Case Digest: Republic vs. CA, July 5, 1996
Evidence | Rule 130
Davide, Jr., JPetitioner: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, Respondents:
Court of Appeals
Heirs of Luis Ribaya, namely:
Andrea Ribaya Buenviaje,
Luis Ribaya,
Antonia Ribaya-Conde,
John Doe Ribaya,
all represented by Andrea Ribaya Buenviaje as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Ribaya
Recit Ver:
In 1920, a land survey for spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris in Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was conducted by Bureau of Lands surveyor Telesforo Untalan, measuring 25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan, was approved in 1922 but lacked the surveyor's signature. Despite this, in March 1925, the spouses applied for land registration, which was granted, leading to the issuance of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947. However, a resurvey later reduced the land area to 10,975,022 square meters, but this amended plan was neither published nor reflected in the original application.
Reliance on case of Benin and its related cases is misplaced due to several critical factors. Firstly, the amendment to the original survey plan for the land sought by the spouses Ribaya occurred after the land registration court issued its decision, necessitating a re-opening of the case, which did not occur. Secondly, the land registration court lacked jurisdiction over the original plan because of insufficient publication in the Official Gazette. Lastly, it has not been convincingly demonstrated that the four parcels of land in Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 correspond to a portion of the area initially described in the original survey plan.
The Court of Appeals found the original area (Plan II-13961) to be 25,542,603 square meters, while the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) covers 10,975,022 square meters. However, the trial court mistakenly recorded measurements. The conflict between the trial court and the Court of Appeals remains unresolved due to the lack of a reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961, as the presented exhibits are merely machine copies, considered secondary evidence under the Rules of Court. These copies are inadmissible because the offeror failed to meet the requirements for their admissibility, rendering them devoid of probative value.
Facts:
In 1920, a land survey for spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris in Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was conducted by Bureau of Lands surveyor Telesforo Untalan.
The land measured 25,542,603 square meters.
The survey plan (Plan II-13961) lacked the surveyor's signature.
In 1922, the Acting Director of Lands allegedly approved Plan II-13961, but according to Land Classification Map No. 871, the land was classified as public forest and only released for disposition in December 1930.
In March 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration of the land.
The notice was published in the Official Gazette.
CFI-Albay: Granted the application, confirming the title of the land to the spouses.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya.
In September 1925, a resurvey reduced the land area to 10,975,022 square meters (Plan II-13961-Amd.).
The amended plan was not published nor reflected in the original application.
In 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, and a Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 was issued for the four lots.
In September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted as OCT No. RO-10848 (3947).
In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya received compensation from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S. for war damages to the land.
In 1968, the land was subdivided through Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075, and separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued.
In January 1977, sixty-two farmers occupying the land requested the Director of Lands to annul OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) and claim ownership.
In August 1978, the Director of Lands filed a complaint to declare nullity of OCT No. 3947, its reconstitution as OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles (TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358).
RTC: Ruled in favor of the petitioner, declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and its reconstituted version (OCT No. RO-10848) null and void ab initio.
The court ordered the heirs to surrender their copy of OCT No. RO-10848 and the TCTs to the Register of Deeds of Albay for cancellation.
The court mandated the reversion of the land to the Republic of the Philippines as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The RTC found that when the spouses Ribaya applied for registration, the land was already classified as alienable and disposable; however, the court lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of publication of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.).
The trial court cited the Fewkes vs. Vasquez case, where it was held that any amendment or alteration in the description of the land after its publication and decree of registration was not permissible unless coupled with republication.
It determined that there was insufficient evidence of open, continuous, and adverse possession by the spouses Ribaya, noting they did not present tax declarations, which are necessary to establish bona fide ownership.
CA:
January 9, 1991:
Affirmed the RTC’s decision.
The CA noted that the land was still part of the public forest at the time of registration and could not be privately owned.
January 24, 1994:
Reversed its previous decision.
OCT No. 3947 was conclusive against all persons, including the government, and emphasized the presumption of regularity in the registration process.
The CA accepted that the spouses Ribaya possessed the land under a bona fide claim of ownership and that their failure to present tax receipts was not detrimental to their claim.
It rejected the application of the Fewkes case and adopted the Benin vs. Tuazon case’s reasoning, stating that republication could be dispensed with in an amendment in the application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion covered by the original application and the original survey plan as published.
The CA also reversed its earlier position on the land's classification, indicating insufficient basis to assert it was still public forest land during the application for registration.
Petitioner’s Assertions:
The indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land;
The spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership;
The amended survey plan was not published;
The land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and
The accuracy of the land survey was doubtful.
Private Respondent’s Comment:
The petition merely raises factual matters
OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents.
Invoked Benin, that the issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was already in compliance with law.
Possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the compensation they received from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages.
The original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner.
Issues:
Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title.
Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.
Held:
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to repeat:
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496).36
First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree.
In the second place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party.
Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic vs. Animas, we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930,41 the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of publication of the second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.
Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have attended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon. This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz, Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acuna, Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, and Director of Lands vs. Benitez, that only where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced.
In the first place, the amendment of the original survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no such re-opening appears to have been done therein.
Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient publication in the Official Gazette.
Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same land covered by the original survey plan. This conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered by Plan II-13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan II-13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title of the land described as follows:
Parcel of Land (plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, P.I. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922. (Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the March 17, 1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18, 1925 but for a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,603 square meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30, 1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961-Amd. (Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters separately described as follows:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square meters, more or less;
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square meters, more or less;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square meters, more or less;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237,368 square meters, more or less.
This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991.
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute such finding and so they not only quoted it therein, 54 they also explicitly assert that:
The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the Official Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The land actually embraced in the decree of registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters.
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares, two ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022 square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097 has., 5 ares, and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II-13961, as well as that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus:
[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the report of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . . that Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454 square meters more or less, Lot No. 2, plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more or less, Lot No. 3, plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and Lot No. 4, plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less, with a total of 10,975.022 square meters more or less; . . . that plan II-13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province of Albay, containing an area of 25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance with Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A). . . .56 (emphasis supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The change from a comma to a period is of vital significance. For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603 square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five hundred and forty-two (542) centares; and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd. would be one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land area of the original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters, (twenty-five million, five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square meters) as found by the former, or 25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three square meters) as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original plan sought to be established through Exhibits "6" and "6-A." The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision of 9 January 1991 because these exhibits did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus:
Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6-A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said original plan (plan II-13961) does not bear the signature of the surveyor thereof, thereof casting doubt on its genuiness and due execution. . . .57 (emphasis supplied).
Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found by the Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meters - with a comma before the last three digits - it would have been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments were not then available. Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to the four lots covered by OCT No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.:
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors);58 (emphasis supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided therein and to establish the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9 January 1991 affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11 November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
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