Case Digest: People v. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015

 RA 8049  Anti-Hazing Law | Criminal Law


Facts:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy. He was required to complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation Period," which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001, in order to reach active status. However, Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. 

The National Bureau of Investigation investigated his death. After months of investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor who found probable cause to charge some individuals, Alvarez et al., as principals of hazing. A criminal case against them was then filed with RTC–Zambales.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military to charge some school authorities, Bayabos et al., as accomplices. The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging the school authorities as accomplices to the crime of hazing. 

Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal accused, Alvarez et al. The accused school authorities filed a Motion to Quash the Information. Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case against Bayabos et al. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the former. 

Sandiganbayan: Dismissed.

Issue:
I. WoN the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
II. WoN the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law

Held:
Dismissed.

I. On dismissal of the case against the accomplice:
The Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
So long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal.
Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.

II. On the quashal of the Information against respondents:
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.

We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and practices" for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the requirements thereof. Thus, the prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information.

Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. 
The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument in his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing. 

Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright.
If a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. 
Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained. Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.  An order sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.


Crime Committed by the Appellant:
RA 8049 Anti-Hazing Law.

The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established:
(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and 
(2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization. 

In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that 
(1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; 
(2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and
(3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.



Recit Version:

Facts:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted to the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy as a probationary midshipman but died during the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation Period." 
A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was filed as principals of hazing, and Bayabos et al. were charged as accomplices. 
RTC-Zambales dismissed the case against the principal accused, and the accused school authorities filed a Motion to Quash the Information. 
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution quashing the Information and dismissing the case against Bayabos et al. since the charge against the principal accused was dismissed with finality.
Issue:
I. WoN the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
II. WoN the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law

Held:
Dismissed.

I. On dismissal of the case against the accomplice: 
So long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal.
Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.

II. On the quashal of the Information against respondents: 
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an organization. Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.

The prosecution’s failure to point out in the Information that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members" is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information. This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution.

Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Plain reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. 


If a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. 
The Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained.  An order sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.