Case Digest: Government of Hongkong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
Rule 114: Bail | Criminal Procedure
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify two orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila. The first order allowed the private respondent, Juan Antonio Muñoz, to post bail, and the second order denied the motion to vacate the first order. The petitioner Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ) argues that both orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion because there is no constitutional provision granting bail to a potential extraditee.
On January 30, 1995, the Philippines and Hong Kong signed an agreement for the surrender of accused and convicted persons. In 1997, Hong Kong became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the People's Republic of China.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged in Hong Kong with several offenses.
In 1999, the Hong Kong Department of Justice requested the provisional arrest of Muñoz from the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which filed an application for Muñoz's provisional arrest with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC issued an order of arrest against Muñoz, and he was subsequently detained Muñoz filed a petition questioning the validity of the order of arrest with the Court of Appeals.
In 1999, the Court of Appeals declared the order of arrest void, but the DOJ appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. In 2000, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the validity of the order of arrest.
Meanwhile, in November 1999, Hong Kong filed a petition for the extradition of Muñoz with the RTC of Manila, Branch 10, which initially denied his application for bail.
The case was later transferred to Branch 8, where the respondent judge granted Muñoz's motion for reconsideration and allowed him to post bail. The petitioner filed a motion to vacate the order, which was denied by the respondent judge. The petitioner argues that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction by granting bail to Muñoz, as there is no provision in the Constitution allowing bail for potential extraditees.
Issue:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail.
Contention:
There is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
Held: NO.
Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.—This Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
While this Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.—The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.—In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration , 90 Phil. 256 A(1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.
It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis ,tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
“Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Recit Version:
Facts:
This Petition for Certiorari aims to invalidate two orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila. The first order granted bail to Juan Antonio Muñoz, the private respondent, while the second order denied the motion to revoke the bail. The petitioner, the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), asserts that both orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion since there is no constitutional provision permitting bail for potential extraditees.
Muñoz faced charges in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong Department of Justice requested his provisional arrest from the Philippine DOJ. The RTC initially issued an order of arrest, which was declared void by the Court of Appeals but later upheld by the Supreme Court. The extradition petition filed by Hong Kong was transferred across different branches of the RTC, and the respondent judge in Branch 8 granted Muñoz's motion for reconsideration, allowing him to post bail. The petitioner argues that the respondent judge exceeded his authority by granting bail since there is no constitutional provision permitting it for potential extraditees.
Issue:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail.
Contention:
There is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
Held: NO.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
While this Court in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Extradition is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis ,tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.