that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission is expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as primarily confidential.
This signifies that the enumeration in the Civil Service decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list.
The Commission can supplement this enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. 1991, specifying positions in the Civil Service which are considered primarily confidential and, therefore, their occupants hold tenure co-terminous with the officials they serve.
Orcullo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 138780, May 22, 2001:
The co-terminous status of an officer or employee may be classified as follows:
co-terminous with the project
when the appointment is coexistent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
co-terminous with the appointing authority,
when the appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;
co-terminous with the incumbent
when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent, the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
co-terminous with a specific period,
the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.
Requisites:
Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-B
Shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and by competitive examination except appointments to positions which are:
policy determining,
primarily confidential or
highly technical.
Umoso v. Civil Service Commission, supra:
In a department, the appointing power is vested in the Department Secretary, and although such power may be delegated to the Regional Director, the same is still subject to the approval, revision, modification or reversal by the Department Secretary.
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001:
Three important points are underscored:
The classification of a particular position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position;
The exemption provided in this section pertains only to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service; and
Sec. 16, RD. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions in PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
Exempt from the competitive examination requirement are appointments to positions which are:
Policy determining
The officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines or rules; or formulates a method of action for government or any of its subdivisions.
Ex: department head.
Primarily confidential
denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of state; or one declared to be so by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission.
Civil Service Commission and PAGCOR v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997:
The Supreme Court said that prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential, namely:
when the President, upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and
in the absence of such a declaration, when from the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing authority which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of State.
When R.A. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Sec. 5 thereof provided that “the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service, or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”.
Thus, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical.
Pinero v. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417:
It was declared that executive pronouncements, such as P.D. 1869, can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict; otherwise, it would lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the constitutional protection of security of tenure.
This rule prevails even with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, despite the fact that the phrase “in nature” was deleted.
Furthermore, the “proximity rule” enunciated in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra., is still authoritative, i.e., that the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayals of personal trust and confidential matters of State.
Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant, and therefore, would not be primarily confidential.
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza:
It was held that the position of Casino Operations Manager (COM) is not a primarily confidential position.
While the COM is required to exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with wide latitude of authority, and he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file employee, nonetheless, lacking is that amplitude of confidence reposed in him by the appointing authority.
For one thing, he reports directly to the Branch Manager, not to the appointing authority.
It becomes unmistakable that the stratum separating the COM from reporting directly to the higher echelons renders remote the proposition of proximity between the respondent and the appointing authority.
Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission, supra.:
The Supreme Court recognized the express authority of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code of 1987, to declare positions in the Civil Service as primarily confidential.
Accordingly, the enumeration of primarily confidential employees in the Civil Service decree is not exclusive; the Commission may supplement the same, as it did when it issued Memo Circular No. 22, s. 1991.
Highly technical
which requires possession of technical skill or training in a supreme or superior degree.
Besa v. Philippine National Bank, supra.:
The position of legal counsel of the PNB was declared to be both primarily confidential and highly technical, with the former aspect predominating.
Cadiente v. Santos, 142 SCRA 280:
The position of City Legal Officer is primarily confidential, requiring the utmost degree of confidence on the part of the Mayor.
Pacete v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 185 SCRA 1:
The position of City Attorney was held to be both confidential and technical in nature.
Borres v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 120:
It was held that the positions of Security Officer and Security Guards of the City Vice Mayor are primarily confidential positions.
Other Personnel Actions.
Promotion
It is a movement from one position to another with increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law and usually accompanied by an increase in pay.
Next-in-rank rule.
The person next in rank shall be given preference in promotion when the position immediately above his is vacated.
But the appointing authority still exercises discretion and is not bound by this rule, although he is required to specify the “special reason or reasons” for not appointing the officer next-in-rank.
This means that the one who is “next-inrank” is given only preferential consideration for promotion; but it does not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed.
Automatic Reversion Rule
Sec. 13 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O. 292, states: “All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in the lower positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.”
For this rule to apply, the following must concur:
there must be a series of promotions;
all promotional appointments are simultaneously submitted to the Commission for approval; and
the Commission disapproves the appointment of a person to a higher position.
Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 110954, May 31, 1995:
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the movement of private respondent Nacario from the Budget Office to the MPDO was not a promotion, but a lateral transfer.
Appointment through Certification.
It is issued to a person who has been selected from a list of qualified persons certified by the Civil Service Commission from an appropriate register of eligibles, and who meets all the qualifications prescribed for the position.
Transfer.
It is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service.
Under current Civil Service rules and regulations, transfer may be imposed as an administrative penalty.
An unconsented transfer violates security of tenure.
A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction, or a transfer that aims to lure the employee away from his permanent position, cannot be done without the employee’s consent, for that would constitute removal from office.
Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position
Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, 193 SCRA 520:
The appointment of the private respondent Yap being that of District Supervisor at large, she could be assigned to any station, as she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station.
Chato v. Natividad, G.R. No. 113843, June 2, 1995:
The Supreme Court sustained the legality of the reassignment of Bias from Pampanga to Cagayan, after BIR Commissioner Chato had issued Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93 redefining the jurisdiction and re-numbering the regional district offices of the BIR.
The Court found that the private respondent failed to show patent illegality in the action of the BIR Commissioner, saying that to sustain private respondent’s contention that his transfer was a demotion simply because the new assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects, along with the great resources and efforts they entail, to individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees; and this would negate the principle that public office is a public trust.
Moreover, the employee should have questioned the validity of his transfer by appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The lower court should have dismissed the action for failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies.
In any event, the movement was held to be a reassignment, made in the exigency of the service — and there was no demotion.
Teotico v. Agda, 197 SCRA 675:
It was held that the holder of a temporary appointment cannot claim a vested right to the station to which assigned, nor to security of tenure thereat.
Thus, he may be reassigned to any place or station.
Cuevas v. Bacal, G.R. No. 139382, December 06, 2000:
Likewise, Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted from one office to another without violating their right to security of tenure, because their status and salaries are based on their ranks and not on the positions to which they are assigned.
Reinstatement.
Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified.
Gloria v. Judge de Guzman, supra.:
The Court said that private respondent’s subsequent acquisition of the appropriate civil service eligibility is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint private respondent.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment.
Still to be considered are performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and more importantly, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power, considering that the position of Board Secretary II is primarily confidential.
Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary on the part of the appointing power; it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.
Reinstatement is technically the issuance of a new appointment, which is essentially discretionary; such exercise of the discretionary power cannot be controlled even by the Courts, as long as it is properly exercised by the appointing authority.
Thus, the order of the lower court for the reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.
Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190:
One who, because of conviction of a crime, has forfeited her right to the public office but was extended a plenary pardon by the President, cannot, by reason of the pardon, demand reinstatement as a matter of right.
Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture & Sports, 180 SCRA 623:
The Supreme Court held that a pardoned elementary school principal, on considerations of justice and equity, should be reinstated to the same position and not to the lower position of classroom teacher, there being no circumstances which would justify the reduction in rank.
Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. L-75025, September 14, 1993:
It was held that when a person is given a pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves him from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring him to his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to his finding of guilt.
The bestowal of executive clemency in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service.
This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply for reinstatement; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency, and he is entitled to back wages.
Detail.
It is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment, and shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions.
It is temporary in nature.
Reassignment.
An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
Reassignment is recognized as a management prerogative vested in the Civil Service Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency embraced in the Civil Service; it does not constitute removal without cause.
Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, supra.:
Considering that the petitioners retained their positions as Director IV and III, and they continued to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their newly assigned stations which they enjoyed at the Civil Service Commission Head Office, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
The appointments to the staff of the CSC Head Office are not appointments to specified public offices, but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks.
But like detail, the reassignment should have a definite date or duration.
Padolina v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 133511, October 10, 2000:
The reassignment of the respondent was deemed a violation of security of tenure.
The lack of specific duration of the reassignment was tantamount to a floating assignment, thus a diminution in status or rank.
The respondent was also deprived of emoluments, like RATA and other allowances, thus the movement was deemed a diminution in compensation.
Finally, the reassignment also removed respondent’s power of supervision over 41 employees, thus deemed a diminution in status.
Pastor v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, May 09, 2002:
The Supreme Court found that the petitioner’s reassignment to different offices in the city government was indefinite; petitioner was on virtual floating assignments amounting to reduction in rank, hence impermissible under the law.
Carino v. Daoas, G.R. No. 144493, April 09, 2002:
The Supreme Court ruled that the reassignment of petitioner was unlawful and, as earlier found by the Civil Service Commission, it was tantamount to transfer without consent.
On the question whether or not petitioner should have, in the meanwhile, complied with the reassignment order, and whether she can be considered AWOL for her refusal to report to her new assignment during the pendency of respondent’s appeal, the Supreme Court noted that it was not the petitioner, but the respondent who appealed to the CSC from the CSC Regional Office’s finding that the petitioner’s reassignment was “not in order”.
The CSC Regional Office’s finding must be accorded the presumption of regularity.
Petitioner cannot be considered on AWOL, as she continued to report to her original station.
Reemployment.
Names of persons who have been appointed permanently to positions in the career service and who have been separated as a result of reduction in force and/or reorganization, shall be entered in a list from which selection for reemployment shall be made.
See Sec. 16, Art. XVIII, which provides that career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, and the reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution, shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay, and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation.
In lieu of separation pay, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the government, or in any of its subdivisions, etc..
This provision shall also apply to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.
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