Evidence: Rule 131 — Burden of Proof, Burden of Evidence, and Presumptions
Revised Rules on Evidence
Rule 131 — Burden of Proof, Burden of Evidence, and Presumptions
Section 1. Burden of Proof and Burden of Evidence. —
Burden of proof is the duty of a party
to present evidence
on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his or her claim or defense
by the amount of evidence required by law.
Burden of proof never shifts.
Burden of evidence is the duty of a party
to present evidence
sufficient to establish or rebut a fact in issue
to establish a prima facie case.
Burden of evidence may shift
from one party to the other
in the course of the proceedings,
depending on the exigencies of the case.
131.1.1 Burden of proof v. Burden of evidence
Burden of proof
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Burden of proof never shifts.
It is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such quantum evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises.
Burden of Evidence
Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case.
Burden of evidence may shift from one party to the other in the course of the proceedings, depending on the exigencies of the case.
Once the prosecution has established these facts, it has already successfully built a prima facie case against the defense.
The burden of evidence is shifted to the defense once the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence to be entitled as a matter of law to a ruling in its favor.
It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily b e disproved by the production of documents or other evidence probably within the defendant's possession or control.
131.1.2 Party’s Burden in Civil Case
As defined, burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment.
For the plaintiff: the burden of proof never parts.
For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense - i.e. an "avoidance" of the claim.
In a civil case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case through a preponderance of evidence.
If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence.
He who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.
Once the plaintiff has established his case, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense.
In the course of trial in a civil case, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
131.1.3 Party’s Burden in Civil Case
In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime.
The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements.
At this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable therefor.
131.1.4 Preponderance of Evidence v. Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Preponderance of Evidence
Quantum of Evidence required in Civil Case.
It means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other or that which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Quantum of Evidence required in Criminal Case.
It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support.
It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary.
It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty — a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.
Section 2. Conclusive Presumptions.
The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has,
by his or her own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another
to believe a particular thing true,
and to act upon such belief,
he or she cannot,
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
be permitted to falsify it; and
(b) The tenant is not permitted
to deny the title of his or her landlord
at the time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
131.2.1 Presumption
A presumption is an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily take.
It is either:
presumption juris, or of law, or
presumption hominis, or of fact.
Presumptions are not allegations, nor do they supply their absence. Presumptions are conclusions.
They do not apply when there are no facts on allegations to support them.
Presumptions of law are, in turn, either:
conclusive or
disputable.
It also refers to a legal inference or assumption that a fact exists because of the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts.
Most presumptions are rules of evidence calling for a certain result in a given case unless the adversely affected party overcomes it with other evidence.
A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the presumption.
131.2.2 Conclusive Presumptions
Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is.
They are made conclusive not because there is an established uniformity in behavior whenever identified circumstances arise.
They are conclusive because they are declared as such under the law or the rules.
They are “inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.”
A presumption that cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted as irrefutable proof that establishes a fact beyond dispute.
131.2.3 Instances of Conclusive Presumptions
The following are instances of conclusive presumptions
Estoppel in Pais. Whenever a party has, by his or her own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he or she cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
Estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
The real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is limited to supplying deficiency in the law but should not supplant positive law.
The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.
❌ If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply.
Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount.
❌ If there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption does not apply.
Otherwise, if the nature of the landlord’s title remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant, then estoppel lies against the tenant.
Note:
Once a law is duly published, there arises a conclusive presumption that all persons are aware of the same.
This is necessarily so because the administration of justice would be imperiled should the courts be required to determine a man’s knowledge or ignorance of the law in every case.
Section 3. Disputable Presumptions.
The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid
when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act
is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person possess,
or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession
of an order on himself
for the payment of the money,
or the delivery of anything,
has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such,
whether in the Philippines or elsewhere,
was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case
were laid before the court and passed upon by it;
and in like manner that all matters
within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration
were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument
was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument
was made before the instrument was overdue
and at the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed
was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years,
it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he is considered dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead
for the purpose of opening his succession
till after an absence of ten years.
If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years,
an absence of five years shall be sufficient
in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead
for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aircraft which is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces
who has taken part in armed hostilities,
and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances
and whose existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years,
the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage
if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead.
In case of disappearance,
where there is a danger of death
the circumstances hereinabove provided,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage.
However, in any case, before marrying again,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings
as provided in the Family Code
and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other
and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage,
has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman
who are not capacitated to marry each other
and who have acquire property through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry,
such contributions and their corresponding shares
including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated
and the mother contracted another marriage
within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage,
these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days
after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage
is considered to have been conceived during such marriage,
even though it be born within the three hundred days
after the termination of the former marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent marriage
is considered to have been conceived during such marriage,
even though it be born within the three hundred days
after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues
as long as is usual with things of the nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book,
purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book,
purporting contain reports of cases
adjudged in tribunals of the country
where the book is published,
contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person
whose duty it was to convey real property
to a particular person
has actually conveyed it to him
when such presumption is necessary
to perfect the title
of such person or his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession,
when two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration,
and it is not shown who died first,
and there are no particular circumstances
from which it can be inferred,
the survivorship is determined from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes,
according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years,
the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty,
the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty,
the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty,
and the sex be different,
the male is deemed to have survived,
if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty,
and the other between those ages,
the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt,
as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first,
whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other,
shall prove the same;
in the absence of proof,
they shall be considered to have died at the same time.
131.3.1. Disputable Presumptions
Disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence.
They are disputable in recognition of the variability of human behavior.
Presumptions are not always true.
They may be wrong under certain circumstances, and courts are expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that may render the expectations wrong.
It refers to an inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence.
Also termed prima facie presumption; conditional presumption; praesumptio juris.
A rebuttable presumption of law being contested by proof of facts showing otherwise, which are denied, the presumption loses its value, unless the evidence is equal on both sides, in which case it should turn the scale.
Note:
The application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based on the existence of certain facts on which they are meant to operate.
If the facts exist to set in motion the operation of a disputable presumption, courts may accept the presumption.
However, contrary evidence may be presented to rebut the presumption.
Courts cannot disregard contrary evidence offered to rebut disputable presumptions.
Disputable presumptions apply only in the absence of contrary evidence or explanations.
131.3.2 Instances of Disputable Presumptions
The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
Presumption of innocence is the fundamental principle that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless the government proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without any burden placed on the accused to prove innocence.
No less than the 1987 Philippine Constitution mandates that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The guilt of the accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in order to warrant a conviction.
Further, Section 2, Rule 133 provides that in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal act.
It has been said that an act is any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world.
Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect a definite result.
In relation to the “particular means” employed the overt acts committed by a person — motive, unlike intent, is quite materially removed.
One motive can give rise to one of several possible courses of action, lawful or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated by one of several possible motives, good or bad.
That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful motive is presumed from the proof of commission of an unlawful act.
Nor would such presumption, if there was, be of any use, for materially unrelated as motive is to the prohibited overt act, it is not essential to the determination of a crime.
When it has been proven that the appellants committed the unlawful acts alleged, it is properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal intent, ‘and it is incumbent upon them to rebut such presumption.’
Further, when the law plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person, the law implies the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law which he had violated.
To reiterate, if the act is criminal, then criminal intent is presumed.
People v. Umaguing:
The Supreme Court ruled that where the accused, a janitor, had nothing to do with the patient and he had no business being in the emergency room at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, his act of removing the endotracheal tube from the patient's mouth which was a serious matter according to the Doctor, was wrongful and it is to be presumed that he did so with an evil intent.
The accused was not able to rebut satisfactorily that presumption and he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder without any aggravating circumstance.
That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his or her voluntary act;
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him.
Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will.
Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil.
Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
When a person commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.
Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.
This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.
That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
The justice system would be rendered inutile should courts assume good faith on everyone even when there is evident violation of law.
It is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns.
For documents sworn to under oath, it has been held that, if a person chooses to swear that an act is legal when he or she is uncertain that it is in fact legal, the choice carries with it the duty of investigating the law.
Hence, an aspirant is obliged to observe reasonable diligence to know the requirements for his or her particular objective and assess if he or she is able to meet the same.
This is especially true when he or she is required to swear to his or her qualification under oath.
Camania v. People:
The Supreme Court ruled that it was evident from the testimony that Councilor Camania voluntarily and intelligently signed the bid documents.
Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns.
In this case, Councilor Camania did not even attempt to overcome the presumption as no evidence was ever presented to show that he was in any way lacking in his mental faculties and, hence, could not have fully understood the ramifications of signing the bid documents.
Neither did Councilor Camania present any evidence that he had been defrauded, forced, intimidated, or threatened into affixing his signature on the documents.
If Councilor Camania had any objections over the documents, he could have totally refrained from having any part in their execution.
That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
In order for this presumption to arise, it is necessary that: MPA
the evidence is material;
the party had the opportunity to produce the same; and
that the said evidence is available only to said party.
However, this presumption does not apply if:
the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
the suppression was not willful;
it is merely corroborative or cumulative and
the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Evangelista v. Spouses Andolong:
The Supreme Court ruled that it is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents' failure to present the documents in their possession — whether such failure was intentional or not — raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
For respondents’ part, they could have easily rebutted petitioners’ claim for Nanito’s share of net profits by producing pertinent documents which would show that the aforesaid gross profits were just enough, or even inadequate, to cover the operational expenses and capital re-infusions to sustain the amusement centers.
Unfortunately, respondents opted not to shed light on the issues at hand as they, unwittingly or otherwise, waived their right to present evidence in this case
Toyota Manila Bay Co. v. Maramag:
The Supreme Court said that it was likewise thus left with no option but to rule that petitioner's failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Here, in failing to produce the original documents, the petitioner effectively deprived the respondent of the opportunity to examine and controvert the same.
That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
Palacios v. Amara, Jr.:
Here, by alleging that respondent was not entitled to the payment of PhP1.8 Million, it was incumbent upon complainant to present evidence to overturn the disputable presumption that the payment was due to respondent.
However, the complainant never presented any evidence to prove that the resolution was passed without the intervention of the respondent.
This it could have done by asking the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang whether respondent represented AFP-RSBS before them. This, complainant did not do.
Further, the Supreme Court held that the amount of PhP1.8 Million is a substantial amount that, in normal human experience, no person would pay to someone who did not render any service.
Further, the mere fact that the contract was executed after the issuance of the resolution does not ipso facto mean that respondent did not have any hand in its issuance. Verily, the complainant failed to overcome the abovementioned disputable presumption. Mere allegations cannot suffice to prove that respondent did not render any service to complainant and, therefore, not entitled to the payment of PhP1 .8 Million
That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
That an obligation delivered up to the debtor bas been paid;
That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him or her;
People v. Hong Yen E and TsienTsien Chua:
The evidence on record clearly established that appellant Chua was in possession of the plastic bags containing prohibited drugs without the requisite authority.
Applying Section 3 (J), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, a disputable presumption arises that she is the owner of the bag and its contents. It may be rebutted by contrary proof that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so.
The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. Here, Chua failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption.
Untalan y Rances v. People:
Untalan was found in possession of the subject missing vehicle by the police authorities in Bacoor, Cavite, three days from the time it was found missing from the private complainant’s garage.
He failed to explain and justify such possession, hence the presumption arises that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.
That a person in possession of an order on himself or herself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
When the Constitution mandated that a government official or employee may not be removed or suspended without due process of law, the law presumes, in protecting such rights, that a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it, and that official duty has been regularly performed.
That official duty has been regularly performed;
When an act has been completed, it is to be supposed that the act was done in the manner prescribed and by an officer authorized by law to do it.
For unless there is evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed by the officer.
It is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed.
The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is on the party alleging it.
All that the Constitutional provision requires is that the decision should state the “essential ultimate facts” upon which the court’s conclusion is drawn.
Courts need not discuss in their decision every evidence adduced by the parties for many of them are not relevant to the decisive issues of fact and law involved in the case.
Indeed, a trial judge enjoys a wider latitude of determining the material facts based on the conflicting asseverations of both parties which would be the basis of his [or her] decision.
In congruence, it is presumed that the official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it.
That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
That private transactions have been fair and regular;
That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.
Where the instrument or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to b e the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance, or indorsement, as the case may be.
Except where an indorsement bears date after the maturity of the instrument, every negotiation is deemed prima facie to have been effected before the instrument was overdue.
That a writing is truly dated;
That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
There is a presumption that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.
The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are:
that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and
that it was mailed.
To prove the fact of mailing, it is important that a party proving the same present sufficient evidence thereof, such as the registry receipt issued by the Bureau of Posts or the registry return card which would have been signed by the petitioner or its authorized representative.
Presumption of absence and death;
That after an absence of seven (7) years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he or she is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his or her succession until after an absence of ten (10) years.
lf he or she disappeared after the age of seventy-five (75) years, an absence of five (5) years shall be sufficient in order that his or her succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs:
A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft which is missing, who has not been heard of for four (4) years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four (4) years;
A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four (4) years; and
If a married person has been absent for four (4) consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death, under the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two (2) years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The essential requisites for a declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage are:
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead — to be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;
Tanguilig v. Court of Appeals:
The Supreme Court emphasized that respondent had in his favor the presumption that “things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.”
However, this presumption has not been rebutted by the petitioner.
Petitioner failed to show that the collapse of the windmill was due solely to a fortuitous event. Interestingly, the evidence does not disclose that there was actually a typhoon on the day the windmill collapsed.
Petitioner merely stated that there was a “strong wind.” But a strong wind in this case cannot be fortuitous — unforeseeable nor unavoidable.
On the contrary, a strong wind should be present in places where windmills are constructed, otherwise the windmills will not turn.
Hence, given the newly-constructed windmill system, the same would not have collapsed had there been no inherent defect in it which could only be attributable to the petitioner.
That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartnership;
That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every internment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
Semper — praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume mamage.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The Supreme Court clarified that the presumption of marriage does not apply where the parties actually entered into a contract of marriage.
It must be emphasized that this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife[,] without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry;
This should be read in corollary with Article 147 of the Family Code, viz:
When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquired property through their actual _joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares, including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit, are equal;
This must be read together with Article 147 of the Family Code, viz:
In cases of cohabitation [by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred (300)) days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
a. A child born before one hundred eighty (180) days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, [provided] it be born within the three hundred (300) days after the termination of the former marriage; and
b. A child born after one hundred eighty (180) days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred (300)days after the termination of the former marriage;
The same presumption can be found under Article 168 of the Family Code.
That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature;
Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
The Supreme Court held that absent any evidence that petitioner divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature.
The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question.
ln his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpitin his affidavit 22 dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he “turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure” is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit.
Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
That the law has been obeyed;
That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so printed or published;
That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him or her when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his or her successor in interest;
Presumption as to who survives
That except for purposes of succession, when two (2) persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
If both were under the age of fifteen (15) years, the older is deemed to have survived;
If both were above the age of sixty (60), the younger is deemed to have survived;
If one is under fifteen (15) and the other above sixty (60), the former is deemed to have survived;
If both be over fifteen (15) and under sixty (60), and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older; and
If one be under fifteen (15) or over sixty (60), and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
That if there is a doubt, as between two (2) or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.
Disputable presumption in relation to DNA Evidence
DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity.
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence.
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
Disputable presumption in relation to Electronic Evidence
Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied therein; and
The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated without error or fault.
Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
The information contained in a certificate is correct;
The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed, and,
A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.
Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy.
There is no presumption of legitimacy
of a child born after three hundred days
following the dissolution of the marriage
or the separation of the spouses.
Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child
must prove his allegation.
131.4.1 Rule on Presumption of Legitimacy or Illegitimacy
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred [(300)] days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses.
Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his or her allegation.
The same can be found under Article 169 of the Family Code which states that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
Further, the heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the aforementioned, only in the following cases:
If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Section 5. Presumptions in Civil Actions and Proceedings.
In all civil actions and proceedings
not otherwise provided for by the law or these Rules,
a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption.
lf presumptions are inconsistent,
the presumption that is founded
upon weightier considerations of policy shall apply.
If considerations of policy are of equal weight,
neither presumption applies.
131.5.1 Presumptions in Civil Actions
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by the law or these Rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.
If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy shall apply.
If considerations of policy are of equal weight, neither presumption applies.
131.5.2 Bursting the Bubble Theory
It states that so long as the party against whom the presumption operates presents evidence to rebut the presumption, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the contesting party to prove the actual issue in question.
This refers to the principle that a presumption disappears once the presumed facts have been contradicted by credible evidence.
Parson v Miller:
The Supreme Court clarified that when undue influence is alleged in the context of will creation, the Thayer theory applies.
Therefore, if the contesting party pleads sufficient facts to show that the above three circumstances exist, the proponent of the will, to avoid a verdict in the contestant's favor, must present evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence.
The presumption functions to shift the burden of production to the will proponent; however, if the proponent puts forward countervailing evidence to prove that the testator was not unduly influenced, the burden of production shifts back to the party contesting the will.
The burden of persuasion always remains with the will contestant, and policy dictates the Supreme Court's reasoning — the burden of showing undue influence should rest upon the party who alleges it.
Evidence must be submitted to prove that the testator was deprived of his own disposition and free will, acting not of his own accord but at the direction of another.
Section 6. Presumption against an Accused in Criminal Cases.
If a presumed fact that establishes guilt,
is an element of the offense charged,
or negates a defense,
the existence of the basic fact
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and the presumed fact follows
from the basic fact beyond reasonable doubt.
131.6.1 Presumption Against Accused in Criminal Cases
If a presumed fact that establishes guilt, is an element of the offense charged, or negates a defense, the existence of the basic fact must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the presumed fact follows from the basic fact beyond reasonable doubt.
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