Case Digest: Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212761-62, July 31, 2018

      Rule 112, Preliminary Investigation, Probable Cause | Criminal Procedure


Facts:

The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, John Raymund de Asis, and Janet Lim Napoles assail the Joint Resolution and Joint Order of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause to indict them and several others for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 in connection with the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Estrada for the years 2004 to 2012. 

They are accused of diverting and disbursing Estrada's PDAF through fraudulent non-governmental organizations created and controlled by Napoles, acquiring significant portions of the diverted funds as commission or kickbacks, and giving unwarranted benefits to Napoles and her controlled NGOs. The scheme commenced with the legislator and Napoles discussing the utilization of the legislator's PDAF, and negotiations involving the list of projects, project costs, and legislator's commission or rebate. The legislator would prepare a letter endorsing the request for release of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), which would then be given to Napoles. The latter's employees would follow-up the release of the SARO from the DBM, and after receipt, the NGOs would start processing the funds for the projects.

Under this modus operandi, Estrada funneled his PDAF amounting to around P262,575,000.008 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and in return, received "commissions" or "rebates" amounting to P183,793,750.00, through his authorized representative, Pauline Labayen.

The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and other respondents with one count of Plunder and eleven counts of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence, the Ombudsman concluded that the petitioners conspired to amass ill-gotten wealth by diverting the PDAF of Estrada from its intended project recipients to JLN-controlled NGOs. 

The Ombudsman filed several Informations before the Sandiganbayan, charging petitioners with one count of Plunder and eleven counts of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. 

Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles filed separate petitions for certiorari assailing the Joint Resolution and Joint Order of the Ombudsman before the Court. Estrada subsequently filed a Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari asserting that his indictment is an act of political persecution and violates his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.


Issue:

WoN the Ombudsman committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolution and Order ultimately finding probable cause against Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles for the charges against them.


Held: DISMISSED.

The Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict Estrada for one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Ombudsman found that probable cause exists to indict Estrada for plunder, after finding that the elements of the crime charged are reasonably apparent based on the evidence on record.

Both the Constitution and RA 6770, or The Ombudsman Act of 1989, give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. Since the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate, it is in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause.

This Court held that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, such as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Estrada, any question on the prosecution's conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.

A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.  Moreover, the validity and merit of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.

The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. All that the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof.


Principle:

Probable Cause

Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, probable cause is needed to be established by the investigating officer, to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial, during preliminary investigation. Thus, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. In determining probable cause, the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he or she has no technical knowledge.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction."

To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause, made during preliminary investigation, is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not the prosecutor has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.



Recit Version

Facts:

The petitions filed by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, John Raymund de Asis, and Janet Lim Napoles challenge the Joint Resolution and Joint Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, which found probable cause to indict them and others for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 in connection with the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Estrada.

They are accused of diverting and disbursing Estrada's PDAF through fraudulent non-governmental organizations created and controlled by Napoles, acquiring significant portions of the diverted funds as commission or kickbacks, and giving unwarranted benefits to Napoles and her controlled NGOs. 

The Ombudsman filed several Informations before the Sandiganbayan, charging petitioners with one count of Plunder and eleven counts of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles filed separate petitions for certiorari assailing the Joint Resolution and Joint Order of the Ombudsman before the Court.


Issue:

WoN the Ombudsman committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolution and Order ultimately finding probable cause against Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles for the charges against them.


Held: DISMISSED.

The Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict Estrada for one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Ombudsman found that probable cause exists to indict Estrada for plunder, after finding that the elements of the crime charged are reasonably apparent based on the evidence on record.

A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.  Moreover, the validity and merit of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.

The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. All that the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof.

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