Torts: Elements of Quasi-delict
a) Negligence
1. Definition
Article 1173, Civil Code.
The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals:
It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
To determine whether or not a person has been negligent requires determining two things:
the diligence required of the actor under the circumstances, and
whether the actor has performed the diligence required.
Failing the second requisite would lead to the conclusion that one has been negligent.
Default Standard of Care: Good Father of a Family Pursuant to Art. 1173, the diligence of a good father of a family is the standard of conduct if the law or contract does not provide otherwise.
Lesser in degree compared to extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, diligence of good father of family may be likened to the requirement of ordinary diligence.
The usual standard of care is such care as a prudent person would exercise under the cir cumstances of a particular case.
But to constitute quasi-delict, it is not enough to establish negligence.
It is equally imperative that the fault or negligence be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
2. Test to determine its existence
Picart v. Smith
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is negligent.
Negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him, but is determined in the light of human experience and the facts involved in the particular case.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion borne of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals:
Foreseeability of the harm is therefore an in dispensable requirement. Thus, in a case where the Supreme Court found that the actor could not have rea sonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, it was ruled that he was not guilty of negligence.
3. Degrees of negligence
In the civil law and at common law, three degrees of negligence were recognized, namely:
Slight negligence is the failure to exercise great or extraordinary care, which means a level of care that goes beyond what is typically expected in a given situation.
Example: A doctor accidentally administers the wrong dosage of medication to a patient, but the error is minor and does not cause significant harm.
Ordinary negligence is the want of ordinary care and diligence, that is, such care and diligence as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
Example: A store owner fails to clear a wet floor, and a customer slips and falls, sustaining minor injuries.
Gross negligence is materially greater than ordinary negligence, and consists of an entire absence of care or an absence of even slight care or diligence; it implies a thoughtless disregard for consequences or an indifference to the rights or welfare of others.
Example: A doctor leaves a surgical instrument inside a patient's body after a procedure, causing serious complications.
The concept itself is relative and comparative. The degree of care to be exercised depends upon person, place and time.
It is a relative or comparative not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose.
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad, et al, G.R. No. 4977, March 22, 1910:
While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case."
Also, where the danger is great, the degree of care required is greater.
S.D. Martinez vs. Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27,1910:
Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom, can not be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence.
Ylarde et al. vs. Aquino, et al, G.R. No. L-33722, July 29, 1988:
The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience.
The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.
Banks:
The banking business is impressed with public interest.
Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it.
By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care.
Electric Companies:
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 33380, December 17,1930:
The same high degree of diligence is demanded among electric companies considering that "electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly."
The measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger.
The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
4. Factors to be considered in determining negligence
In considering negligence, among the factors considered to be taken into consideration are: EIPO
his employment or occupation;
his degree of intelligence;
his physical condition; and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and with the importance of the act which he is to perform.
United States vs. Clemente, G.R. No. 8142, January 25, 1913:
It is the duty of any person driving a vehicle, and especially a street car, in the public thoroughfares to reduce the same to control ready to be stopped at any moment if he sees a child below the age of understanding in such a place that is can, by any reasonable chance, place itself in a dangerous position with respect to the vehicle.
In such case the vehicle must be under such control that, if the child, by some sudden or unusual movement, places itself in the way of the vehicle, it can be stopped in time to avert injury.
United States vs. Knight, G.R. No. 8561, December 4,1913:
But boys 10 or 12 years of age who are permitted to go about unattended may fairly be presumed to have sense enough to take care of themselves from the ordinary and usual dangers of street traffic.
Wright vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 7760, October 1,1914:
Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care.
If a person's conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
b) Proximate Cause
1. Definition
That cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence,
cause defined unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
The term has also been defined as the:
dominant or immediate cause;
the cause that sets the others in motion;
the efficient cause;
the one that necessarily sets the other causes in operation.
An act or omission is not the proximate cause of an injury unless, had it not happened, the injury would not have occurred.
The proximate cause need not be the sole cause, or necessarily the direct cause, or the one which is nearest in time or place to the result.
We seem to have also the adopted the above "but-for" test because "[t]he omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury."
2. Concurrence of efficient causes
In order to render a person liable, negligence need not be the sole cause of an injury.
It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured.
It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same.
No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
3. Burden of proof
The burden of proving negligence that is the proximate cause of the quasi-delict is on the one alleging proof the same.
The person who alleged negligence must prove it.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail
If negligence is not established, there can be no damages.
Where it appears that an injury was received in an accident, without the intervention of negligence of any kind, no damages can be recovered by reason of such injury.
Accident is defined as an occurrence by chance, and not as expected.
Act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented.
4. Presumptions of negligence
There are instances, however, when negligence is presumed by law.
It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months (Article 2184, NCC).
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation (Article 2185, NCC).
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business (Article 2188, NCC).
Art. 2185 does not apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy.
A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force.
A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion, is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles.
At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable of inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision.
This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the fuels that they use.
Also, where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
5. Res Ipsa Loquitor
As Black's Law Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself.
Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred, and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.
Under the doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur,' the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where the plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of the defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used."
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence, which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged.
It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty of due care.
It is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not create an independent ground of liability.
Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for and relieves the plaintiff of the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.
The maxim simply places on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.
Prima facie evidence is the initial evidence presented that is presumed to be true, unless it is challenged or disproved during legal proceedings.
Resort to the doctrine may be allowed only when:
the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;
other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.
The doctrine can be invoked when, and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption or inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear.
Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence.
The presumption of res ipsa loquitur therefore applies when there is no direct proof or evidence of the cause of injury but the thing or instrumentality causing injury is under the exclusive control and use of the defendant, and the accident is one which ordinarily does not happen unless one is negligent.
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary presumption; therefore, it is not to be invoked to overcome evidence but to be applied only in its absence.
Hence, whenever the doctrine is applied, the query is not whether the accident rarely happens, but whether, when it occurs, it is ordinarily the result of negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur has application only to the law of negligence
It is confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort, since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.
Where the doctrine is applicable, all that the plaintiff must prove is the accident itself; no other proof of negligence is required beyond the accident itself.
It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff's prima facie case.
The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption.
The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms.
In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence.
The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of.
Thus, it is the defendant's responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part.
Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact.
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