Case Digest: Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019
Rule 114: Bail | Criminal Procedure
Facts:
Juanito A. Tio, representing Family Choice Grains Processing Center, filed a complaint for estafa against Allen Padua, Emelita Pimentel, and Dante Frialde, who are officials of Nviro Filipino Corporation. Tio accused the petitioners of falsely claiming to be in the business of power plant construction when their authorized business only involved manufacturing and selling fertilizer.
Tio alleged that the petitioners obtained 130,000 Euros from Family Choice for "expat fees" but failed to remit the amount to their supplier. He also claimed that the petitioners did not deliver the promised equipment and demanded additional payment despite receiving almost 90% of the agreed construction price. Tio stated that Family Choice suffered actual damages amounting to P 16,388,253.90 as a result of the petitioners' actions.
The petitioners denied the allegations, considering them absurd, defamatory, and lacking credible evidence. They argued that the filing of the criminal cases was untimely and violated the provisions of their Memorandum of Agreement. The petitioners claimed that they never claimed to be in the power plant construction business and only acted as the accredited agent/developer of K.E.M A/S Energy and Environmental Technology Company of Denmark. They acknowledged delivering a second-hand/incompatible equipment induction motor but blamed the local supplier for the error. The petitioners asserted that they acted in good faith during the construction project and tried to fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract.
An Assistant Provincial Prosecutor found all the elements of estafa to be present and recommended the filing of four separate Informations against the petitioners. Subsequently, four Informations were filed against Padua, Pimentel, and Frialde for estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Isabela.
Following the issuance of a warrant of arrest in August 2010, Padua and Pimentel filed in July 2014 an Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail). They claimed that their co-accused had died and that they were recently informed about their right to bail. They argued that the charges against them only indicated estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which carries a maximum penalty of reclusion temporal. They contended that since the charges did not allege any aggravating circumstances or mention the amendment by Presidential Decree No. 1689, the imposable penalty could not exceed twenty years of imprisonment, making the charges bailable.
However, on August 4, 2014, the trial court denied their omnibus motion. Padua and Pimentel filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, in its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the petition, affirming the ruling of the trial court.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Orders of the court a quo finding petitioners as not being entitled to bail despite being charged with bailable offenses.
Contention:
Petitioners maintain that being charged with estafa which is an offense punishable by reclusion temporal, they should be granted bail as a matter of right. They also asserted that they already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court when they filed their Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) and, thus, there is no need to make personal appearance.
Held: Yes.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Right to Bail; From the moment an accused is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.—The general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, from the moment an accused is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Estafa, under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.10951, which petitioners have been charged with, has an imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which is still bailable.—Clearly, in the instant case, petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right as they have not been charged with a capital offense. Estafa, under Art. 315 of the RPC as amended by R.A. 10951, which petitioners have been charged with, has an imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which is still bailable.
Same; Same; Same; Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.—Indeed, a person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. However, applying also the same pronouncement in Tuliao, the Court also held therein that, “in adjudication of other reliefs sought by accused, it requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the person.” Thus, except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.
Same; Same; Same; Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail but it is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the accused, as in the instant omnibus motion to quash warrant of arrest and to fix bail.—The subject Omnibus Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) is distinct and separate from an application for bail where custody of law is required. A motion to quash is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that it is the very issue. Its prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court which is also as an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, in filing the subject Omnibus Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail), petitioners are questioning the court’s jurisdiction with precaution and praying that the court fix the amount of bail because they believed that their right to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law.
They are not applying for bail, therefore, custody of the law, or personal appearance is not required. To emphasize, custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail but it is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the accused, as in the instant omnibus motion to quash warrant of arrest and to fix bail.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.—Indeed, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. However, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. Nevertheless, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Right to Bail; The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction. However, if the accused is charged with an offense and the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — “regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution” — and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.—The constitutional mandate is that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. However, bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction. However, if the accused is charged with an offense and the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — “regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution” — and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Clearly, bail is a constitutional demandable right which only ceases to be so recognized when the evidence of guilt of the person charged with a crime that carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death is found to be strong. Stated differently, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or death.
Same; Same; Same; When the grant of bail is discretionary, the grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose.—When the grant of bail is discretionary, the grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion.
Judicial discretion in granting bail may indeed be exercised only after the evidence of guilt is submitted to the court during the bail hearing.
It is precisely for this reason why an accused must be in the custody of the law during an application for bail because where bail is a matter of discretion, judicial discretion may only be exercised during bail hearing. However, where bail is not a matter of discretion, as in fact it is a matter of right, no exercise of discretion is needed because the accused’s right to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. An accused must be granted bail if it is a matter of right.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that estafa is a bailable offense, petitioners no longer need to apply for bail as they are entitled to bail, by operation of law. Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no bail is recommended.—An accused who is charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as in this case, they must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of right. Here, considering that estafa is a bailable offense, petitioners no longer need to apply for bail as they are entitled to bail, by operation of law. Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no bail is recommended. To do otherwise, if We deny bail albeit it is a matter of right, We will effectively render nugatory the provisions of the law giving distinction where bail is a matter of right, or of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; The practice of admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial.—It must be emphasized anew that bail exists to ensure society’s interest in having the accused answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused’s right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. The spirit of the procedure is rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial, with all the safeguards, hasfound and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted thisconditional privilege, the individuals wrongly accused could bepunished by the period or imprisonment they undergo whileawaiting trial, and even handicap them in consulting counsel,searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense.Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate boththe accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest inassuring his presence at trial.
Same; Same; Same; Where bail is a matter of right, prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance.—Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is the reason precisely why the probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases. However, where bail is a matter of right, prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of probability that the accused will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to the constitutional provision that “excessive bail shall not be required.” The recourse of the judge is to fix a higher amount of bail and not to deny the fixing of bail.
Same; Same; Same; After the amount of bail has been fixed, petitioners, when posting the required bail, must be in the custody of the law.—In the instant case, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) wherein it is not required that petitioners be in the custody of the law, because the same is not an application for bail where custody of the law is required. Moreover, to reiterate, when bail is a matter of right, the fixing of bail is ministerial on the part of the trial judge even without the appearance of the accused. They must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of right.
However, it must be further clarified that after the amount of bail has been fixed, petitioners, when posting the required bail, must be in the custody of the law. They must make their personal appearance in the posting of bail. It must be emphasized that bail, whether a matter of right or of discretion, cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender, or personal appearance.
This is so because if We allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at-large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can betaken against him since flight is indicative of guilt.
Recit Version:
Facts:
Juanito A. Tio, on behalf of Family Choice Grains Processing Center, filed a complaint against Allen Padua, Emelita Pimentel, and Dante Frialde of Nviro Filipino Corporation, accusing them of estafa. Tio alleged that the petitioners falsely claimed to be involved in power plant construction when their actual business was manufacturing and selling fertilizer. According to Tio, the petitioners received 130,000 Euros from Family Choice but failed to pay their supplier. He also claimed that they did not deliver the promised equipment and demanded additional payment despite receiving most of the construction price.
The petitioners denied the allegations, stating that they never claimed to be in the power plant construction business and acted as an agent/developer for a Danish company. They admitted delivering an incorrect equipment but blamed the local supplier. They argued that they acted in good faith and tried to fulfill the contract terms.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommended filing four Informations for estafa against the petitioners. A warrant of arrest was issued in August 2010. In 2014, Padua and Pimentel filed a motion to quash the warrant and request bail, claiming they recently learned about their right to bail. The trial court denied their motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, leading to their petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Orders of the court a quo finding petitioners as not being entitled to bail despite being charged with bailable offenses.
Contention:
Petitioners maintain that being charged with estafa which is an offense punishable by reclusion temporal, they should be granted bail as a matter of right. They also asserted that they already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court when they filed their Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) and, thus, there is no need to make personal appearance.
Held: Yes.
Considering that estafa is a bailable offense, petitioners no longer need to apply for bail as they are entitled to bail, by operation of law. Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no bail is recommended.
The practice of admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial.
Where bail is a matter of right, prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance.
After the amount of bail has been fixed, petitioners, when posting the required bail, must be in the custody of the law.
It must be further clarified that after the amount of bail has been fixed, petitioners, when posting the required bail, must be in the custody of the law. They must make their personal appearance in the posting of bail. It must be emphasized that bail, whether a matter of right or of discretion, cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender, or personal appearance.