Political Law Review


Political Law  

  1. People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887 (1922)

  • Political law is a branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.

  • Article 256 was created to protect high-ranking public officials from criticism, especially those representing monarchical authority like the Ministers of the Crown. Since the provision affects how people may interact with or criticize the government, it clearly touches on freedom of speech and the press, which are fundamental political rights.


  1. Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982

  • Political law is a branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.

  • Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.


Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution


  1. Francisco v. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003

  • The Supreme Court applied the principle of verba legis, giving the words of Section 5 their ordinary meaning: initiation of impeachment occurs when proceedings are first deemed initiated under the Constitution’s text, not at some later time as in the House Rules.

  • The Court then invoked ratio legis et anima, interpreting Section 5 in light of the framers’ intent to prevent harassment of public officers through repeated impeachment efforts within a twelve-month period. 

  • Thus, once an impeachment complaint is filed and referred or endorsed by 1/3 members and filed with the Secretary General, it is “initiated.”

  1. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896, February 22, 1991

  • Only the exceptions explicitly stated in the Constitution, such as the Vice‑President’s Cabinet membership, or the Secretary of Justice as a Judicial and Bar Council ex‑officio member are allowed, not additional exceptions created by an executive action. The plain phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” must refer only to the provided exceptions in the Constitution.

  • In construing constitutional provisions, the object sought to be accomplished and the evils it sought to remedy must  be considered. The framers intended to avoid conflicts of interest and the concentration of power seen under previous regimes (martial law). The Constitution should be interpreted as a whole (ut magis valeat quam pereat). Sections on the same subject matter (disqualifications) must be interpreted together, not construed in isolation to defeat other provisions.


  1. [Separate Opinion] Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 141254, August 15, 2000

  • Unlike statutes, where courts seek legislative intent from legislative debates, the interpretation of the Constitution aims to ascertain the intent of the people, through the deliberations of their elected representatives.

  • The Constitution derives its force from ratification, not drafting. The Constitution’s authority comes from the people who ratified it, not from the Convention itself.


Self-executing provisions


  1. Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011

  • Section 11, Article XII is self-executing, like other nationality-reservation provisions in the Constitution, and needs no implementing statute

  • Accordingly, the sale of PTIC shares to First Pacific violated the Constitution’s mandate that public‐utility franchises be granted only to entities “at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by… citizens [of the Philippines].” 


  1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, GR. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

  • The Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (Filipino First Policy) is self-executing because it is complete in itself and can be enforced without need for further legislation.

  • Unless the Constitution clearly intends otherwise, its provisions should be deemed self-executing; otherwise, the legislature could effectively nullify them by not enacting a law. This specific provision embodies a nationalist economic policy to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights over national economy and patrimony.

  • The Constitution is supreme over all laws and contracts

  • Any law, contract, or executive action that violates it is null and void. Since the Constitution’s preference clause was violated by awarding the sale to a foreign corporation despite a qualified Filipino’s higher bid, the GSIS action had no legal force. The constitutional provision is deemed written into the bidding rules and the contract of sale, making GSIS bound by it.


  1. Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

  • Section 26, Article II on “equal access to opportunities for public service” is not self-executing.

  • It is not a right, but a privilege subject to legislative or administrative regulation. The provision is part of the “Declaration of Principles and State Policies” and does not confer enforceable rights. It merely serves as a guideline for legislative or executive action. They do not create rights that courts can enforce, and failure to comply does not give rise to a cause of action.


  1. Tanada v. Angara, GR. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

  • Section 19, Article II mandating to develop an "independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos" is a "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" and is not intended to be self‑executing. These provisions serve as guidelines for judicial review and legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. The absence of implementing legislation does not give rise to a judicial cause of action. 


The 1935 Constitution 


  1. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1

  • The proposal and ratification of Parity Amendment are political questions not subject to judicial review. These are functions committed to Congress and ultimately to the people via plebiscite.


The 1973 Constitution 


  1. Imbong v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970

  • R.A. No. 6132 is constitutionalOnce Congress had exercised its constituent power by passing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 with the required three-fourths vote, it could then use its legislative power to enact laws like R.A. No. 6132 to implement those resolutions. The doctrine of “necessary implication allows Congress acting in its legislative capacity to enact statutes filling in gaps left by the Constituent Assembly, as long as they do not conflict with the Constitution or the resolutions


  1. Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971

  • Organic Resolution No. 1, COMELEC’s implementing acts, and the proposed plebiscite is null and void. All proposed amendments by a Constitutional Convention must be submitted in a single plebiscite, because Section 1, Article XV refers to submission in "an election", taken to mean only one. Allowing piecemeal ratification would deprive voters of a complete “frame of reference”, as they could not meaningfully assess the proposed amendment in relation to the rest of the constitutional revisions.


  1. Planas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-35925, January 22, 1973  

  • Before the Court could rule on the merits of the plebiscite under P.D. 73 for being called not by Congress, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1102 on January 17, 1973, declaring that the Constitution had been ratified by the Citizens’ Assemblies. The Court dismissed all petitions as moot and academic, since the plebiscite was no longer going to be held and the President had already proclaimed the Constitution in force.


  1. Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973

  • By a majority of six votes, the Supreme Court dismissed all petitions questioning the ratification of the 1973 Constitution.

  • The Court concluded that there was no further judicial obstacle to the 1973 Constitution being considered in force and effect.


  1. Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976

  • The President’s authority to propose amendments (Amendment No. 6) is valid.

  • The interim National Assembly, constitutionally granted the power to propose amendments, was never convened. Thus, in its absence, the President, who was legitimately exercising legislative functions under Martial Law, could validly act in its stead to propose amendments as necessary for the people. This extension of executive authority was grounded in necessity, given the transitional context.

 The 1986 Provisional Constitution

  1. Philippine Bar Association v. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455 (January 7, 1986)

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions by a vote of 7–5 because fewer than ten justices voted to declare BP 883 (snap elections) unconstitutional (a constitutional invalidation of a statute requires at least 10 votes under existing precedent). As to whether the election should be prohibited, the Court held it was a political matter not a judicial one.


  1. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Corazon Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

  • President Aquino’s government was not only de facto (in actual control) but also de jure (legally recognized). The Filipino people had accepted her leadership. The international community had also recognized her government.


  1. In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, I,·-::_:_· October 24, 1986

  • The Court found no ambiguity in Section 5, Article XVIII, it clearly referred to President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel. The Aquino government was not only de facto but also de jure, having been accepted by the people and recognized internationally.



  1. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003

  • The EDSA Revolution resulted in a revolutionary government, which was not bound by the 1973 Constitution.

  • During the interregnum (Feb 25 - March 24, 1986), there was no operative Constitution, and thus no enforceable Bill of Rights.

  • The directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law during this period. Nevertheless, the Court made an important qualification: even without a domestic constitution, the State remained bound by its international human rights obligations, specifically under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).


  1. De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

  • The 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite, not on the date of its proclamation (February 11, 1987). This interpretation was based on Section 27, Article XVIII of the Constitution: “This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose…”


  1. Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

  • The initiative petition did not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
  • The two-part test to determine whether the proposal was an amendment or a revision:
    • Quantitative Test

      • The proposal affected multiple provisions across Articles VI and VII and added Article XVIII.

    • Qualitative Test

      • The proposal sought to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary and abolish the bicameral legislature, which are fundamental structural changes.

  • The Court concluded that the proposal constituted a revision, which cannot be done through a people’s initiative.

Amendment by Proposal by Congress (Constituent v. Legislative Power)


  1. lmbong v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L32432, September 11, 1970

  • Once Congress had exercised its constituent power by passing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 with the required three-fourths vote, it could then use its legislative power to enact laws like R.A. No. 6132 to implement those resolutions. The doctrine of “necessary implication allows Congress acting in its legislative capacity to enact statutes filling in gaps left by the Constituent Assembly, as long as they do not conflict with the Constitution or the resolutions


Amendment by Proposal


  1. Occena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981

  • The legislature, when convened as a constituent body, has full discretion over the method of proposing amendments. The Congress has the discretion to propose amendments directly or through a Constitutional Convention. This principle aligns with earlier rulings which recognized that the method of proposal is a political question entrusted to the legislature.


Amendment by Proposal by Constitutional Convention

 

  1. Gonzales vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 (1968) 

  • The Constitution does not require a special election for ratifying amendments. The phrase “at an election” in Article XV was interpreted broadly to include general elections, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Thus, Congress may validly schedule a plebiscite during regular elections.


Amendment by Proposal by the People thru initiative 


  1. Santiago vs. Comelec, G.R. 127325, March 19, 1997 

  • The Court ruled that R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the system of initiative for constitutional amendments.

  • Consequently, the Court held that COMELEC has no jurisdiction to act on any petition to amend the Constitution via initiative until Congress enacts a fully sufficient implementing law. 

  • Lambino v. COMELEC (2006) — Follow-up Case

    • A majority of justices expressed the view that R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to support a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. The Solicitor General supported the Lambino petition and urged the Court to treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules as temporary mechanisms to operationalize the initiative process until a more comprehensive law is passed. The Constitution does not require a perfect law, only one that reasonably enables the process.


  1. PIRMA vs. COMELEC, Sept. 23, 1997 

  • Article XVII, Section 2 is not self-executing; it requires implementing legislation by Congress for people’s initiative to operate constitutionally. Republic Act No. 6735 is inadequate as an enabling law for constitutional amendment by initiative because it lacks procedures specifically tailored to amendment petitions.




Popular posts from this blog

Equality and Human Rights: The United Nations and Human Rights System (September 16, 2023)

Election Laws: Requirements Before Election

Special Rules and Proceedings: Rule 75