Case Digest: Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation vs. Chung, G.R. No. 173252. July 17, 2009.

Easement

CASE TITLE: Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation vs. Chung
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 173252. July 17, 2009.*
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: RTC - Petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way CA - Appeal
FACTS: Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation owns land in Manila, which includes a voluntary easement for Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico. The title has an encumbrance of a voluntary easement from Encarnacion S. Sandico's Original Certificate of Title, dating back to 1924. The easement allows Francisco Hidalgo to open doors and pass through Sandico's land to reach the estero and Pasig River. The easement was consistently annotated on subsequent titles. Hidalgo's property is now owned by respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung, and Cleto Chung under TCT No. 121488. On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a petition to cancel the easement, claiming the dominant estate has adequate access to Matienza Street. RTC: Initially dismissed the petition, citing it as a land registration case. Upon motion for reconsideration, the trial court conducted an inspection. The trial court found the dominant estate had adequate access to Matienza Street and granted the petition. CA: Reversed the trial court's decision. Ruled that the presence of an alternate access through Matienza Street did not extinguish the voluntary easement.
ISSUE: Whether the presence of an alternate access through Matienza Street did not extinguish the voluntary easement. YES
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioner argue that the dominant estate has an adequate alternative access to Matienza Street, rendering the easement unnecessary. Article 631(3) of the Civil Code allows for the extinguishment of easements when there is an adequate outlet to a public road. The easement is no longer needed and should be canceled to fully exercise their property rights without encumbrance. Petitioner argues that the annotation explicitly limits the easement to Sandico and Hidalgo, not extending to their heirs or assigns unless expressly provided. Petitioner claims that allowing respondents to continue enjoying the easement without compensating them would result in unjust enrichment.	The existence of the voluntary easement is crucial for the locality and the community. Canceling the easement would cause significant inconvenience and economic impact to the surrounding area. Article 631(3) does not apply to voluntary easements; these can only be extinguished by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the dominant estate owner. Argued that Unisource took 15 years to file the petition after acquiring the property, implying they were negligent in asserting their rights promptly.
PREVAILING PARTY: Respondents
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The petition lacks merit. As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements. In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that "the easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of [the lot] described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650." It further stated that "the voluntary easement of the right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and definitely not an easement created by such court order because ‘the Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties." In its Memorandum dated September 27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that "the annotation found at the back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement." Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.  Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Petitioner cites City of Manila v. Entote in justifying that the easement should bind only the parties mentioned therein and exclude those not so mentioned. However, that case is inapplicable since the issue therein was whether the easement was intended not only for the benefit of the owners of the dominant estate but of the community and the public at large. In interpreting the easement, the Court ruled that the clause "any and all other persons whomsoever" in the easement embraces only "those who are privy to the owners of the dominant estate, Lots 1 and 2 Plan Pcs-2672" and excludes "the indiscriminate public from the enjoyment of the right-of-way easement." We also hold that although the easement does not appear in respondents’ title over the dominant estate, the same subsists. It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes the easement.  Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the easement. Article 618 30 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 27, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76213 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.