Case Digest: Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Aldecoa, G.R. No. 166330. September 11, 2013
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CASE TITLE: Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Aldecoa | |
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 166330. September 11, 2013. | |
PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J. | |
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 | |
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS:
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FACTS:
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ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in declaring Petitioner’s base station and generator a nuisance. | |
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES | |
PETITIONER | RESPONDENTS |
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PREVAILING PARTY: Petitioner | |
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The Petition is partly meritorious. While the Court agrees that the Court of Appeals should not have taken cognizance of the issue of whether the locational clearance for petitioner’s cellular base station is valid, the Court will still not reinstate the RTC Order dated January 16, 2001 granting petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and entirely dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The issues of (1) whether petitioner’s cellular base station is a nuisance, and (2) whether the generator at petitioner’s cellular base station is, by itself, also a nuisance, ultimately involve disputed or contested factual matters that call for the presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial. On the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s locational clearance for its cellular base station is a nullity Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioner’s locational clearance for its cellular base station. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were explained at length by the Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, as follows: The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier disposition of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. x x x x The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. We have held that while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of our resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the court will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. The Court again discussed the said principle and doctrine in Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v. Megaworld Properties & Holdings, Inc., et al., citing Republic v. Lacap, to wit: We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. In the case of Republic v. Lacap, we expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise: The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the planning, regulatory, and quasi-judicial instrumentality of government for land use development. In the exercise of its mandate to ensure rational land use by regulating land development, it issued HLURB Resolution No.R-626, series of 1998, Approving the Locational Guidelines for Base Stations of Cellular Mobile Telephone Service, Paging Service, Trunking Service, Wireless Loop Service and Other Wireless Communication Services (HLURB Guidelines). Said HLURB Guidelines aim to protect" providers and users, as well as the public in general while ensuring efficient and responsive communication services." Indeed, the HLURB Guidelines require the submission of several documents for the issuance of a locational clearance for a cellular base station, including: IV. Requirements and Procedures in Securing Locational Clearance A. The following documents shall be submitted in duplicate: x x x x g. Written Consent: g.1 Subdivisions x x x x g. 1.2 In the absence of an established Homeowners Association, consent/affidavit of non-objection from majority of actual occupants and owners of properties within a radial distance equivalent to the height of the proposed base station measured from its base, including all those whose properties is adjoining the proposed site of the base station.(Refer to Figure 2) x x x x h. Barangay Council Resolution endorsing the base station. Correlatively, the HLURB provides administrative remedies for non-compliance with its requirements. In 2000, when factual precedents to the instant case began to take place, HLURB Resolution No. R-586, series of 1996, otherwise known as the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, was in effect. The original 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure was precisely amended by HLURB Resolution No. R-655, series of 1999, "so as to afford oppositors with the proper channel and expeditious means to ventilate their objections and oppositions to applications for permits, clearances and licenses, as well as to protect the rights of applicants against frivolous oppositions that may cause undue delay to their projects. "Under the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended, an opposition to an application for a locational clearance for a cellular base station or a complaint for the revocation of a locational clearance for a cellular base station already issued, is within the original jurisdiction of the HLURB Executive Committee. Relevant provisions read: RULE III Commencement of Action, Summons and Answer x x x x SECTION 2. Opposition to Application for Permit/License/ Clearance. – When an opposition is filed to an application for a license, permit or clearance with the Board or any of its Regional Field Office, the Regional Officer shall make a preliminary evaluation and determination whether the case is impressed with significant economic, social, environmental or national policy implications. If he/she determines that the case is so impressed with significant economic, social, environmental or national policy implications, such as, but not limited to: 1) Projects of national significance, for purposes of this rule, a project is of national significance if it is one or falls under any of those enumerated in Rule III, Section 3 of these Rules, as amended; 2) Those involving zoning variances and exceptions; 3) Those involving significant public interest or policy issues; 4) Those endorsed by the zoning administrators of local government units. The Regional Officer shall cause the records of the case to be transmitted to the Executive Committee which shall assume original jurisdiction over the case, otherwise, the Regional Officer shall act on and resolve the Opposition. SECTION 3. A project is of national significance if it involves any of the following: a) Power generating plants (e.g., coal-fired thermal plants)and related facilities (e.g., transmission lines); b) Airport/seaports; dumping sites/sanitary landfills; reclamation projects; c) Large-scale piggery and poultry projects; d) Mining/quarrying projects; e) National government centers; f) Golf courses; g) Fish ponds and aqua culture projects; h) Cell sites and telecommunication facilities; i) Economic zones, regional industrial centers, regional agro-industrial centers, provincial industrial centers; j) All other industrial activities classified as high-intensity uses (1-3 Projects). SECTION 4. Any party aggrieved, by reason of the elevation or non-elevation of any contested application by the Regional Officer, may file a verified petition for review thereof within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of elevation or non-elevation of the contested application with the Executive Committee which shall resolve whether it shall assume jurisdiction thereon. The contested application for clearance, permit or license shall be treated as a complaint and all other provisions of these rules on complaints not inconsistent with the preceding section shall, as far as practicable, be made applicable to oppositions except that the decision of the Board en banc on such contested applications shall be final and executory as provided in Rule XIX, Section 2 of these Rules, as amended. The Rules pertaining to contested applications for license, permit or clearance shall, by analogy, apply to cases filed primarily for the revocation thereof. x x x x RULE XVII Proceedings Before the Board of Commissioners x x x x SECTION 15. The Executive Committee. – The Executive Committee shall be composed of the four regular Commissioners and the Ex-Officio Commissioner from the Department of Justice. x x x x The Executive Committee shall act for the Board on policy matters, measures or proposals concerning the management and substantive administrative operations of the Board subject to ratification by the Board en banc, and shall assume original jurisdiction over cases involving opposition to an application for license, permit or clearance for projects or cases impressed with significant economic, social, environmental or national policy implications or issues in accordance with Section 2, Rule II of these Rules, as amended. It shall also approve the proposed agenda of the meetings of the Board en banc. (Emphases supplied.) After the HLURB Executive Committee had rendered its Decision, the aggrieved party could still avail itself of a system of administrative appeal, also provided in the 1996 HLURB Rules of Procedure, as amended: RULE XII Petition for Review SECTION 1. Petition for Review. – Any party aggrieved by the Decision of the Regional Officer, on any legal ground and upon payment of the review fee may file with the Regional Office a verified Petition for Review of such decision within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt thereof. In cases decided by the Executive Committee pursuant to Rule II, Section 2 of these Rules, as amended, the verified Petition shall be filed with the Executive Committee within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt of the Committee’s Decision. Copy of such petition shall be furnished the other party and the Board of Commissioners. No motion for reconsideration or mere notice of petition for review of the decision shall be entertained. Within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the petition, the Regional Officer, or the Executive Committee, as the case may be, shall elevate the records to the Board of Commissioner together with the summary of proceedings before the Regional Office. The Petition for Review of a decision rendered by the Executive Committee shall betaken cognizance of by the Board en banc. RULE XVIII Appeal from Board Decisions SECTION 1. Motion for Reconsideration. – Within the period for filing an appeal from a Board decision, order or ruling of the Board of Commissioners, any aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration with the Board only on the following grounds: (1) serious errors of law which would result in grave injustice if not corrected; and (2) newly discovered evidence. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Motions for reconsideration shall be assigned to the division from which the decision, order or ruling originated. SECTION 2. Appeal. – Any party may upon notice to the Board and the other party appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners en banc or by one of its divisions to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987. RULE XIX Entry of Judgment x x x x SECTION 2. Rules on Finality. – For purposes of determining when a decision or order has become final and executory for purposes of entry in the Book of Judgment, the following shall be observed: a. Unless otherwise provided in a decision or resolution rendered by the Regional Officer, the Executive Committee, or the Board of Commissioners, as the case may be, the orders contained therein shall become final as regards a party thirty (30) calendar days after the date of receipt thereof and no petition for review or appeal therefrom has been filed within the said period. There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the afore-mentioned administrative remedies prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, respondents never asserted nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case. Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action. However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that respondents’ Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 is primarily for abatement of nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of HLURB requirements for the cellular base station, not to seek nullification of petitioner’s locational clearance, but to support their chief argument that said cellular base station is a nuisance which needs to be abated. The issue of whether or not the locational clearance for said cellular base station is valid is actually separate and distinct from the issue of whether or not the cellular base station is a nuisance; one is not necessarily determinative of the other. While the first is within the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB and, therefore, premature for the courts to rule upon in the present case, the latter is within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine but only after trial proper. On the declaration of the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s cellular base station is a nuisance that must be abated Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as: ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. The term "nuisance" is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort. The Court, in AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, settled that a simple suit for abatement of nuisance, being incapable of pecuniary estimation, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Although respondents also prayed for judgment for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses, such claims are merely incidental to or as a consequence of, their principal relief. Nonetheless, while jurisdiction over respondents’ Complaint for abatement of nuisance lies with the courts, the respective judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals cannot be upheld. At the outset, the RTC erred in granting petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering the dismissal of respondents’ Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which state: SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court discussed extensively when a summary judgment is proper: For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim. The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the moving party and not of the papers/documents in opposition thereto. Conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise an issue of material fact. A party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculations or compilation of differences. He may not create an issue of fact through bald assertions, unsupported contentions and conclusory statements. He must do more than rely upon allegations but must come forward with specific facts in support of a claim. Where the factual context makes his claim implausible, he must come forward with more persuasive evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual issues disputed or contested by the parties. As respondents correctly argued in their Opposition to petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment: 1. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, there are several genuine issues as to the cause of action and material facts related to the complaint. For one there is an issue on the structural integrity of the tower, the ultra high frequency (UHF) radio wave emission radiated by the communications tower affecting the life, health and well being of the[respondents] and the barangay residents, especially their children. Also, the noxious/deleterious fumes and the noise produce[d] by the standby generator and the danger posted by the tower if it collapses in regard to life and limb as well as the property of the [respondents] particularly those whose houses abut, or are near/within the periphery of the communications tower. x x x Likewise constituting real or genuine issues for trial, which arose from subsequent events, are the following: whether the generator subject of respondents’ Complaint had been removed; whether said generator had been replaced by another that produces as much or even more noise and fumes; and whether the generator is a nuisance that can be abated separately from the rest of the cellular base station. Furthermore, the Court demonstrated in AC Enterprises, Inc. the extensive factual considerations of a court before it can arrive at a judgment in an action for abatement of nuisance: Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air conditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is to be resolved only by the court in due course of proceedings. The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the consequences thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may be of such a character as to constitute a nuisance, even though it arises from the operation of a lawful business, only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an actionable nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in which that word is used, but in the absence of statute, noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of quantity or quality; they depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning ordinances. The delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing, industry or general business is not a license to emit every noise profitably attending the conduct of any one of them. The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it. Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance. The courts have made it clear that in every case the question is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of one’s property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable invasion of another’s use and enjoyment of his property so as to constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules, but must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case, such as locality and the character of the surroundings, the nature, utility and social value of the use, the extent and nature of the harm involved, the nature, utility and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded, and the like. Persons who live or work in thickly populated business districts must necessarily endure the usual annoyances and of those trades and businesses which are properly located and carried on in the neighborhood where they live or work. But these annoyances and discomforts must not be more than those ordinarily to be expected in the community or district, and which are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades and businesses. If they exceed what might be reasonably expected and cause unnecessary harm, then the court will grant relief. A finding by the LGU that the noise quality standards under the law have not been complied with is not a prerequisite nor constitutes indispensable evidence to prove that the defendant is or is not liable for a nuisance and for damages. Such finding is merely corroborative to the testimonial and/or other evidence to be presented by the parties. The exercise of due care by the owner of a business in its operation does not constitute a defense where, notwithstanding the same, the business as conducted, seriously affects the rights of those in its vicinity. A reading of the RTC Order dated January 16, 2001 readily shows that the trial court did not take into account any of the foregoing considerations or tests before summarily dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The reasoning of the RTC that similar cellular base stations are scattered in heavily populated areas nationwide and are not declared nuisances is unacceptable. As to whether or not this specific cellular base station of petitioner is a nuisance to respondents is largely dependent on the particular factual circumstances involved in the instant case, which is exactly why a trial for threshing out disputed or contested factual issues is indispensable. Evidently, it was the RTC which engaged in speculations and unsubstantiated conclusions. For the same reasons cited above, without presentation by the parties of evidence on the contested or disputed facts, there was no factual basis for declaring petitioner's cellular base station a nuisance and ordering petitioner to cease and desist from operating the same. Given the equally important interests of the parties in this case, i.e., on one hand, respondents' health, safety, and property, and on the other, petitioner's business interest and the public's need for accessible and better cellular mobile telephone services, the wise and prudent course to take is to remand the case to the RTC for trial and give the parties the opportunity to prove their respective factual claims. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 and Resolution dated December 9, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71337 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, of Roxas, Isabela, which is DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 to its docket and proceed with the trial and adjudication thereof with appropriate dispatch in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED. | |
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