Case Digest: Torres vs. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, June 28, 2005

                        Motion to Quash, Motion to Dismiss | Criminal Procedure


Facts:

Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. for falsification of public documents.

They alleged that titles to their properties were transferred without their knowledge through a forged deed of sale.

Torres denied the forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the properties to him with a different deed of sale.

The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended filing charges against Torres, which were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Torres's motion for reconsideration was denied.

On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings and ordered the withdrawal of the charges. Aguinaldo's motion for reconsideration was also denied.

The Metropolitan Trial Court granted the motion to withdraw the information.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which granted the petition and reinstated the finding of probable cause against Torres.


Issue:

WoN the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies.


Held: 

Anent the first issue, Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. Citing Bañares II v. Balising, Torres insists that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is final if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.

The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation.

On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. In Bañares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal.

In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Bañares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case.

Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same as a Motion to Dismiss, we do not find that it complied with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Section 8, Rule 117.

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