REQUIREMENTS BEFORE ELECTION

A. Registration

Registration of Voters

The right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others, the process of registration.

Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
R.A. No. 8189, the Voter's Registration Act of 1996 (approved June 11, 1996):

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy.

It is the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board;
Registration Record refers to an application for registration duly approved by the Election Registration Board;

Sec. 7. General Registration of Voters.

Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposed of the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recalls subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general registration of voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21, and 22 and, subject to the discretion of the Commission, on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.

Sec. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters.

The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

Sec. 9. Who may Register. –

All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may register as a voter.

Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation, profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Police Forces, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.

Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence but, who, on the day of the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.

Sec. 10. Registration of Voters.

A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.The application shall contain the following data:

Name, surname, middle name, and/or maternal surname;
Sex;
Date, and place of birth;
Citizenship;
Civil status, if married, name of spouse;
Profession, occupation or work;
Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
Exact address with the name of the street and house number for location in the precinct maps maintained by the local office of the Commission, or in case there is none, a brief description of his residence, sitio, and barangay;
A statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter;
A statement that the applicant is not a registered voter of any precinct; and
Such information or data as may be required by the Commission.

The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four (4) identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.

Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that the applicant’s specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voter’s application.

As a means of determining who possess the qualifications of voters, and of regulating the exercise of the right to vote, statutes have been passed requiring the names of those entitled to vote to be previously recorded by officers provided for that purpose. These laws are ordinarily known as registration laws, and the act of listing the names as registration.
The Constitution, by carefully prescribing the qualifications of voters, necessarily requires that an examination of the claims of persons to vote, on the ground of possessing these qualifications, must at some time be had by those who are to decide on them.
The provisions in the general law regulating elections, which require that the qualifications of voters shall be previously proved, in order to entitle them to vote, that their names shall be entered upon an alphabetical register or list of voters, is highly reasonable and useful, calculated to promote peace, order, and celerity in the conduct of elections, and as such, to facilitate and secure the most precious right to those who are by the Constitution entitled to enjoy it.
The requirement cannot be justly regarded as adding a new qualification to those prescribed by the Constitution, but as a reasonable and convenient regulation of the mode of exercising the right of voting. It is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.

Necessity of Registration

Registration is essential to the exercise of the right of suffrage, not the possession thereof. It is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process.
In order that a qualified elector may vote in any election, plebiscite, or referendum, he must be registered in the permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides. All persons having complied with the requisites prescribed for the registration of voters shall be registered in the list, provided they possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter.
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality, or country solely by reason of his occupation, profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in military or naval reservations, service in the army, navy, or air force, the Philippine National Police, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law, shall be deemed not to have lost his original residence.
Unless excused by some fact which the law itself deems sufficient, the voter must register if he would exercise his privilege. The fact that he is qualified must be evidenced by the proper registration, and where it is not so evidenced, the failure must, where the opportunity for registration is afforded, be attributed to the voter's own fault or neglect.

Akbayan Youth v. Commission on Elections, 355 SCRA 318 [2001]:

COMELEC denied request of petitioners to hold a special registration of new voters ages 18 to 21.
Petitioners — representing the youth sector — seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under R.A. No. 8189.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of which reads:

"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001."

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH), et al. filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R.A. No. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
Significance of registration.

Contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly, and peaceful elections, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner — one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.

Prohibitive period for registration.

Section 8 of R.A. No. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is explicit, to wit:

SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.'

Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. No. 8189, which, among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter’s list, provides:

'x x x SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List - Any registered voter, representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election.'

As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its Comment:

"x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand, serves the purpose of securing the voter’s substantive right to be included in the list of voters.

In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter’s registration is conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the voter’s list since we would already be well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process, this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the voter’s list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
x x x It must be remembered that the period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. We would be obliged to simply take them at face value. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voter’s list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts x x x.
x x x The shortcuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of registration within the last 60 days will give rise to a haphazard list of voters, some of whom might not even be qualified to vote. x x x The very possibility that we shall be conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections, regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own results."

COMELEC acted within bounds of the law.

x x x Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter - Section 8 of R.A. No. 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters’ registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act
Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC - a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence."

Mandatory Biometrics Registration System for New Voters

To complement R.A. No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996), in light of the advances in modern technology, R.A. No. 10367 (Biometrics Law, Feb. 2013) institutionalizes biometrics validation as part of the registration process.
Meaning of Terms

Under R.A. No. 10367:

Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features.
Validation is the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured.
Deactivation refers to the removal of the registered record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation process.

Consequence of Noncompliance

Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated. The penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all voters.
Deactivation is not novel to R.A. No. 10367, for R.A. No. 8189 (Sec. 27 thereof) already provides for certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only the disqualifications under the Constitution or the Omnibus Election Code are listed.

Requirement of Biometrics Registration Not an Additional Qualification

The requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, which the State has the right to reasonably regulate to achieve the compelling State interest of establishing a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters.
R.A. No. 10367 is a valid regulation that assists in the identification of a person for purposes of ensuring that the right to vote is exercised only by that person and also in purging the voters' list of spurious names or ghost voters.

Registration with Election Registration Board

Election Registration Board

There shall be in each city and municipality as many Election Registration Boards as there are election officers therein to act on all applications for registration in thickly populated cities/municipalities. The Commission may appoint additional election officers for such duration as may be necessary.
The Board shall be composed of the Election Officer as chairman and, as members, the public school official most senior in rank and the local civil registrar, or in his absence, the city or municipal treasurer.

The Election Officer is the highest official or authorized representative of the Commission in a city or municipality.

In case of disqualification of the Election Officer, the Commission shall designate an acting Election Officer who shall serve as Chairman of the Board. In case of disqualification or non-availability of the Local Civil Registrar or the Municipal Treasurer, the Commission shall designate any other appointive civil service official from the same locality as a substitute.

Illiterate or Disabled Applicants

They refer to persons who cannot by themselves prepare an application for registration because of their physical disability and/or inability to read and write.
Any illiterate person may register with the assistance of the Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arm. The Election Officer shall:

place such illiterate person under oath,
ask him the questions, and
record the answers given in order to accomplish the application form in the presence of the majority of the members of the Board.

The Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arm shall read the accomplished form aloud to the person assisted and ask him if the information given is true and correct.
The accomplished form shall be subscribed by the applicant in the presence of the Board by means of thumbmark or some other customary mark, and it shall be subscribed and attested by the majority of the members of the Board. The attestation shall state the name of the person assisted, the name of the Election Officer or the member of the accredited citizen’s arm who assisted the applicant, the fact that the Election Officer placed the applicant under oath, that the Election Officer or the member of the accredited citizen’s arm who assisted the applicant read the accomplished form to the person assisted, and that the person assisted affirmed its truth and accuracy by placing his thumbmark or some other customary mark on the application in the presence of the Board.
The application for registration of a physically disabled person may be prepared:

by any relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity or
by the Election Officer or
any member of an accredited citizen’s arm using the data supplied by the applicant.

The fact of illiteracy or disability shall be so indicated in the application.

Change of Residence or Address

Any registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the Election Registration Board.

Upon approval of the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of the former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voter’s registration record to the Election Officer of the voter’s new residence.

Any voter who has changed his address in the same city or municipality shall immediately notify the Election Officer in writing. If the change of address involves a change in precinct, the Board shall transfer his registration record to the precinct book of voters of his new precinct and notify the voter of his new precinct.
All changes of address shall be reported to the office of the provincial election supervisor and the Commission in Manila.

Notice and Hearing of Applications

Upon receipt of applications for registration, the Election Officer shall set them for hearing:

Notice of hearing shall be posted in the city or municipal bulletin board and in his office for at least one (1) week before the hearing, and furnish copies thereof to the applicant concerned, the heads or representatives of political parties, and other accredited groups or organizations that actively participate in the electoral process in the city or municipality. On the date of the hearing, the Election Officer shall receive such evidence for or against the applicant.
A registrant whose application is not seasonably objected to shall be notified in writing that no objection was raised against his application and that he need not appear on the date set for the hearing of his application. Physical presence of the applicant concerned shall, however, be mandatory in all cases where objections against his application have been seasonably filed with the proper Election Registration Board for him to rebut or refute evidence presented in opposition thereto.
All applications for registration shall be heard and processed on a quarterly basis.

For this purpose, the Election Registration Board shall meet and convene on the third Monday of April, July, October, and January of every calendar year, or on the next following working day if the designated days fall on a non-working holiday, except in an election year to conform with the 120-day prohibitive period before election day. Should one day be insufficient for the processing of all accepted applications, the Board shall adjourn from day to day until all the applications shall have been processed.

Challenges to Right to Register

Any voter, candidate, or representative of a registered political party may challenge in writing any application for registration, stating the grounds therefor.
The challenge shall be under oath and be attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of hearing to the challenger and the applicant.
Oppositions to contest a registrant’s application for inclusion in the voter’s list must, in all cases, be filed not later than the second Monday of the month in which the same is scheduled to be heard or processed by the Election Registration Board.
The hearing on the challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month, and the decision shall be rendered before the end of the month.

Approval and disapproval of application.

The Election Officer shall submit to the Board all applications for registration filed, together with the evidence received in connection therewith.
The Board shall, by majority vote, approve or disapprove the applications.
Upon approval, the Election Officer shall assign a voter's identification number and issue the corresponding identification card to the registered voter.
If the Board disapproves the application, the applicant shall be furnished with a certificate of disapproval stating the ground therefor.
In cases of approval or disapproval, any aggrieved party may file a petition for exclusion or inclusion, as the case may be, with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court.

Publication of action on application for registration.

Within five (5) days from approval or disapproval of application, the Board shall post a notice in the bulletin board of the city or municipal hall and in the office of the Election Officer, stating the name and address of the applicant, the date of the application, and the action taken thereon.
The Election Officer shall furnish a copy of such notice personally, or by registered mail or special delivery to the applicant and heads or representatives of registered political parties in the city or municipality.

Preservation of Voter's Registration Records

Compilation of original copies

The Election Officer shall compile the original copies of the approved applications for registration per precinct and arrange the same alphabetically according to surname.
He shall preserve the book of voters and ensure its integrity.
The second and third copies of the registration records shall be sent to the provincial and national central files within three (3) days after the approval of the Board.

Provincial file

There shall be a provincial file consisting of the duplicate copies of all registration records in each precinct of every city and municipality in the province.
The file shall be in the custody of the Provincial Election Supervisor and shall be compiled and arranged by precinct, by municipality, and alphabetically by surname of voters.
Should the book of voters in the custody of the Election Officer be lost or destroyed at a time so close to election day that there is no time to reconstitute the same, the corresponding book of voters in the provincial file shall be used during the voting.

National central file

There shall be a national central file under the custody of the Commission in Manila consisting of the third copies of all approved voter registration records in each city or municipality.
The file shall be compiled by the precinct in each city/municipality and arranged alphabetically by surname so as to make the file a replica of the book of voters in the possession of the Election Officer. Thereafter, a national list shall be prepared following alphabetical arrangements of surnames of voters.
There shall be a national file consisting of the computerized voters' list (CVL), both in print and in diskette, submitted by the Election Officer in each city and municipality concerned, under the custody of the Commission in Manila.
The computerized voters' list shall make use of a single and uniform computer program that will have a detailed sorting capability to list voters alphabetically by the precincts where they vote, by the barangays, municipalities, cities, or provinces where they reside, and by their voters' identification number (VIN).

Identification of Voters

Voter's identification card

The voter's identification card (VIC) issued to the registered voter shall serve as a document for his identification.

In case of loss or destruction, no copy thereof may be issued except to the registered voter himself and only upon the authority of the Commission.

The Commission shall adopt a design for the voter's identification card which shall be, as much as possible, tamper-proof.
It shall provide the following:

the name and address of the voter,
his date of birth, sex, photograph, thumbmark,
the number of the precinct where he is registered,
the signature of the voter and the chairman of the Election Registration Board, and
the voter's identification number (VIN).

Voter's identification number

The Commission shall assign every registered voter a voter's identification number (VIN) consisting of three (3) parts, each separated by a dash. For example: 7501-0019A-C1451BCD.

Part I: Current Address of the Voter

The first two (2) digits 75 stand for the province; and
The last two (2) digits, 01, stand for the city, municipality, or a district, particularly in Manila.
The code assignment for provinces, cities, and municipalities shall follow the Urban Code devised by the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).

Puerto Princesa, Palawan — 1705

Part II: Current Precinct Assignment of the Voter

The first four digits, 0019, stand for the permanent number of the precinct where the voter is currently assigned; and
The letter indicates whether it is a mother or a daughter precinct.
The number assigned to the precinct in every city or municipality shall be permanent, but the voter may transfer his precinct number. The VIN reflects the current precinct assignment of the voter.

Part III: Permanent Birth and Name Code Unique to the Voter

The letter C stands for the month, i.e., A for January, B for February, and so forth.
The next two (2) digits, 14, stand for the date of birth.
The next two (2) digits, 51, stand for the year of birth.
The last three (3) letters, BCD, stand for the name code, i.e., Bayani Cruz Davide. The last three letters shall stand for the first letter of the first name, the middle name, and the last name, in that order.

G1898EMT

The Commission shall ensure that Part II of the voter's identification number (VIN) shall be permanent and unique to each voter. If necessary, the Commission may expand and modify the same.

The combined birth and name code is assigned during the lifetime of every voter. Upon transfer of the voter to another precinct, the first two (2) parts of the VIN shall change.

Deactivation of Registration

Deactivation is the removal of the registration record of a registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters.
The Election Registration Board shall deactivate the registration and remove the registration records of the following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and place the same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause or causes of deactivation:

Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty.

Any such person disqualified to vote shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan.

Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law.

He shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence.

Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown by his voting records.

For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections.

Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the court.
Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

For this purpose, the clerks of court of the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned at the end of each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with their addresses.
The Commission may request a certified list of persons who have lost their Filipino citizenship or have been declared insane or incompetent, with their addresses, from other government agencies.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of those persons whose registration was deactivated and the reasons therefor and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of political parties, the national central file, the provincial file, and the voter concerned.

Reactivation of Registration

Reactivation is the restatement of a deactivated voter.
Any voter whose registration has been deactivated may file with the Election Officer a sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist any time but not later than 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.
The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate action.
In case the application is approved, the Election Officer shall retrieve the registration record from the inactive file and include the same in the corresponding precinct book of voters. Local heads or representatives of political parties shall be properly notified on approved applications.

Cancellation of Registration

The Board shall cancel the registration records of those who have died as certified by the Local Civil Registrar who shall submit each month a certified list of persons who died during the previous month to the Election Officer of the place where the deceased is registered.
In the absence of information concerning the place where the deceased is registered, the list shall be sent to the Election Officer of the city or municipality of the deceased's residence as appearing in his death certificate. In any case, the Local Civil Registrar shall furnish a copy of this list to the national central file and the proper provincial file.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a list of those persons who died whose registrations were cancelled, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of the political parties, the national central file, and the provincial file.

List of Voters per Precinct

List of voters refers to an enumeration of names of registered voters in a precinct duly certified by the Election Registration Board for use in the election.
Permanent List of Voters

There shall be a permanent list of voters per precinct in each city or municipality consisting of all registered voters residing within the territorial jurisdiction of every precinct indicated by the precinct maps.
Such precinct-level list of voters shall be accompanied by an addition/deletion list for the purpose of updating the list.
For the purpose of the 1997 general registration, the Commission shall cause the preparation and posting of all precinct maps in every barangay nationwide. Five (5) days before the 1997 general registration, individual precinct maps shall be posted at the door of each polling place. Subsequently, the Election Officer shall be responsible for the display throughout the year of precinct maps in his office and the bulletin board of the city or municipal hall.
The precinct assignment of a voter in the permanent list of voters shall not be changed or altered or transferred to another precinct without the express written consent of the voter. The voter shall not unreasonably withhold such consent. Any violation thereof shall constitute an election offense which shall be punished in accordance with law.

Computerization

A permanent and computerized list arranged by precinct, city or municipality, province, and region shall be prepared by the Commission. Thereafter, another list shall be prepared consisting of the names of the voters, arranged alphabetically according to surnames.
The computer print-outs of the list of voters duly certified by the Board are official documents and shall be used for voting and other election-related purposes as well as for legitimate research needs.
The total number of voters in the permanent list shall be the basis for the printing of the official ballots by the Commission.

Preparation and Posting of the Certified List of Voters

The Board shall prepare and post a certified list of voters 90 days before a regular election and 60 days before a special election and furnish copies thereof to the provincial, regional, and national central files.
Copies of the certified list, along with a certified list of deactivated voters categorized by precinct per barangay, within the same period shall likewise be posted in the office of the Election Officer and in the bulletin board of each city/municipal hall.
Upon payment of the fees as fixed by the Commission, the candidates and heads of registered political parties shall also be furnished copies thereof.
The Board shall also furnish two (2) certified copies of said certified list of voters, along with a certified list of deactivated voters to the Board of Election Inspectors for posting in the polling place and for their reference on election day.

Book of Voters

The Book of Voters refers to the compilation of all registration records in a precinct.
Sealing

The Election Registration Board shall notify within 15 days before the start of the campaign period representatives of all registered political parties and members of the Board of Election Inspectors to inspect and verify the completeness of the voters' registration records for each precinct compiled in the book of voters.
After verification and certification by the Board of Election Inspectors and party representatives as to the completeness of the voters' registration records in the precinct book of voters, the Board shall seal the book of voters in the presence of the former at the start of the campaign period and take custody of the same until their distribution to the Board of Election Inspectors on election day.
The Election Officer shall deliver the sealed precinct book of voters to the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors when the latter secures its official and other paraphernalia for election day.

Annulment

The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter or election officer or duly registered political party and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that:

is not prepared in accordance with R.A. No. 8189 or
was prepared through fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force, or any similar irregularity, or which contains data that are statistically improbable.

No order, ruling, or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within 90 days before an election.

Inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters.

Judicial proceedings.

Petition for inclusion or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office hours;
Notice of the place, date, and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the members of the Election Registration Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition.

Service of such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by personal delivery, by leaving it in the possession of a person of sufficient discretion in the residence of the challenged voter, or by registered mail.
Should the foregoing procedures not be practicable, the notice shall be posted in the bulletin board of the city or municipal hall and in two (2) other conspicuous places within the city or municipality;

A petition shall refer only to one (1) precinct and implead the Board as respondent;
No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings.
However, if the court should find that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses;
Any voter, candidate, or political party who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and present his evidence;
The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a stipulation of facts.

If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious; and

The petition shall be heard and decided within 10 days from the date of its filing. Cases appealed to the Regional Trial Court shall be decided within 10 days from receipt of the appeal. In all cases, the court shall decide these petitions not later than 15 days before the election and the decision shall become final and executory.

Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases.

The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.
Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof; otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory.
The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within 10 days from the time it is received and the decision shall immediately become final and executory.
No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Petition for inclusion of voters in the list.

Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or 75 days prior to a special election.
The petition shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board.
It shall be decided 15 days after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters, the Board shall place the application for registration previously disapproved in the corresponding book of voters and indicate in the application for registration the date of the order of inclusion and the court which issued the same.

Petition for exclusion of voters from the list.

Any registered voter, representative of a political party, or the Election Officer may file with the court a sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address, and the precinct of the challenged voter at any time except 100 days prior to a regular election or 65 days before a special election.
The petition shall be accompanied by proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged voter and shall be decided within 10 days from its filing.
If the decision is for the exclusion of the voter from the list, the Board shall, upon receipt of the final decision, remove the voter's registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.

Verification of list of registered voters.

The Election Officer shall, in order to preserve the integrity of the permanent list of voters, file exclusion proceedings when necessary and verify the list of the registered voters of any precinct by regular mail or house-to-house canvass.
The Commission may enlist the help of representatives of political parties and deputize non-government organizations (NGOs), civic organizations, and barangay officials to assist in the verification and house-to-house canvass of registered voters in every precinct.

Voter excluded through inadvertence or registered with an erroneous or misspelled name.

Any registered voter whose registration record has not been included in the precinct book of voters, or whose name has been omitted in the list of voters, or who has been included therein with a wrong or misspelled name may file with the Board an application for inclusion of his record, or reinstatement or correction of his name, as the case may be.
If the application is denied or not acted upon, the voter may file on any date with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court a petition for an order directing that the voter's name be entered or corrected in the list.
The voter shall attach to the petition a certified true copy of his registration record or identification card or the entry of his name in the list of voters used in the preceding election, together with proof that his application was denied or not acted upon by the Board and that he has served notice thereof to the Board.
The citizenship of a person to be stricken from the list of voters may be decided in the exclusion proceedings. Considering the summary character of an exclusion case, the decision that a court may render thereon, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.

Inclusion and exclusion proceedings summary in character.

Factual findings and conclusions of trial court not conclusive on COMELEC.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character.

In terms of purposes, voters inclusion/exclusion and Certificate of Candidacy denial/cancellation are different proceedings.
One refers to the application to be registered as a voter, while the other refers to the application to be a candidate.

Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC.

Scope of court's authority.

Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised, including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority.

Decision, not res judicata.

However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
In this sense, the decision does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political status nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.
It is ridiculous, for example, to suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in such a summary peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the registry list of voters.

Issue of compliance with residency requirement.

The determination of the trial court in the proceedings as to the right of a person to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of his qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. It is not within the competence of the trial court in an exclusion proceeding to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality.

Jurisdiction of lower court limited.

The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of a voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another, for it is the function of the Election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189.

Qualifications of a voter.

The qualifications for the exercise of suffrage are provided by the Constitution.

Citizenship.

It may be by birth or naturalization.

Age.

A person may be registered as a voter although he is less than 18 years at the time of registration if he will be at least 18 at the time of the election.

Residence.

The term "residence," as used in election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
It is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation" but rather to "domicile" or legal residence.

Residence qualification of voter/candidate.

The question of what constitutes residence is one of no little difficulty, but, in general terms, it may be said that a person's residence is the place of his domicile.

Or, as was said in a case, it is "that place where the elector makes his permanent or true home, his principal place of business, and his family residence, if he has one; where he intends to remain indefinitely, and without a present intention to depart, when he leaves it he intends to return to it, and after his return he deems himself at home."

Residence, a matter of intention.

The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances.
Every person is deemed to have a domicile somewhere, and when it has been once acquired in a certain place, it will be deemed to continue there until a new one has been acquired. Temporary absences, therefore, although frequent or long continued, will not, while the person has a continuous intention to return, deprive him of his domicile and right to vote, even though he may have unlawfully voted while absent.
In election cases, the Supreme Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, under the previous Constitution and the present Constitution. Domicile is not easily lost.
In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur:

Actual residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
A bona fide intention to remain there and to abandon the old domicile; and
Acts which correspond with that purpose.

In other words, there must basically be:

animus manendi (intention to remain) coupled with
animus non revertendi (intention not to return).

The residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Abandonment of residence.

The mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
Anciano v. Otadoy, 27 SCRA 200 (1969):

Registration and voting by a person in another place (Manila) do not by themselves constitute abandonment of his legal residence (in Poro, Cebu), where the stay in the former cannot be considered voluntary but a necessity in order to continue his studies, and it appears that he made periodical visits during school vacations and asked the cancellation of his name from the voter's list in Manila when he applied to be registered in Poro, Cebu.

Faypon v. Quirino:

Absence from the residence of origin to practice a profession does not also constitute loss of residence.

Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991):

The fact that one made periodical journeys to his home province revealed that he always had animus revertendi.

Abella v. Commission on Elections, 201 5CRA 253 (1911):

But where there is no evidence that one temporarily left her residence in X municipality to pursue a calling, profession, or business, but the evidence on record shows that she established her residence in Y City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein, and the intention not to abandon her residence in X is not present, the fact that she occasionally visits X through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein.

Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court, 226 5CRA 408 (1993):

The sudden departure from the country of petitioner because of the EDSA People's Power Revolution of 1986 to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions had been established was held not voluntary, so as to constitute an abandonment of residence.

De Los Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893 (1935):

It is not necessary that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile in a municipality. It is enough that he should live in said municipality or in a rented house, or in that of a friend or relative, in order to acquire a residence and domicile in said municipality, provided that his stay is accompanied by his intention to reside therein permanently. On the other hand, mere ownership of a house or some other property does not establish his bodily presence in the locality and his intent to stay there before the elections.

Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 400 (1995):

There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, Sep 18, 1995:

Petitioner was disqualified by the Commission on Elections for allegedly failing to meet the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte.
Petitioner IRM filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, wherein in item No. 8, she provided the following information:

Residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the elections. — Years and seven months.

Under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution, the period for residence must be "not less than one year." On March 29, 1995, she filed an amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood." She averred that the entry of the word "seven" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation," thinking "the word 'residence' to mean actual or physical residence and the word 'seven' merely reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte," and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City (a component city of the First Legislative District of Leyte) as her domicile or residence."
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995, elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the April 24, 1995, Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position.
One of the principal issues is whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one (1) year at the time of the May 9, 1995, elections.
Settled meaning of "residence" for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position.

While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that '[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.'
In Ong v. Republic (19 SCRA 1966 [1967].), this Court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's 'permanent home,' 'a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.' Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of 'the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place' and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently."

Domicile and residence distinguished.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community, or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health.

If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile;
if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established, it is residence.

It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uy v. Republic (95 Phil. 890 [1954].), we laid this distinction quite clearly:

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence' is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."

For political purposes, the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval v. Guray (52 Phil. 645 [1928].), the Court held that "the term residence x x x is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
Larena v. Teves (61 Phil. 36 [1934].) reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
Faypon v. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1934].) held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.

Constitutional concept of residence.

"The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of 'residence' in election law, it actually means only 'domicile' to wit: x x x

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (199 SCRA 692 [1991].), this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile."

Materiality of erroneous statement in a certificate of candidacy.

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution's residency qualification requirement.

Jurisprudence on residence in election law.

We have stated many times in the past that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.

Various residences for different purposes.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the past four (4) decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC's Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in

Tacloban, Leyte.

Domicile of minor.

A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Requisites for change of domicile.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two (2) legal residences at the same time.
In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this Court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium)."

Effect of marriage on domicile of origin of wife.

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence.

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile or origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage. x x x
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (or origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. x x x
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). x x x
Parenthetically, when petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

Common law concept of matrimonial domicile.

On the other hand, the common law concept of 'matrimonial domicile' appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term 'residence' has been supplanted by the term 'domicile' in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Different meanings of residence in civil law and in political law.

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned - affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife - the term residence should only be interpreted to mean 'actual residence.'
The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation, therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile or origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilum necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile.

Padilla, J., dissenting:

Candidates intent and actual presence.

To my mind, the one-year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term 'residence' is to be synonymous with 'domicile.' In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.

Regalado, J., dissenting:

Presumption as to wife's domicile after husband's death.

Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law.

The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis; the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium necessarium.
There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party. xxx

Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin, which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation."

Davide, Jr., J., dissenting:

Domicile of wife after husband's death.

The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death, the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. (28 C.J.S. Domicile Secs. 12, 27.) Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power, her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death. (25 Am. Jur. 2d Domicile Secs. 62, 45.) Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death—which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that place."

Disqualifications from voting.

The following shall be disqualified from voting:

Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

Any such person disqualified to vote shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;

Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security in accordance with the law.

He shall automatically reacquire his right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; and

Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority unless subsequently declared by proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.

The above persons are not qualified to vote even if they have the necessary qualifications.

B. Precincts and Polling Places

Election precincts.

The basic unit of territory established by the Commission on Elections for the purpose of voting is the election precinct.

R.A. No. 10366 authorizes the Commission on Elections to establish precincts assigned to accessible polling places exclusively for persons with disabilities and senior citizens who, in their registration records, manifest their intent to avail of their rights to a separate precinct. Such precinct shall be provided with assistive devices as well as the services of experts in assisting persons with disability.

Establishment.

In preparation for the general registration in 1997, the Commission drew updated maps of all the precincts nationwide. Upon completion of the new precinct maps, all the precincts established in the preceding elections were deemed abolished.
The precinct maps refer to a sketch or drawing of a geographical area stated in terms of streets or street blocks or sitios, the residents of which would belong to a particular precinct.
For the purpose of the general registration, the Commission shall create original precincts only. Spin-off precincts may be created after the regular elections of 1998 to accommodate additional voters residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the original precincts.
The Commission shall introduce a permanent numbering of all precincts, which shall be indicated by Arabic numerals and a letter of the English alphabet. Original or mother precincts shall be indicated by the Arabic numeral and letter "A" of the English alphabet. Spin-off or daughter precincts shall be indicated by the Arabic numeral and a letter of the English alphabet starting with letter "B" and so on.
No territory comprising an election precinct shall be altered or a new precinct established at the start of the election period.
Splitting of an original precinct or merger of two (2) or more original precincts shall not be allowed without redrawing the precinct map/s 120 days before election day.
The determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. If there are no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants, considering that people migrate.

Arrangement.

Every barangay shall have at least one (1) precinct.
Each precinct shall have no more than 200 voters and shall comprise contiguous and compact territories.
A precinct shall be allowed to have less than 200 registered voters under the following conditions:

As soon as the 200-limit for every precinct has been reached, a spin-off or daughter precinct shall be created automatically by the Commission to accommodate voters residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the original precinct. Thereafter, a separate list of new voters shall be prepared by the Election Officer; and
An island or group of islands with less than 200 voters may comprise one (1) original precinct.

Every case of alteration of precincts shall be duly announced by posting a notice thereof in a conspicuous place in the precinct, in the office of the election officer, and in the city or municipal hall, and by providing political parties and candidates a list of all the precincts at the start of the campaign period.
Consolidation or merger of at most three (3) precincts may be allowed. The computerized counting shall be implemented. The merger of such precincts shall be effected 90 days before election day.

Note: In view of the automated elections held on May 10, 2010, the Commission had to cluster the precincts to only about 76,000, each having around 1,000 voters. In past elections, there were more than 200,000 precincts nationwide, each with a maximum of 200 voters.

Publication of maps of precincts.

At least five (5) days before the first registration day preceding a regular election or special election or a referendum or a plebiscite, the Commission on Elections shall, through its duly authorized representative, post in the city hall or municipal building and in three (3) other conspicuous places in the city or municipality and on the door of each polling place a map of the city or municipality showing its division into precincts with their respective boundaries and indicating therein all streets and alleys in populous areas and the location of each polling place.
These maps shall be kept posted until after the election, referendum, or plebiscite.

Polling places and their designation.

A polling place refers to the building or place where the board of election inspectors conducts its proceedings and where the voters cast their votes.
Voting center, on the other hand, refers to the building or place where the polling place is located.
Size and location of polling place.

Each polling place shall be, as far as practicable, on the ground floor and shall be of sufficient size to admit and comfortably accommodate 40 voters at one time outside the guard rail for the board of election inspectors.
The polling place shall be located within the territory of the precinct as centrally as possible with respect to the residence of the voters therein, and whenever possible, such location shall be along a public road.

Change of location.

The location of polling places designated in the preceding regular election shall continue with such changes as the Commission on Elections may find necessary, after notice to registered political parties and candidates in the political unit affected, if any, and hearing.
No location shall be changed within 45 days before a regular election and 30 days before a special election or a referendum or plebiscite except in case it is destroyed or it cannot be used.

Change of designation of polling place.

No designation of polling places shall be changed except upon written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct, agreement of all the political parties, or by resolution of the Commission upon prior notice and hearing.
A public building having the requirements prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be preferred as a polling place.

Modes for initiating change of location.

As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election.
However, changes may be initiated by:

written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct,
agreement of all the political parties, or
by resolution of the COMELEC after notice and hearing.

But ultimately, it is the COMELEC which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and hearing.

Arrangements and contents of polling places.

Each polling place shall conform as much as possible to the sketch prescribed.
A voting booth for every 20 voters.

During the voting, there shall be in each polling place a booth for every 20 voters registered in the precinct.
The Commission on Elections shall post inside each voting booth and elsewhere in the polling place on the day before the election, referendum, and plebiscite a list containing the names of all the candidates or the issues or questions to be voted for and shall at all times during the voting period keep such list posted in said places.

Guard rail in every polling place.

In every polling place, there shall be a guard rail between the voting booths and the table for the board of election inspectors, which shall have separate entrance and exit.

A ballot box in each polling place.

There shall be in each polling place on the day of the voting a ballot box, one (1) side of which shall be transparent, which shall be set in a manner visible to the voting public, containing two (2) compartments, namely, the compartment for valid ballots and the compartment for spoiled ballots.
Note: Ballot boxes are not used under the Automated Election System. (Chap. Six.)

10 voting booths in each polling place.

Any provision or law to the contrary notwithstanding, there shall be in each polling place at least 10 voting booths of such size, specifications, and materials as the Commission may provide to enable the voters to fill out their ballots secretly.

Furnishing of ballot boxes, forms, stationeries, and materials for election.

The Commission on Elections shall prepare and furnish the ballot boxes, forms, stationeries, and materials necessary for the registration of voters and the holding of the election.
The provincial, city, and municipal treasurers shall have custody of such election paraphernalia, supplies, and materials as are entrusted to them under the law or rules of the Commission and shall be responsible for their preservation and storage, and for any loss, destruction, impairment, or damage of any election equipment, material, or document in their possession.

Requisition, printing and distribution of official ballots and election returns.

The official ballots and election returns shall be printed upon orders of the Commission on Elections.
Requisition of official ballots shall be for each city and municipality, at the rate of one and one-fifth (1 1/5) ballots for every registered voter in the next preceding election, and for election returns, at one set thereof for every polling place.
The official ballots and election returns shall be printed by the Government Printing Office and/or the Central Bank printing facilities exclusively, under the exclusive supervision and control of the Commission which shall determine and provide the necessary security measures in the printing, storage, and distribution thereof.
The official ballots and the election returns shall be distributed by the Commission to each city and municipality at the rate of one and one-fifth (1 1/5) ballots for every voter registered in each polling place; and for election returns, at the rate of one set each for every polling place.

Names of watchers.

The ruling party and the dominant opposition party or their respective duly authorized representatives in the different provinces, cities, and municipalities, shall submit the names of their respective watchers who, together with the representatives of the Commission and the provincial, city, and municipal treasurers, shall verify the contents of the boxes containing the shipment of official ballots, election returns, and sample official ballots received by the said treasurers.

Form and content of ballots.

Ballots for national and local elections, or special, plebiscites, and referenda, shall be of uniform size and shall be provided by the Commission. They shall be printed in black ink on white security paper with distinctive, clear, and legible watermarks that will readily distinguish it from ordinary paper.
Each ballot shall be in the shape of a strip with a stub and detachable coupon containing the serial number of the ballot, and a space for the thumbmark of the voter on the detachable coupon.
It shall bear at the top of the middle portion thereof the coat-of-arms of the Republic of the Philippines, the words "Official Ballot," the name of the city or the municipality and province in which the election is to be held, the date of the election, and the following notice in English:

"Fill out this ballot secretly inside the voting booth. Do not put any distinctive mark on any part of this ballot."

The official ballot shall also contain the names of all the offices to be voted for in the election, allowing opposite the name of each office, sufficient space or spaces with horizontal lines where the voter may write the name or names of individual candidates voted for him.
There shall not be anything printed or written on the back of the ballot except as provided in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166.
Official ballots for cities and municipalities where Arabic is of general use shall have each of the titles of the offices to be voted for printed in Arabic in addition to and immediately below the English title.
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions, the Commission is authorized to prescribe a different form of official ballot on the same watermarked security paper to facilitate voting by illiterate voters only and to use or adopt the latest technological and electronic devices in connection therewith as provided under Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Note: In the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the voters, instead of manually writing the names of candidates, shaded the oval indicated in the ballot next to the name of the candidate of their choice.

Signature of Chairman at back of every ballot.

In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back thereof.
Failure to so authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the board of election inspectors and shall constitute an election offense punishable under Sections 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Publication of official ballots, etc.

The Commission on Elections shall publish at least 10 days before an election in a newspaper of general circulation certified data on the number of official ballots and election returns and the names and addresses of the printers and the number printed by each.

C. Certificates of Candidacy

Meaning of candidate.

Under the Omnibus Election Code, the term candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.

Sec. 15 (3rd par., second sentence) of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369, provides that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
The immediately succeeding proviso in the second paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period."
The amendment incorporates the doctrine in Lanot v. Commission on Elections (507 SCRA 114 [2006]), which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In short, a person who files a certificate of candidacy shall not be considered a candidate before the start of the campaign period. This means that election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period and that before that time, such election offenses cannot be committed.

Meaning of certificate of candidacy.

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed.
It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.

Corollary to the right of a political party "to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preference" is the right to exclude persons in its association and to not lend its name and prestige to those it deems undeserving to represent its ideals.
A certificate of candidacy makes known to the COMELEC that the person therein mentioned has been nominated by a duly authorized political group empowered to act and that it reflects accurately the sentiment of the nominating body. A candidate's political party affiliation is also printed, followed by his or her name, in the certified list of candidates. A candidate misrepresenting himself or herself to be a party's candidate, therefore, not only misappropriates the party's name and prestige but foists a deception upon the electorate, who may unwittingly cast its ballot for him or her on the mistaken belief that he or she stands for the party's principles.
To prevent this occurrence, the COMELEC has the power and the duty to step in and enforce the law, not only to protect the party but, more importantly, the electorate, in line with the Commission's broad constitutional mandate to ensure orderly elections.

Section 74 of the OEC enumerates the items that should be stated in a certificate of candidacy.

Filing of certificate of candidacy.

No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed by the Omnibus Election Code.
Certificate for more than one (1) office.

No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one (1) office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one (1) certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate for the other office or offices.

Stray vote.

Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for any office for which he did not present himself is void and counted as a stray vote, but it does not invalidate the whole ballot.

Ministerial duty/jurisdiction of Commission.

The Commission on Elections or its designated officer has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy but has jurisdiction under Section 78 above, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy provided due process is observed. (infra.)
In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the Commission to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of a person to be included in or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction does not preclude the Commission, in the determination of his qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

The Comelec has no discretion to give or not to due course to COCs filed in due form. While it may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate in thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.

Time, place, and manner of filing.

Under R.A. No. 7166, which provides for synchronized national and local elections, the certificates of candidacy of any person running for the office of President, Vice-President, Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, or any elective provincial, city, or municipal office, shall be filed in five (5) legible copies with the offices of the Commission specified below not later than the day before the date legally fixed for the beginning of his campaign period.

The certificate of candidacy for President, Vice-President, and Senators shall be filed with the main office of the Commission in Manila;
The certificate of candidacy for Members of the House of Representatives shall be filed with the provincial election supervisor of the province concerned.

Those for legislative districts in the National Capital Region shall be filed with the regional election director of said region, and those for legislative districts in cities outside the National Capital Region which comprise one or more legislative districts shall be filed with the city election registrar concerned;

The certificate of candidacy for provincial offices shall be filed with the provincial election supervisor concerned; and
The certificate of candidacy for city and municipal offices shall be filed with the city or municipal election registrar concerned.

A certificate of candidacy filed beyond the deadline is not valid.
The certificate of candidacy shall be filed by the candidate personally or by his duly authorized representative. No certificate of candidacy shall be filed or accepted by mail, telegram, or facsimile.

Printing of candidates' names in election returns.

Whenever practicable, the names of registered candidates for local positions shall be printed in the election returns.
If a candidate has been disqualified or declared a nuisance candidate, it shall be the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the appropriate election officials to delete the name of said candidate as printed in the election return.

Importance of a valid certificate of candidacy.

Requirement absolutely mandatory.

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all. By its express language, Section 78 (supra.) is absolutely mandatory.
It is but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office.
A certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate.
Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is canceled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.
The provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory to give effect to the will of the people.

Purpose of law.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor are:

To enable the voters to know, at least 60 days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the choice; and
To avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast.

For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.
It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides for grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.

Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.

Time and form.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. The filing of withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal, or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
Under Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, the withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy must be made in a written declaration under oath to produce effect.

Thus, in a case, it was held that there was no withdrawal of candidacy for the position of mayor, where the candidate, before the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, personally appeared in the COMELEC office, asked for his certificate of candidacy, and intercalated the word "vice" before the word "mayor," and the following day wrote the election registrar saying that his name be included in the list of official candidates for mayor. The right to vote and be voted for may be denied only on the clearest and most compelling reasons.
In another case, the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy originally for the office of provincial board member but 15 minutes before the deadline, he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor, and eight (8) days later filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel or withdraw his certificate of candidacy for the office of provincial board member and to declare subsisting his certificate of candidacy for mayor, attaching his written declaration under oath withdrawing his certificate of candidacy for the office of board member. Overruling the resolution of the COMELEC declaring the petitioner as not eligible for any of the offices mentioned in the two (2) certificates of candidacy because he failed to declare under oath the office which he seeks to be elected and to cancel his certificate of candidacy for the other office before the deadline fixed by law, the Supreme Court ruled that since the petitioner's certificate of candidacy for the office of board member was filed by his party, and the said party had withdrawn the nomination, which withdrawal was confirmed by the petitioner under oath, there was substantial compliance with Section 73. His filing under oath within the statutory period of his individual certificate of candidacy for the separate office of mayor was, in effect, a rejection of the party nomination on his behalf for the other office of board member. The voters should not be deprived of their choice of candidates for the office of mayor.

Place of filing.

There is nothing in Section 73 which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed.
Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on November 20, 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution cannot contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law.

Effect of withdrawal.

The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio.
Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn. Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

"The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal, or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."

Automatic resignation.

Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act) repealed Sec. 67 of B.P. Blg. 881, which reads:

"Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for the President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

It rendered ineffective Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions they are running.
Pursuant to Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 9006, elective officials continue in office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. In fine, an elective official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.
Sec. 14 has been held as not violative of the equal protection provision of the Constitution on the ground that "substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials,"

Stated differently, "forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing, save a new election or appointment, can restore the ousted official."
The automatic and permanent loss of office by any elective official makes no exception for officials under suspension when they file certificates of candidacy for another office.
An official who is considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy is not restored to his position by the withdrawal of the same.

Flores v. Commission on Elections, 184 SCRA 484 [1990].

Votes were counted in favor of a candidate for kagawad on the theory that he was still an incumbent barrio captain notwithstanding the filing of a certificate of candidacy for the office of kagawad.
Petitioner RF (Flores) was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in the barangay election and thus became punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 6679. However, his election was protested by R, who placed second in the election. It appears that four (4) questioned votes cast for "Flores" only, without a distinguishing first name or initial, were divided equally between RF and AF (Flores), another candidate for kagawad, instead of being considered invalid.
Implementing R.A. No. 6679, the Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No. 2022-A, providing in Section 164(3) thereof that:

"Incumbent Barangay Captains, whether elected, appointed, or designated, shall be deemed resigned as such upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which is another office, for the March 28, 1989 barangay election."

This was the reason why the Municipal Circuit Trial Court held that RF was not entitled to any of the four (4) contested votes because he was not incumbent as punong barangay (or barangay captain, as the office was formerly called) on the date of the election.
RF insists on the application to him of Section 211(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, stating pertinently that:

"2. x x x If there are two or more candidates with the same full name, first name or surname, and one of them is incumbent, and on the ballot is written only such full name, first name or surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of the incumbent."

Because he should not have been considered resigned but continued to be entitled to the office of punong barangay under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6679, providing as follows:

"SEC. 8. Incumbent elective officials running for the same office shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. They shall continue to hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified."

The petitioner contends that the aforequoted administrative regulation is inofficious because the forfeiture prescribed is not authorized by the statute itself and beyond the intentions of the legislature. Moreover, the enforcement of the rule would lead to discrimination against the punong barangay and in favor of the other kagawads, who, unlike him, could remain in office while running for reelection and, additionally, benefit from the equity-of-the-incumbent rule.
Alternatively, the petitioner argues that, assuming the regulations to be valid, he was nonetheless basically also a kagawad as he was a member of the sangguniang barangay like the other six (6) councilmen elected with him in 1982. In fact, Section 5 of R.A. No. 6679 also speaks of seven kagawads, the foremost of whom shall again be the punong barangay. He concludes that he should thus be regarded as running for the same office—and, therefore, not considered resigned—when he filed his certificate of candidacy for kagawad.
Should RF be considered resigned when he filed his certificate of candidacy for kagawad?
Yes.
Position of punong barangay different from that of kagawad.

It seems to us that the challenged resolution quite clearly expresses the mandate of the above-quoted Section 8 that all incumbent elected officials should not be considered resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy as long as they were running for the same position. The purpose of the resolution was merely to implement this intention, which was clearly applicable not only to the ordinary members of the sangguniang barangay but also to the punong barangay.
As for the questioned authority, this is found in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, which empowers the public respondent to 'promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x'
The justification given by the resolution is that the position of punong barangay is different from that of kagawad—as in fact, it is. There should be no question that the punong barangay is an essentially executive officer, as the enumeration of his functions in Section 88 of the Local Government Code will readily show, unlike the kagawad, who is vested with mainly legislative functions (although he does assist the punong barangay in the administration of the barangay).

Petitioner deemed resigned as punong barangay upon filing certificate of candidacy for kagawad.

Under R.A. No. 6679, the person who wins the highest number of votes as a kagawad becomes by operation of law the punong barangay, or the executive of the political unit. In the particular case of the petitioner, it should be noted that he was in fact not even elected in 1982 as one of the six councilmen but separately as the barangay captain. He was thus correctly deemed resigned upon his filing of a certificate of candidacy for kagawad in 1989, as this was not the position he was holding, or was incumbent in, at the time he filed such certificate."

Candidate can run only for kagawad.

It is worth stressing that under the original procedure followed in the 1982 barangay elections, the petitioner was elected barangay captain directly by the voters, separately from the candidates running for mere membership in the sangguniang barangay. The offices of the barangay captain and councilmen were both open to the candidates, but they could run only for one or the other position and not simultaneously for both. By contrast, the candidate under the present law may aspire for both offices, but can run only for one, to wit, that for kagawad.

Petitioner's certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay.

It follows that the petitioner cannot insist that he was running not for kagawad only but ultimately also for punong barangay in the 28 March 1989 election. In fact, his certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As the basic position being disputed in the barangay election was that of kagawad, that of punong barangay being conferred only by operation of law on the candidate placing first, the petitioner had to forfeit his position of punong barangay, which he was holding when he presented his candidacy for kagawad. Consequently, he cannot be credited with the four contested votes for 'Flores' on the erroneous ground that he was still incumbent as punong barangay on the day of the election.

Certified list of candidates.

In cities with more than one election registrar, the Commission on Elections shall designate the election registrar who shall receive the certificate of candidacy.
In lieu of the additional copies of the certificate of candidacy equal to twice the number of polling places which a candidate is required to file, the Commission shall cause to be printed a certified list of candidates containing the names of all registered candidates for each office to be voted for in each province, city, or municipality, immediately followed by the nickname or stage name of each candidate duly registered in his certificate of candidacy and his political party affiliation, if any. Said list shall be posted inside each voting booth during the voting period.
Whenever practicable, the board of election inspectors shall cause said list of candidates to be written clearly and legibly on the blackboard or on manila paper for posting at a conspicuous place inside the polling place.
The names of all registered candidates, immediately followed by the nickname or stage name, shall also be printed in the election returns and tally sheets.

Under R.A. No. 9189, The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, the Commission on Elections is mandated to prepare the Certified List of Overseas Absentee Voters and furnish copies thereof to the appropriate embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments which shall post the same in other bulletin boards.

Candidates in case of death, disqualification, or withdrawal of another.

If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew, or was disqualified.
The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected not later than mid-day of the day of the election.
If the death, withdrawal, or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission on Elections.
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.

Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266 (1999):

The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial. What is more significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as an independent candidate for Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO, at which time he was, for all intents and purposes, already deemed a member of the LAKAS party 'MATUGAS wing.' As such, EMMANUEL is obliged to pursue and carry out the party's ideology, political ideas, and platforms of government. As the official candidate of an organized political party, he is bound by the party's rule. He owes loyalty to the party, its tenets and its policies, its platforms, and programs of government. To the electorate, he represents the party, its principles, ideals, and objectives.

Rulloda v. Commission on Elections, 395 SCRA 535 [2003]:

The absence of a specific provision governing the substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution, a restrictive construction that cannot be read into the law where the same is not written.

The substitute candidate need not even be a member of the political party concerned prior to his nomination as its official candidate.

Where certificate of candidacy is cancelled.

In all the instances enumerated in Section 77, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non for substitution.
While Section 77 above enumerates the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
Under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 (supra.) of the Omnibus Election Code.
More importantly, under Section 77, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted.
A cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy.

In other words, a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been canceled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former.
Where there was no valid substitution, there could not be a valid proclamation.

Votes cast for substituted candidates.

In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter.
If the substitute candidate has the same family name, the above rule shall not apply.

Under R.A. No. 9006, the Fair Election Act (Appendix "C"), sec. 12, and under R.A. No. 8436, the Automated Election System Act (Appendix "A"), in case of valid substitutions after the official ballots shall have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered votes for the substitutes. (Sec. 12 thereof.)

Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy

A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy (not to disqualify a candidate) may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 (Contents of Certificate of Candidacy) is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due process and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election.

The 15-day period in Section 78 for deciding the petition is merely directory.
A person whose certificate of candidacy (COC) has been denied due course and/or canceled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all because his COC is considered void ab initio and thus cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.
A petition under Section 78 should not be interchanged or confused with the petition under Sec. 68 (see "Disqualifications," infra). They are different remedies based on different grounds and resulting in different eventualities.
Sec. 74, in relation to Sec. 78, governs the cancellation of and grant or denial of due course to certificates of candidacy (COCs). The combined application of these two (2) provisions requires that the candidate's stated facts in the COC be true under pain of the COC's denial or cancellation if any false representation of a material fact is made.
For the petition to deny due course or cancel a COC of a candidate to prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, etc. One's nickname is not considered a material fact, especially where there is no substantive evidence showing that, in writing the nickname in his COC, the candidate had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity, which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.
A COC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case. The cancellation of a COC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose COC has been canceled as stray votes.

Where the certificate of candidacy was duly sworn to before a person who represented himself to be a notary public but whose authority had already expired, such notary public on whose authority the candidate relied in good faith was held for all legal intents and purposes a de facto notary public, and the certificate cannot be faulted.

Petition Distinguished from Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of Voters

The two (2) proceedings may ultimately have common factual bases, but they are very different in terms of the issues, reliefs, and remedies involved.
In terms of purpose, voters' inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are different proceedings. One refers to the application to be registered as a voter to be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the application to be a candidate.

Because of their different purposes, they also involve different issues and entail different reliefs, although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities where they may be said to converge or interface.

Voters' inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the one hand, essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications.
On the other hand, the COC denial/cancellation process involves the issue of whether there is a false representation of a material fact.

The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidate's qualifications for elective office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or, otherwise stated, with the intent to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.

Cancellation of Certificate by Commission

Grounds.

The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if the following situations are extant:

If it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute; or
If said certificate was filed to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidate; or
If there are other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the COC has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
While Sec. 69 does not explicitly provide for grounds to declare a nuisance candidate, it states clearly some tests.

The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. This is the rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual.

Ballots indicating only the similar surnames of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections
Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987) provides the procedure in cases of nuisance candidates. The effect of cancellation of a certificate of candidacy only leads to stray votes. A nuisance candidate must also be declared as such in order that his votes may be credited to the protestant.

When decisions become final and executory.

Decisions of the COMELEC in pre-proclamation controversies and petitions to deny course to or to cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

Validity of votes where certificate canceled.

Strictly speaking, a canceled certificate of candidacy cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Where, however, the ruling is not yet final on election day, the duty of the court is to ascertain the will of the electorate under the factual circumstances of the case. Election laws are enacted to prevent the disenfranchisement of the electorate.

Votes for Candidates with Disqualification Case

Candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for them shall not be counted.

A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy (e.g., ineligibility because barred by final judgment of conviction in a criminal case) can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy based on ineligibility means that the candidate was never a valid candidate from the very beginning.

Those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong.

Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC continues if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes.

The Supreme Court imposes the additional condition: "and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his oath of office."

Material and False Representation in the Certificate

Every person aspiring to hold any elective public office must file a sworn certificate of candidacy. One of the things which should be stated therein is that the candidate is eligible for the office. In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Commission on Elections is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78 (supra.) of the Omnibus Election Code.
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter, for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate—the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation," the Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78.

The false representation contemplated by Section 78 pertains to material fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. The critical "material fact" refers to a candidate's qualifications for election such as one's citizenship and residence.
It is essential that the representation should evince a deliberate intent to deceive or misinform the electorate as to one's qualifications and eligibility to run for public office or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Winning the election does not cure the material representation.
A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve. In both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

The false representation must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.

Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 [2010]:

The evidence showed that the petitioner never hid his intention to transfer his city residence (his domicile of origin) and acquire a new one within the province to comply with the residence requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office; hence, there was no basis for the conclusion that he deliberately attempted to mislead the electorate of the province.

Residence requirement of a candidate.

In considering the residency issue, the COMELEC cannot base its decisions solely on very personal subjective assessment standards, such as the nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling place in relation to the stature of the candidate.

The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. For election purposes, they are used synonymously.
Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.
It is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it one's residence.
The purpose of the residency requirement is best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. The requirement directly supports the purpose of representation—electing those who can best serve the community because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its needs. At the same time, the constituents themselves can best know and evaluate the candidate's qualifications and fitness for office if these candidates have lived among them.

Abella v. Larrazabal (180 SCRA 509 [1989].):

A petition was filed with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondent Larrazabal, a candidate for the position of Governor, for alleged false statement in her certificate of candidacy regarding residence that "she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so."
The Supreme Court held that the challenge made against private respondent's claimed residence was properly classified as a proceeding under Section 78, despite the fact that it was filed only on the very day of the election. The false statement concerning a candidate's qualification for an office is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of the candidate's certificate of candidacy.

In Labo v. Commission on Elections (211 SCRA 297 [1992]:

The disqualification proceeding filed by respondent pursuant to Section 78 sought to cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by petitioner Ramon Labo, who ran for mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections, based on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court held that Labo, having failed to submit any evidence to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, is not a Filipino citizen and respondent COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in canceling his certificate of candidacy. The Court went on to say that the possession of citizenship, being an indispensable requirement for holding public office, may not be dispensed with by the fact of having won the elections, for it "strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested office."

Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections cases (257 SCRA 727 [1996]; 232 SCRA 785 [1994]; 174 SCRA 245 [1989]):

Frivaldo's qualification for public office was questioned in a petition filed by petitioner praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position and that his certificate of candidacy be canceled by reason of his not yet being a citizen of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court held that Frivaldo had reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of his repatriation under P.D. No. 725 and was qualified to hold the position of governor of Sorsogon.

Citizenship may be possessed even on the day the candidate assumes office. In the case of residency, Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160.) requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality "for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 312 SCRA 447 (1999):

On the other hand, a candidate who used her husband's family name even when their marriage was void was held not guilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact, it appearing that there was no intention to deceive the electorate as to her identity. The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a "material representation" under Section 78, which refers to "qualifications for elective office," especially where there is no showing of an intent to deceive the electorate as to the candidate's identity, or that the voting public was thereby deceived.

Similarity/difference of proceeding with quo warranto proceeding.

Qualifications of candidate.

The Supreme Court has likened a proceeding under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the Code since they both deal with the qualifications of a candidate.

Time for filing petition.

There are two (2) instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Code, to wit:

(a) before election, pursuant to Section 78; and
(b) after election, pursuant to Section 253 of the Code, viz.:

"Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the election."

Grounds.

The only difference between the two (2) proceedings is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 may be brought on the basis of two (2) grounds:

(a) ineligibility, or
(b) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines,

and must be initiated within 10 days after the proclamation of the election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

Petition for quo warranto not barred by failure to file petition to disqualify.

Where the petition to disqualify petitioner was based upon an alleged false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to the candidate's age, the Supreme Court once again drew a parallel between a petition for quo warranto and a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy when it stated that "x x x if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within 10 days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code."

Material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78.

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refers to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave—to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.

Material misrepresentation with intention to deceive.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision.

Remedy where candidate has been proclaimed.

If the winning candidate was not eligible to be a candidate for the office because he failed to file properly his certificate of candidacy as required by law, the remedy is to contest his election after he has been duly proclaimed.
Certain steps required before election construed as directory after elections.

It has been held, however, that the defects in the certificate of candidacy should be questioned on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been expressed through the ballots. While the provisions relating to certificate of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate.

Rationale for principle.

The rationale is that these provisions were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did not do their duty. Thus:

(a) The filing of a certificate of candidacy beyond the statutory period is a technicality that should be enforced before the election, but can be disregarded after the electorate has made the choosing.
(b) The amendment of the certificate of candidacy, although made at a date after the deadline for filing the same, but before the election, is substantial compliance with the law and cures the defect of said certificate.
(c) Even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed, or it does not contain the required data, or was not properly sworn to, the proclamation of the candidates as winner may not be nullified on such ground after the election without invalidating the will of the electorate, which should not be done.

Doubts resolved in favor of candidate's eligibility.

Where a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount.

Disqualifications.

A candidate for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for the position he or she seeks but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualifications under the law.
1. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given the plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualification to be a candidate above provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five (5) years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals—an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private or social duties which a man owes his fellowmen or to society in general.

(2) Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:

(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Omnibus Election Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.

To be disqualified under (a), it must be proved that:

the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material consideration; and
the act of giving money or other material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.

All the offenses mentioned in Sec. 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, not to violations (e.g., three (3)-term limit rule) of other penal laws.

A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Sec. 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Sec. 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Sec. 78 can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he/she must have also made a false representation of the same in the certificate of candidacy.
A petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy and a petition for disqualification have different grounds and periods for their filing. The petitions also have different legal effects or consequences. While a person who is disqualified under Sec. 68 is merely prohibited from continuing as a candidate, the person whose certificate is canceled or denied due course under Sec. 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Sec. 68 can validly be substituted under Sec. 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or canceled under Sec. 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate."
One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his/her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate's compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law—such as age, residency, and citizenship—is not in question, he/she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought about by the commission of election offenses mentioned by law.
R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Secs. 261(d) (1) and (2) of the OEC. The effect of the repeal is to remove Sec. 261(d) from among those listed as grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68. With the repeal, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Sec. 68. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of its jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to Secs. 265 and 268 of the OEC, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice.
The Commission cannot, itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate. The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent a candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. A petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68.
To disqualify a candidate, there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

(3) Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any election under the Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Failure to meet the one (1)-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the "disqualification" of a candidate under Sec. 68.
The jurisdiction of the Commission to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Sec. 68. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of its jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature.
Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 9164, like Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), from which it was taken, bars an elective local official from running again for the same local government post provided two (2) conditions concur:

The official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive times to the same local government post; and
He has fully served three consecutive terms.

The words "qualified elector" mean a person who has all the qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list. In the same vein, the term "qualified," when applied to a voter, does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. However, under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 39), an elective official must not only be a "qualified elector" or "qualified voter;" he must also be a "registered voter."

Note: Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225 or the Dual Citizenship Act of 2003 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines, i.e., "at the time of the filing of certificate of candidacy, made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."

Rules governing cases of disqualifications before the election.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 (Nov. 3, 1988) provides the rules on the procedure in dealing with and manner of disposing of cases of disqualification filed under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the "Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," to wit:
(1) Complaint filed before election.

Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts complained, the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate.

Complaint not resolved before election. -

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election.

Complaint filed after election and proclamation of winner. -

Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department.

Complaint filed after election but before proclamation of winner.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending, and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

Submission of recommendation to Commission en banc.

The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within 30 days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the Information for filing with the appropriate court.

Bagatsing v. Commission on Elections, 320 SCRA 817 [1999]

Complaint for disqualification was filed after the election against a candidate who has not yet been proclaimed a winner and was subsequently proclaimed as there was no prima facie of guilt yet.
Petitioners B, M, and L and private respondent A were candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 18, seven (7) days after the elections, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a complaint for disqualification against A on the ground that the latter allegedly caused the disbursement of public funds in the amount of more than P3 million within the prohibited 45-day period before the elections in violation of Article 22, Section 261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The alleged disbursement was intended to be distributed in the form of financial assistance to the public school teachers of the City of Manila who manned the precinct polls in that city during the elections.
On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an order suspending the proclamation of A. On May 21, 1998, A filed a motion for reconsideration and sought to set aside the order directing the suspension of his proclamation as Mayor. On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division) handed down a resolution granting the motion for reconsideration. That same day at around eleven o'clock in the morning, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of A. In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and a Second Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of A before COMELEC en banc.
On June 25, 1999, without waiting for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration pending before the COMELEC en banc, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari to set aside the June 4, 1998 resolution of the COMELEC's First Division. The petition seeks to strike down as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion COMELEC First Division Resolution dated June 4, 1998 dismissing the petition for disqualification and referring the case to the COMELEC's Law Department for preliminary investigation, based on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.
Did the COMELEC FIRST DIVISION commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack, or excess of jurisdiction in handing down its June 4, 1998 resolution granting A's motion for reconsideration and directing the proclamation of A as Mayor of the City of Manila?
No.
(1) Resolution 2050 covers two (2) different aspects.

"First, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu proprio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
Second, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong."

(2) Sunga case not applicable.

"Petitioners contend that Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC anchored its dismissal of the disqualification case, is no longer a good law since it has been nullified in toto by this Court in Sunga v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 76 (1998).
Contrary to petitioners' contention, nowhere did the Court strike down COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 in Sunga.
The ruling in Sunga is not applicable to the case at bar. There, the complaint for disqualification was filed prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, where the complaint was filed before the election but for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before the election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and hearing of the case. Thus, the facts in Sunga fall under the contemplation of Section 6, namely: (1) the complaint for disqualification was filed before the election; (2) for any reason, the issue of disqualification was not finally resolved before the election; and (3) the candidate sought to be disqualified is voted for and received the winning number of votes. Consequently, the COMELEC should have continued with the hearing and decided the case on the merits.
Instead, COMELEC erroneously dismissed the disqualification case and referred the matter to the Law Department for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect of the case. x x x
In sharp contrast, the complaint for disqualification against private respondent in the case at bar was lodged on May 18, 1998 or seven (7) days after the 1998 elections. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case and shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the COMELEC. Under this scenario, the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election which may be either before or after the proclamation of the respondent candidate."

(3) Sunga misapplied Resolution No. 2050.

"The COMELEC in Sunga obviously misapplied Resolution No. 2050 in dismissing the disqualification case therein simply because it remained unresolved before the election and, in lieu thereof, referring it to its Law Department for possible criminal prosecution of the respondent for violation of the election laws. Notably, there is nothing in paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 2050 which directs the dismissal of the disqualification case not resolved before the election. It says the COMELEC "may motu proprio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws."
The referral to the Law Department is discretionary on the part of the COMELEC and in no way may it be interpreted that the COMELEC will dismiss the disqualification case or will no longer continue with the hearing of the same. The reason for this is that a disqualification case may have two (2) aspects: the administrative, which requires only a preponderance of evidence to prove disqualification, and the criminal, which necessitates proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. Where, in the opinion of the COMELEC, the acts which are grounds for disqualification also constitute a criminal offense or offenses, referral of the case to the Law Department is proper.

(4) R.A. No. 6640 Not Applicable

"Section 6 explicitly applies only to any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified before an election. The section provides further that if for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest x x x.
There is no provision in R.A. No. 6646 that treats a situation where the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election. If the intention of the law is for the COMELEC to hear and decide disqualification cases filed after the election, it would not have made a distinction between cases filed before and after the election. Section 6 would not have used the word ‘before’ preceding ‘an election.’
Thus, the need for implementing rules as embodied in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, which provides that any complaint for disqualification based on Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as the winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case, but the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of COMELEC."

(5) Difference Between a Disqualification Case Filed Before and After an Election Recognized
"The Court in Sunga recognized the difference between a disqualification case filed before and after an election when, as earlier mentioned, it stated that the referral of the complaint for disqualification where the case is filed before an election 'is totally different from the other two (2) situations contemplated by Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a disqualification case.'
Why there is a difference between a petition for disqualification filed before and after the election proceeds from the fact that before the election, the question of disqualification is raised as an issue before the electorate, and those who vote for the candidate assume the risk that should said candidate be disqualified after the election, their votes would be declared stray or invalid votes. Such would not be true in the case of one filed after the electorate has already voted."
(6) Order Necessary to Suspend Proclamation of Winning Candidate
"The mere filing of a petition for disqualification is not a ground to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate. In the absence of an order suspending proclamation, the winning candidate who is sought to be disqualified is entitled to be proclaimed as a matter of law.
This is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, providing that the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified is suspended only if there is an order of the COMELEC suspending the proclamation. Here, there was no order suspending private respondent's proclamation. Consequently, private respondent was legally proclaimed on June 4, 1998."
(7) Suspension of A's Proclamation Not Warranted
"Neither did the COMELEC err in not ordering the suspension of private respondent's proclamation. The second paragraph of paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 provides that where a complaint is filed after the elections but before proclamation, as in this case, the complaint must be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.
If before the proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending, and that court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
It appearing that none of the foregoing circumstances obtain herein as there is no prima facie finding of guilt yet, a suspension of private respondent's proclamation is not warranted.
The mere pendency of a disqualification case against a candidate, and a winning candidate at that, does not justify the suspension of his proclamation after winning in the election. To hold otherwise would unduly encourage the filing of baseless and malicious petitions for disqualification if only to effect the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, not only to his damage and prejudice but also to the defeat of the sovereign will of the electorate, and for the undue benefit of undeserving third parties."

Effect of disqualification case.

(1) After final judgment. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.

(2) Before final judgment. - If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof, order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.¹³⁹

(a) Suspension of proclamation/continuation of hearing. - Under this provision, the Commission can legally suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate although he received the winning number of votes.¹⁴⁰ The use of the word "may" above indicates that the suspension of the proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is made mandatory is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest.¹¹

(b) Purpose of a disqualification proceeding. - The purpose is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.

(c) Effect of proclamation. - Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. Also, the fact that a candidate was already proclaimed and had assumed the position to which he was elected does not divest the Commission of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification.¹⁰

The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and encourage him to employ delaying action to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.¹⁰¹

(d) Intervention by a third party. - Under the same provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.¹

(3) Candidate who obtained second highest number of votes. - The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

(a) Not the choice of the people. - A defeated candidate or repudiated loser cannot be deemed elected to the office. The simple reason is that he was obviously not the choice of the people. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.¹⁴⁵

(b) Possible exception to rule. - A subsequent case, however, laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate on the concurrence of two (2) assumptions, namely, the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified and the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of the candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.¹⁴ The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.¹⁶

Under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, if the elected mayor is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law.¹⁹

Election Laws: Requirements Before Election