Case Digest: Quinto vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

                  Equal Protection of the Laws | Constitutional Law


Facts:

In preparation for the upcoming 2010 National Elections, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8678 to govern the filing of Certificates of Candidacy for national and local positions. Section 4 of the Resolution reads:

Sec. 4. Effects of Filing of Certificates of Candidacy. (a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

 Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.


Issue:

WoN the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause.


Held:

NO.

The provisions satisfy the requisites of the equal protection test, especially the second requirement that it must be germane to the purposes of the law. It was emphasized that the purpose of the law is to defer to the sovereign will of the people by letting elective officials serve until the end of the terms for which they were elected notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, the automatic resignation rule was imposed upon appointive officials because unlike elected politicians, "appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or from taking part in any election, except to vote" 

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The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned 8or controlled corporations with original charters.] This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

 While the provisions on the ipso facto resignation of appointive civil servants are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad, the general provisions prohibiting civil servants from engaging in "partisan political activity" remain valid and operational, and should be strictly applied.


Ratio:

Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum.

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