Case Digest: People vs. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014
RA 3019 | Criminal Law
Facts:
(1) In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., the Supreme Court nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
(2) Subsequently, certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of RA 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent Henry Go, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a Concession Agreement, which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
(3) On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent Henry Go for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
(4) On April 28, 2005, respondent Henry Go filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
(5) On June 2, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Quash the Information for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, for the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court.
Issue:
(I) WoN respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Defense:
(I) As alleged in the Information filed against the respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter’s Motion to Quash, the respondent conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
(II) The Sandiganbayan has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation, and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the respondent’s case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
Held:
GRANTED.
The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting respondent’s Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
(I) On conspiracy:
The elements of Section 3(g) of RA. 3019 are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile’s death, there is no longer any public officer with whom the respondent can be charged for violation of RA 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and the private respondent.
The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
Thus, this Court held that a conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
(II) On jurisdiction:
The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
In order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court, he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person.
The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of RA 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.
In the instant case, ideally, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, it does not follow that the Sandiganbayan is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent.
To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Notes:
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
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