Case Digest: Estipona vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
Pre-Trial, Plea Bargain | Criminal Procedure
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. is accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs - Shabu).
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."
The accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
Issue:
WoN Estipona is allowed to enter into a plea bargaining agreement to withdraw his not guilty plea and instead enter a plea of guilty. (YES)
Contention:
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining
Held:
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.
As properly administered in Santobello v. New York, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain.
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is
that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed.
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.