Case Digest: Salapudin vs. CA, G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013

       Rule 112, Preliminary Investigation, Discretion | Criminal Procedure

Facts:

On November 13, 2007, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives in the Batasan Complex, Quezon City. Several people were killed, and many were seriously injured. The explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle parked near the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby. 

On November 15, the police raided an alleged Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) safehouse and killed three persons while arresting three others. Several items were seized, including a black wallet with a GSIS ID card issued to Caidar Aunal and calling cards of Gerry A. Salapuddin. One of the Cal. 45 pistols found was traced back to Julham S. Kunam, Political Affairs Assistant of Salapuddin. 

Adham Kusain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay claiming that his motorcycle was used during the bombing at the Batasan Complex without his knowledge. Ikram Indama claimed that Redwan Indama asked him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar using a bomb to be planted on a motorcycle. He was not informed of the reason for the mission or the identity of the person who gave the order. 

Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily gave a sworn statement denying any knowledge of the Batasan bombing. 

Ikram's earlier affidavits did not mention Salapuddin's involvement in the plan to kill Congressman Akbar. However, in his fourth affidavit, he alleged that Salapuddin asked him to bring Redwan to his house where he heard Salapuddin order the killing of the congressman. Ikram later amended the dates in his earlier affidavits in his fifth affidavit. 

On February 22, 2008, Prosecutor Zuño approved the DOJ Investigating Panel's Supplemental Resolution recommending the amendment of the Information in criminal case pending before Quezon City RTC, Branch 83, to include respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan Judda, Jang Hataman and Salapuddin. The Investigating Panel stated that Salapuddin's participation in the crime cannot be downplayed just because he did not actively take part in the planning.

Salapuddin filed a petition for review with the Office of the Secretary of Justice, arguing that the only evidence against him was the inconsistent and unreliable statements of Ikram. The Secretary of Justice modified the Supplemental Resolution, excluding Salapuddin from the Information. Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan questioned the Secretary of Justice’s Resolution before the CA, arguing that the admissibility of evidence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the courts during trial, and not at the stage of determining probable cause.

The CA set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, citing the totality of evidence indicating the probability of Salapuddin's involvement in the crime. Salapuddin's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Ikram filed a statement claiming that he was forced to sign previous affidavits and implicate Salapuddin and the Hataman brothers in the alleged conspiracy by Gov. Jum Akbar and several mayors from Basilan because of their political rivalry in the province. Ikram later submitted another affidavit alleging physical and mental torture by police officers to sign statements regarding the Batasan bombing.

Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review, claiming the appellate court erred in admitting the extrajudicial admissions obtained through torture and in giving full probative value to Ikram's extrajudicial confession despite serious contradictions and inconsistencies. The Court initially denied the petition but later granted Salapuddin's Motion for Reconsideration, citing that there is no longer any reason or probable cause to maintain the criminal case against him since Ikram's testimony, the only direct evidence linking him to the crime, has been recanted.

Issue:

WoN the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case is proper.

Held: Reversed.

The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by the law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 

Pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the investigating prosecutor(s), he or she can direct the prosecutor(s) concerned "to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties." This action is not subject to the review of courts unless there is a showing that the Secretary of Justice has committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution.

Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence. A review of the records, however, show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

This Court, has previously stressed that mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila.

It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy. There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy, and not simple inferences, conjectures and speculations speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence."

The discrepancies in Ikrams’ affidavits and the variations in the statements of the other accused do not persuade this Court to find probable cause that Salapuddin, who was indicted primarily because of Ikram’s confession, was part of the conspiracy that led to the Batasan bombing. No such evidence was presented to sufficiently establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused of.

Principle:

Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:

‘(1) Supervision and Control.—Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x’

Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:

‘Section 3. x x x

The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.’

x x x           x x x          x x x

‘Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.’

‘Supervision’ and ‘control’ of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:

‘In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.’

——

Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.

On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Recit Version

Facts: 

In 2007, a bomb exploded at the House of Representatives in Batasan Complex, Quezon City, killing several people and injuring many more. In the subsequent investigation, items seized from a safehouse allegedly linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group pointed to the involvement of several individuals, including petitioner Gerry Salapuddin. 

Ikram Indama initially implicated Salapuddin in the bombing, but later recanted his statement, alleging that he was forced to implicate Salapuddin and others due to political rivalries in Basilan.

Salapuddin filed a petition for review with the Office of the Secretary of Justice, arguing that the only evidence against him was the inconsistent and unreliable statements of Ikram. The Secretary of Justice modified the resolution, excluding Salapuddin from the Information.

Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan questioned the Secretary of Justice’s Resolution before the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the admissibility of evidence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the courts during trial, and not at the stage of determining probable cause. 

The CA set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, citing the totality of evidence indicating the probability of Salapuddin's involvement in the crime. Salapuddin's motion for reconsideration was denied. However, the court later granted Salapuddin's motion, citing that there is no longer any reason or probable cause to maintain the criminal case against him since Ikram's testimony, the only direct evidence linking him to the crime, has been recanted.

 

Issue:

WoN the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case is proper.

Held: Reversed.

If the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, he or she can direct the prosecutor concerned "to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties." This action is not subject to the review of courts unless there is a showing that the Secretary of Justice has committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution.

A review of the records, however, show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. As pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila. It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 

The discrepancies in Ikrams’ affidavits and the variations in the statements of the other accused do not persuade this Court to find probable cause that Salapuddin, who was indicted primarily because of Ikram’s confession, was part of the conspiracy that led to the Batasan bombing. No such evidence was presented to sufficiently establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused of.