Torts - Introduction
Kinds of Culpa Classified According to the Source of the Obligation
Culpa contractual
contractual negligence — or that which results in a breach of a contract
Culpa aquiliana
civil negligence or tort or quasi-delict
Culpa criminal
criminal negligence — or that which results in the commission of a crime or a delict
Distinctions Re the Three Kinds of Culpa
NPP-DP
Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana refers to
fault or negligence which results in damage to another,
there being no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
and is governed by Art. 2176, Civil Code.
Torts, which is a much broader concept,
includes intentional and malicious acts
and is covered by Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
and by the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 20 — indemnification of another due to illegal acts
Art. 21 — indemnification due to immoral acts
Art. 22 — unjust enrichment
Art. 26 — respect for the personality and dignity of others
Requisites before a person may be liable under quasi-delict:
There must be an act or omission;
There must be damage or prejudice;
There must be causal relationship between the act or omission and the damage done;
There must be no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.
A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.
Classification of torts
Intentional torts
Articles 20, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
Negligent torts
any other act or omission where there is fault or negligence
Strict liability
liability independent of fault or negligence
The Tortfeasor
Principal or sole tortfeasor
the person whose act or omission directly or principally causes the injury or damage
Joint tortfeasor/s
the person or persons whose negligence or concurrent and whose responsibility is deemed solidary.
Negligence
According to Article 1173 of the Civil Code,
the fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place.
On the other hand, according to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence,
physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
The test of negligence is:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Culpa Contractual
Example: Contract of Carriage
The hurt passenger may bring a civil case of culpa contractual (for breach of the contract of carriage) against the owner of the taxicab company, and not against the driver, because the contract is between the passenger and the owner, and not between the passenger and the driver, who merely represents the owner. Hence, properly, only the owner should be the defendant (without prejudice to his right to reimbursement from his driver).
All that the passenger must prove is the existence of the contract of carriage, and the fact that there was a breach because he did not arrive at his destination unhurt.
If the owner can prove that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver, said owner is still responsible because of “respondeat superior” or the master-servant rule (the negligence of the servant is the negligence of the master).
However, this “diligence” of the owner makes him a debtor in good faith and the damages would be mitigated.
If the company wants to escape liability, it is its duty to prove that the driver was really careful; otherwise the presumption of the driver’s negligence remains.
The common carrier is presumed negligent in case of death or physical injuries to passengers unless it proves the exercise of extraordinary diligence. Indeed when the action is based on a contract of carriage, and not of tort, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, for its obligation is to transport the passenger safely.
Culpa Aquiliana
Example: A pedestrian was hit by a taxi and suffered physical injuries. The taxi driver was negligent and was responsible for the injury.
This is culpa aquiliana, there being no previous existing contractual relations between the pedestrian on the one hand, and the taxi driver and the owner of the taxicab company, upon the other hand.
The injured pedestrian can bring an action based on culpa aquiliana (tort or quasi-delict) against both the taxi driver and the owner or operator of the taxicab company.
Reason: The driver is responsible for his negligence in making possible the injury.
If the owner can prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver, he could not have been re sponsible in any way for the injury. Thus, this defense is proper for the employer, and if proved, will exempt him from liability.
As a general rule, it is logical that in case of culpa aquiliana, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proving the existence of the negligence, as the only fact upon which his action is based.
Culpa Criminal
Example: A pedestrian was injured because of the recklessness of a taxi-driver.
As we have already seen, the pedestrian can bring an action of culpa aquiliana against the driver and the owner of the taxi company.
But if the pedestrian wants, he may bring an action for culpa criminal (physical injuries thru reckless imprudence).
In the same way, passenger may bring not only a suit for culpa contractual but also a suit for culpa criminal (physical injuries thru reckless imprudence).
Procedure:
The injured pedestrian will file a criminal case against the driver (not against the owner).
If the driver is found guilty, the owner will be subsidiarily liable if the driver is insolvent.
The owner will not be allowed to present the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, for his liability is automatic and subsidiary.
There is no necessity of previously reserving the case against the owner (because the owner is not a defendant in the criminal case).
After the criminal case is terminated, the convicted driver should pay.
If the driver is insolvent, the victim can now file a civil action against the owner to recover on the latter’s subsidiary liability. All the victim has to do is:
To present the judgment in the criminal case, declaring the driver guilty.
To present proof of driver’s insolvency by showing that the execution attempted by the sheriff could not be satisfied.
In the absence of collusion between the driver and prosecuting attorney, once the two exhibits are presented or proved, the judge should order the owner to pay.
The owner will not be allowed to present any defense any more.
He cannot, however, be said to have been deprived of his day in court because he also had his chance, namely, in the criminal case against the driver.
In said case, he should have given his driver a good defense counsel, because in defending the interest of the driver, the owner would also be defending his own interest, for his liability is automatic and dependent on the driver’s guilt and insolvency.
This is the rule in culpa criminal.
If a passenger sues for culpa criminal, substantially the same procedure as the above would be followed.
Effects of Victim’s Own Negligence and of His Contributory Negligence
When a plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages (because there is no culpa aquiliana on the part of the defendant). (Art. 2179, Civil Code).
Example:
A pedestrian, not looking where he was going, bumped into a carefully driven car.
He cannot recover damages in culpa aquiliana. As a matter of fact, if any damage was caused the car, the owner can recover from the pedestrian.
If the plaintiff’s negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (Art. 2179, Civil Code)
Degrees of Culpa Under Roman
culpa lata — grave negligence
culpa levis — ordinary negligence
culpa levissima — slight negligence
Kinds of Diligence Under the Civil Code
that agreed upon by the parties
in the absence of (a), that required by the law (particular provision)
in the absence of (b), that expected of a good father of a family (bonum pater familia)
Extraordinary Diligence
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
b) Art. 100, Art. 103, and Art. 112 of the Revised Penal Code
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. —
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Basis of Civil Liability
An act or omission xxx gives rise to civil liability because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to civil liability is the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another, by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently.
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. [Art. 20, CC.]
When Imposable
If the felony committed did not cause any damage to another, the offender is not civilly liable even if he is criminally liable for the felony committed.
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability.
Insanity, Minority
Effect of Acquittal in Criminal Action
General Rule:
The court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil action.
The reason for this is that the accused has already been accorded due process.
Exceptions:
Acquittal in the criminal action for negligence does not preclude the offended party from filing a separate civil action to recover damages, based on the new theory that the act is a quasi-delict
Facts from which the civil action might arise do not exist (e.g., the defendant was acquitted because he was not the perpetrator of the felony)
Determination of Civil Liability
General Rule:
Civil liability arising from the commission of the felony is deemed instituted with the criminal action. [Rule 111, Sec. 1(a), ROC]
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil
Exceptions: When the offended party: [WRIP]
Waives his right to file a civil action
Reserves his right to Institute it separately, or
Institutes the civil action Prior to the criminal action.
Reservation of Right to File
A reservation of the right to file a separate civil action only gives the party aggrieved the right to choose under which body of laws he must bring the civil action, either under the:
RPC – where the recovery may be defeated by proof that the acts on which the action is based do not exist, or
New Civil Code – where the same proof is required to preclude recovery, or proof of diligence in the selection and employment of the employee.
Institution of Separate Civil Action
Commencement of criminal action is not a condition precedent to the filing of civil action arising from a crime.
However, civil action arising from crime cannot be instituted in the following cases:
Before criminal action has commenced
Civil action is suspended until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. The civil and criminal actions may be consolidated so that they are tried and decided jointly.
After criminal action has commenced
Cannot be instituted until after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
Said rule applies only when the plaintiff in the civil action is the offended party in the criminal action and both cases arise from the same offense.
Independent Civil Actions
An independent civil action may be filed in the following cases:
Violations of fundamental rights [Art. 32, NCC.]
Defamation, fraud and physical injuries [Art. 33, NCC.]
Failure or refusal of a member of the police force to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property [Art. 34, NCC.]
When there is fault or negligence, there being no pre-existing contract between the parties (quasi-delict). [Art. 2176, NCC]
Responsibility for quasi-delicts is separate from civil liability arising from negligence under the RPC, but the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice from the same act or omission. [Art. 2177, CC.]
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. —
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry
for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
in the discharge of their duties.
Art. 112. Extinction of civil liability. —
Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code
shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations,
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.
c) Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party
waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused
by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information,
the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual,
is specified in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party
upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint
may be filed by the accused in the criminal case,
but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions,
the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein.
If the amounts are not so alleged
but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately
and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case.
If the application is granted,
the trial of both actions shall proceed
in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. —
After the criminal action has been commenced,
the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted,
the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits.
The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action,
the same may, upon motion of the offended party,
be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action.
In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action
shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case
and of the parties to present additional evidence.
The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action,
the running of the period of prescription of the civil action
which cannot be instituted separately
or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished
if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. —
In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.
It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. —
The death of the accused after arraignment and
during the pendency of the criminal action
shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict.
However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule
or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused
after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be.
The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives
to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment,
the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party
may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. —
A final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability
is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant
for the same act or omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
d) Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
Article 32.
Any public officer or employee,
or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense,
the aggrieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth
is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company
David Taylor, a 15-year-old minor, filed a lawsuit for injuries, including the loss of his eye, caused by an explosion involving brass fulminating caps.
The defendant, Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, operated a street railway and electric light system in Manila.
David Taylor and another boy, Manuel Claparols, found the caps on the company's premises and took them home.
The caps were explosive and used for detonating dynamite; they resembled small pistol cartridges.
The boys, along with a young girl, experimented with the caps, leading to an explosion that caused serious injuries.
The company had left the caps in an open area accessible to the public, including children.
The plaintiff argued that the company was negligent in leaving the caps exposed, which directly led to the injury.
The case referenced similar cases, like the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, where courts held property owners liable for injuries to children caused by dangerous items left on their premises.
The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstance of the case.
The court ruled that the proximate cause of the injury was not the defendant's negligence but the plaintiff's deliberate action in igniting the cap.
The court concluded that David Taylor, despite his age, was mature enough to understand the danger and that his own actions were the immediate cause of the injury, barring recovery from the defendant.
The plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
Damages to the plaintiff.
Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
2. Jarantilla vs. CA, G.R. No. 80194, March 21, 1989
On July 7, 1971, Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a Volkswagen Beetle car driven by Edgar Jarantilla in Iloilo City, resulting in physical injuries.
Jarantilla was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207, where Kuan Sing participated as the complaining witness.
Jarantilla was acquitted in the criminal case due to reasonable doubt.
On October 30, 1974, Kuan Sing filed a separate civil case (Civil Case No. 9976) against Jarantilla based on the same incident.
Jarantilla argued that the civil action was barred because Kuan Sing did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action during the criminal proceedings.
Issue: Whether Kuan Sing could file a separate civil action after participating in the criminal case without reserving the civil action, especially after Jarantilla’s acquittal. YES
The court held that Kuan Sing could file the civil action under Article 29 of the Civil Code, as the acquittal did not preclude civil liability.
The court emphasized that a person acquitted of a crime due to reasonable doubt might still be civilly liable under a separate action based on quasi-delict.
The same negligent act can lead to both criminal (ex delicto) and civil (ex quasi delicto) liabilities. However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both.
Even if an accused is acquitted, they may still be civilly liable under Article 29, which only requires a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.
The private respondent's complaint alleges a quasi-delict due to the petitioner’s negligent driving.
May the civil action for culpa aquiliana and the criminal action for the same negligent act be filed simultaneously? NO.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between
an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused.
3. Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. PP, et al., G.R. No. 12909, April 3, 2000
On June 20, 1989, Romeo Dunca, a driver for Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, was involved in a collision in Cauayan, Isabela, resulting in two deaths and significant property damage.
Dunca lost control of the truck after hitting potholes, swerving into the opposite lane, and colliding with a Nissan vehicle.
Dunca was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property.
The victims' families initially reserved the right to file a separate civil action and later filed a civil case against Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation based on quasi-delict.
The trial court found Dunca guilty of double homicide through reckless imprudence and ordered compensatory and moral damages.
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation was held subsidiarily liable for damages if Dunca was insolvent.
Dunca fled to a foreign country during the appeal, leading to the dismissal of his criminal case appeal.
Issues:
Whether the trucking company could be held subsidiarily liable despite a separate civil action (NO).
Whether damages could be awarded in the criminal case despite a civil action against the employer (NO).
The Supreme Court granted the petition, remanding the case to the trial court to determine the trucking company's civil liability under quasi-delict.
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation cannot be held subsidiarily liable because a separate civil action based on quasi delict was filed against it, not as part of the criminal action.
The filing of a separate civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code means that other civil actions, including indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, are waived.
Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states that reserving or filing a separate civil action waives other available civil actions arising from the same act or omission.
The intention of the private respondents to proceed against the employer (Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation) directly became clear as they did not seek dismissal of the quasi-delict action.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court erred by holding both the accused and the employer liable in the criminal case because the separate civil action against the employer resulted in the waiver of the civil action for damages arising from the crime.
Even if private respondents withdrew their reservation to file a civil action against the driver, it does not affect the separate civil action against the employer.
The rule is designed to avoid multiple suits for the same act or omission of the offender.
4. Casapunan, et al., vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002
Two vehicles were involved in an accident:
one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and
the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan.
Laroya filed a criminal case (Criminal Case No. 002-99) against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case (Civil Case No. 2089) against Laroya for quasi-delict.
Laroya filed a motion to dismiss the civil case based on forum-shopping due to the pending criminal case.
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. YES
Criminal vs. Civil Actions:
Criminal Case: Based on culpa criminal (Revised Penal Code).
Civil Case: Based on culpa aquiliana (Civil Code Articles 2176 and 2177).
Rules on Separate Civil Actions:
Under the 1985 Rules, civil actions arising from the same act as a criminal case could be "impliedly instituted" with the criminal case unless reserved.
The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure allow civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code to proceed independently of the criminal action without prior reservation.
Suspension of Civil Action:
Separate civil actions for damages ex-delicto (arising from the crime) are suspended during the criminal case.
Independent civil actions (e.g., for quasi-delict) can proceed independently even if a criminal action is ongoing.
Accused’s Counterclaim:
Under Rule 111, accused persons must file counterclaims in separate civil actions, not in the criminal case.
This ensures that the accused can litigate claims for quasi-delict separately from the criminal proceedings.
Conclusion:
Forum-shopping is avoided if the civil and criminal actions are treated separately and independently, ensuring no double recovery for the same act.
Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
A separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. But this rule applies only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule does not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
5. Sps. Santos, et al. vs. Pizardo, et al., G.R. No. 151452, July 29, 2005
In 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries following a vehicle collision involving a Viron Transit bus and a Lite Ace Van, resulting in four deaths and injuries to five passengers.
Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment ranging from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. No civil liability was pronounced.
Civil Complaint:
In 2000, Victims' families filed a civil complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit, and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris.
RTC-QC: Dismissed the complaint, ruling it had prescribed under the four-year period for quasi-delict actions.
Issue: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by concluding that the cause of action was based on quasi-delict and thus prescribed.
Allegations:
Petitioners: Argued the action was based on criminal liability (ex delicto) and should not be bound by the four-year prescription for quasi-delict.
Private Respondents: Countered that the action was for quasi-delict, subject to a four-year prescriptive period, and certiorari was improper.
It was held that civil liability arising from a crime is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except in three cases: waiver, reservation of the right to file a separate action, or prior filing of a civil action.
Petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action. Thus, the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime was valid despite the prescription of the quasi-delict claim.
The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint based on prescription but should have allowed it to be prosecuted on the merits.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
independent civil liabilities, such as those
not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
6. Manliclic vs. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007
Collision involved two vehicles:
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 driven by Mauricio Manliclic and
an owner-type jeep driven by Marcelo Mendoza and owned by Modesto Calaunan.
The collision occurred around 6:00 to 7:00 AM on July 12, 1988, on the North Luzon Expressway in Bulacan. The bus struck the jeep’s rear left side, causing the jeep to fall into a ditch, while the bus stopped 7-8 meters from the collision.
Respondent Calaunan sustained minor injuries; his driver was unhurt.
A criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries was filed against Manliclic in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Calaunan later filed a civil case for damages against Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) in the RTC of Dagupan City.
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Calaunan argued that the bus was at fault, hitting the jeep while overtaking.
Manliclic claimed the jeep swerved left while he was overtaking, causing the collision.
Whether the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s version since Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. NO
Court of Appeals Ruling:
Declared no negligence on Manliclic's part in the criminal case.
Found that the jeep’s swerving was beyond Manliclic's control.
Acquitted Manliclic on grounds that the collision was not due to his negligence.
Distinction between Penal and Civil Liability:
Civil liability arising from a crime (ex delicto) can be extinguished by an acquittal.
Civil liability arising from quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) remains unaffected by criminal acquittal.
Quasi-Delict:
Separate from criminal liability; negligence under Civil Code can still be pursued despite criminal acquittal.
Manliclic could still be held liable for damages under quasi-delict principles.
Upheld trial court’s finding of Manliclic’s negligence.
Considered discrepancies in testimonies and evidence.
Confirmed that the employer (PRBLI) failed to prove adequate supervision of employees.
Employer's Liability (PRBLI):
Found negligent in supervision, not just selection.
Required to show diligence in monitoring and enforcing safety measures.
7. Franco vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71137, October 5, 1989
October 18, 1974, around 7:30 PM.
Franco Bus (Plate No. XY320-PUB) swerved to avoid a parked truck and collided with an oncoming Isuzu Mini Bus (Plate No. YL-735).
The mini bus was dragged 15 meters and overturned into a canal.
Casualties: Both drivers and two mini bus passengers (Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay) died.
Plaintiffs:
Antonio Reyes (mini bus owner)
Susan Chuay (wife of Fernando Chuay)
Lolita Lugue (wife of Magdaleno Lugue)
The plaintiffs sought damages from Franco Transportation Company, Sps. Federico Franco and Felicisima Franco, alleging reckless driving caused the collision.
The Francos claimed due diligence in selecting and supervising their driver, Macario Yuro.
Issues: Basis of Action: Whether the case was based on a crime or quasi-delict. Determined as quasi-delict.
Liability: The case was primarily based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not subsidiary liability under the Penal Code. The employer's primary liability is based on negligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
No criminal action was taken against the deceased driver, so the employer's subsidiary liability (under Article 103) could not be pursued.
The case was determined as a civil action under quasi-delict, where the employer's primary liability was assessed.
Due Diligence Defense: The defense of due diligence was rejected due to insufficient evidence.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103. The conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted.
8. PSBA vs. CA, G.R. No. 84698, January 4, 1982
On August 30, 1985, Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student, was fatally stabbed on the PSBA campus.
The assailants were outsiders, not part of the PSBA community.
Carlitos's parents sued PSBA and its officers for damages, alleging negligence and insufficient security.
Defendants included PSBA’s President, Vice-President, Treasurer/Cashier, Chief of Security, and Assistant Chief of Security.
Defense:
Argued that as an academic institution, it was not subject to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Sought dismissal of the suit, asserting it was beyond the scope of quasi-delictual liability.
Whether a school has contractual obligations to provide a safe environment for students, in addition to fulfilling educational commitments.
Article 2180: Holds schools liable for the acts of their students but was considered insufficient for this case as the assailants were not students.
Contractual Relationship: Affirmed that schools have a contractual obligation to ensure safety, which is independent of quasi-delictual obligations.
Schools and students have a contractual relationship with mutual obligations.
Schools must provide a safe environment, integral to their educational mission.
Distinction from Quasi-Delicts:
Quasi-delicts (Article 2176) involve non-contractual obligations between parties.
Even with a contract, a tort or quasi-delict may be recognized if the contractual breach involves bad faith or violation of morals (Article 21).
Previous Cases:
Air France vs. Carrascoso: Demonstrated that liability from tort can exist even with a contract.
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad: Highlighted that non-contractual obligations can exist alongside contractual ones.
Quasi-Delict vs. Contractual Liability: The case involves a breach of contractual duty rather than a typical quasi-delict. However, the breach of contract may also involve quasi-delictual considerations if bad faith or violation of morals is evident. Determined that the contractual relationship between PSBA and Carlitos Bautista is central to assessing liability.
By definition, the pre-existing contract between the parties bar the applicability of the law on quasi delict. Thus, in a case involving a stabbing incident in side the campus where the assailants were not students or employees of the school, the Supreme Court refused to apply the rules on quasi-delict as "the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista." Said the Supreme Court, "[a] perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-con tractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied."
9. Airfrance vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
On March 28, 1958, Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was issued a first-class round-trip ticket from Manila to Rome by Air France through Philippine Air Lines.
On March 30, 1958, while traveling with a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims to Lourdes, Carrascoso was forced to vacate his first-class seat in Bangkok in favor of another passenger.
Carrascoso occupied a first-class seat from Manila to Bangkok.
In Bangkok, Air France's manager demanded he leave the seat for a "white man" who allegedly had a "better right" to it.
After a heated discussion, and being pacified by fellow passengers, Carrascoso relinquished his seat.
Entitlement to First-Class Seat:
It was affirmed that Carrascoso was entitled to a first-class seat based on his ticket and payment.
The Court of Appeals supported this, dismissing Air France's claim that the ticket did not guarantee a first-class seat.
Moral and Exemplary Damages:
The Court affirmed the awards for moral damages and exemplary damages, finding that Air France acted in bad faith by forcibly removing Carrascoso from his seat and failing to prove any legitimate reason for the action.
Attorney's Fees:
Attorney's fees were deemed appropriate and justified due to the nature of the case and the awarded damages.
He was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is 'contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. . .
That liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
10. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 110295, October 18, 1993
Lydia L. Geronimo:
Proprietor of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City.
Geronimo's canteen sold contaminated Coke and Sprite.
Contaminants were found in unopened bottles.
Sales dropped significantly due to the contamination, leading to the canteen's closure and Geronimo's financial distress.
Geronimo sought damages from Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., including actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages.
The petitioner (Coca-Cola) moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was based on breach of warranty with a six-month prescription period.
Geronimo argued it was a quasi-delict with a four-year prescription period.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying quasi-delict principles instead of breach of warranty.
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision.
It was determined that the claim was based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, not breach of warranty.
The Court affirmed the four-year prescription period for quasi-delict.
Liability for quasi-delict can exist even if there is a contractual relationship.
A breach of contract may also be considered a quasi-delict if it involves negligence or reckless conduct.
Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also inten tional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.
Hence, where the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict, the mere fact that there was pre-existing contract will not preclude a finding of quasi-delict. "Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations"
11. FEBTC vs. CA, G.R. No. 108164, February 23, 1995
Luis A. Luna and Clarita S. Luna had credit cards issued by Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC).
Clarita lost her credit card in August 1988, reported it, and FEBTC canceled both the lost card and the principal card.
On October 6, 1988, Luis's credit card was declined at a restaurant due to its cancellation, causing him embarrassment and requiring a cash payment.
Luis demanded damages from FEBTC on October 11, 1988.
FEBTC apologized for the mistake, attributing it to an overzealous employee.
Luis and Clarita filed a complaint for damages against FEBTC.
Issues:
FEBTC's liability for moral and exemplary damages. NO
FEBTC's liability for nominal damages and attorney’s fees. YES
Supreme Court Decision:
Moral and Exemplary Damages:
FEBTC was not liable for moral damages as there was no evidence of bad faith or malice.
The award of exemplary damages was also not justified.
Nominal Damages:
FEBTC was ordered to pay P5,000 in nominal damages to Luis.
Attorney’s Fees:
Award for reasonable attorney’s fees was affirmed.
Doctrine:
Moral damages require proof of fraud or bad faith.
Exemplary damages are not justified without gross negligence or malice.
Nominal damages can be awarded to recognize a violation of rights without compensating for loss.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson v. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155).
This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents’ case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract.
The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.
12. Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. 12191, October 14, 1918
Jose Cangco was employed as a clerk by the Manila Railroad Company, earning a monthly wage of P25. He used a company-issued pass for free train rides.
On January 20, 1915, Cangco exited a second-class car and stood on the steps, holding the guardrail.
At the San Mateo station, where the platform slopes up from the ground, he encountered a sack of watermelons, which caused him to slip and fall onto the platform.
He then rolled under the moving train, resulting in severe injury to his right arm.
The platform was dimly lit, and a row of melon sacks was piled there for market shipment. Cangco's fall was attributed to stepping on a melon in the darkness.
Cangco's injuries were serious, leading to the amputation of his arm. Initially, he underwent surgery at one hospital, then was transferred to another for a higher amputation. He incurred medical expenses totaling P790.25.
Cangco sued the railroad company for damages, claiming negligence due to the unsafe placement of the melon sacks.
Whether Cangco was guilty of contributory negligence. NO
Negligence by the Railroad Company: The railroad company’s employees were negligent in piling sacks on the platform, causing the plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries.
Contractual Liability: The railroad company’s liability stems from a breach of the contract of carriage, not from the general principles of respondeat superior or culpa aquiliana (non-contractual negligence).
Distinction in Legal Responsibilities: The distinction between contractual and extra-contractual obligations is crucial. Contractual obligations are direct and immediate, and negligence of servants in fulfilling these obligations does not relieve the company of liability.
Contributory Negligence: The defendant argued contributory negligence by the plaintiff, claiming that the plaintiff should have waited for the train to stop before alighting. The court did not fully accept the defendant's argument, noting that the train was barely moving when the plaintiff alighted, and thousands of passengers regularly alight under similar conditions without injury, provided the platform is kept clear of obstructions.
Assessment of Negligence: The court applied a standard of "ordinary or reasonable care" to assess whether the plaintiff was negligent in alighting from the train. The plaintiff’s actions were deemed reasonable under the circumstances, given the railroad company’s failure to provide a safe alighting place.
In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."
13. BLTBC vs. IAC, G.R. Nos. 74387-90, November 14, 1998
Date of Incident: August 11, 1978
Location: Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon
Parties Involved:
BLTB Bus No. 1046, driven by Armando Pon
Superlines Bus No. 404, driven by Ruben Dasco
Incident: Collision between BLTB Bus No. 1046 and Superlines Bus No. 404
Consequences:
Deaths: Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo, Romeo Neri (passengers of BLTB Bus No. 1046)
Injuries: Nena Rosales (wife of Aniceto), Baylon Sales (passengers of BLTB Bus No. 1046)
Cause of Accident: BLTB Bus No. 1046 attempted to overtake a Ford Fiera car and failed to return to its lane in time, leading to a collision with the oncoming Superlines Bus No. 404.
Legal Actions:
Separate cases filed by Nena Vda. de Rosales, Baylon Sales, and heirs of the deceased against BLTB, Superlines, and their drivers for damages.
Criminal cases filed against the drivers of the two buses.
Defense: BLTB, Superlines, and their drivers denied liability, claiming they exercised due care and blaming each other.
Lower Court (CFI-Marinduque):
Exonerated Superlines and its driver, Ruben Dasco.
Held BLTB and its driver, Armando Pon, solely responsible for the accident, ordering them to pay damages.
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC): Affirmed the lower court’s judgment.
Issue: Whether the IAC erred in adjudging the actions based on culpa contractual (contractual negligence).
Ruling: The IAC did not err; the decision was based on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana (tort).
Decision/Doctrine:
The proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the BLTB driver in overtaking in a no-overtaking zone.
The negligence and recklessness of the BLTB driver were binding on BLTB, as a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence in transporting passengers.
BLTB and its driver were held solidarily liable for the damages.
The petitioners’ defense of force majeure was rejected, as the accident was due to human negligence.
Comments
Post a Comment