Case Digest: People vs. Golidan, GR No. 205307, January 11, 2018

Evidence | Rule 130

Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Petitioner: People of the Philippines  

Respondents:

• Eduardo Golidan (Golidan)

• Francis Nacionales (Nacionales)

• Teddy Ogsila (Ogsila)

Facts:

• Three separate Informations, were filed against appellants Eduardo Golidan (Golidan), Francis Nacionales (Nacionales), Teddy Ogsila (Ogsila) and a certain "John Doe," for rape with homicide, murder, and frustrated murder of Elizabeth Leo (AAA), Namuel Aniban (BBB), and Cherry Mae Bantiway (CCC), respectively, on January 20, 1995. 

• Cherry Mae suffers from cerebral palsy which affects her movements which is why her grandmother Muriel Bantiway hires a babysitter to watch over her. At the time of the incident, the baby sitter was one named Elizabeth Leo.

• Cherry Mae identified the persons who had killed and raped Elizabeth Leo, murdered Namuel, and wounded her, on three occasions: 

1. February 10, 1995

• Cherry Mae identified appellants Nacionales and Ogsila at the Baguio Police Station. 

2. February 21, 1995

• 13 photographs were presented to Cherry Mae at the Child and Family Services (CFS) and she was able to identify Nacionales, Ogsila, and Golidan.

3. June 10, 1995. 

• When asked what the appellants did, Cherry Mae answered, pointing to the picture of Golidan, "paatong auntie" and then pointing to the picture of Nacionales,"pakpak bote coke pipit auntie" and lastly, pointing to the picture of Ogsila, "pakpak kayo ashtray baby.”

• Dr. Divina R. Martin Hernandez (Dr. Divina Hernandez), a neurologist, was presented as a prosecution witness to show Cherry Mae's competence to testify in court and on what the latter would be able to recall regarding the incident where she herself was a victim. 

• She said that Cherry Mae was brought to her office by an aunt and a social worker for her to examine Cherry Mae's ability and adequacy to testify in court.

• Dr. Divina Hernandez said that cerebral palsy is a disease of the brain characterized by non-progressive motor impairment and that persons afflicted with this disease usually walk with an abnormality, but they are fairly intelligent, can perceive and make known their perception. 

RTC-Baguio: Found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether Cherry Mae Bantiway is competent to testify. YES

Held:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as the representative of the State on appeal, filed a consolidated brief for the appellee. The OSG argued that there is an existence of conspiracy, which is proven by the common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose of the appellants. In this case, the appellants cooperated with each other in such a way as to achieve their criminal plan.

While the appellants invoked Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130, contending that Cherry Mae is not a competent witness, the OSG countered that the prosecution was able to prove that Cherry Mae was a competent witness through the testimony of Dr. Divina Hernandez. Thus, the prosecution established that Cherry Mae is incapable of telling a lie and could not be influenced by others; that the lone survivor was not capable of concocting events or manipulating facts, as these would entail motive, which is something Cherry Mae could not have due to her condition.

Therefore, the OSG concluded that Cherry Mae was telling the truth when she positively identified the appellants. The OSG claimed that the appellants failed to show that the persons who had supposedly conditioned Cherry Mae's mind had an ulterior motive to pin them down, and so her testimony should be given full weight and credit. The OSG added that the reason why Cherry Mae failed to identify the appellants on January 26, 1995, February 9, 1995 and February 10, 1995 was because the child was still physically and mentally weak from the incident. The period from January 20, 1995 up to the aforementioned dates is not enough to let the victim recover from the injury inflicted by the perpetrators. On said dates, Cherry Mae was still very weak, could hardly move her body, and needed the assistance of her grandmother. 

The OSG alleged that the appellants' alibi cannot prevail over their positive identifications made by Cherry Mae because the former failed to adduce sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene.

On September 21, 2004, this Court transferred the instant case to the Court of Appeals through a resolution, which reads:

Conformably with the decision promulgated on 7 July 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87, entitled The People of the Philippines vs. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before such cases are elevated to this Court, the Court Resolved to TRANSFER these cases to the Court of Appeals, for appropriate action and disposition. 

On April 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the Judgment of the RTC but with modifications. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1) In Criminal Case No. 13971-R, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole. Appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of Php 75,000.00 as moral damages, Php 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Elizabeth Leo;

2) In Criminal Case No. 13972-R, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole and to pay jointly and severally the amount of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Namuel Aniban;

3) In Criminal Case No. 13973-R, each is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Php 40,000.00 as moral damages, Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php 25,000.00 as temperate damages to Cherry Mae Bantiway; and

4) Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision. 

We agree with the ruling and reasoning of the Court of Appeals, subject to modifications of the penalties as provided by the latest jurisprudence, to be discussed below.

The Court of Appeals, at the outset, affirmed that the lone survivor, Cherry Mae Bantiway, is a competent witness although she is suffering from cerebral palsy, citing the rule that any child can be a competent witness if he/she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his/her perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he/she is examined. The Court of Appeals held that even if Cherry Mae has cerebral palsy, she can still perceive and make known her perception, as per Dr. Hernandez's explanation in her testimony, which is quoted below:

Q:

You said that what you saw in Cherry Mae Bantiway was typical of...?

A:

Cerebral palsy, Sir.

   

Q:

Will you please explain to us what kind of a sickness or diseases (sic) is this?

A:

Cerebral palsy is a disease of the brain characterized by a non-progressive motor imperment (sic), non-progressive means to say it will not become worst and it is solely focused on the motor system movement, Sir.

   

x x x x

   

Q:

In other words, Dra. this (sic) patient's (sic) can still perceive and make known their perception?

A:

Yes, Sir.

   

Q:

This is brain damage which involves the motor nerves?

A:

The motor system, Sir.

   

Q:

And aside from the motor system the brain is functioning?

A:

Yes, Sir.

   

Q:

In other words, the damage of the brain is not total?

A:

Yes, Sir"

   

x x x x

   

"Q:

You said that you made this examination, did you find out whether she has the ability to recall the events that happen (sic) in the past?

A:

Yes, Sir.

   

Q:

You know you've been told that this particular patient was the victim of violence, is that correct?

A:

Yes, Sir.

   

Q:

And in accordance with your examination, did you find out whether she can recall some events which happened when injuries were inflicted on her?

A:

I only asked her if she had a playmate and she said she has a playmate a young boy, and where is he now because I did not like to get it from her really like to lead her into a question but I asked her whether she had a playmate and she said yes and where was your playmate now, he's not there anymore and what happen (sic) to him she called her baby "ading" and where is he now she told me that he was hit on the head, Sir.

   

Q:

How did she tell you?

A:

She told me "napakpak sa ulo" and she even gestured but that's all, I did not like to deal more or other things, Sir.

   

Q:

In other words Dra it was obvious at the time that she could recall some incident that happened?

A:

Yes, Sir.

   

Q:

Now this patient Cherry Bantiway Dra in your opinion was she capable of concocting events or manipulating facts considering her mental condition?

A:

No, Sir. 

The Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to overturn the RTC decision because there is no clear basis that the latter erred in finding that Cherry Mae is a competent witness. The Court of Appeals stressed that the trial judge is in the best position to determine the competence as well as the credibility of Cherry Mae as a witness since the trial judge has the unparalleled opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. On the allegation that Cherry Mae is mentally retarded as opined by Dr. Francisco Hernandez, the Court of Appeals held that this is insufficient reason to disqualify a witness, for a mental retardate who has the ability to make perceptions known to others can still be a competent witness.

Regarding appellants' allegations that Cherry Mae was not able to identify them in the initial stages of the investigation, the Court of Appeals stated that at the time of these initial confrontations at the hospital and at the police station, Cherry Mae had just survived from the incident where there were brutal killings and where she herself had sustained a fatal wound on her head. As such, the Court of Appeals noted that the condition of the child, being already afflicted with cerebral palsy, was aggravated by the head injuries inflicted on her, not to mention the state of shock and fear she might have been experiencing at that time. Thus, the Court of Appeals considered that the purported non-identification by child of the appellants at the initial stages of the investigation is of no moment and is not fatal to the prosecution's case.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that where there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him/her in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the witnesses for the prosecution had any motive to testify falsely against the appellants.

Anent the issue of conspiracy, the Court of Appeals stated that for collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proven by direct evidence or prior agreement to commit the crime nor is it essential that there be proof of previous agreement to commit a crime. Conspiracy may logically be inferred from acts and circumstances showing the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged. It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Due to conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.  Furthermore, conspiracy exists when, at the time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their action. 

The Court of Appeals emphasized that the prohibition against custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel does not extend to a person in a police line up. This particular stage of an investigation where a person is asked to stand in a police line up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has been held that identification without the presence of counsel at a police line up does not preclude the admissibility of in-court identification.

As regards the appellants' defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the same crumbles in the face of the positive identification made by Cherry Mae. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he/she was elsewhere when the crime was committed, but he/she must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him/her to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, aside from the positive identification made by Cherry Mae, several witnesses saw the appellants in the vicinity of San Carlos Heights, Baguio City in the morning of January 20, 1995. Thus, it goes without saying that it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the crime.

We find and so hold that the above pronouncements of the Court of Appeals, which affirm the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, have basis both in fact and in law, and the assailed decision does not contain reversible error, contrary to the appellants' allegations.

As a general rule, this Court upholds factual findings of the RTC when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as the appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties is their primary responsibility. It is, moreover, the province of the lower court to determine the competency of a witness to testify.

In People v. Magbitang, we held:

Secondly, Magbitang's contention that CCC, being a child of tender age, was not a competent witness because his testimony was filled with inconsistencies and suffered from improbabilities was unfounded.

Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully. The testimony of the child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence. x x x.  

Regarding the evaluation of a witness's testimony, we have ruled in People v. Hermosa  in this wise:

[T]he trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because of its direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine if they are telling the truth or not. This opportunity enables the trial judge to detect better that thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the competence and credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the records that his judgment is erroneous.  

In this case, the trial court found sufficient basis to consider the testimony of Cherry Mae Bantiway, unique though it may have been because of her condition, to be valid. The court invited expert witnesses to testify on the nature of cerebral palsy and the capacity of one who has it, specifically Cherry Mae, to perceive events surrounding her and to express them. The trial court was able to see consistency in the child's testimony, specifically in her positive identification of the appellants.

The appellants in Hermosa likewise impugned the testimony of the child witness on the ground that she did not immediately tag them as the culprits but the Court held that the failure to immediately reveal the identity of the perpetrator of a felony will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness. 

The Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, became effective on December 15, 2000. The first three sections of this Rule provide as follows:

SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rule. — Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.

SECTION 2. Objectives. — The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.

SECTION 3. Construction of the Rule. — This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the child and to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.

The lower court had already decided this case as of August 18, 1999, so this Rule was not applied during trial. However, we are discussing its relevant provisions because of the flexibility given to the courts in examining child witnesses under this Rule. In fact, under Section 20, the court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice. This Court reiterated that the rule was formulated to allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage them to testify in legal proceedings and facilitate the ascertainment of truth. 

This Court recently explained the rationale behind this rule in People v. Esugon,  where it was stated:

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court. All questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court. 

Furthermore, this Court has applied flexibility in the consideration of evidence in child abuse cases. As we observed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis:

Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above­ described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.  

The above pronouncement may also be found in People v. Santos, where the Court held:

The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice. It must be borne in mind that the offended party in this case is a 6-year old minor who was barely five when she was sexually assaulted. As a child of such tender years not yet exposed to the ways of the world, she could not have fully understood the enormity of the bestial act committed on her person. Indeed —

Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make the "perfect victims." They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The child's age and developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary. x x x.  

We likewise affirm the finding of conspiracy. As the Court of Appeals stated, conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused in accomplishment of a common unlawful design. The Court of Appeals held that there is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case from the concerted actions of the accused-appellants. The surviving victim testified regarding the specific acts perpetrated by the appellants against her and the other victims, which show a unity of purpose and sentiment, and a concerted effort on the part of the appellants to commit the gruesome crimes.

The defense of denial and alibi, as held by the Court of Appeals, is weak compared to the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.  Where there is the least possibility of the presence of the accused at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.  In this matter, the Court has consistently ruled as follows:

The Court has considered the defense of denial and alibi put up by the accused, but finds them relatively weak and insufficient to overcome the positive and categorical identification of the accused as perpetrators. The rule is that the defense of denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the defense of denial and alibi to be insufficient to overthrow the prosecution's evidence against the appellants, who failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when the incidents occurred.

Applying prevailing jurisprudence which has increased the amount of awards for damages in criminal cases to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives,  we hereby modify the monetary awards as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 13971-R for Rape with Homicide, where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, because of Republic Act No. 9346, in addition to the Php100,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals, each accused-appellant is sentenced to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of Elizabeth Leo: the amounts of Php100,000.00 as moral damages and Php100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. 13972-R for Murder, each accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay jointly and severally the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, and Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages plus temperate damages of Php50,000.00 to the heirs of Namuel Aniban; and

3. In Criminal Case No. 13973-R, for Frustrated Murder, each accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Each accused-appellant is ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Php50,000:00 as civil indemnity, and the amounts of Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages to Cherry Mae Bantiway.

WHEREFORE, for want of merit, this appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 25, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02430, which affirmed with modification the August 18, 1999 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio City, in Criminal Case Nos. 13971-R, 13972-R, and 13973-R finding accused­ appellants Eduardo Golidan (Golidan) and Francis Nacionales (Nacionales) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape with homicide, murder, and frustrated murder, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the above-mentioned amount of monetary awards.

SO ORDERED.