Case Digest: Sanchez vs. Darroca, GR No. 242257, October 15, 2019

Evidence | Rule 130

Leonen, J.

Petitioner:  Vivian A. Sanchez 

Respondent: 

• PSupt. Marc Anthony D. Darroca, Chief of Police at the San Jose Municipal Police Station; 

• PSSupt. Leo Irwin D. Agpangan, Provincial Director of the PNP-Antique; 

• PCSupt. John C. Bulalacao, Regional Director of the PNP-Region VI; 

• members of the PNP under their authority

Facts:

• On August 16, 2018, Vivian A. Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa, was among seven alleged members of the New People's Army killed by the Philippine National Police in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique.

• After discovering the bodies were taken to St. Peter's Funeral Home, Sanchez visited the funeral home.

• However, she left without identifying her husband's body after police officers took photos of her without consent.

• Later, Police Officer 2 Nerissa A. De la Cruz, a friend of Sanchez, warned her that her photo was circulating at the police station and urged her to cooperate with the investigation, fearing police surveillance if she did not.

• The next day, upon returning to the funeral home, Sanchez was threatened by police officers with obstruction of justice if she did not answer their questions, prompting her to leave without confirming her husband's identity.

• Later that day, police officers showed Sanchez a photo of a cadaver, which she confirmed as Labinghisa.

• In the following days, Sanchez experienced frequent police presence near her home, causing anxiety for her and her children, particularly her 15-year-old daughter, Scarlet, who described feeling nervous and unsafe.

• On August 24, 2018, Sanchez filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Antique, against Police Superintendent Marc Anthony D. Darroca, Police Senior Superintendent Leo Irwin D. Agpangan, Police Chief Superintendent John C. Bulalacao, and the police officers under their authority.

• In her petition, Sanchez claimed that the police's surveillance caused fear for her family's safety and restricted their ability to leave their home, questioning the lack of communication regarding the purpose of the police presence.

RTC: Issued a writ of amparo and a temporary protection order in favor of Vivian A. Sanchez, directing the Philippine National Police (PNP) to file a verified written return within 72 hours.

• The court ordered the police to include lawful defenses showing that they did not violate Sanchez's rights and to provide information regarding any threats or actions taken against her.

• The court granted a temporary protection order prohibiting the police from approaching within one kilometer of Sanchez and her children and from conducting any surveillance on them.

• In their verified return, the police officers denied any wrongdoing, claiming that Sanchez's allegations were based on assumptions and hearsay.

RTC: Dismissed Sanchez's petition for a writ of amparo, stating she failed to substantiate claims that she became a person of interest to the police after identifying her husband's body.

• The court noted a lack of specific allegations against the police, and the evidence did not support claims of surveillance or threats to Sanchez's safety.

• The court lifted the temporary protection order and denied the privilege of the writ of amparo, concluding that Sanchez had not provided sufficient evidence.

Issue: Whether petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez was able to prove with substantial evidence her entitlement to the privilege of a writ of amparo.

Held: 

In determining whether a petition for a writ of amparo should be granted, judges, as impartial inquisitors, must assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the petitioner's life, security, or liberty. Indeed, pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, but the zeal with which our law enforcement officers clamp down on persons of interest or their loved ones must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons.

The Petition is meritorious.

I

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued by this Court as an exercise of its power to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights[.]" Section 1 defines a petition for a writ of amparo as "a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty[,] and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." The writ of amparo is, thus, an equitable and extraordinary remedy primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. 

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies substantial evidence as the degree of proof required of both parties to a petition. Section 18 further reinforces the requirement of substantial evidence for the petitioner to establish his or her allegations to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo:

SECTION 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.  

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, this Court explains that the remedy of a writ of amparo, being a summary proceeding, requires only substantial evidence to provide rapid judicial relief to the petitioner. More than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might determine as adequate to support a conclusion.

In Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court further defines substantial evidence as "such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred."

Additionally, hearsay evidence, which is generally considered inadmissible under the rules of evidence, may be considered in a writ of amparo proceeding if required by the unique circumstances of the case.

This Court in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis concluded that the "totality of the obtaining situation" must be taken into consideration to determine if a petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo:

At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case. 

The totality of petitioner's evidence undoubtedly showed that she became a person of interest after she had first visited the funeral home, where her photo was taken. PO2 De la Cruz tried to downplay the situation by claiming that petitioner's photo was not "posted" in the police station, but she likewise did not deny telling petitioner that she saw petitioner's photo at the police station. Whether petitioner's photo was actually posted and distributed at the police station or was just taken for future reference, the taking of the photo bolsters petitioner's claims that she was being monitored by the police.

Respondents try to paint petitioner's claims as the ramblings of a paranoid and overly suspicious person, but even her daughter confirmed the numerous times the police drove by their house and being tailed whenever they set foot outside their house. This shows that petitioner was not merely imagining the threats against her and her family.

The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows that petitioner and her children were the subject of surveillance because of their relationship with a suspected member of the New People's Army, creating a real threat to their life, liberty, or security.

Being Labinghisa's widow, despite being separated in fact from him for more than a decade, puts her at a precarious position in light of the current administration's aggressive efforts to stamp out the communist struggle in the country, which is seen as the "scourge of society[.]" Her apprehension at being targeted as a suspected member of the New People's Army was, thus, palpable and understandable, causing her to "act suspiciously" as claimed by respondents, who subjected her to threats and accusations.

Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca claims that petitioner was only placed under general investigation because they wanted to know the identity of the last unclaimed cadaver. However, the drive-bys and tailings intensified after petitioner had identified her husband, belying his assertions that their investigation was innocuous.

Further, petitioner's relationship with her husband insulates her from any inquiries regarding Labinghisa's purported membership in the New People's Army. Whatever information respondents may hope to extract from her or her children are protected by spousal and filial privileges, which continue to exist even after Labinghisa's death.

II

Marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which, in turn, is the foundation of the nation.52

In recognition of the significance of marriage to Philippine society, testimonial privilege and communication privilege have been granted to spouses. This is to preserve their harmonious relationship and to prevent any party, including a spouse, to take advantage of the free communication between the spouses or of information learned within the union.

This Court, in People v. Francisco,  explained the reasons behind marital disqualification:

The rule contained in section 26 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on the subject have assigned as reasons therefor the following: First, identity of interest; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because where a want of domestic [tranquility] exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. This has been said in the case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 61, 6a; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A. L. R., 133), thus:

"The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquillity exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. (70 C. J., 119.)" 

Therefore, the overriding consideration in the State's support of marriage is the recognition of its status as an inviolable social institution, with the State implicitly acknowledging the importance of unfettered communication between the spouses.

The family and its members likewise enjoy a similar privilege. No one can be compelled to testify against his or her direct descendants or direct ascendants. 

Nonetheless, exceptions do exist to the general rule of marital privilege or disqualification. Among these is when a spouse commits an offense that "directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation[.]" 58 This Court expounded in Francisco that when there is no more spousal harmony to be preserved because of strained domestic relations, the identity of interests and the danger of perjury disappear, and the law's aim of protecting the security of private life also ceases to exist. 

None of the exceptions to marital privilege exist here.

Petitioner admits to being separated in fact from Labinghisa for more than a decade. Yet, this does not suffice as an exception, as separation is not tantamount to strained marital relations. Further, neither spouse committed an offense that impaired their conjugal union. Labinghisa's supposed membership in the New People's Army is not an offense envisioned by jurisprudence which would create an exception to the general rule of marital disqualification.

Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as evidenced by the privileges they enjoy against State incursion into their relationships. Hence, respondents' surveillance of petitioner and her children as witting or unwitting witnesses against her husband or his activities is correctible by a writ of amparo.

III

Similar to marital privilege, the right to privacy is also a basic, fundamental right. The Constitution recognizes every person's right to physical privacy, hence the explicit limitations on unwarranted State intrusion into personal affairs.

To safeguard against the enormous powers wielded by the State and nip any potential abuse and interference into the private sphere, the Constitution guarantees, among others, every person's right to due process, to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and to the privacy of their communication and correspondence. The Civil Code, in turn, punishes with damages those who meddle and pry into another person's private affairs.

This is why respondent Police Superintendent Darroca's lack of contrition over his police officers' act of taking petitioner's photo without her permission-and then placing it on display at the police station-is disturbing. It appears as though he sees nothing wrong in flagrantly and inexcusably violating petitioner's right to privacy.

Petitioner was not a person of interest when she went to the funeral parlor to identify her husband's body. Certainly, the police officers stationed there did not know who she was. Yet, they took her photo against her wishes and badgered her into admitting her relationship with her husband, a suspected member of the New People's Army.

Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca excused the police officers' discourteous and threatening actions toward a civilian by saying that such was merely part of the investigation process and that the police officers acted in good faith.

This Court is not convinced.

The Philippine National Police's Ethical Doctrine Manual enjoins its police officers to respect human dignity and human rights,65 and to judiciously use their authority in the performance of duty. 

The police officers' brusque treatment of petitioner, threatening her with imprisonment and displaying her photo at the police station, does not reflect the professional and courteous image that the Philippine National Police wishes to convey as an institution. What they did was clearly not part of the usual investigation protocol. The police officers could not be said to have acted in good faith when they ganged up on and accosted a defenseless civilian.

Even the surreptitious surveillance of petitioner and her family is an abuse of the Philippine National Police's authority. If respondents wanted to interview petitioner and her children, they should have done so formally: informing them of their rights, holding the interview in an environment free of intimidation, and making sure that they had access to and were assisted by legal counsel or legal assistance groups. Further, when a minor is being interviewed, the interviewer should be specially trained to handle children.

Moreover, the Regional Trial Court erred in failing to consider the gender and power issues at play here, and how they affected the dynamics between the parties. Male police officers were investigating and surveilling the widow and daughter of an alleged communist, creating two (2) tiers of power: (1) law enforcer-civilian; and (2) male-female.

The Philippine National Police Manual wishes to craft the institution's image as a valiant peacekeeper dedicated to ensuring public safety and community participation, but the bleak reality is that most people keep their guards up when faced with a member of the police force. In a patriarchal society where women have had to calibrate their responses toward men, the additional layer of power presented by a man in uniform would lead even an innocent civilian, especially a woman, to act jittery and nervously, trying to find a way to protect herself from her perceived vulnerabilities.

The gross imbalance in power dynamics makes it understandable for petitioner to initially hesitate to reveal her relationship with Labinghisa. As it turned out, she was correct to do so, as the moment the police officers found out who she was, she and her daughters became the subject of surveillance.

In inferring conclusions involving power deficits in relationships, judges must be careful not to be gender-blind. In denying the Petition for the writ of amparo, the Regional Trial Court echoed respondents' statement that the taking of petitioner's photo and the threats of obstruction of justice thrown at her were part of "the conduct of a logical investigation."68 It could not see, or it refused to see that these actions, together with the surveillance done, were actual or imminent threats against petitioner and her children.

In rendering judgment, judges must not impose a standpoint viewed from their implicit status in society. They must look beyond their status as well-connected people who can assert themselves against men in uniform and who have no filial relation to one tagged as a communist.

By advertently or inadvertently ignoring petitioner's not so unique predicament as the spouse of a labeled communist, the Regional Trial Court created standards that would deny protection to those who need it most.

Petitioner's apprehension over the threat to her security was duly supported by substantial evidence. It was further corroborated by her daughter who also witnessed the constant police drive-bys and the tailings done by an unmarked vehicle. Thus, petitioner and her children deserve the protection of a writ of amparo.

IV

Respondents' claim that the police officers reported and asked for the investigation of the plate number of the car that did the surveillance should not have been enough for the trial court. The trial court should have required a full report from respondents. As compared with petitioner, they had better, if not exclusive access to the information from the Land Transportation Office.

In his Affidavit  attached to the Verified Return,  respondent Police Superintendent Darroca denied putting petitioner and her children under surveillance or ordering his officers to follow them:

10. As regards the tinted vehicle with plate number ALL 5385 who the petitioner alleged to have followed her and her daughters to Iloilo City, I categorically state that I have no knowledge about it; Moreover, I have no knowledge about the alleged call the petitioner received on August 22, 2018 nor I did (sic) order any of my men to follow her or her children[.] 

However, his denial is not the lawful defense required in a Verified Return, but a merely general denial, which is proscribed in Section 973 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Further, he failed to show that he observed extraordinary diligence in performing his duty, a required by Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. 

Petitioner and her daughter categorically stated that police cars have driven by their house with alarming regularity after petitioner had identified her husband's body. To this, respondent Police Superintendent Darroca only issued a blanket denial that he did not direct his officers to tail or monitor petitioner and her family. He did not present affidavits from his police officers to support his claim. Further, petitioner's report of being tailed by a vehicle only merited a perfunctory request from the police to the Land Transportation Office. The police, which had better resources to perform the investigation, should have done more to follow up her request. Their failure to exert the extraordinary diligence expected of them hints at a motive against petitioner and her family.

In granting the Petition for the writ of amparo, this Court in Republic v. Cayanan pointed out that the State, in submitting its passive certificates, failed to comply with the extraordinary diligence required of it by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of them. Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is almost needless to characterize the certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a detailed return. As such, the certifications amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was really conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself. 

The proceedings for the issuance of writs of amparo are extraordinary. They are significant not only in terms of final relief. In determining whether the petition must be granted, judges act as impartial inquisitors seeking to assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the life or liberty of petitioners. In a way, courts hearing writs of amparo assist in ferreting out the truth by providing an antidote to the naturally intimidating atmosphere of police investigations, especially involving communist and other rebels against the government.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was crafted in an era when extrajudicial killings and involuntary disappearances were on the rise allegedly due to the government's efforts to defeat an insurgency. The Rule was, in part, this Court's statement that the insurgents' narrative that fundamental rights were not durable and universal at all times was false. It was an affirmation of the belief that, perhaps unlike the rebels, our Constitution protected civility and human rights, and that this protection was what differentiated the government from the insurgents. It was, and still is, a rule that underscores our humanity and our civility.

While pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, the zeal of our police must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons, especially the loved ones of persons of interest. After all, the values we have in our Constitution are what differentiate us from lawless elements.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER is issued prohibiting members of the Philippine National Police from monitoring or surveilling petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez and her children, Scarlet Sanchez Labinghisa and Star Sanchez Labinghisa. The respondent police officers are reminded to uphold the rights of citizens as contained in the Constitution as well as conduct investigations in accordance with their promulgated manuals including the Ethical Doctrine Manual.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Inting, JJ., concur.

A. Reyes, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of J. R. Hernando.

Gesmundo, J., I join Justice Hernando dissent.

J. Reyes, Jr., J., on leave.

Hernando, J., I dissent. Please see Dissenting Opinion.

Carandang, J., I joint the dissent of J. Hernando.

Zalameda, J., I join J. Hernandos' dissent.