Torts and Damages: Defenses

 Torts and Damages | Defenses

Proximate Cause: Own Negligence

Ilusorio vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 139130, November 27, 2002

Petitioner’s failure to examine his bank statements appears as the proximate cause of his own damage. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In the instant case, the bank was not shown to be remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to petitioner so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the bank’s attention at the earliest opportunity. But, petitioner failed to examine these bank statements not because he was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because he did not pay sufficient attention to the matter. Had he done so, he could have been alerted to any anomaly committed against him. In other words, petitioner had sufficient opportunity to prevent or detect any misappropriation by his secretary had he only reviewed the status of his accounts based on the bank statements sent to him regularly. In view of Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, no recovery could be had for damages.

Fe Cayao-Lasam vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, December 18,2008

It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioner’s advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about Editha’s own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine Editha’s health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear that Editha’s omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her part.

All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences specially so if the patient herself did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.

Pari Delicto

Menchavez, et al., vs. Teves, Jr., G.R. No. 153201, January 26, 2005       

Being merely applicants for the lease of the fishponds, petitioners had no transferable right over them. And even if the State were to grant their application, the law expressly disallowed sublease of the fishponds to respondent. Void are all contracts in which the cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, public order or public policy.

A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect. It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation. Parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as they are, because they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault."

Assumption of Risk

Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co. vs. Phil. Motors Corporation, 55 Phil. 129, 133

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger. 

In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.

Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf

An employee does not assume the risk that his employer will be negligent in keeping the working premises safe.

In the Philippines, the negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.

The court found that the defendant company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, et al., G.R. Nos. 79050-51, November 14, 1989

The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. 

Tiu, et al., vs. Arriesgado, et al., G.R. No. 138060, September 1, 2004

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. 

It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

Emergency Rule

Gan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-44264, September 19, 1988

A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."  

Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.

Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs. C&A Construction, Inc. G.R. No. 156034, October 1, 2003

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.

Prescription

Kramer vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83524, October 13, 1989 

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.

Diligence of Good Father of Family

Secosa vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 160039, June 29, 2004

Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, inasmuch as the witnesses’ testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Petitioner’s attempt to prove its “deligentissimi patris familias” in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.

Syki vs. Begasa, G.R. No. 159149, October 23, 2003

Based therefore on jurisprudential law, the employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he had observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that of his witnesses.

In sum, the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner’s driver who, as found by the lower courts, did not slow down even when he was already approaching a busy intersection within the city proper. The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent was already partly inside the jeepney, when petitioner’s driver bumped the rear end of it. The impact was so strong such that respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur), and suffered severely wounds in his left knee and leg. No doubt that respondent petitioner’s driver was reckless speeding.

Contributory Negligence v. Last Clear Chance

Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990

Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body." There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.

Lambert vs. Castillon, et al., G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court had sustained a mitigation of:

• 50% in Rakes v. AG & P;

• 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals; and

• 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals. 

In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: 

1. was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; 

2. was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney;

3. has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and

4.  was not wearing a protective helmet.

These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 40452, October 12, 1989

The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.

Ramos vs. COL Realty, G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.