Case Digest: People v. Magayon, GR No. 238873, September 16, 2020

 

CASE TITLE: People v. Magayon, GR No.
GR No/ Date: G.R. No.  238873, September 16, 2020
PLAINTIFF: People of the Philippines Represented by: -	DEFENDANT: Sundaram Magayon y Francisco Represented by: -
ACTION WITH THE SUPREME COURT: Appeal from the Decision of the CA
PONENTE: Lazaro-Javier, J.
FACTS: Appellant Sundaram Magayon y Francisco was convicted for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), for possessing 276.9662 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops and 104.3403 grams of marijuana stalks. The appellant pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The prosecution's witnesses included: PO2 Rey Gabrielle Busa Maderal,  Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Torres Mangasep, and  Police Senior Inspector Norman Gales Jovita. The defense witnesses were Richard Bentoso Amado and the appellant himself. Version of the Prosecution: On August 3, 2004, PO2 Maderal and other officers, including SPO4 Amora, PO3 Gono, and PO2 delos Santos, conducted a buy-bust operation at the appellant's residence in Butuan City. PO2 delos Santos and a confidential informant conducted the transaction with the appellant at the store attached to his house. PO2 Maderal witnessed the exchange of P100 marked money for a teabag-sized packet of marijuana. The appellant was arrested after the exchange, and the marked money was recovered from his "wife." SPO4 Amora informed the appellant of a search warrant. The search began after barangay officials and media personnel arrived. Seventy-four packets of marijuana were found in various parts of the house, along with a plastic bag and a plastic ice cream container filled with marijuana. PO2 Maderal prepared an inventory of the seized items in the presence of barangay officials and the appellant. The appellant refused to sign the certificate of orderly search. The appellant, his "wife," and the seized items were brought to the police station for booking and investigation. PSI Jovita, a forensic chemist, received and tested three sets of marijuana specimens, including the packet from the buy-bust and the 74 packets from the search. All items tested positive for marijuana, and PSI Jovita testified that the integrity of the evidence was preserved. Version of the Defense: Amado's Testimony: On August 3, 2004, Amado attended a festivity in Barangay Obrero, Butuan, where he met the appellant, who asked him to accompany him to his girlfriend’s rented house on 6th Street. They arrived at the house around 3:00 PM. Amado stayed outside while the appellant went inside to speak with his girlfriend, Che-che. Amado went to use the restroom at the appellant’s sister's house nearby, and upon returning, saw police conducting a raid and the appellant being handcuffed. Appellant’s Testimony: The appellant visited his brother in Barangay Obrero and later asked Amado to accompany him to his girlfriend's house to ask for money. At the house, after asking for a bottle of "Tanduay," a man knocked and showed him a search warrant with his name on it. During the search, marijuana was found in his girlfriend’s bag, and marked money was recovered from her wallet. He was taken to the police station, where he was questioned in front of media but did not answer. Appellant's Affidavits: In his first affidavit (August 14, 2004), the appellant stated the marijuana was found in his residence, that he handed the marked money to his girlfriend, and asked for leniency under the Probation Law. In his second affidavit (February 2, 2005), he claimed he was a drug user but not a pusher, and that the search warrant was illegal. RTC: Convicted the appellant for violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The marijuana was found in the appellant’s house, indicating either actual or constructive possession, despite the appellant's claim that the store was leased by his girlfriend. The appellant was acquitted of the charge for drug pushing (Section 5, Article II of RA 9165) due to insufficiency of evidence. CA: Affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE: Whether the search conducted on the store is valid. YES Whether the appellant's guilt for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . YES
APPELLANT:
The appellant maintained he was only a user, not a seller, of drugs. He claimed Cheche’s former husband had left the marijuana in the house. Although he admitted to signing the affidavits, he stated that some parts of the second affidavit were not his own words.
DECISION/DOCTRINE:   Ruling 1(a). Appellant's  failure  to  object  to the search warrant  and  the  evidence adduced  below  precludes  him  from belatedly interposing his objections in the present proceedings. It is a matter of record that appellant never assailed the search warrant and the evidence emanating therefrom before the trial court. As the appellate court correctly observed, appellant's objections were belatedly raised on appeal and, thus, are deemed waived. In People v. Nuñez, the Court had the opportunity to state that "any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby was deemed waived when no objection was raised by appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or impliedly." So must it be. 1(b). The  search  warrant  described the   place   to   be   searched     with sufficient particularity as required by the Constitution. We reckon with Section 2, Article III of the Constitution: SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Appellant argues that the search warrant did not specifically mention the store to be among the places to be searched thereby violating the proviso that the place or places to be searched must be described with particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry, leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. A search warrant is deemed to have described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity when the premises have been identified as being occupied by the accused. As aptly found by the courts below, the search warrant here stated that the place to be searched was appellant's "rented residence and its premises located [on] 6th Street, Guingona Subdivision, Barangay 25, Jose P. Rizal, Butuan City." The apprehending officers became and were in fact familiar with the place to be searched as a result of the test buy which they had conducted just hours before the search. Further, appellant has not denied that the store formed part of the "rented residence" and was not a separate structure. PO2 Maderal categorically testified that the store was part of the house and it was an open space on which a curtain hung as a divider.  We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the common findings of the courts below that the house and its appurtenant store were found at the same address indicated in the search warrant. Hence, appellant's protestation that the search warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity must fail. 1(c).  The  police  officers  fully complied with the Rules on the conduct of a valid search. Section 8, Rule 126 ordains: SECTION 8. Search of House, Room, or Premises to Be Made in Presence of Two Witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Although appellant does not dispute the fact that there were at least two (2) witnesses who were present during the search, he asserts that he himself did not witness it. This claim, however, is belied by the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses PO2 Maderal and Barangay Kagawad Mangasep that he and his girlfriend/common law wife were actually present during the search. The Court of Appeals, too, aptly noted that appellant himself testified that he witnessed the search conducted by the police. We quote with approval the Court of Appeals' relevant disquisition: Also, this Court noted that Magayon was able to give a clear sequence of events when he recounted the search, which strongly bespeaks of his presence while the same was ongoing. Pertinent parts of his testimony states: ATTY. RULIDA: So, what happened after the search? MAGAYON: After the search, Sir, I noticed that they recovered marijuana from the bag of my girlfriend and a tea bag of marijuana. Q: After they discovered those items that you mentioned, what happened next? A: After that, they searched the wallet of my girlfriend. Q: After searching the wallet of your girlfriend, what happened next? A: They recovered the P100.00 bill. Q: After they recovered the P100.00 bill, what did they do to it, if any? A: After that, they compared the P100.00 bill recovered from the wallet of my girlfriend and the Xerox copy that they have at that time. Q: After that, what happened, if any? A: After that, Sir, they placed the items on a table. The above precise statements of Magayon demonstrate how he actually witnessed the search. He obviously saw how and where the items were recovered thus, negating his claim that the search was not done in his presence. The testimony of defense witness Amado that appellant and his girlfriend were outside the house/store when the search was conducted was rejected by both courts below for being devoid of credence. Surely, Amado would not have known better than appellant himself who testified that he and his girlfriend/wife were in fact present during the search, even as Amado went to the toilet to relieve himself some thirty (30) or fifty (50) meters away. Whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court's factual findings thereon is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect. For it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. More so, where the trial court's factual findings on the credibility of witnesses carry the full concurrence of the Court of Appeals, as in this case. No compelling reason exists here to deviate from this rule. 2(a).  The  evidence  on   record   show that appellant did  have  dominion  and control over the place of subject of the search. The elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 are: possession by the accused of an item or object identified to be a prohibited drug;  the possession is not authorized by law; and  the free and conscious possession of the drug by the accused.  Possession under the law includes not only actual possession but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located were shared with another.  Appellant nonetheless contends that he could not be guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs in view of the prosecution's alleged failure to prove that he owned or controlled the house and the store where the confiscated items were found. Appellant asserts that it was his girlfriend who rented the place subject of the search and she lived there alone. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected this argument. For it was plainly stated in appellant's own counter-affidavits that he resided in the address specified in the search warrant and where the search was actually conducted. Specifically, in his Counter-Affidavit dated August 14, 2004, he stated that he and Cheche were live-in partners. Although, on the witness stand, appellant subsequently disavowed certain portions of his counter-affidavits, the recanted statements did not include appellant's address nor the fact that he and Cheche were living together.  Appellant is now estopped from claiming otherwise. He is bound by the admissions in his sworn statements duly identified and marked in court. An admission in open court is a judicial admission. In fine, appellant cannot disclaim his control and dominion over the place subject of the search where subject drugs were found. 2(b).       Appellant's         inculpatory admissions sustain his conviction and Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not come into play. Records indubitably show that appellant had frankly admitted his possession of the enormous amount of prohibited drugs which found in and seized from his residence. To recall, appellant testified that during the investigation at the police station he refrained from answering the police officers' questions and told them he wished to consult with a lawyer first. Appellant, thereafter, secured the services of counsel de parte, Atty. Poculan. With the able assistance of Atty. Poculan, he executed and submitted his counter-affidavits to the Office of the City Prosecutor. In his Counter-Affidavit dated February 2, 2005, he stated that "the alleged prohibited drugs found in [his] possession were for [his] personal use and not for sale or distribution to buyers." Too, in his earlier Counter-Affidavit dated August 14, 2004, appellant tried to absolve his girlfriend from any liability, as he stated, "[his] live in partner, Syntyche Litera y Lumacang alias [Che-che], had nothing to do with the activities that transpired in [their] residence" and "[t]he marked money that was found in her possession came from [him] because [he] handed it to her because [he] was about to take a bath." Clearly, appellant knowingly took full responsibility for the seized drugs in his counter-affidavits. Extrajudicial confessions are admissible in evidence, provided they are:  voluntary;  made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; express; and  in writing. Here, appellant's admissions in his counter-affidavits are binding on him as they were knowingly and voluntarily made with assistance of his counsel of choice, Atty. Poculan. Although appellant later on tried to retract the foregoing statements in court, claiming it was not true that Cheche was blameless and it was in fact her former husband who owned the seized marijuana, his belated attempt to diffuse his past damaging admissions must fail. For courts may believe one part of the testimony of a witness and disbelieve another part. Courts are not required to accept or reject the whole of the testimony of a particular witness. While case law holds that recantations do not necessarily cancel out an earlier declaration, ultimately, it should still be treated like any other testimony and as such, its credibility must be tested during trial.  On this score, the Court of Appeals correctly took into account that appellant was not an unlettered person but was a third year college student majoring in Elementary Education; hence, he readily understood the statements in his counter-affidavits and could have refused to sign them if they were untrue. He did not charge his lawyer with incompetence, neglect or impropriety. He did not adduce evidence of coercion or intimidation from anyone. These counter-affidavits were notarized, the first, by appellant's own counsel, and the second, by the city prosecutor. It cannot be gainsaid then that appellant's extrajudicial admissions can stand on their own to support a verdict of conviction. In Regalado v. People, Regalado admitted that he possessed the seized marijuana but contended that the apprehending officers did not fully comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. The Court held that Regalado's damning admission warranted the affirmance of his conviction, albeit we sternly reminded police officers to be mindful of their duty to comply with the statutorily mandated procedure in drugs cases, lest their lapses become fatal to the prosecution's cause. Here, appellant already admitted several times his possession of a large quantity of marijuana and did not pose substantial objections to the identity and integrity of the drugs confiscated at the place of his arrest. The case records flatly contradicted his objections to the chain of custody of the seized drugs in question. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 on the chain of custody rule outlines the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in order to ensure the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. Here, the testimonies of PO2 Maderal and the forensic chemist sufficiently established every link in the chain of custody from the time the prohibited drugs were seized and inventoried right after the search at the place of the search, to the time they were brought to the police station for the booking, investigation, and forensic analysis, up until the prohibited drugs were presented in court. Contrary to appellant's claim, the fact that PO2 Maderal's testimony focused on his preparation of the inventory and the documents relative to the investigation did not mean he was not present during the search. In fact, his testimony was replete with details which could have only been known by one who was personally present during the search. On the marking of the seized items, appellant himself admitted that the seized drugs were marked and inventoried at the time and place of the search. Surely, he could not have made such a confirmation if the marking and inventory had not been made in his presence as required by Section 21. Further, there is no law or rule requiring that the inventory should segregate the seized items according to the specific place in the house or store where they were found. The law simply and solely mandates that an inventory of all the seized items be made by the apprehending officer/team. Notably, appellant himself admitted in court that the items subject of the inventory as photographed by the police officers were indeed recovered from the place where the search and arrest were made. In sum, appellant admitted the identity and integrity of the drugs seized from his residence and those presented in court, although appellant did not specify the exact quantity or amount of drugs. In his Counter-Affidavit dated August 14, 2004, he categorically admitted that the police found the prohibited drugs in his residence, thus: x x x x That these marijuana leaves were left at my residence. I was about to report it to the authorities but the policeman must have heard of it because they raid my residence on August 3, 2004. x x x x Five (5) months later, he admitted the prohibited drugs were found in his possession and for his personal use in his second Counter-Affidavit dated February 2, 2005, viz.: x x x x The alleged prohibited drugs found in my possession were for my own personal use and not for sale or distribution to buyers; x x x x I am executing this affidavit to state that I am only a USER of the prohibited drugs and not a pusher thereof, and that I be admitted to a rehabilitation center. I know the legal consequences in executing this affidavit.   As shown, appellant categorically stated that he knew the consequences of his admissions. He was even assisted by counsel when affixed his signature on his counter-affidavit. As the final nail in the coffin, appellant even stressed in open court that he was not a pusher but only a user. These admissions are already sufficient to establish that he indeed illegally possessed the prohibited drugs. His belated, nay, self-serving claim that the drugs confiscated by the police belonged to another must, therefore fail. They cannot prevail over his prior categorical admissions which he voluntarily and knowingly made with assistance of counsel. It is immaterial that appellant's counter-affidavit did not specify the amount of drugs found in his possession. This does not negate the applicability of Regalado. A plain reading of his second counter-affidavit readily shows that he admitted to owning all 381.3065 grams of marijuana recovered during the search. Notably, when he executed his second counter-affidavit on February 2, 2005, about six (6) months after he got arrested, he already knew by then that he was being charged with illegal possession of 381.3065 grams of marijuana. Yet he still admitted ownership thereof without qualification as to its quantity. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for construing the counter-affidavit as an admission of ownership and possession of the entire amount recovered. There was no piecemeal admission here. It was either appellant owned the entire quantity or none at all. As it was, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, in their final evaluation of the evidence before them, found that between appellant's admission, on the one hand, and his recantation, on the other, the former is more deserving of weight and credit. There exists no cogent reason to depart from these factual findings of the courts below. At any rate, appellant ought not to be allowed to swing from one version of facts to another. The Court should not condone his act of foisting different narratives to muddle the facts case and confuse the courts. Suffice it to state that the large amount of the confiscated drugs involved here and appellant's own inculpatory judicial admissions go against the possibility of planting or substitution by the police. Neither could appellant's mere denial and inconsistent statements overcome the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. This is especially true when there were shown not to have any ulterior motive to falsely testify against him in such grave offense of illegal possession of prohibited drugs. ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED, and the Decision dated January 26, 2018 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01411-MIN, AFFIRMED. Sundaram Magayon y Francisco is found GUILTY of illegal possession of drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 and sentenced to indeterminate penalty of twenty (20) years and one (1) day as minimum to thirty (30) years as maximum and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. SO ORDERED.