Case Digest: Mauro Ganzon v. CA, G.R. No. L-48757, May 30, 1988

Commercial Laws 2: Common Carriers

Sarmiento, J.

Recit Ver:

On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing hired Mauro B. Ganzon to transport 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to Manila using the lighter LCT "Batman."

On December 1, Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Captain Filomeno Niza for loading. During the loading process, Mayor Jose Advincula demanded P5,000 from Tumambing. When Tumambing refused, Advincula shot him non-fatally, leading to Tumambing being hospitalized. The loading was resumed after the incident. 

On December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by police, ordered Captain Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked, and the remaining iron was taken to NASSCO’s compound. Tumambing subsequently sued Ganzon for damages based on culpa contractual, claiming that the carrier was responsible for the loss.

The court found that the scrap iron had been unconditionally placed under the carrier's custody and that the contract of carriage was thus perfected. The carrier was held responsible for the loss of the cargo due to a presumption of negligence, as the petitioner failed to prove extraordinary diligence or that the loss was due to force majeure. The petitioner's claims that the loss resulted from an "order or act of competent public authority" were rejected, as there was no evidence of lawful authority behind the order to dump the scrap iron. The court upheld the decision that the carrier was liable for the damages, as the intervention of municipal officials did not absolve them of responsibility.

Facts:

• On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing hired Mauro B. Ganzon to transport 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to Manila using the lighter LCT "Batman."

• The lighter docked in three feet of water in Mariveles.

• On December 1, 1956, Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Captain Filomeno Niza of the lighter. 

• During the loading process, under the captain's supervision, Mayor Jose Advincula demanded P5,000 from Tumambing. 

• After Tumambing refused, Advincula shot him non-fatally. 

• Tumambing was hospitalized for treatment.

• On December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, with police, ordered the lighter's crew to dump the scrap iron, and the remaining iron was taken to NASSCO’s compound. 

• Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt acknowledging the Municipality’s custody of the scrap iron.

• Tumambing instituted an action against Guanzon for damages based on culpa contractual. 

CFI-Manila: -

CA: Reversed the decision, ordering Mauro Ganzon to pay Tumambing:

• P5,895 in actual damages

• P5,000 in exemplary damages

• P2,000 for attorney's fees. 

Issues: 

1. Whether the CA erred in finding the petitioner guilty of breach of the contract of transportation and in imposing a liability against him commencing from the time the scrap was placed in his custody and control. NO

2. Whether the CA erred in condemning the petitioner for the acts of his employees in dumping the scrap into the sea despite that it was ordered by the local government official without his participation. NO

3. Whether the CA erred failed to consider that the loss of the scrap was due to a fortuitous event and the petitioner is therefore not liable for losses as a consequence thereof. NO

Held: 

The petitioner, in his first assignment of error, insists that the scrap iron had not been unconditionally placed under his custody and control to make him liable. However, he completely agrees with the respondent Court's finding that on December 1, 1956, the private respondent delivered the scraps to Captain Filomeno Niza for loading in the lighter "Batman," That the petitioner, thru his employees, actually received the scraps is freely admitted. Significantly, there is not the slightest allegation or showing of any condition, qualification, or restriction accompanying the delivery by the private respondent-shipper of the scraps, or the receipt of the same by the petitioner. On the contrary, soon after the scraps were delivered to, and received by the petitioner-common carrier, loading was commenced.

By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.  The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.

The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. By reason of this presumption, the court is not even required to make an express finding of fault or negligence before it could hold the petitioner answerable for the breach of the contract of carriage. Still, the petitioner could have been exempted from any liability had he been able to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods in his custody, according to all the circumstances of the case, or that the loss was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. As it was, there was hardly any attempt on the part of the petitioner to prove that he exercised such extraordinary diligence.

It is in the second and third assignments of error where the petitioner maintains that he is exempt from any liability because the loss of the scraps was due mainly to the intervention of the municipal officials of Mariveles which constitutes a caso fortuito as defined in Article 1174 of the Civil Code.  

We cannot sustain the theory of caso fortuito. In the courts below, the petitioner's defense was that the loss of the scraps was due to an "order or act of competent public authority," and this contention was correctly passed upon by the Court of Appeals which ruled that:

... In the second place, before the appellee Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. 

Neither has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles. What we have in the record is the stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap iron was accumulated by the appellant through separate purchases here and there from private individuals (Record on Appeal, pp. 38-39). The fact remains that the order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown the appellant for P5,000.00. The order of the acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for appellee Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.

Now the petitioner is changing his theory to caso fortuito. Such a change of theory on appeal we cannot, however, allow. In any case, the intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner's employees. The mere difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is not considered force majeure. We agree with the private respondent that the scraps could have been properly unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO compound, so that after the dispute with the local officials concerned was settled, the scraps could then be delivered in accordance with the contract of carriage.

There is no incompatibility between the Civil Code provisions on common carriers and Articles 361 and 362 of the Code of Commerce which were the basis for this Court's ruling in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Ynchausti & Co. and which the petitioner invokes in tills petition. For Art. 1735 of the Civil Code, conversely stated, means that the shipper will suffer the losses and deterioration arising from the causes enumerated in Art. 1734; and in these instances, the burden of proving that damages were caused by the fault or negligence of the carrier rests upon him. However, the carrier must first establish that the loss or deterioration was occasioned by one of the excepted causes or was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. Be that as it may, insofar as Art. 362 appears to require of the carrier only ordinary diligence, the same is deemed to have been modified by Art. 1733 of the Civil Code.

Finding the award of actual and exemplary damages to be proper, the same will not be disturbed by us. Besides, these were not sufficiently controverted by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Yap, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.