Case Digest: Ampatuan, Jr vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013

                            Rule 119: Trial, State Witness | Criminal Procedure

Facts:

In November 23, 2009, 57 innocent civilians were killed in a massacre in Sitio Masalay, Maguindanao.

Petitioner, Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., then Mayor of Datu Unsay, was among the principal suspects.

Murder charges were filed against petitioner in the RTC in Cotabato City. The Court grated the request to transfer the trial venue to Metro Manila to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Subsequently, additional murder charges filed against petitioner in Cotabato City RTC and Quezon City RTC.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to each murder charge during arraignments.

In a joint resolution, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder based on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. Dalandag admitted into the Witness Protection Program in August 2010.

Petitioner requested the inclusion of Dalandag as an accused, considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations, but the request was denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to charge Dalandag as an accused. Manila RTC issued pre-trial order and granted petitioner's motion for the production of documents.

RTC issued a subpoena to Dalandag, which respondents moved to quash.

RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus, leading to the appeal through a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

WoN respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. (NO)

Held:

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.

The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."

The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: 

(a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and 

(b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).

These modes are intended to encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.

These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.

Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. 

The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely: 

(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; 

(b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; 

(c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; 

(d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and 

(e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:

Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;

b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.

A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist.

While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one, and the like.

On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.

The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.